Free will is back, and maybe we can measure it(aeon.co)
aeon.co
Free will is back, and maybe we can measure it
http://aeon.co/magazine/philosophy/free-will-is-back-and-maybe-we-can-measure-it
11 comments
ISTM that the hundreds of years of debate comes from a unfortunate misunderstanding provoked by many centuries of religious thought: that to be free we need some kind of "soul" apart from physical reality. (The article mentions that)
But I don't fully understand why so many smart people, including non-believers, can't see the obvious: that determinism has nothing to do with free will. Free will is just a mechanism of finding a path between the set of natural forces operating inside our mind, including all the range of motivations, from basic instincts to sublimated aspirations.
The opposite to freedom is slavery, either from external circumstances or from own instincts that, in turn, is caused by external circumstances: arrested development, physiological defects or the mental illness.
So lack of freedom has causes and freedom has causes too (configuration of our brain and a favorable environment). The opposite of freedom is not "uncaused".
Requiring no determinism is one more example of the not true scottman fallacy. Or moving goal posts.
But I don't fully understand why so many smart people, including non-believers, can't see the obvious: that determinism has nothing to do with free will. Free will is just a mechanism of finding a path between the set of natural forces operating inside our mind, including all the range of motivations, from basic instincts to sublimated aspirations.
The opposite to freedom is slavery, either from external circumstances or from own instincts that, in turn, is caused by external circumstances: arrested development, physiological defects or the mental illness.
So lack of freedom has causes and freedom has causes too (configuration of our brain and a favorable environment). The opposite of freedom is not "uncaused".
Requiring no determinism is one more example of the not true scottman fallacy. Or moving goal posts.
that determinism has nothing to do with free will
The theory goes that, on an atomic level, interactions between particles is a deterministic process - it's wholly and completely predictable because the outcome is determined by a knowable set of rules. Given the fact that our brains are just[1] a huge set of particles and chemical processes it should then follow that a perfect computer model of someone's brain would make the exact same decisions as that person.
In other words, we don't actually make any decisions for ourselves. It's all determined by chemistry.
If that's true then someone could argue that the path of their life was predetermined by the state of the universe at any given time, so the fact they shot their wife was actually nothing they could have had any control over, and it's very unfair to lock them away for 30 years if they couldn't have changed anything. It's just the latest outcome of a chemical reaction that started at the Big Bang.
It's actually a very compelling argument. The counter argument requires 'magic' in the form of something that we can control that can't be measured. That's a big ask for any rational scientist.
[1] Pretty huge 'just' there because it discounts God, souls, etc. Many people think that the brain isn't just atomic particles. But there's no evidence that they're right. We've cut brains up and looked.
The theory goes that, on an atomic level, interactions between particles is a deterministic process - it's wholly and completely predictable because the outcome is determined by a knowable set of rules. Given the fact that our brains are just[1] a huge set of particles and chemical processes it should then follow that a perfect computer model of someone's brain would make the exact same decisions as that person.
In other words, we don't actually make any decisions for ourselves. It's all determined by chemistry.
If that's true then someone could argue that the path of their life was predetermined by the state of the universe at any given time, so the fact they shot their wife was actually nothing they could have had any control over, and it's very unfair to lock them away for 30 years if they couldn't have changed anything. It's just the latest outcome of a chemical reaction that started at the Big Bang.
It's actually a very compelling argument. The counter argument requires 'magic' in the form of something that we can control that can't be measured. That's a big ask for any rational scientist.
[1] Pretty huge 'just' there because it discounts God, souls, etc. Many people think that the brain isn't just atomic particles. But there's no evidence that they're right. We've cut brains up and looked.
Then by this logic one could argue, that locking them away for 30 years is not unfair because it is also predetermined by the state of the universe at this given time and there is nothing other people could do but to sentence the killer. Free will or no free will the argument goes both ways.
Exactly. I have never understood why people use determinism to excuse bad behaviour, but fail to see the resulting punishment is just as determined.
They don't fail to see it, they just object to calling it "fair".
If determinism is true then nothing (or everything) is “fair”.
it's wholly and completely predictable
Predictabilty hasn't anything to do with freedom either.
it should then follow that a perfect computer model of someone's brain would make the exact same decisions as that person
So what?
In other words, we don't actually make any decisions for ourselves. It's all determined by chemistry.
Nonsense. We are the chemistry, we are our brains. Are we "determined" by ourselves?
the fact they shot their wife was actually nothing they could have had any control over, and it's very unfair to lock them away for 30 years
That comes from the ancient and barbaric conception of penal justice as retribution. Punishment is a disincentive and the very right thing to do to prevent crime.
Edit: also that's again the faked duality. "...nothing they could have any control over" as if the subject is a pure soul completely apart from the universe and its forces. The subject is part of the universe, exactly the part of the universe that could have any control over killing or not killing. We put that part of the universe behind bars to prevent it from killing again and sending a message to other parts of the universe that could feel tempted to do the same. Also, in theory, to try to modify that part of the universe so it wont kill again.
Predictabilty hasn't anything to do with freedom either.
it should then follow that a perfect computer model of someone's brain would make the exact same decisions as that person
So what?
In other words, we don't actually make any decisions for ourselves. It's all determined by chemistry.
Nonsense. We are the chemistry, we are our brains. Are we "determined" by ourselves?
the fact they shot their wife was actually nothing they could have had any control over, and it's very unfair to lock them away for 30 years
That comes from the ancient and barbaric conception of penal justice as retribution. Punishment is a disincentive and the very right thing to do to prevent crime.
Edit: also that's again the faked duality. "...nothing they could have any control over" as if the subject is a pure soul completely apart from the universe and its forces. The subject is part of the universe, exactly the part of the universe that could have any control over killing or not killing. We put that part of the universe behind bars to prevent it from killing again and sending a message to other parts of the universe that could feel tempted to do the same. Also, in theory, to try to modify that part of the universe so it wont kill again.
interactions between particles is a deterministic process
But this isn't even deterministic on its own terms. Particle decay is stochastic. Quantum tunneling is stochastic. There's a constant, silent rain of neutrinos that don't interact nearly all the time.
Fully deterministic analog electronic computing is impossible because we cannot eliminate Johnson noise and shot noise. Why do people then think that neural computing would be noise-free?
