Evading Airport Security(schneier.com)
schneier.com
Evading Airport Security
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/evading_airport.html
165 comments
While TSA are examining my shoes and scanning my bum, they let through without fanfare my carry-on device: a solid brick of chemicals surrounded by advanced electronics including a radio receiver.
Seriously, I'm no bomb expert but wouldn't laptops still be the most fruitful terrorist attack vector? Mine laptop is 6 lbs and has never been given a second glance.
Seriously, I'm no bomb expert but wouldn't laptops still be the most fruitful terrorist attack vector? Mine laptop is 6 lbs and has never been given a second glance.
Haven't you always been required to place it into it's own bin to go through the X-Ray machine? That seems like an effective "second glance" to me.
They'll also sometimes swab it and check for explosive residue.
They'll also sometimes swab it and check for explosive residue.
"It would obviously be tragic and damaging for someone to attack "defenseless" passengers with "traditional" weapons, but -- in my eyes -- it's not terribly different from a random attack in the street or a shopping mall."
Well one way it's different is in the availability of emergency response personnel. In the air you are confined in a small space and much further from help.
Well one way it's different is in the availability of emergency response personnel. In the air you are confined in a small space and much further from help.
Well the truth of the matter is that a bunch of angry guys living in caves in the desert really hated American freedom, so they pooled together some money, flew to America, and sneaked past the notoriously anal TSA.
These were dangerous men armed with the most dangerous weapons known to man - BOX CUTTERS. Using their BOX CUTTERS, they hijacked planes full or several hundred individuals who were to terrified of their BOX CUTTERS that instead of trying to overpower them, they decided to accept a fiery death via crashing into skyscrapers, taking thousands more with them.
That's really the whole truth - there's nothing more to it. If you don't believe it, then you truly underestimate the power of BOX CUTTERS.
These were dangerous men armed with the most dangerous weapons known to man - BOX CUTTERS. Using their BOX CUTTERS, they hijacked planes full or several hundred individuals who were to terrified of their BOX CUTTERS that instead of trying to overpower them, they decided to accept a fiery death via crashing into skyscrapers, taking thousands more with them.
That's really the whole truth - there's nothing more to it. If you don't believe it, then you truly underestimate the power of BOX CUTTERS.
I don't think it's about the danger to the passengers as much as forcing your way to the pilot. I.e. someone capturing/torturing passengers until the pilot comes out.
I guess I simply don't buy that any terrorist on board -- even if there were several of them and they were armed with box-cutters and the like -- could ever take the cockpit. The doors are locked, the pilots are sometimes armed; and mostly, the passengers would never let it happen.
Even in the most extreme scenarios imaginable, the passengers would have a 20-1 advantage, and would understand that the cost of failing to neutralize the threat would likely result in their personal demise (not to mention the greater threat of using the plane as a weapon).
Even in the most extreme scenarios imaginable, the passengers would have a 20-1 advantage, and would understand that the cost of failing to neutralize the threat would likely result in their personal demise (not to mention the greater threat of using the plane as a weapon).
This is of course not really testable, but putting other passengers in a position where their actions would directly result in someone else's death could change that. Would you really expect people to resist if someone started by binding random person and promising to stab them if anyone gets up? (yeah, starts like a bad action movie plot, but it could be relatively effective)
Locked doors and guns are one thing, and a pretty solid argument imo but... 20 american joe publics vs. any small number of arabs, maybe even just one?
Fear of death is not such a great motivator as you imagine I think.
have you seen people react to threats in the wild? especially from the first-world white middle class background? its just not a part of their life and generally they do really stupid things like freeze or panic wildly, shoot first and ask questions later...
a lot of these terrorist guys come from very tough environments with aggressive cultures that make the south of USA look tame... if they panic or freeze up when death is imminent they are likely die and leave no offspring - and these situations occur much more frequently so that there is a very strong selection pressure to compete in that regard which is absent from most of western society, modulo wars, for at least three or four generations now...
Fear of death is not such a great motivator as you imagine I think.
have you seen people react to threats in the wild? especially from the first-world white middle class background? its just not a part of their life and generally they do really stupid things like freeze or panic wildly, shoot first and ask questions later...
a lot of these terrorist guys come from very tough environments with aggressive cultures that make the south of USA look tame... if they panic or freeze up when death is imminent they are likely die and leave no offspring - and these situations occur much more frequently so that there is a very strong selection pressure to compete in that regard which is absent from most of western society, modulo wars, for at least three or four generations now...
> any small number of arabs, maybe even just one?
Any small number of people.
There is no need to single out certain cultures.
Any small number of people.
There is no need to single out certain cultures.
it was an example... and a good one.
i strongly disagree with the sentiment that we can't use races, sexes etc. to discriminate (we shouldn't use it to privilege or under-privilege people for sure, and thats the real issue with racism, sexism etc.) - there is real measurable data there.
p.s. i am an arab. i can understand why arabs in particular would be inclined towards becoming anti-US terrorists too... its not very complicated or deep, and certainly not racist.
i strongly disagree with the sentiment that we can't use races, sexes etc. to discriminate (we shouldn't use it to privilege or under-privilege people for sure, and thats the real issue with racism, sexism etc.) - there is real measurable data there.
p.s. i am an arab. i can understand why arabs in particular would be inclined towards becoming anti-US terrorists too... its not very complicated or deep, and certainly not racist.
Thank you. Equally could have called them
American allies (Saudi). I can distinctly remember the feeling in late 2001 that people would look back at the reaction to events in a similar way to how we look at the McCarthy era or other such witch hunt and demonization type events. I don't think we have reached that place yet, but it's closer than it was.
Of course, it's equally insulting to say that people from a white middle-class background can't react effectively to emergencies.
20 american joe publics vs. any small number of arabs, maybe even just one?
I didn't know having an arabian background turned you into some kind of superhuman ninja. Or are you just slightly confused and a bit bigoted?
I didn't know having an arabian background turned you into some kind of superhuman ninja. Or are you just slightly confused and a bit bigoted?
It's a good thing evolution doesn't work that quickly. Selection has less of an effect than you portray in this case. If it were true, it would be all middle-eastern countries winning the olympic events.
and black american people make excellent athletes - and that has nothing to do with selective breeding in the slave trade?
evolution is maybe not the answer, but my experience tells me that survival skills lack in my surrounds.
evolution is maybe not the answer, but my experience tells me that survival skills lack in my surrounds.
I've been on planes with about 20 passengers, so 2 or 3 terrorists could significantly narrow the odds.
That said, I don't disagree with your point at all.
I'd rather see an armed plainclothes officer on every flight than be harassed at the airport.
That said, I don't disagree with your point at all.
I'd rather see an armed plainclothes officer on every flight than be harassed at the airport.
That size of a plane is too small to worry about. Commercial aviation is usually at least 50 seats. The TSA isn't preventing terrorists from chartering a private jet and flying it into something either.
I've been on 737s with about 20 passengers. It's rare, but given the right combination of flight, time of day, and season, it can happen.
It's also worth noting that anyone attempting to use a plane as a missile against a particular target is fighting the clock. It would take some time for the hijackers to breach the cockpit (whatever the method), and in that time it is highly probable that military jets have been scrambled and are inbound.
I'm also a bit curious just how difficult it would be to take down a modern jetliner if you had the run of the back of the plane and whatever you could legally bring on board.
