There are plenty of protections against private entities in the US legal system -- other people, corporations and organizations. Those were not the issues the founders were trying to address, though -- the common law offered many such protections.
The page you link contains many interesting examples; but many of them are simply cases of making the vote harder -- requiring unanimous consent to change English-French bilingualism in Canada, for example -- rather than cases where the law simply can not ever be changed by a vote.
With regards to Germany, the page says:
...if a constitution provides for a mechanism of its own abolition or replacement, like the German Basic Law does in Article 146, this by necessity provides a "back door" for getting rid of the "eternity clause", too.
It's really hard to have a legal system that literally can not be changed by any legitimate vote -- only by revolution -- because what sits at the bottom of most of them (all of them?) is that the consent of some body politic is necessary and sufficient to legitimate a law.
Everything in the US Constitution is amendable, though -- in other words, the whole Constitution can be changed with a vote.
The US is founded on certain ideas about natural rights -- hence not granted, per se -- but that's somewhat orthogonal to this whole issue. Even if there were an unwritten constitution, a country could base its institutions, philosophy of lawmaking, jurisprudence, &c, on natural rights doctrine (and for a time, the British did exactly that).
The earlier post mentions "That's why you have a constitution with rights that are not up for vote." but if what they mean is natural rights, that goes well beyond any procedural issue around the basic law.
I don't understand how it is that the EU Parliaments votes to reject legislation. Presumably, this is not the default for most rules. Is this some special class of rule -- put together by a special committee, for example -- that has to be voted down rather than up?
I'm not sure any country actually has a Constitution with rights that are not up for a vote. There is generally a separate, harder procedure for changing the "basic law" or Constitution of a country -- for example, 2/3 of delegates or a 2/3 of states or something of that nature -- but I'd be surprised if there's a country where they have literally no way to change it at all.
It can be in their interest if their model assumes certain revenue from sales and service.
Most brands of cars can be repaired by independent technicians. Toyotas are more valuable because they are reliable -- because they are repaired less often.
It seems like you're saying, that PE, landlords, &c, are in a market where a landowner can hold on to property, not rent it out or put it to other productive use, and still make money. That is a problem, but not a problem with wealth or wealthy people per se.
I interpreted it to mean, it was much harder than something else -- than another approach. But I couldn't figure out what other approach they had in mind.
Most of Europe post-war was very poor. I'm not sure the trend could go back as far as that.
How are you weighing the trend you highlight relative to overall long run success of private ordering, stock companies, readily available credit, strong private property protections, &c, &c, in raising people's standard of living?
Consumption is a kind of voting in the economy, I suppose; but the economy is heavily geared towards making things that regular people want. How many Corollas are there for every Bugatti?
If what you're saying is true, would it be unfair of me to say that the government is not using their power over the economy to fix any of the deep fundamental problems we are facing?
Is it good policy to take people's money because they aren't doing what we think they should be doing with it?
When a PE fund buys an apartment building, isn't that really competing with landlords, not renters? The PE fund is not living in the apartment -- they have to try to rent it out, after all.
This is potentially a long conversation; but why would you start with rankings like this, which only go back a relatively short time?
Broadly speaking, human welfare got a lot better in the last three hundred years, due to productivity improvements that were tied to things like property rights, joint stock companies, availability of credit, &c.
We haven't really found a good alternative to it. It may seem to you that countries like Austria, &c, are doing the right thing by taking very large amounts of GDP out of the hands of private enterprise and using it "for good" instead of "for growth"; but that is just eating the seed corn. It looks good in the short term.
Wealthy people pay a lot of taxes in the USA. If they aren't routinely avoiding paying income tax and taxes in general, how could that be the point?
It may be more realistic to view this in terms of elite power struggle. There are some constituencies that have found their way into positions of some power -- in government and public service -- that are in conflict with other elites, who have found some power in private enterprise. These groups battle for control of things. One strategy in the battle is managing the other group's access to money.
It's not clear from any kind of first principles, that we are better off with government allocation of a large portion of the society's capital. That hasn't historically been a big winner. Private ordering seems to net out a higher quality of life overall, even with income inequality.
If those with assets keep accruing more assets the median person will suffer.
How will they suffer? The people with assets, to realize a benefit from them, have to spend money. If they don't spend the money, then what's the problem?