But this isn't even deterministic on its own terms. Particle decay is stochastic. Quantum tunneling is stochastic. There's a constant, silent rain of neutrinos that don't interact nearly all the time.
Fully deterministic analog electronic computing is impossible because we cannot eliminate Johnson noise and shot noise. Why do people then think that neural computing would be noise-free?
Unpredictability != dualistic free will.
>>that determinism has nothing to do with free will
>The theory goes that, on an atomic level, interactions between particles is a deterministic process - it's wholly and completely predictable because the outcome is determined by a knowable set of rules. Given the fact that our brains are just[1] a huge set of particles and chemical processes it should then follow that a perfect computer model of someone's brain would make the exact same decisions as that person.
yes. Absolutely true. In theory. The coin head/tail outcome can be modeled and predicted even more easily than brain. Thus the coin is an example of determinism. In theory. On practice though it is the thing that comes among firsts to mind when we talk about in-determinism.
Giving the amount of computations necessary to perfectly model even a coin, less a brain, and the minimum energy cost of a unit of computation, it may be so that such perfect computer is just not possible inside our Universe (it may happen that Universe is the smallest computer that can run such simulation and that exactly that it is doing right now :)
>The theory goes that, on an atomic level, interactions between particles is a deterministic process - it's wholly and completely predictable because the outcome is determined by a knowable set of rules. Given the fact that our brains are just[1] a huge set of particles and chemical processes it should then follow that a perfect computer model of someone's brain would make the exact same decisions as that person.
yes. Absolutely true. In theory. The coin head/tail outcome can be modeled and predicted even more easily than brain. Thus the coin is an example of determinism. In theory. On practice though it is the thing that comes among firsts to mind when we talk about in-determinism.
Giving the amount of computations necessary to perfectly model even a coin, less a brain, and the minimum energy cost of a unit of computation, it may be so that such perfect computer is just not possible inside our Universe (it may happen that Universe is the smallest computer that can run such simulation and that exactly that it is doing right now :)
> The theory goes that, on an atomic level, interactions between particles is a deterministic process - it's wholly and completely predictable because the outcome is determined by a knowable set of rules.
That is not true. The quantum mechanics doesn't disprove determinism, but is clearly states the result can not be predicted, because an act of measurement changes the outcome.
That means it's not magic, but uncertainty that makes exact outcome of a system unpredictable. We can just know probability of the outcome.
Of course this unpredictability doesn't mean there's free will, it just means that we will never be able to find out with a 100% certainty what we will think even if we measured every little detail about the brain.
And if the argument is "But let's imagine we knew every little detail about a brain to atomic level, then we would surely know what he will think in the future" then we are talking about imaginary things. Magic knowledge doesn't exist.
That is not true. The quantum mechanics doesn't disprove determinism, but is clearly states the result can not be predicted, because an act of measurement changes the outcome.
That means it's not magic, but uncertainty that makes exact outcome of a system unpredictable. We can just know probability of the outcome.
Of course this unpredictability doesn't mean there's free will, it just means that we will never be able to find out with a 100% certainty what we will think even if we measured every little detail about the brain.
And if the argument is "But let's imagine we knew every little detail about a brain to atomic level, then we would surely know what he will think in the future" then we are talking about imaginary things. Magic knowledge doesn't exist.
>completely predictable because the outcome is determined by a knowable set of rules
.. which are vastly incomplete, themselves, because we have not reached the limit for where the atoms stop and the particles begin, and even beyond that, there is much evidence that we have not gotten, in fact, to the bottom of things.
>The counter argument requires 'magic' in the form of something that we can control that can't be measured. That's a big ask for any rational scientist.
Good thing rational scientists are willing - pun intended - to continue the investigation and discover just what it is we have not measured, and cannot measure, until we decide to do so.
Can decisions be weighed? Do they have mass, energy, substance? Does a decision exist somewhere in the universe, or is it able to move around the physical universe unhindered by physics? It could be argued that there are no definitive answers to those questions ..
.. which are vastly incomplete, themselves, because we have not reached the limit for where the atoms stop and the particles begin, and even beyond that, there is much evidence that we have not gotten, in fact, to the bottom of things.
>The counter argument requires 'magic' in the form of something that we can control that can't be measured. That's a big ask for any rational scientist.
Good thing rational scientists are willing - pun intended - to continue the investigation and discover just what it is we have not measured, and cannot measure, until we decide to do so.
Can decisions be weighed? Do they have mass, energy, substance? Does a decision exist somewhere in the universe, or is it able to move around the physical universe unhindered by physics? It could be argued that there are no definitive answers to those questions ..
> Pretty huge 'just' there because it discounts God, souls, etc. Many people think that the brain isn't just atomic particles. But there's no evidence that they're right. We've cut brains up and looked.
But if the mind (note wording change) were not just atomic particles (that it, God, souls, or some such was involved), when you cut brains up and looked, what would you see?
But if the mind (note wording change) were not just atomic particles (that it, God, souls, or some such was involved), when you cut brains up and looked, what would you see?
> Free will is just a mechanism of finding a path between the set of natural forces operating inside our mind, including all the range of motivations, from basic instincts to sublimated aspirations.
Then, unless you are positing some kind of outside force, the free-will-mechanism is also a natural force and a component of our brains and describing it as "free will" is not really sensible, since it is neither "free" except in a very limited sense nor a "will".
I prefer to say that the thing we call "free will" is simply a confusion of ideas and it doesn't really make sense to talk about free wills or unfree wills. That's often the case with longstanding philosophical problems, which often began with superstition and then had centuries of extremely intelligent people devising concepts and arguments to justify and validate them. With free will, the problem is complicated by the fact that people do have a feeling of free will.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
See in particular, 3.3.
Then, unless you are positing some kind of outside force, the free-will-mechanism is also a natural force and a component of our brains and describing it as "free will" is not really sensible, since it is neither "free" except in a very limited sense nor a "will".
I prefer to say that the thing we call "free will" is simply a confusion of ideas and it doesn't really make sense to talk about free wills or unfree wills. That's often the case with longstanding philosophical problems, which often began with superstition and then had centuries of extremely intelligent people devising concepts and arguments to justify and validate them. With free will, the problem is complicated by the fact that people do have a feeling of free will.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
See in particular, 3.3.