Using the plane as a weapon and bringing it down are very different objectives. The chief concern here is using that plane as a force magnifying weapon. If you wanted to pop a hatch in the floor and start messing with the avionics bay, you'd rather easily scuttle the plane.
The pilots knows the same as the passengers: That if the hijackers take the cockpit, odds are nobody lives, so in a crisis, his best strategy for both personal survival and for saving the most passengers is to get the plane on the ground as soon as possible.
If a hijacker "just" wants to perform an old-school hijack, ie. not use the plane as a 9/11-style missile, his best odds are convincing the captain of that fact without taking the cockpit. The hijacker can verify that the captain is complying using a smartphone with GPS.
If a hijacker "just" wants to perform an old-school hijack, ie. not use the plane as a 9/11-style missile, his best odds are convincing the captain of that fact without taking the cockpit. The hijacker can verify that the captain is complying using a smartphone with GPS.
Fun fact: Smartphone GPS doesn't work above 10K feet, such that it can't be used to terrorize airplanes.
Is that an actual limitation of the GPS network, or a limitation of the client-side software.
My understanding is that GPS satellites broadcast a timestamp, and the receivers use that information to compute their position. Assuming that this is accurate, devices should still be able to get the signal at higher altitudes. The only way I can think of this not working is if the geometry works out so that at 10K feet you are no longer in ranges of 4 satellites. I suppose this could be done my calibrating how wide to make the signal (which would make the signals stronger on the ground, but require more satellites for full coverage). This would likely also require having been thought of back when the GPS network was planned.
Also, I would imagine that planes use GPS, in which case it would have to be a client-side restriction.
My understanding is that GPS satellites broadcast a timestamp, and the receivers use that information to compute their position. Assuming that this is accurate, devices should still be able to get the signal at higher altitudes. The only way I can think of this not working is if the geometry works out so that at 10K feet you are no longer in ranges of 4 satellites. I suppose this could be done my calibrating how wide to make the signal (which would make the signals stronger on the ground, but require more satellites for full coverage). This would likely also require having been thought of back when the GPS network was planned.
Also, I would imagine that planes use GPS, in which case it would have to be a client-side restriction.
Client side (may be in firmware or software): GPS above certain elevations or speeds requires a special export license that your smartphone probably doesn't have. An unlicensed device is required to output no fix (but it has to be able to calculate that the parameters are outside the allowed range).
http://ravtrack.com/GPStracking/cocom-gps-tracking-limits/46...
http://ravtrack.com/GPStracking/cocom-gps-tracking-limits/46...
How difficult would it be for someone to work around these restrictions? If I have an unlocked Android phone, would I be able comment out the range check and recompile the gps software?
It's probably either in the driver for the gps chip or the gps firmware; neither of which are likely to have source available for you.
Don't you see, you're only helping the TERRORISTS by pointing that out. :)
Anyway, in that case, they'd have to remember to buy one of these first, then: http://www.amazon.com/Bad-Elf-1000-30-Pin-Receiver/dp/B0035Y...
Anyway, in that case, they'd have to remember to buy one of these first, then: http://www.amazon.com/Bad-Elf-1000-30-Pin-Receiver/dp/B0035Y...
10k feet sounds a bit low. i thought the limit was at 60k feet and 600MPH
I don't think passengers would ever allow this to happen.
I thought the cockpit doors were actually sealed until the plane landed, i.e. the pilots couldn't open them even if they wanted to?
Pilots can definitely exit to cockpit (they do this routinely to use the restroom, and flight attendants sometimes barricade the forward galley with one of the service carts)
The original 9/11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect. I think Schneier's point is correct that spending the same amount of money on intelligence, investigations, and emergency response would keep us safer than screening what innocent passengers bring on to airplanes, but current procedures for airport security are still a reaction to 9/11 as it happened then. I look forward to the day when we dial back airport security procedures to the new reality of reinforced cockpit doors and passengers who will fight would-be hijackers to save their lives.
> The original 9/11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect.
Right, but the GP's point is that it was only possible to do that _once_, because the success of the 9/11 attacks depended on the passengers cooperating with the hijackers. That was a reasonable assumption because for the previous 30 years, "in the event of a hijacking just cooperate until we can negotiate your release" was the standard advice. Now it isn't.
Even in 9/11, 25% of the passengers figured out on their own that they shouldn't cede the cockpit. Today the figure would be 100%, plus the cockpit is sealed off for the duration of the flight anyway. So I really don't see a scenario where box-cutters would take out the whole plane any more.
Right, but the GP's point is that it was only possible to do that _once_, because the success of the 9/11 attacks depended on the passengers cooperating with the hijackers. That was a reasonable assumption because for the previous 30 years, "in the event of a hijacking just cooperate until we can negotiate your release" was the standard advice. Now it isn't.
Even in 9/11, 25% of the passengers figured out on their own that they shouldn't cede the cockpit. Today the figure would be 100%, plus the cockpit is sealed off for the duration of the flight anyway. So I really don't see a scenario where box-cutters would take out the whole plane any more.
I have heard many people express this sentiment - our own attitude has changed since the tragedy, and thus we would never let a small group of people muscle their way to the cockpit as they did then.
That said, whenever I read accounts of the actual attack [1] they seem well planned - several "muscle men" clearing the way, using pepper sprays, etc. That is, it is not obvious to me that a group of people would be able to overcome that level of coordination and brute force. What piece am I missing?
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks#Events
That said, whenever I read accounts of the actual attack [1] they seem well planned - several "muscle men" clearing the way, using pepper sprays, etc. That is, it is not obvious to me that a group of people would be able to overcome that level of coordination and brute force. What piece am I missing?
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks#Events
Haven't all cockpits now become much more secure? I'm no expert, but it's my understanding that the pilots can seal themselves inside. Anyone trying to get into the cockpit would become a sitting duck, even if they were ruthlessly executing passengers with their simple weapons, 50+ people (likely including an air marshall or at least a strong, fit, high level athlete) should be able to overcome the hijackers. Post-9/11, I doubt many people take the "I hope they don't turn the plane into a missile" route.
Short of getting several automatic weapons on the plane or some kind of chemical weapon that can kill or incapacitate everyone on board, pilots being able to seal themselves off, coupled with internet and cell phone access getting better seems like it would make a repeat 9/11 extraordinarily difficult.
Short of getting several automatic weapons on the plane or some kind of chemical weapon that can kill or incapacitate everyone on board, pilots being able to seal themselves off, coupled with internet and cell phone access getting better seems like it would make a repeat 9/11 extraordinarily difficult.
Remember, one plane did. After hearing about what happened to the other three planes, the passengers realized what was going on, and (almost) took back the plane. This was all on the spur of the moment, yet they rose to the occasion. If they had known what was going on slightly earlier than they did, they could have stopped the terrorists getting into the cockpit in the first place, and then they would have saved their plane as well.
Exactly, that fourth plane already proved the case, no idea why we're even having this debate. No plane will ever be successfully hijacked in the US again (or at least not for many generations), even if the hijackers have guns, because everyone now knows the plan is to crash it into something. The entire passenger compartment will bum rush the hijackers. Plus, armed Air Marshals.
The passengers of the fourth plane knew that other planes had been hijacked and crashed that same day. They made the assumption that these multiple hijackings in such a short period of time were all related and concluded that their plane would likely crash.
The probability that a random hijacking would be done with the intent of crashing the plane is far lower in general than on a day where you know another 3 hijackings did result in that. Especially when you consider how unlikely simultaneous hijackings are.