Then, unless you are positing some kind of outside force, the free-will-mechanism is also a natural force and a component of our brains
Of course, it's both, we're part of nature!!!
describing it as "free will" is not really sensible, since it is neither "free" except in a very limited sense nor a "will"
That's nothing more than semantic juggling. I've defined precisely what I understand as freedom, not an esoteric concept at all, but the absence of obstacles. You just ignored it, invoking exactly the falacy I mentioned: "except in a very limited sense". Why is it "very limited"? You don't even try to justify that qualification.
And "not a will"? Oh, come on! What is your definition of will? Something that has no causation? Of course our will is caused, by instincts based on natural needs: food, sex, group bonds, in the aspiration to dignity, improvement and solidarity. We're not free in a vacuum, but free to decide what means lead more effectively to goals and a personality that are given to us.
With free will, the problem is complicated by the fact that people do have a feeling of free will.
No, that's the most simple and truthful intuition. The complication comes from people trying to apply abstractions out of place and concluding that nothing heavier than air can fly.
Of course, it's both, we're part of nature!!!
describing it as "free will" is not really sensible, since it is neither "free" except in a very limited sense nor a "will"
That's nothing more than semantic juggling. I've defined precisely what I understand as freedom, not an esoteric concept at all, but the absence of obstacles. You just ignored it, invoking exactly the falacy I mentioned: "except in a very limited sense". Why is it "very limited"? You don't even try to justify that qualification.
And "not a will"? Oh, come on! What is your definition of will? Something that has no causation? Of course our will is caused, by instincts based on natural needs: food, sex, group bonds, in the aspiration to dignity, improvement and solidarity. We're not free in a vacuum, but free to decide what means lead more effectively to goals and a personality that are given to us.
With free will, the problem is complicated by the fact that people do have a feeling of free will.
No, that's the most simple and truthful intuition. The complication comes from people trying to apply abstractions out of place and concluding that nothing heavier than air can fly.
Maybe I misunderstand, but your definition of free will seemed to me to be a tautological "free will is the freedom to choose among possible alternatives."
To my reading, you did not address what it actually means to choose, which implies some kind of unmoored Cartesian ego selecting one alternative or another.
> And "not a will"? Oh, come on! What is your definition of will? Something that has no causation? Of course our will is caused, by instincts based on natural needs: food, sex, group bonds, in the aspiration to dignity, improvement and solidarity.
Quite the opposite: that what we experience as will is actually an after-the-fact event that occurs after a decision is already made in the brain as a consequence of how it synthesizes different instincts and stimuli.
Anytime you think to yourself "I'm going to do this", that decision was already made before you were even aware of it.
> We're not free in a vacuum, but free to decide what means lead more effectively to goals and a personality that are given to us.
What does that mean? Do you have any evidence that, given the same circumstances, I could have chosen to do something differently? Or it is just a bunch of hypothetical navel-gazing?
The Stanford encyclopedia link is a great read.
To my reading, you did not address what it actually means to choose, which implies some kind of unmoored Cartesian ego selecting one alternative or another.
> And "not a will"? Oh, come on! What is your definition of will? Something that has no causation? Of course our will is caused, by instincts based on natural needs: food, sex, group bonds, in the aspiration to dignity, improvement and solidarity.
Quite the opposite: that what we experience as will is actually an after-the-fact event that occurs after a decision is already made in the brain as a consequence of how it synthesizes different instincts and stimuli.
Anytime you think to yourself "I'm going to do this", that decision was already made before you were even aware of it.
> We're not free in a vacuum, but free to decide what means lead more effectively to goals and a personality that are given to us.
What does that mean? Do you have any evidence that, given the same circumstances, I could have chosen to do something differently? Or it is just a bunch of hypothetical navel-gazing?
The Stanford encyclopedia link is a great read.
Maybe I misunderstand
Yes you do.
which implies some kind of unmoored Cartesian ego selecting one alternative or another
"Implies". Hmmm... no. You're stubbornly insisting in the wrong mental frame that muds the waters, where the self is outside nature. That's a relic of religious thought. That vision has no support from science at all.
Quite the opposite: that what we experience as will is actually an after-the-fact event
That doesn't follow my question, just returned to your absurd premises and described what you think it happens based on them.
What does that mean?
We're not free in a vacuum means that we don't get to choose that we like food, sex or games. It means that we get to choose our behaviour to feed, have sex or play at different times or delay gratification to optimize satisfaction for our whishes.
Actually we're also free, to a certain extent, to change ourselves, to refine our tastes, to train our body, to increase our will power observing how it works and controling our reactions predicting them.
Do you have any evidence that, given the same circumstances, I could have chosen to do something differently?
The same circumstances!!! Do you realize how absurd is what you're asking for? So freedom for you consist in the ability to contradict nature laws? No wonder you think it doesn't exist.
The Stanford encyclopedia link is a great read.
Fine, you're not going to get bored.
Yes you do.
which implies some kind of unmoored Cartesian ego selecting one alternative or another
"Implies". Hmmm... no. You're stubbornly insisting in the wrong mental frame that muds the waters, where the self is outside nature. That's a relic of religious thought. That vision has no support from science at all.
Quite the opposite: that what we experience as will is actually an after-the-fact event
That doesn't follow my question, just returned to your absurd premises and described what you think it happens based on them.
What does that mean?
We're not free in a vacuum means that we don't get to choose that we like food, sex or games. It means that we get to choose our behaviour to feed, have sex or play at different times or delay gratification to optimize satisfaction for our whishes.
Actually we're also free, to a certain extent, to change ourselves, to refine our tastes, to train our body, to increase our will power observing how it works and controling our reactions predicting them.
Do you have any evidence that, given the same circumstances, I could have chosen to do something differently?
The same circumstances!!! Do you realize how absurd is what you're asking for? So freedom for you consist in the ability to contradict nature laws? No wonder you think it doesn't exist.
The Stanford encyclopedia link is a great read.
Fine, you're not going to get bored.
> It means that we get to choose our behaviour to feed, have sex or play at different times or delay gratification to optimize satisfaction for our whishes.
That's still tautological. What does it mean to choose? What is the "I" that is doing the choosing? Those are the crucial questions that underpin the whole idea which you aren't explaining.
Even taking what you said at face value, almost every animal exihbits this behavior. Do all animals have free will? And what makes these a free choice? If you're saying that, assuming I have food and sex readily available, and I choose food, that I could have chosen otherwise given the same circumstances?
> So freedom for you consist in the ability to contradict nature laws? No wonder you think it doesn't exist.