The probability that a random hijacking would be done with the intent of crashing the plane is far lower in general than on a day where you know another 3 hijackings did result in that. Especially when you consider how unlikely simultaneous hijackings are.
The only thing the 4th plane proved was that the murder of an entire airliner is possible with ordinary weapons.
The plane only went down b/c the terrorists had taken the cockpit. They crashed it intentionally when they realized the passengers were about to retake it. With barricaded, reinforced cockpits that won't happen again, and passengers will also fight back instantly, won't give hijackers time to get control and get organized.
Except, with reinforced cockpit doors, I'm not sure that a hijacking with those types of weapons would result in a crash now.
That plane had the smallest crew of hijackers, perhaps because one member of the hijacking plot was then under arrest in Minnesota.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zacarias_Moussaoui#Capture
That the arrest was not followed up by a FISA court order allowing more investigation of the plans of the arrested person was a major screw-up on the part of the FBI.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zacarias_Moussaoui#Capture
That the arrest was not followed up by a FISA court order allowing more investigation of the plans of the arrested person was a major screw-up on the part of the FBI.
Cockpit doors are basically impossible to brute force / open / unlock now without the cooperation of the pilots.
I recall hearing about an airplane crash post-9/11. The airport fire department attempted to breach the door to reach a seriously injured pilot.
It took them forty minutes to reach the pilot. They first tried to breach the door and ended up forced to cut through the roof to get to him.
If the pilot doesn't want the door open, the door won't be opened. And I'd imagine that pilots are well-trained to never open the door in a hijacking. That said, if the hijacking gets nasty... maybe...
E: found it - it was the Turkish 1951 crash.
It took them forty minutes to reach the pilot. They first tried to breach the door and ended up forced to cut through the roof to get to him.
If the pilot doesn't want the door open, the door won't be opened. And I'd imagine that pilots are well-trained to never open the door in a hijacking. That said, if the hijacking gets nasty... maybe...
E: found it - it was the Turkish 1951 crash.
Thanks for pointing that out, I was unaware there was much tactical skill in the attacks. Every news piece I'd seen on the hijackers concentrated mostly on their mistakes leading up to the attacks and how even a marginally competent counter-intelligence effort would have caught them...
More to your point though, I don't think the passengers would have to actually overcome the hijackers, just bottle them up. Whatever they're _not_ good at, surprised scared uncoordinated groups of strangers are pretty good at getting in the way. And there's still the fact that the cockpit door is locked.
More to your point though, I don't think the passengers would have to actually overcome the hijackers, just bottle them up. Whatever they're _not_ good at, surprised scared uncoordinated groups of strangers are pretty good at getting in the way. And there's still the fact that the cockpit door is locked.
Also, the pilots have at least a fire axe on hand, and possibly also a gun, which they can easily use on anyone who forces the cockpit door.
And, they will be highly motivated to so defend themselves and the cockpit.
And, they will be highly motivated to so defend themselves and the cockpit.
9/11 was different. People cooperated because that was protocol at the time for a plane hijacking. Nobody expected them to use the plane as a weapon with no regard to their own lives. This was an unprecedented attack.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_hijacking
"Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, most hijackings involved the plane landing at a certain destination, followed by the hijackers making negotiable demands. Pilots and flight attendants were trained to adopt the "Common Strategy" tactic, which was approved by the FAA. It taught crew members to comply with the hijackers' demands, get the plane to land safely and then let the security forces handle the situation. Crew members advised passengers to sit quietly in order to increase their chances of survival. They were also trained not to make any 'heroic' moves that could endanger themselves or other people. The FAA realized that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it would end peacefully with the hijackers reaching their goal.[12] The September 11 attacks presented an unprecedented threat because it involved suicide hijackers who could fly an aircraft and use it to delibrately crash the airplane into buildings for the sole purpose to cause massive casualties with no warning, no demands or negotiations, and no regard for human life. The "Common Strategy" approach was not designed to handle suicide hijackings, and the hijackers were able to exploit a weakness in the civil aviation security system. Since then, the "Common Strategy" policy in the USA and the rest of the world to deal with airplane hijackings has no longer been used."
There was also a change in protocol after the Columbine High School massacre. In that attack the two were able to shoot victims while the police were outside setting up a perimeter. Now as a direct result of that attack police actively charge an active shooter, this is called Immediate Action Rapid Deployment. This is said to have saved dozens of lives in Virgina Tech alone.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_hijacking
"Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, most hijackings involved the plane landing at a certain destination, followed by the hijackers making negotiable demands. Pilots and flight attendants were trained to adopt the "Common Strategy" tactic, which was approved by the FAA. It taught crew members to comply with the hijackers' demands, get the plane to land safely and then let the security forces handle the situation. Crew members advised passengers to sit quietly in order to increase their chances of survival. They were also trained not to make any 'heroic' moves that could endanger themselves or other people. The FAA realized that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it would end peacefully with the hijackers reaching their goal.[12] The September 11 attacks presented an unprecedented threat because it involved suicide hijackers who could fly an aircraft and use it to delibrately crash the airplane into buildings for the sole purpose to cause massive casualties with no warning, no demands or negotiations, and no regard for human life. The "Common Strategy" approach was not designed to handle suicide hijackings, and the hijackers were able to exploit a weakness in the civil aviation security system. Since then, the "Common Strategy" policy in the USA and the rest of the world to deal with airplane hijackings has no longer been used."
There was also a change in protocol after the Columbine High School massacre. In that attack the two were able to shoot victims while the police were outside setting up a perimeter. Now as a direct result of that attack police actively charge an active shooter, this is called Immediate Action Rapid Deployment. This is said to have saved dozens of lives in Virgina Tech alone.
"Nobody expected them to use the plane as a weapon"
Nobody ... except for Tom Clancy and every single person who read _Debt of Honor_, wherein a plane is used as a suicide weapon flown into the US capital building.
Nobody ... except for Tom Clancy and every single person who read _Debt of Honor_, wherein a plane is used as a suicide weapon flown into the US capital building.
> Nobody ... except for Tom Clancy and every single person who read _Debt of Honor_, wherein a plane is used as a suicide weapon flown into the US capital building.
Which is almost how Samuel Byck planned to assassinate Richard Nixon. The difference is that Byck planned to fly into the White House. (No, they're not the same building. Many people are confused on this point.)
He utterly failed in his attempt to hijack the airliner (hint: don't attempt a hijacking while the plane is still on the ground unless you know how to get a plane airborne), however, and Byck killed himself before the police got to him.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Byck
Anyway, movie-plot threats only very rarely come to pass. There are thousands of potential threats of this nature for every attempt, and the ratio of attempts to successful attempts is probably fairly high as well. It isn't worthwhile to try to protect against these kinds of threats.
https://www.schneier.com/essay-087.html
Which is almost how Samuel Byck planned to assassinate Richard Nixon. The difference is that Byck planned to fly into the White House. (No, they're not the same building. Many people are confused on this point.)
He utterly failed in his attempt to hijack the airliner (hint: don't attempt a hijacking while the plane is still on the ground unless you know how to get a plane airborne), however, and Byck killed himself before the police got to him.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Byck
Anyway, movie-plot threats only very rarely come to pass. There are thousands of potential threats of this nature for every attempt, and the ratio of attempts to successful attempts is probably fairly high as well. It isn't worthwhile to try to protect against these kinds of threats.
https://www.schneier.com/essay-087.html
> Nobody expected
But the gov't did.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bojinka_plot
I followed the Yousef trial and only heard about the blowing up airliners over the ocean part. I've never found a reference pre-9/11 about crashing them and believe these details were filled-in only afterwards.