Of course not. I'm merely restating the problem.
That's still tautological. What does it mean to choose? What is the "I" that is doing the choosing? Those are the crucial questions that underpin the whole idea which you aren't explaining.
Even taking what you said at face value, almost every animal exihbits this behavior. Do all animals have free will? And what makes these a free choice? If you're saying that, assuming I have food and sex readily available, and I choose food, that I could have chosen otherwise given the same circumstances?
> So freedom for you consist in the ability to contradict nature laws? No wonder you think it doesn't exist.
Of course not. I'm merely restating the problem.
That's still tautological. What does it mean to choose? What is the "I" that is doing the choosing? Those are the crucial questions that underpin the whole idea which you aren't explaining.
From here it seems that you're being deliberately obtuse. You reply to a phrase in my comment without considering the thread of questions and answers that led to it and ignoring the rest of the comment where I previously answered the very same question.
The "crucial" questions have no interest at all. I use the terms in their common colloquial sense. There's no explanation needed: we are intelligent animals, complex machines that select the options that we perceive as more favourable for us and reject the worse ones. Choosing is the fact that we selected lemon ice cream instead of orange ice cream. "I" means the 80 kg of biomass, the brain in particular, that is typing this comment.
Do all animals have free will? And what makes these a free choice?
Freedom is the absence of obstacles. Compared to humans, animals have a more limited set of choices, a lot more obstacles to overcome and less understanding of what they are and who they are. So they're less free.
If you're saying that, assuming I have food and sex readily available, and I choose food, that I could have chosen otherwise given the same circumstances?
Again? You asked for a definition of choosing and it's you who's mixing two different concepts to reach confusing conclusions.
"Giving the same circumstances" is the trap. If I get to choose food or sex, the outcome will depend on my tastes and the circumstances: Do I like the sex partner? Had I any sex in the last month or year? Am I really hungry? Do I like that food? Is it any good?
Freedom means that if presented with an attractive partner and disgusting food I can choose sex. Nobody forces me to do what I don't want to do. Your frame is so absurd that you try it to mean the opposite: that I'm free to eat disgusting food instead of having sex with an nice attractive woman.
We're not "free from ourselves", we're free (or not) from external interference. We weren't free to choose our rising environment and once the circumstances of it internalize, that's part of us and our will.
From here it seems that you're being deliberately obtuse. You reply to a phrase in my comment without considering the thread of questions and answers that led to it and ignoring the rest of the comment where I previously answered the very same question.
The "crucial" questions have no interest at all. I use the terms in their common colloquial sense. There's no explanation needed: we are intelligent animals, complex machines that select the options that we perceive as more favourable for us and reject the worse ones. Choosing is the fact that we selected lemon ice cream instead of orange ice cream. "I" means the 80 kg of biomass, the brain in particular, that is typing this comment.
Do all animals have free will? And what makes these a free choice?
Freedom is the absence of obstacles. Compared to humans, animals have a more limited set of choices, a lot more obstacles to overcome and less understanding of what they are and who they are. So they're less free.
If you're saying that, assuming I have food and sex readily available, and I choose food, that I could have chosen otherwise given the same circumstances?
Again? You asked for a definition of choosing and it's you who's mixing two different concepts to reach confusing conclusions.
"Giving the same circumstances" is the trap. If I get to choose food or sex, the outcome will depend on my tastes and the circumstances: Do I like the sex partner? Had I any sex in the last month or year? Am I really hungry? Do I like that food? Is it any good?
Freedom means that if presented with an attractive partner and disgusting food I can choose sex. Nobody forces me to do what I don't want to do. Your frame is so absurd that you try it to mean the opposite: that I'm free to eat disgusting food instead of having sex with an nice attractive woman.
We're not "free from ourselves", we're free (or not) from external interference. We weren't free to choose our rising environment and once the circumstances of it internalize, that's part of us and our will.
> "I" means the 80 kg of biomass, the brain in particular, that is typing this comment.
That's very different from what most people when they say "I", because they're thinking of their ego, the little voice narrating to them their thoughts. If you're willing to reduce "I" to this definition, then yes, that solves a lot of problems.
> "Giving the same circumstances" is the trap. If I get to choose food or sex, the outcome will depend on my tastes and the circumstances: Do I like the sex partner? Had I any sex in the last month or year? Am I really hungry? Do I like that food? Is it any good?
The reason I asked the question was to pin down the variant of compatibilism you were subscribing to. You seem to be effectively arguing for a minimalist compatibilist view.
When you say things like:
> Freedom means that if presented with an attractive partner and disgusting food I can choose sex. Nobody forces me to do what I don't want to do.
> We're not "free from ourselves", we're free (or not) from external interference. We weren't free to choose our rising environment and once the circumstances of it internalize, that's part of us and our will.
You are redefining the definitions of "free" and "will" such that of course it is obviously compatible with determinism, because you have (rightly) watered down the words "freedom" and "will" until they were much, much weaker than most people who believe in free will at all. It doesn't make much sense to call it free will anymore, at that point. And that's what my original post was about: I prefer to call a spade a spade, while some compatibilists prefer to argue down from the old superstitions until they rationalize the history of thought down to an approximation of reality, and still call that by the old "free will" term.
That's very different from what most people when they say "I", because they're thinking of their ego, the little voice narrating to them their thoughts. If you're willing to reduce "I" to this definition, then yes, that solves a lot of problems.
> "Giving the same circumstances" is the trap. If I get to choose food or sex, the outcome will depend on my tastes and the circumstances: Do I like the sex partner? Had I any sex in the last month or year? Am I really hungry? Do I like that food? Is it any good?
The reason I asked the question was to pin down the variant of compatibilism you were subscribing to. You seem to be effectively arguing for a minimalist compatibilist view.
When you say things like:
> Freedom means that if presented with an attractive partner and disgusting food I can choose sex. Nobody forces me to do what I don't want to do.
> We're not "free from ourselves", we're free (or not) from external interference. We weren't free to choose our rising environment and once the circumstances of it internalize, that's part of us and our will.
You are redefining the definitions of "free" and "will" such that of course it is obviously compatible with determinism, because you have (rightly) watered down the words "freedom" and "will" until they were much, much weaker than most people who believe in free will at all. It doesn't make much sense to call it free will anymore, at that point. And that's what my original post was about: I prefer to call a spade a spade, while some compatibilists prefer to argue down from the old superstitions until they rationalize the history of thought down to an approximation of reality, and still call that by the old "free will" term.
Not sure why you are downvoted, for presenting what amounts to the leading theory of free will. ( Compatibilism, the view that free will is compatible with determinism is the most popular theory of free will among philosophers.[1])
[1] http://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP
[1] http://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP
Free will is flat earth of philosophy.
Not sure why you are downvoted
Politics. Any question that has remotely been associated with different ideologies, religions or any other polarizing groups division is bound to provoke this kind of reaction.
Free will is associated with religion, so non-religious people tend to oppose to the idea.
Actually I believe that religion is in the origin of the no free will conception.
Nature vs nurture is another of such debates. I'd add a few more, but enough of making friends for today :-)
Politics. Any question that has remotely been associated with different ideologies, religions or any other polarizing groups division is bound to provoke this kind of reaction.
Free will is associated with religion, so non-religious people tend to oppose to the idea.
Actually I believe that religion is in the origin of the no free will conception.
Nature vs nurture is another of such debates. I'd add a few more, but enough of making friends for today :-)
> The fact is whether or not we have free will is largely irrelevant.
I think perhaps more proper would be to say, whether there is an underlying determinism or not is irrelevant (and that's what Dennett is saying). Free will (as in freedom) is relevant.
And about that question, it's quite easy to:
- Build a deterministic system on top of non-deterministic one. Just take a lot of indeterminism and average it. For example, we do that with computer gates, which are deterministic, but built on very non-deterministic (random) behavior of atoms.
- Build a non-deterministic system on top of deterministic one. Take a pseudorandom generator and keep the seed/algorithm for yourself. For example, we do that in operating systems, where operating system itself is deterministic but each application lives in non-deterministic environment, because it doesn't know what other applications or processes are running inside the system.
So just going from atoms to applications, we switched from non-determinism to determinism and back!
I think perhaps more proper would be to say, whether there is an underlying determinism or not is irrelevant (and that's what Dennett is saying). Free will (as in freedom) is relevant.
And about that question, it's quite easy to:
- Build a deterministic system on top of non-deterministic one. Just take a lot of indeterminism and average it. For example, we do that with computer gates, which are deterministic, but built on very non-deterministic (random) behavior of atoms.
- Build a non-deterministic system on top of deterministic one. Take a pseudorandom generator and keep the seed/algorithm for yourself. For example, we do that in operating systems, where operating system itself is deterministic but each application lives in non-deterministic environment, because it doesn't know what other applications or processes are running inside the system.
So just going from atoms to applications, we switched from non-determinism to determinism and back!
> For example, we do that in operating systems, where operating system itself is deterministic but each application lives in non-deterministic environment, because it doesn't know what other applications or processes are running inside the system.
This may be a bit nit-picky, but if i understand correctly, the fact that other agents in the system influence the one you understand in ways you don't is not the same as non-determinism. Arguably, if you knew the exact system date and all other software installed, you could predict exactly how your program would behave. It's just because most systems are sloppily specified (if at all, mind) that this isn't how it works.
But maybe i'm missing something fundamental ;).
This may be a bit nit-picky, but if i understand correctly, the fact that other agents in the system influence the one you understand in ways you don't is not the same as non-determinism. Arguably, if you knew the exact system date and all other software installed, you could predict exactly how your program would behave. It's just because most systems are sloppily specified (if at all, mind) that this isn't how it works.
But maybe i'm missing something fundamental ;).
> Arguably, if you knew the exact system date and all other software installed, you could predict exactly how your program would behave.
First of all, there is a difference between what you can predict about the system and what you want the system to be. Since even on nondeterministic system you can build a deterministic one, it doesn't matter what you can or cannot predict about the underlying system. If you want a deterministic system, you can simply ignore the unpredictable parts by averaging over them.
Although, if you know the other software, you could predict the system. But normal application, unless it has root privileges or there are privilege escalation loopholes, cannot inspect the whole system and cannot see all the processes that go on. Therefore, deterministic modelling of the system from a perspective of one application is impossible.
But there is actually a simpler example. Just take an application using the pseudorandom number generator. You can't know if there are other processes using the generator too, so once you use pseudorandom generator, your application becomes non-deterministic. If on the other hand the application wants to be deterministic, all it has to do is not use system-wide generator of randomness, regardless of whether the generator is actually deterministic or not.
The point is, for free will to exist, it doesn't really matter if the universe is deterministic. Just as it doesn't matter in D&D game if the result is determined by dice rolls or a pseudo-random number generator with a known starting seed. People cannot calculate the latter in their heads, so the difference won't affect their reasoning (these things are conditionally dependent on the observed reality); that's all that matters.
First of all, there is a difference between what you can predict about the system and what you want the system to be. Since even on nondeterministic system you can build a deterministic one, it doesn't matter what you can or cannot predict about the underlying system. If you want a deterministic system, you can simply ignore the unpredictable parts by averaging over them.
Although, if you know the other software, you could predict the system. But normal application, unless it has root privileges or there are privilege escalation loopholes, cannot inspect the whole system and cannot see all the processes that go on. Therefore, deterministic modelling of the system from a perspective of one application is impossible.
But there is actually a simpler example. Just take an application using the pseudorandom number generator. You can't know if there are other processes using the generator too, so once you use pseudorandom generator, your application becomes non-deterministic. If on the other hand the application wants to be deterministic, all it has to do is not use system-wide generator of randomness, regardless of whether the generator is actually deterministic or not.
The point is, for free will to exist, it doesn't really matter if the universe is deterministic. Just as it doesn't matter in D&D game if the result is determined by dice rolls or a pseudo-random number generator with a known starting seed. People cannot calculate the latter in their heads, so the difference won't affect their reasoning (these things are conditionally dependent on the observed reality); that's all that matters.
What is relationship between free will and ethics/morality?
If we don't have free will then we have no control over what we do. Consequently we can't be held to account over our actions if they weren't a choice.
Sure we can.
If a robot went around killing people with an axe, we would stop it and dismantle it. We wouldn't shrug out shoulders and say "The robot can't help it so we can't hold it accountable for what it's doing."
If an individual does something to break the law, we hold that individual accountable for it. There are tons of modifiers, maybe the individual was under the influence of drugs, maybe the individual was mentally challenged, etc. These things modify how we hold the individual accountable.