No doubt keeping everyone else in the dark helped keep us safer. /s
But the gov't did.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bojinka_plot
I followed the Yousef trial and only heard about the blowing up airliners over the ocean part. I've never found a reference pre-9/11 about crashing them and believe these details were filled-in only afterwards.
No doubt keeping everyone else in the dark helped keep us safer. /s
This article indicates the crashing part of the plan was first mentioned in the media in June 1995:
http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a060395ciahea...
“Then the ultimate assault on the so-called ‘infidels’: a plane flown by a suicide bomber was to nose-dive and crash into the American headquarters of the CIA, creating carnage.”
In any case, you really believe that the government talking more about Bojinka would have prevented 9/11?
http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a060395ciahea...
“Then the ultimate assault on the so-called ‘infidels’: a plane flown by a suicide bomber was to nose-dive and crash into the American headquarters of the CIA, creating carnage.”
In any case, you really believe that the government talking more about Bojinka would have prevented 9/11?
The only reference is the Australian Advertiser in 1995. It is followed by this:
"While this first mention may be obscure from a United States point of view, the Bojinka planes as weapons plot will be mentioned in other media outlets in the years to come."
And a claim by the CNN correspondent that "We've done stories on it..."
All without citations to back up those claims. Every other reference to this detail at historycommons and everywhere I looked 11 years ago is post-9/11.
Here's what Bush said: "Nobody in our government, at least, and I don't think the prior government, could envision flying airplanes into buildings on such a massive scale."
Notice the "massive" out there. They could envision 10 airliners being blown up over the Pacific, but... Condi couldn't even foresee:
"I don't think anybody could have predicted that ... they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile..."
So apprently they were as ignorant as I was?
These groups were already well known to return to old methods (Bojinka itself was inspired by a mid-air bomb planted on a Tokyo flight earlier in the 90s, planned by KSM himself). My view, if your not going to do anything to mitigate against these techniques, the least you could do is publically warn us, IMO.
A few black kids beat a few white folks, a blond disappears from a cruise ship, and it's non-stop news coverage. Maybe folks would think a little bit after hearing more about Bojinka and a congressman or the FAA would wonder about cockpit intrusion and hijack policies. At least no one would be able to say "nobody could have foreseen"
"While this first mention may be obscure from a United States point of view, the Bojinka planes as weapons plot will be mentioned in other media outlets in the years to come."
And a claim by the CNN correspondent that "We've done stories on it..."
All without citations to back up those claims. Every other reference to this detail at historycommons and everywhere I looked 11 years ago is post-9/11.
Here's what Bush said: "Nobody in our government, at least, and I don't think the prior government, could envision flying airplanes into buildings on such a massive scale."
Notice the "massive" out there. They could envision 10 airliners being blown up over the Pacific, but... Condi couldn't even foresee:
"I don't think anybody could have predicted that ... they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile..."
So apprently they were as ignorant as I was?
These groups were already well known to return to old methods (Bojinka itself was inspired by a mid-air bomb planted on a Tokyo flight earlier in the 90s, planned by KSM himself). My view, if your not going to do anything to mitigate against these techniques, the least you could do is publically warn us, IMO.
A few black kids beat a few white folks, a blond disappears from a cruise ship, and it's non-stop news coverage. Maybe folks would think a little bit after hearing more about Bojinka and a congressman or the FAA would wonder about cockpit intrusion and hijack policies. At least no one would be able to say "nobody could have foreseen"
Good points I guess, I just have a hard time believing publicizing these claims more would have had much of an effect on policy. I'll just point out the irony of your username and leave it at that :)
And that's what reinforced cockpit doors are for; if you can't gain access to the pilots then you can't hijack the plane. If you can't hijack the plane, then you can't turn it into a missile. Everything else is just a waste if you're just concerned with preventing the plane from becoming a missile.
You have a major flaw in your logic.
There are 3 actors:
S -- the security apparatus, the TSA, airlines, the state, the laws and rules they create, air marshals, NSA etc.).
A -- attackers
E -- everyone else, regular passengers
The flaw is that E is stupid, static, unable to learn form the past, need to be constantly protected by S.
A is smart, flexible, able to adapt and learn from mistakes ("ha we took X planes down, now we learned and we'll take X*5 planes down!").
S is also responsible, smart, it needs to act as a parent protecting and handling E. It also learns from the past, and if necessary it might impose arbitrary restrictions on E (security checks, black lists) in order to protect them from A.
You see the problem? Don't feel bad that is a very common mistake to make. Many people and the official reaction from S also follows the same logic (maybe you just internalized their PR?).
In fact not only did E learn better and was more effective, it has a track record to prove it. It immediately adapted (within hours!) and made sure to bring the plane down in a rural PA area not in NYC. TSA on the other hand, after years, billions of dollars and millions of man hours wasted still has not caught one single terrorist red-handed with a bomb ready to go off. (Granted other agencies from S foiled some plots). E has also been busy, they stopped Reid (the shoe bomber, if I am not mistaken).
Anyway, hopefully you see where I am going with this.
There are 3 actors:
S -- the security apparatus, the TSA, airlines, the state, the laws and rules they create, air marshals, NSA etc.).
A -- attackers
E -- everyone else, regular passengers
The flaw is that E is stupid, static, unable to learn form the past, need to be constantly protected by S.
A is smart, flexible, able to adapt and learn from mistakes ("ha we took X planes down, now we learned and we'll take X*5 planes down!").
S is also responsible, smart, it needs to act as a parent protecting and handling E. It also learns from the past, and if necessary it might impose arbitrary restrictions on E (security checks, black lists) in order to protect them from A.
You see the problem? Don't feel bad that is a very common mistake to make. Many people and the official reaction from S also follows the same logic (maybe you just internalized their PR?).
In fact not only did E learn better and was more effective, it has a track record to prove it. It immediately adapted (within hours!) and made sure to bring the plane down in a rural PA area not in NYC. TSA on the other hand, after years, billions of dollars and millions of man hours wasted still has not caught one single terrorist red-handed with a bomb ready to go off. (Granted other agencies from S foiled some plots). E has also been busy, they stopped Reid (the shoe bomber, if I am not mistaken).
Anyway, hopefully you see where I am going with this.
> I look forward to the day when we dial back airport security procedures to the new reality of reinforced cockpit doors and passengers who will fight would-be hijackers to save their lives.
I think this has already happened. I have TSA Pre✓ now, and the security procedure is as follows: plunk your bag down on the X-ray, walk through a metal detector, reclaim your bag. No taking liquids out. No taking your laptop out. Shoes, belt, and coat stay on.
The future (past?) is here :)
I think this has already happened. I have TSA Pre✓ now, and the security procedure is as follows: plunk your bag down on the X-ray, walk through a metal detector, reclaim your bag. No taking liquids out. No taking your laptop out. Shoes, belt, and coat stay on.
The future (past?) is here :)
> The original 9/11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect.
The 9/11 tactic was no longer effect on 9/11, when the passengers of one of the flights heard that such things happened and took down the plane rather than allow it to be used as a weapon.
The only reason the attack worked was because previous hijackings were for ransom, and would be entirely ineffective in the modern climate, where citizens would take it as intent to use the plane as a weapon.
The 9/11 tactic was no longer effect on 9/11, when the passengers of one of the flights heard that such things happened and took down the plane rather than allow it to be used as a weapon.
The only reason the attack worked was because previous hijackings were for ransom, and would be entirely ineffective in the modern climate, where citizens would take it as intent to use the plane as a weapon.
[deleted]
>>The original 9/11 attack showed how simple traditional weapons could be used to leverage using four whole airplanes as nontraditional weapons, three of them with devastating effect, all of them with lethal effect.
For the record, I think this is complete rubbish and USgov isn't being truthful about what/how 9/11 happened. I can't believe a plane full of people were too scared to fight people with box-cutters[1].
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLvkftuCFlI&t=1m55s
For the record, I think this is complete rubbish and USgov isn't being truthful about what/how 9/11 happened. I can't believe a plane full of people were too scared to fight people with box-cutters[1].
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLvkftuCFlI&t=1m55s
People weren't scared to fight people with box cutters, they just had no idea what was happening. The traditional model of airplane hijackings until that date was a hijacking followed by a safe landing and hostage exchange. The smart thing to do, given previous patterns, was to sit quietly and obey instructions.
If you've noticed, people are now much more wary of potential hijacking, to the point where a person who charged the cockpit door was beaten to death by passengers.
If you've noticed, people are now much more wary of potential hijacking, to the point where a person who charged the cockpit door was beaten to death by passengers.
Even cockpit doors are going overboard. The 9-11 attacks were about attacking buildings with flammable liquids. A gasoline tanker and a small bomb would have killed 10× more people and been cheaper.
Getting a gasoline tanker close enough to cause sufficient damage (i.e.: inside) would be hard; not only does it have to get close, it has to get inside. WTC famously had "10,000 pound planters" positioned around the buildings to stop vehicles from getting too close, and IIRC rather aggressive security preventing unwanted vehicles entering; they learned from the garage bombing about a decade before (just didn't extend vertically). Hijacking a just-took-off airliner was the most efficient & surprising way to transport & insert the liquids.
Cockpit doors are a cheap sensible solution. 10,000 pound planters worked until somebody figured out how to go over them.
Cockpit doors are a cheap sensible solution. 10,000 pound planters worked until somebody figured out how to go over them.
A gasoline tanker and bomb would make a fire. As with any other vehicles on the road, they crash and catch fire on a regular basis without taking down sky scrapers.
Hollywood representations of what gas tanks do when ruptured are inaccurate.
Hollywood representations of what gas tanks do when ruptured are inaccurate.
The WTC fell from fire weakening the steel frame.
Yes, from a plane, which first made massive holes in the structure, followed up by the fuel from an airline that carries more than one tanker truck worth of fuel being deposited into the center of the building.
A small leak on the side of a highway is different than the entire tank being ripped open in the lobby.
Good luck getting a tanker truck into a modern skyscraper's lobby. They've all got anti-truck posts concreted in around the perimeter to prevent just that.
"The cost of TSA (direct and indirect through delays, etc.) is immense"
I hate debating based on speculative estimates.. That said, El Al seems to put sky marshalls on every single flight. I would throw in a dime that this would be a more (cost)effective and reliable solution compared to current screening implementations.
I hate debating based on speculative estimates.. That said, El Al seems to put sky marshalls on every single flight. I would throw in a dime that this would be a more (cost)effective and reliable solution compared to current screening implementations.
Air marshals are superflous at this point, in my estimation. Post 9/11 regular passengers have intervened admirably every time the opportunity has arisen.
I haven't been able to find any instance of an air marshal actually confronting a "terrorism-related" event. I'm sure there are examples of them subduing an unruly or drunk passenger; but the sheer magnitude of flights, combined with the fact that on-board threats are very few and far-between, makes me doubt the cost-effectiveness of the program.
I hope they're trained better than that. It would be awfully easy for a small group of terrorists to have one of their group act like a unruly drunk asshole. If an air marshal intervened in that, he'd out himself, allowing any other terrorists on board to jump him from behind at their convenience.
I seem to recall just a couple of months ago the FAA proposed relaxing the rules so that small knives would be legal. Immediately following that, the media reported widespread public condemnation of the proposal by people concerned for their safety.
So as much as I despise this nonsense, this seems to be what a significant, vocal portion of the people want.
So as much as I despise this nonsense, this seems to be what a significant, vocal portion of the people want.
> this seems to be what a significant, vocal portion of the people want.
I wonder how many of them fly, and how many of them are just afraid that once we allow pocket knives on airplanes, they'll start falling out of the sky onto their heads.
I wonder how many of them fly, and how many of them are just afraid that once we allow pocket knives on airplanes, they'll start falling out of the sky onto their heads.
Many flight attendants were vocal about their opposition.
https://www.change.org/petitions/tsa-do-not-allow-knives-on-...
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/06/business/la-fi-tsa-a...
https://www.change.org/petitions/tsa-do-not-allow-knives-on-...
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/06/business/la-fi-tsa-a...
Nice; the change.org link references the Boston Marathon bombing, as if it had any relevance whatsoever to this issue.
"it's not terribly different from a random attack in the street or a shopping mall"
You are right. However, the one difference is the reaction to an attack. It is fairly straightforward (these days) to get responders on the scene in a mall. A shooting or knife fight in an airplane is much harder to contain or react to.
Overall though, I agree with Schneier about the need for intelligence replacing TSA check points.
Overall though, I agree with Schneier about the need for intelligence replacing TSA check points.
Well in Kenya the reaction wasn't great. Perhaps other countries are better prepared.
Missing the point. TSA is just another jobs program. Another example of how a large bureauocracy has to keep expanding control. The best solution against terrorism is for people to be brave enough to accept it, and brave enough to defend themselves and the people around them. No government will ever encourage this sort of behavior because it gives up too much control in the process.
At any rate, the TSA is not going away. Just step in the scanner, raise your arms like you're already a perp, step out, and be on your way.
At any rate, the TSA is not going away. Just step in the scanner, raise your arms like you're already a perp, step out, and be on your way.
> Missing the point. TSA is just another jobs program.
TSA is more a means of moving the liability risk of security from private firms (starting with the airlines, but its creeping out to other areas) to the government (which can simply handwave much of it away with sovereign immunity) as a subsidy (by removing risk) to industry. The jobs were there before nationalization, they were just private jobs where private firms were at risk of liability if the job wasn't done right.
TSA is more a means of moving the liability risk of security from private firms (starting with the airlines, but its creeping out to other areas) to the government (which can simply handwave much of it away with sovereign immunity) as a subsidy (by removing risk) to industry. The jobs were there before nationalization, they were just private jobs where private firms were at risk of liability if the job wasn't done right.
"The only super-substantial potential damage stems from an explosive of some sort, not a box-cutter, knife, or anything of the sort."
Not entirely true. If you can get some Mercury on board, it's party-time. Mercury just loves Aluminium...
Not entirely true. If you can get some Mercury on board, it's party-time. Mercury just loves Aluminium...
It may be my libertarded paranoia, but I think airport security screening in the last decade has been largely about diverting public money into private hands.
Metal detectors are so cheap now that they can be placed in urban public schools, and every airport already has plenty of them. Pass-through x-ray luggage scanners are likewise already nearly ubiquitous. Automated gas chromatographs, microwave passenger scanners, and x-ray backscatter passenger scanners--those things are new, big, and shiny, and no one responsible for budgeting knows how much they should cost.