If a robot went around killing people with an axe, we would stop it and dismantle it. We wouldn't shrug out shoulders and say "The robot can't help it so we can't hold it accountable for what it's doing."
If an individual does something to break the law, we hold that individual accountable for it. There are tons of modifiers, maybe the individual was under the influence of drugs, maybe the individual was mentally challenged, etc. These things modify how we hold the individual accountable.
That's incapacitation, not retribution.
By the same argument other people have no choice but to hold them to account.
You have incorrect definition of accountability. Accountability is not true/false value defined by "if a person made a choice". Accountability is a percentage of electrical signals, originated from frontal cortex, that caused the action in question. That's why children, mentally ill and even women on PMS are less accountable - less of the electrical signals originated in frontal cortex.
Now, since we have cleared out what a "choice" is and there is no more argument about that, it is easy to show that frontal cortex output is determined by input that are prior experience (or electrical signals coming in), genetics (how it reacts to them and how it is initially wired) and chemical environment (drugs/hormones/others). So there's no room for any kind of free will.
So as you see there is no conflict between lack of free will and morals/ethics. We just need to accept that your frontal cortex is "YOU" and if it produced defective output (a crime for example), it has to be punished regardless of predetermination to do so. And accept that it is ETHICAL and MORAL to do that. That is all.
Now, since we have cleared out what a "choice" is and there is no more argument about that, it is easy to show that frontal cortex output is determined by input that are prior experience (or electrical signals coming in), genetics (how it reacts to them and how it is initially wired) and chemical environment (drugs/hormones/others). So there's no room for any kind of free will.
So as you see there is no conflict between lack of free will and morals/ethics. We just need to accept that your frontal cortex is "YOU" and if it produced defective output (a crime for example), it has to be punished regardless of predetermination to do so. And accept that it is ETHICAL and MORAL to do that. That is all.
All discussions about free will are completely useless without first defining what exactly "free will" is. Is your definition of free will compatible with the assumption that the brain has to obey the laws of physics? Do you believe that free will is somehow magic?
In general, it's far from useless to investigate the nature of X before having a clear definition of X. Perhaps the definition will come as a result of the investigation. Perhaps there will never be a clear definition, but paradigm cases are easy to come by (that's arguably the case with free will).
"Free will" is the output of your fully developed (25+ years) frontal cortex (brain region operating on most abstract concepts) under normal chemical conditions (level of hormones, no affecting drugs, etc.) At least that's how legal system uses free will and I think it is pretty correct.
"We must believe in free will — we have no choice." (Isaac Bashevis Singer)
This article is complete nonsense.
Just because it looks like animals are solving problems doesn't mean they have free will, any more than humans solving problems means humans have free will.
There is no reason these things can't come about through a deterministic universe.
Just because it looks like animals are solving problems doesn't mean they have free will, any more than humans solving problems means humans have free will.
There is no reason these things can't come about through a deterministic universe.
I read the article about being less about free will and more about delayed gratification. Which seems ironic, since from a neural standpoint, can be one of the most addictive things possible.
Not really that compatible with free will in my view.
To slightly contradict myself, I don't think it's quite fair too say that the ability to wait for something can be an indicator of free will, since that characteristic can vary a lot, even among healthy adults. And describing some humans as having more free will than others appears very dangerous to me.
Not really that compatible with free will in my view.
To slightly contradict myself, I don't think it's quite fair too say that the ability to wait for something can be an indicator of free will, since that characteristic can vary a lot, even among healthy adults. And describing some humans as having more free will than others appears very dangerous to me.
So basically: The world is deterministic, so free will just means to be able to weigh options and delay gratification for a bit longer?
That's a sad definition in my book.
That's a sad definition in my book.
That depends on exactly what idea of determinism you have. If you mean something like phenomena can be described by the standard model, that's fine, but if it's something like local realism, that's been busted pretty hard. This might prove more interesting than the linked article, though it was on HN previously:
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v409/n6822/full/409791a...
Local realism is the idea that objects have definite properties whether or not they are measured, and that measurements of these properties are not affected by events taking place sufficiently far away1.
[...]
Many experiments1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 have since been done that are consistent with quantum mechanics and inconsistent with local realism. But these conclusions remain the subject of considerable interest and debate, and experiments are still being refined to overcome ‘loopholes’ that might allow a local realistic interpretation. Here we have measured correlations in the classical properties of massive entangled particles (9Be+ ions): these correlations violate a form of Bell's inequality. Our measured value of the appropriate Bell's ‘signal’ is 2.25 ± 0.03, whereas a value of 2 is the maximum allowed by local realistic theories of nature. In contrast to previous measurements with massive particles, this violation of Bell's inequality was obtained by use of a complete set of measurements. Moreover, the high detection efficiency of our apparatus eliminates the so-called ‘detection’ loophole.
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v409/n6822/full/409791a...
Local realism is the idea that objects have definite properties whether or not they are measured, and that measurements of these properties are not affected by events taking place sufficiently far away1.
[...]
Many experiments1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 have since been done that are consistent with quantum mechanics and inconsistent with local realism. But these conclusions remain the subject of considerable interest and debate, and experiments are still being refined to overcome ‘loopholes’ that might allow a local realistic interpretation. Here we have measured correlations in the classical properties of massive entangled particles (9Be+ ions): these correlations violate a form of Bell's inequality. Our measured value of the appropriate Bell's ‘signal’ is 2.25 ± 0.03, whereas a value of 2 is the maximum allowed by local realistic theories of nature. In contrast to previous measurements with massive particles, this violation of Bell's inequality was obtained by use of a complete set of measurements. Moreover, the high detection efficiency of our apparatus eliminates the so-called ‘detection’ loophole.
The Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is consistent with local realism.
What would happen if a particle measurement had a probability with irrational numbers (in every base)? What would the outcome be?
And I feel that MW would need a pilot wave that carries the information for every parallel possible outcome for entanglement to work, wherein certain pilot waves cause universe splits starting from the point where they overlap and others merge - if you measure the spin of two entangled particles you get two waves that meet where X+X and Y+Y don't interact, but X+Y and Y+X does and thus create new universes. I don't see how the wave-less versions hold up when there for example are orientation-dependent probability and a ton of other crap like that. What else makes the particles interact with exactly the right universe?