Meanwhile, Schneier repeatedly and convincingly argues that the measures that we are paying through the nose for them to use are worthless to increase the physical security of the airplanes and their passengers. But the TSA already bought them. It doesn't matter if they work. They have them: they use them.
All that remains now is to justify the budget for the labor force. The ID checker, that's a job. The pat-down guy, that's a job. The guys that stand in front of the tablet app that digitally flips a coin to see if you get your hands swabbed and chromatographed, apparently that's three jobs. The guy who stands at the exit to make sure no wrong-way traffic gets through, that's a job for every exit.
Except they're proposing that the exit guard jobs be replaced with expensive machines now, too. Give it another few years and you'll have DNA sequencers and single-use biological test chips involved somehow. Perhaps after the next airborne pathogen scare, they will be introduced to reassure passengers that no one on their plane has ebolaria or influengue or tubercuningitis or whatever.
Conspiracy hypotheses are easy if you just follow the money.
Metal detectors are so cheap now that they can be placed in urban public schools, and every airport already has plenty of them. Pass-through x-ray luggage scanners are likewise already nearly ubiquitous. Automated gas chromatographs, microwave passenger scanners, and x-ray backscatter passenger scanners--those things are new, big, and shiny, and no one responsible for budgeting knows how much they should cost.
Meanwhile, Schneier repeatedly and convincingly argues that the measures that we are paying through the nose for them to use are worthless to increase the physical security of the airplanes and their passengers. But the TSA already bought them. It doesn't matter if they work. They have them: they use them.
All that remains now is to justify the budget for the labor force. The ID checker, that's a job. The pat-down guy, that's a job. The guys that stand in front of the tablet app that digitally flips a coin to see if you get your hands swabbed and chromatographed, apparently that's three jobs. The guy who stands at the exit to make sure no wrong-way traffic gets through, that's a job for every exit.
Except they're proposing that the exit guard jobs be replaced with expensive machines now, too. Give it another few years and you'll have DNA sequencers and single-use biological test chips involved somehow. Perhaps after the next airborne pathogen scare, they will be introduced to reassure passengers that no one on their plane has ebolaria or influengue or tubercuningitis or whatever.
Conspiracy hypotheses are easy if you just follow the money.
I believe the term is [0] "libtard" not "libertard".
[0] - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UubTrNKYf-8
[0] - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UubTrNKYf-8
This is neoliberalism 101, you don't even have to bring up "military-industrial complex". The state is increasingly working with industry (pseudo-privatization), in return the industry increasingly influences state policy. The system keeps working as long as contracts keep going to a small group of big companies (the only ones capable of "working the system") and as long as the big companies can keep influencing politics.
It's simple math considering the "state" is just a collection of politicians easily influenced by fear-driven populism, media, money, nepotism, and their old private school friends. And on the other side there are extremely powerful billion-dollar defense contractors.
It's simple math considering the "state" is just a collection of politicians easily influenced by fear-driven populism, media, money, nepotism, and their old private school friends. And on the other side there are extremely powerful billion-dollar defense contractors.
I mentioned this as a comment on the original HN discussion about Booth's article (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6742780).
The TSA itself has admitted that terrorist threats to aviation are nonexistent: http://tsaoutofourpants.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/tsa-admits-...
Even if we ignore the independent investigations from third parties, what more evidence could we ask for that the TSA is ineffective and superfluous, if not its own admission?
The TSA itself has admitted that terrorist threats to aviation are nonexistent: http://tsaoutofourpants.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/tsa-admits-...
Even if we ignore the independent investigations from third parties, what more evidence could we ask for that the TSA is ineffective and superfluous, if not its own admission?
The irony is that the majority of the terrorist attacks on planes in recent memory have been stopped by vigilant passengers on the plane itself. Since 9/11, using the plane as the weapon is no longer an option. The passengers are going to fight back, without question, a la Flight 93. Additionally, reinforcing and locking the cockpit doors post 9/11 has put a stop to physical takeover of the aircraft, along with an expanded air marshal program. Bag through an x-ray and walk through a metal detector should be more than sufficient. At the airport in Jakarta, Indonesia, that is how it works.
Of course, the problem is that we now live in a fear driven society where the bad people are literally around every corner and each time we step onto an airplane we are taking our own life into our hands.
Of course, the problem is that we now live in a fear driven society where the bad people are literally around every corner and each time we step onto an airplane we are taking our own life into our hands.
I typically think Schneier is too cavalier about "security theater", but in this case I agree completely. On the other hand, I don't think that means airport security should be drastically scaled back: There are probably 10x as many dumb potential attackers as smart ones, and it makes sense to be eliminate the easy avenues for the dumb ones while you concentrate other resources on the smart ones. It's also important not to ignore both the intelligence value of security checks as well as their potential forensic value in the event of a successful attack.
TSA actually seems to be making an effort to get smarter about its screening. Trusted passenger programs are expanding dramatically, and I expect the overall burden on the traveling public to decline over time.
TSA actually seems to be making an effort to get smarter about its screening. Trusted passenger programs are expanding dramatically, and I expect the overall burden on the traveling public to decline over time.
> On the other hand, I don't think that means airport security should be drastically scaled back
It absolutely should be drastically scaled back. Or eliminated entirely. The thing you're ignoring is that the current level of airport security kills a lot of people. It does so largely by making flying more expensive and inconvenient so people drive instead of fly and as a result die in auto accidents. The TSA makes us all poorer and causes a great many deaths for no clear benefit whatsoever. The hypothetical attackers who you are postulating might be deterred are a sufficiently weird edge case that it's unlikely they exist at all. Basically, you're imagining somebody who has all the following attributes at once. He or she:
(a) is highly motivated to do evil things that kill lots of people in a high-profile fashion
(b) has the resources to actually implement a plan to do these evil things.
(c) is SMART enough that the attack WOULD succeed were it not for security. If they made a bomb, they were successful at figuring out how to make one that would work well (unlike the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber)
(d) but is DUMB enough that they just can't figure out any way to get around security.
(e) but is SMART enough to REALIZE they can't get around security, so they don't try to do so anyway (explaining the fact that security has never ever caught even a single person trying to do so)
(f) but is DUMB enough that they can't think of any way to use the same resources to carry out some OTHER attack that kills a similar number of people with similar terrorizing effect, like by attacking the security line or a bridge or a tunnel or a shopping mall.
If you can find anybody with all those characteristics at once, THAT is the person who airport security has saved us from.
It absolutely should be drastically scaled back. Or eliminated entirely. The thing you're ignoring is that the current level of airport security kills a lot of people. It does so largely by making flying more expensive and inconvenient so people drive instead of fly and as a result die in auto accidents. The TSA makes us all poorer and causes a great many deaths for no clear benefit whatsoever. The hypothetical attackers who you are postulating might be deterred are a sufficiently weird edge case that it's unlikely they exist at all. Basically, you're imagining somebody who has all the following attributes at once. He or she:
(a) is highly motivated to do evil things that kill lots of people in a high-profile fashion
(b) has the resources to actually implement a plan to do these evil things.
(c) is SMART enough that the attack WOULD succeed were it not for security. If they made a bomb, they were successful at figuring out how to make one that would work well (unlike the shoe bomber and the underwear bomber)
(d) but is DUMB enough that they just can't figure out any way to get around security.
(e) but is SMART enough to REALIZE they can't get around security, so they don't try to do so anyway (explaining the fact that security has never ever caught even a single person trying to do so)
(f) but is DUMB enough that they can't think of any way to use the same resources to carry out some OTHER attack that kills a similar number of people with similar terrorizing effect, like by attacking the security line or a bridge or a tunnel or a shopping mall.
If you can find anybody with all those characteristics at once, THAT is the person who airport security has saved us from.
Exactly, there is a massive opportunity cost [1] at play here when you exchange very neutral/limited returns in security, for crippling airport efficiency and disrupting the lives of individuals making them not want to fly (invading privacy, long lines, belittling treatment, etc).
Just arguing whether or not TSA is effective at stopping smart vs dumb criminals is too limited of a discussion. It needs to also factor in the trade-offs at risk of being able to even do so.
Especially considering the TSA is reporting tens of thousands of false-positives for every real security threat prevented. That ratio can't be ignored as a counter-weight.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunity_cost
Just arguing whether or not TSA is effective at stopping smart vs dumb criminals is too limited of a discussion. It needs to also factor in the trade-offs at risk of being able to even do so.
Especially considering the TSA is reporting tens of thousands of false-positives for every real security threat prevented. That ratio can't be ignored as a counter-weight.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opportunity_cost
> There are probably 10x as many dumb potential attackers as smart ones, and it makes sense to be eliminate the easy avenues for the dumb ones while you concentrate other resources on the smart ones. It's also important not to ignore both the intelligence value of security checks as well as their potential forensic value in the event of a successful attack.
This is the point that is always missed when talking about "security theater".
Smart and practiced people can make anything look easy. An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute. Is it impossible? No, but almost nothing is impossible.
Making an attack difficult on a plane also eliminates the majority of severally mentally unstable from carrying it out. You can kill 300+ people in one instant, it is impossible to stop the truly motivated and capable (ultra tail risk) attacker, but it is crucial to stop the rest of the tail from casually taking down an airliner.
This is the point that is always missed when talking about "security theater".
Smart and practiced people can make anything look easy. An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute. Is it impossible? No, but almost nothing is impossible.
Making an attack difficult on a plane also eliminates the majority of severally mentally unstable from carrying it out. You can kill 300+ people in one instant, it is impossible to stop the truly motivated and capable (ultra tail risk) attacker, but it is crucial to stop the rest of the tail from casually taking down an airliner.
An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute. Is it impossible? No, but almost nothing is impossible.
I don't think you are making the point you intend to make - the very fact that pulling off a successful attack is inherently difficult is what stops those people, not any security agency.
Same thing with attacks anywhere else. For example: The Times Square bomber couldn't even build a working bomb despite two college degrees and the 2007 London & Glasgow Airport bombers couldn't figure it out either, for their swan song they put propane tanks in their jeep cherokee, lit themselves on fire and drove into a barricade in front of the airport, despite one of them having a doctor's education.
In all of its existence, the TSA has never detained someone who was later convicted on terrorism charges, despite the vast lowering of the standard of evidence for such charges since 9/11. The fact that we've seen so few attacks on "softer" targets (roughly 3 civilians have been killed in islamic-extremist attacks on US soil since 9/11) means that the size of the actual threat is practically zero - including the fools.
I don't think you are making the point you intend to make - the very fact that pulling off a successful attack is inherently difficult is what stops those people, not any security agency.
Same thing with attacks anywhere else. For example: The Times Square bomber couldn't even build a working bomb despite two college degrees and the 2007 London & Glasgow Airport bombers couldn't figure it out either, for their swan song they put propane tanks in their jeep cherokee, lit themselves on fire and drove into a barricade in front of the airport, despite one of them having a doctor's education.
In all of its existence, the TSA has never detained someone who was later convicted on terrorism charges, despite the vast lowering of the standard of evidence for such charges since 9/11. The fact that we've seen so few attacks on "softer" targets (roughly 3 civilians have been killed in islamic-extremist attacks on US soil since 9/11) means that the size of the actual threat is practically zero - including the fools.
There was a shooting at LA just weeks ago. Lots of less than spectacular events have occurred on soft targets over the past 10 years. Each of those may have easily converted in to a more spectacular attack.
The marathon bombers were targeting the marathon for the message. They may have choosen to use an airliner to make that message had it not been for TSA. We don't know. There just isn't quality enough data on either side to remove airport security.
The marathon bombers were targeting the marathon for the message. They may have choosen to use an airliner to make that message had it not been for TSA. We don't know. There just isn't quality enough data on either side to remove airport security.
There was a shooting at LA just weeks ago.
You mean Paul Anthony Ciancia who was pissed off about all the excessive security and deliberately targeted TSA agents hoping to commit suicide-by-cop?
Lots of less than spectacular events have occurred on soft targets over the past 10 years. Each of those may have easily converted in to a more spectacular attack.
Citing all attacks anywhere as justification for the TSA is a recipe for the unlimited ratcheting up of security. It is an enormous leap in logic to assume somebody with a semi-auto rifle or a crock-pot bomb is capable of getting them past pre-911 airport security and also doing something effective with it once they have. An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute.
You mean Paul Anthony Ciancia who was pissed off about all the excessive security and deliberately targeted TSA agents hoping to commit suicide-by-cop?
Lots of less than spectacular events have occurred on soft targets over the past 10 years. Each of those may have easily converted in to a more spectacular attack.
Citing all attacks anywhere as justification for the TSA is a recipe for the unlimited ratcheting up of security. It is an enormous leap in logic to assume somebody with a semi-auto rifle or a crock-pot bomb is capable of getting them past pre-911 airport security and also doing something effective with it once they have. An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute.
[deleted]
But there's little if any evidence that there's any real threat of mentally unstable people, or not particularly smart terrorists, wanting to carry out attacks either.
If these people existed, they'd be attacking trains/metros today. The Madrid and London bombings show how devastating these can be - and on a train, you could do it with a pretty high chance of getting away uninjured - just leave your bag on the train and get off before it's due to explode.
Yet despite the ridiculous ease, low risk and effectiveness of such an attack, they still very, very rarely happen.
If these people existed, they'd be attacking trains/metros today. The Madrid and London bombings show how devastating these can be - and on a train, you could do it with a pretty high chance of getting away uninjured - just leave your bag on the train and get off before it's due to explode.
Yet despite the ridiculous ease, low risk and effectiveness of such an attack, they still very, very rarely happen.
Please take a look at the list of airline hijakings which prompted the creation of airport security.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings
Without security, you can bet that this list of American Hijackings would continue to present day. Not everyone needs to blow up a plane to cause mass havoc.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_hijackings
Without security, you can bet that this list of American Hijackings would continue to present day. Not everyone needs to blow up a plane to cause mass havoc.
"this list of American Hijackings"?
I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. From that list, there were 2 involving the US in the 90s and 4 in the 80s. Is the huge increase in disruption, inconvenience and intrusion for every traveller really necessary to cut that level of threat down?
And how many of the attempted hijackings since 2001 had anywhere near the impact of Madrid or London's train/bus bombs? If there's really terrorists trying to cause havoc, why aren't they taking this easy option?
I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. From that list, there were 2 involving the US in the 90s and 4 in the 80s. Is the huge increase in disruption, inconvenience and intrusion for every traveller really necessary to cut that level of threat down?