Edit: Not to mention how complex MW would have to be to explain the delayed quantum eraser experiment.
And I feel that MW would need a pilot wave that carries the information for every parallel possible outcome for entanglement to work, wherein certain pilot waves cause universe splits starting from the point where they overlap and others merge - if you measure the spin of two entangled particles you get two waves that meet where X+X and Y+Y don't interact, but X+Y and Y+X does and thus create new universes. I don't see how the wave-less versions hold up when there for example are orientation-dependent probability and a ton of other crap like that. What else makes the particles interact with exactly the right universe?
Edit: Not to mention how complex MW would have to be to explain the delayed quantum eraser experiment.
You're thoroughly confused about what MW is.
In what way? There's no one canonical MW either way, my version with growing parallel universe bubbles that merge or split is just my interpretation, as the other versions I've seen seem to be unable to address various issues
There is a canonical MW interpretation. The MW hypothesis is just that reality is the evolution of the Schrodinger PDE on a configuration space with no other modification such as pilot waves or collapse required. The math is really quite simple (this simplest of any QM interpretation). It doesn't have parallel universes or bubbles as fundamental objects.
And by what mechanics does that happen? How do the universe "know" which particles should behave how in delayed eraser experiments, for example? It just... Happens? How are the particles "separated" and "merged" (in lack of better terms) in the configuration space?
Particles are not fundamental, either, and thinking in classical terms will yield only confusion. You'll find a good non-technical introduction to the MW interpretation here: http://lesswrong.com/lw/r5/the_quantum_physics_sequence/
My basic justification for my interpretation: either entanglement of two photons makes all of spacetime branch out into two instantaneously (however that's represented in the configuration space - Pluto wouldn't wait for the event to enter its light cone to now diverge into two "branches");
Or every point in the universe is essentially an independent configuration space, linked in a kind of matrix, in which the fact that the photon we sent to Pluto had spin X on measurement propagates outwards back to us and upon reaching us causes our configuration space to react accordingly in two different branches. After all the knowledge couldn't be available to you before it came back. Functionally equivalent to my bubble description above, only the terminology differs. Or is the configuration space infinite to the degree that all possible future outcomes is accounted for and represented in every point at once already, practically making it into a growing complex infinite web of interactions when following the time line forwards?
Or every point in the universe is essentially an independent configuration space, linked in a kind of matrix, in which the fact that the photon we sent to Pluto had spin X on measurement propagates outwards back to us and upon reaching us causes our configuration space to react accordingly in two different branches. After all the knowledge couldn't be available to you before it came back. Functionally equivalent to my bubble description above, only the terminology differs. Or is the configuration space infinite to the degree that all possible future outcomes is accounted for and represented in every point at once already, practically making it into a growing complex infinite web of interactions when following the time line forwards?
True, but it makes Occam spin in infinitely many graves.
I'm not sure why people believe this. I would address it here again, but better people than me have written on it: http://lesswrong.com/lw/q3/decoherence_is_simple/.
Agree. From the article:
"If you are able to imagine a number of options for yourself, weigh them with regard to your interests, and then commit yourself to the one that seems the best, you are exercising your free will."
So .. if the number of options you CAN imagine is arbitrary (which it by definition is), you've just described a computer program written for optimisation.
"If you are able to imagine a number of options for yourself, weigh them with regard to your interests, and then commit yourself to the one that seems the best, you are exercising your free will."
So .. if the number of options you CAN imagine is arbitrary (which it by definition is), you've just described a computer program written for optimisation.
Focusing on actual processes in the brain may be a more objective discussion than discussing "free will". For example, is the human brain driven by reinforcement learning? is dopamine part of the reward loop? how does curiosity fit in? Are there tipping point effects in neural networks? What about noise, or even quantum effects if you were trying to model and predict an outcome?
Regardless of one's position, that's an objective discussion with questions that can be tested, with useful results that could help develop a general AI.
Contrast that with a discussion about "free will", a suitcase word with numerous polarizing definitions. It's like walking into a minefield of bias and enmity. And frankly just as much strident opinion from "rationalists" as from the religious. And I ask, where is that going? What's the result such discussion is driving towards? Is the discussion really analyzing a real physical process in the brain or is this a values discussion masquerading as logic?
Regardless of one's position, that's an objective discussion with questions that can be tested, with useful results that could help develop a general AI.
Contrast that with a discussion about "free will", a suitcase word with numerous polarizing definitions. It's like walking into a minefield of bias and enmity. And frankly just as much strident opinion from "rationalists" as from the religious. And I ask, where is that going? What's the result such discussion is driving towards? Is the discussion really analyzing a real physical process in the brain or is this a values discussion masquerading as logic?
Is he saying that because other animals also seem to exhibit free will, and because some humans appear to be more impulsive than others, that makes it possible without a "supernatural ability to transcend the laws of nature"?
Buried in the article, rather than in an introductory definition of the terms used, is the line:
"for some, a really free will is one that is not determined by anything – one that stands outside the causal chains of nature. Such a person might feel cheated when offered instead a set of capacities that we share (to a degree) with cats and chickens."
Surely there's nothing at all novel here. We've long known that other animals have varying degrees of autonomy.
I also don't think that any determinists would argue (or even ever have argued) against the existence of this kind of free will. Just that it is only free if you also accept that Bertrand Russell's table is "oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard", and choose to go no deeper.
Buried in the article, rather than in an introductory definition of the terms used, is the line:
"for some, a really free will is one that is not determined by anything – one that stands outside the causal chains of nature. Such a person might feel cheated when offered instead a set of capacities that we share (to a degree) with cats and chickens."
Surely there's nothing at all novel here. We've long known that other animals have varying degrees of autonomy.
I also don't think that any determinists would argue (or even ever have argued) against the existence of this kind of free will. Just that it is only free if you also accept that Bertrand Russell's table is "oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard", and choose to go no deeper.
Free will is how a decision-choosing algorithm feels from inside. Not much more to it, IMO.
When a decision-choosing algorithm says "I can't predict my own decisions, therefore they must be unpredictable in principle", that strikes me as unfounded.
When a decision-choosing algorithm says "I can't predict my own decisions, therefore they must be unpredictable in principle", that strikes me as unfounded.
Free will is a scalar dimension along which decision choosing algorithms can vary.
With high free will, human can adapt, customize, and innovate situationally optimized responses to an unpredictable environment. With low free will, a Sphex wasp can reactively activate one of its stored patterns and use very little expensive cognitive processing to react optimally in a predictable environment.
With high free will, human can adapt, customize, and innovate situationally optimized responses to an unpredictable environment. With low free will, a Sphex wasp can reactively activate one of its stored patterns and use very little expensive cognitive processing to react optimally in a predictable environment.
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Once you have a grasp of the fundamental mechanisms of the universe(cause/effect, logic, etc) you quickly see that certain, socially-defined terms are irreconcilable with the facts of reality. Namely they, the three major and thorny ones, are ideas of God or gods, supernatural phenomenon and ideas of free will.
These three ideas just don't fit with the facts. If an entity was powerful enough to create everything, what created IT? If supernatural phenomenon were real, why isn't there solid evidence of its existence, and if it exists on a plane beyond the material then how could it ever affect the material plane we inhabit? Finally, if you accept that the universe follows certain predictable, immutable laws then you must agree that with enough information any future or past state could be predicted or recreated. Humans and their minds live within the constraints of this physical universe, thus any potential future state of mind or behavior could be predicted from the previous state(s) that human was in. All moments arise from the moments before them. There is absolutely no gap there to shimmy in ideas of "free will". I was born at a certain time, place and in a certain community. I had no choice there, but the die was cast and everything I ever become will be constrained by those facts. I will never be able to magically pull myself out of this causal chain.
I would like to add one more thing, to counteract the possible easy pessimism that a realization like this could have on an individual. One day I realized that ghosts weren't real. As a child, this was a burden lifted from my shoulders, as I could rest easier knowing no unpredictable and unfathomable force was going to accost me as I slept. One day I realized that there was no God. I suddenly felt freer than ever, and less self-conscious in solitude. I don't live every day in anxiety about the "lack" of these two delusions. It happened once more with free will. I realized all things belong to a causal chain possibly extending into infinity, and I was just a pattern at the tail end of this chain in time. I suddenly felt more compassionate for every other human, lodged as they are in their station . You and I can't help what we have become, what we came from or what we will be. Even knowing this, I live intentionally, not drowning in a sea of slavish fatalism, but instead with the keen knowledge that I too belong to the causal chain, and that through evolutionary machinations, my mind can suspend disbelief and still feel it is directing the future toward a desired state.
The paradox is difficult to rest in, but it has given me a powerful tool, another paradoxical belief, that I can control my future by knowing that I simply arise from what has past.
These three ideas just don't fit with the facts. If an entity was powerful enough to create everything, what created IT? If supernatural phenomenon were real, why isn't there solid evidence of its existence, and if it exists on a plane beyond the material then how could it ever affect the material plane we inhabit? Finally, if you accept that the universe follows certain predictable, immutable laws then you must agree that with enough information any future or past state could be predicted or recreated. Humans and their minds live within the constraints of this physical universe, thus any potential future state of mind or behavior could be predicted from the previous state(s) that human was in. All moments arise from the moments before them. There is absolutely no gap there to shimmy in ideas of "free will". I was born at a certain time, place and in a certain community. I had no choice there, but the die was cast and everything I ever become will be constrained by those facts. I will never be able to magically pull myself out of this causal chain.
I would like to add one more thing, to counteract the possible easy pessimism that a realization like this could have on an individual. One day I realized that ghosts weren't real. As a child, this was a burden lifted from my shoulders, as I could rest easier knowing no unpredictable and unfathomable force was going to accost me as I slept. One day I realized that there was no God. I suddenly felt freer than ever, and less self-conscious in solitude. I don't live every day in anxiety about the "lack" of these two delusions. It happened once more with free will. I realized all things belong to a causal chain possibly extending into infinity, and I was just a pattern at the tail end of this chain in time. I suddenly felt more compassionate for every other human, lodged as they are in their station . You and I can't help what we have become, what we came from or what we will be. Even knowing this, I live intentionally, not drowning in a sea of slavish fatalism, but instead with the keen knowledge that I too belong to the causal chain, and that through evolutionary machinations, my mind can suspend disbelief and still feel it is directing the future toward a desired state.
The paradox is difficult to rest in, but it has given me a powerful tool, another paradoxical belief, that I can control my future by knowing that I simply arise from what has past.
> These three ideas just don't fit with the facts. If an entity was powerful enough to create everything, what created IT?
That's exactly the same argument as "what happened before big bang created time and space".
The right argument is "big bang theory requires less assumptions than God, and gives better predictions, so let's use it (until we find even better theory)".
> Finally, if you accept that the universe follows certain predictable, immutable laws then you must agree that with enough information any future or past state could be predicted or recreated
According to our best understanding these laws have random generator in them, so for example we cannot predict exactly when a radioactive decay of an atom will happen. And it's not because our lack of knowledge, that uncertainity is a state of universe, it's inherent to the quantum mechanics. At best we can calculate the probability distribution.
That's exactly the same argument as "what happened before big bang created time and space".
The right argument is "big bang theory requires less assumptions than God, and gives better predictions, so let's use it (until we find even better theory)".
> Finally, if you accept that the universe follows certain predictable, immutable laws then you must agree that with enough information any future or past state could be predicted or recreated
According to our best understanding these laws have random generator in them, so for example we cannot predict exactly when a radioactive decay of an atom will happen. And it's not because our lack of knowledge, that uncertainity is a state of universe, it's inherent to the quantum mechanics. At best we can calculate the probability distribution.
Where would you put the possibility of random events? I do think it's a real possibility that things on sub atomic scale behave randomly or at least stochastic.
If that is true, then no amount of information can predict the future.
If that is true, then no amount of information can predict the future.
We really don't.
The author of the article has written off hundreds of years of philosophical debate about determinist free will versus indeterminism and decided that his interpretation of free will, which falls firmly in the causal indeterminism camp, is the right way to think about things. Admittedly that's the nice one, because determinism is hard when it comes to things like ethics and morality, but we don't need to redefine 'free will' to have the discussion. Especially when it's a low redefinition[1].
The fact is whether or not we have free will is largely irrelevant. There's a really interesting Philosophy Bites podcast with Daniel Dennett about what's important in the free will question[2]. It's well worth a listen if you're interested in philosophical stuff.
[1] http://www.fallacyfiles.org/redefine.html
[2] http://traffic.libsyn.com/philosophybites/Daniel_Dennett_on_...