And how many of the attempted hijackings since 2001 had anywhere near the impact of Madrid or London's train/bus bombs? If there's really terrorists trying to cause havoc, why aren't they taking this easy option?
I'm talking about the time period before security screening started at most airports... when hijackings were common. Look at the 50s-70s.
An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute.
It is currently difficult to execute. It won't be if we had no security.
Search for "Security screening" on this wiki article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metal_detector
You will notice that they were rolled out in the 70s as security screening started at airports. It was proven effective and unless you can make an argument why people wouldn't pose security threats now with no security checkpoints you won't convince any actual decision maker anywhere.
An attack on an airplane is simply too challenging for the vast majority of people to execute.
It is currently difficult to execute. It won't be if we had no security.
Search for "Security screening" on this wiki article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metal_detector
You will notice that they were rolled out in the 70s as security screening started at airports. It was proven effective and unless you can make an argument why people wouldn't pose security threats now with no security checkpoints you won't convince any actual decision maker anywhere.
From that list :-
50s - none involving America. 60s - 5. 70s - 14 (3 of which, as far as I can tell with any fatalities).
However, I'm not really arguing against zero security at airports. What I'm arguing against is the ludicrous increase in security procedures since 9/11.
>It is currently difficult to execute. It won't be if we had no security
It's not difficult to execute bombings on trains, and they are hugely impactful when it happens. Yet they rarely happen. You seem to be ignoring this.
50s - none involving America. 60s - 5. 70s - 14 (3 of which, as far as I can tell with any fatalities).
However, I'm not really arguing against zero security at airports. What I'm arguing against is the ludicrous increase in security procedures since 9/11.
>It is currently difficult to execute. It won't be if we had no security
It's not difficult to execute bombings on trains, and they are hugely impactful when it happens. Yet they rarely happen. You seem to be ignoring this.
The 70s are the decade where there were many hijackings. That's also when air travel became more commonplace and huge jets were more widely in service.
In the 60s if you weren't a military person, foreigner arriving from or headed to home, or white guy with a suit, you'd be picked up on pretty quickly, security checkpoints or no. Also, we weren't exporting trillions of dollars to and fomenting unrest in the Middle East in those days.
In the 90s, I used to fly to Baltimore on Southwest to get drunk for $30 with friends for the weekend. If I couldn't make it, I'd give the ticket to someone else or sell it. Totally different universe and threat model than ye olden times.
In the 60s if you weren't a military person, foreigner arriving from or headed to home, or white guy with a suit, you'd be picked up on pretty quickly, security checkpoints or no. Also, we weren't exporting trillions of dollars to and fomenting unrest in the Middle East in those days.
In the 90s, I used to fly to Baltimore on Southwest to get drunk for $30 with friends for the weekend. If I couldn't make it, I'd give the ticket to someone else or sell it. Totally different universe and threat model than ye olden times.
I agree. But I am really tired of having problems because the deodorant I use has 150ml of liquid instead of 100.
I have never, ever been stopped due to what I consider reasonable amounts of liquid/gel/aerosol beyond the 100ml limit. Typical culprits: deodorant, shaving cream and sunscreen. I do my best to fit everything in a 1qt baggie, but typically the shaving cream and sunscreen are just jammed into a running shoe or put in a separate pocket in my carry-on. Never, ever been stopped. Also, never been confiscated by the TSA random checked bag checks in the couple of cases I've had to gate check a carry-on.
For anyone who doesn't already know or wouldn't be willing to spend the $100 for Global Entry + PreCheck, the AMEX Platinum card covers the cost for both (along with free access to most AIrline lounges, and a free membership to Priority Club, which gives you access to even more lounges). Totally worth the annual fee for frequent travelers, especially ones who find themselves on random airlines connecting random airports.
For anyone who doesn't already know or wouldn't be willing to spend the $100 for Global Entry + PreCheck, the AMEX Platinum card covers the cost for both (along with free access to most AIrline lounges, and a free membership to Priority Club, which gives you access to even more lounges). Totally worth the annual fee for frequent travelers, especially ones who find themselves on random airlines connecting random airports.
For anyone who doesn't already know or wouldn't be willing to spend the $100 for Global Entry + PreCheck
These programs are the ultimate sign of just how pointless airport security is. There is simply no way that $100 is even remotely enough money to cover an investigation of any effectiveness whatsoever. It's probably just enough to cover the cost of checking the same lists the TSA already checks on every ticket booked and then adding you to the list of people who get to skip security most of the time.
Those programs are just a way for the TSA to co-opt the ire of the kind of rich and powerful people who might have the political influence to reform the agency. 10 to 1 every member of congress has signed up for Pre-Check. If you believe that the TSA is defending against a real threat, these programs, by their very existence, create a giant gaping hole in the TSA's security. The only reason it hasn't been used to perpetrate an attack is because there is effectively no risk in the first place.
These programs are the ultimate sign of just how pointless airport security is. There is simply no way that $100 is even remotely enough money to cover an investigation of any effectiveness whatsoever. It's probably just enough to cover the cost of checking the same lists the TSA already checks on every ticket booked and then adding you to the list of people who get to skip security most of the time.
Those programs are just a way for the TSA to co-opt the ire of the kind of rich and powerful people who might have the political influence to reform the agency. 10 to 1 every member of congress has signed up for Pre-Check. If you believe that the TSA is defending against a real threat, these programs, by their very existence, create a giant gaping hole in the TSA's security. The only reason it hasn't been used to perpetrate an attack is because there is effectively no risk in the first place.
You're totally right, of course. My in-person security interview was a joke. The officer didn't even try to ask any questions. He validated my contact information and we shot the shit while their computer system logged his approval of my application. Took maybe 15 minutes of waiting my turn with a half dozen other poor saps who had also scheduled the interview 2-3 months in advance, and then 5 minutes for the actual processing.
Interestingly, my airport now has a third(!) category of security line, for airline elevated status holders. They skip the long line for the normal screenings, but then go through the normal "remove shoes, belts, jackets and laptops" part, so it's like getting half a reprieve. I'm convinced that by this time next year there will be have so much dilution of the process that everyone will be treated identically again and it'll probably be based on the Pre-Check standards: x-ray machine, no significant liquids, no removal of shoes/belt/jacket.
Interestingly, my airport now has a third(!) category of security line, for airline elevated status holders. They skip the long line for the normal screenings, but then go through the normal "remove shoes, belts, jackets and laptops" part, so it's like getting half a reprieve. I'm convinced that by this time next year there will be have so much dilution of the process that everyone will be treated identically again and it'll probably be based on the Pre-Check standards: x-ray machine, no significant liquids, no removal of shoes/belt/jacket.
They threw my deodorant in Frankfurt because of that. It was very annoying, I could not buy it for one week as I was very busy with work.
Then there is the problem with medicines. I have a light psoriasis. Remember that before the 100ml extension, we could not carry liquid at all...
Then there is the problem with medicines. I have a light psoriasis. Remember that before the 100ml extension, we could not carry liquid at all...
> Then there is the problem with medicines.
That right there is a beautiful example of idiocy regarding TSA policies. Remember that that wasn't even a result of 9/11, it was after police foiled a plot to blow up planes using liquids in the UK in 2006 before the terrorists even had a concrete plan. It's always after something happens that TSA reacts, making me believe even more strongly that what passengers get to personally deal with is mostly just security theater rather than anything actually useful.
Bonus points: there was never a limit on the medication you can bring with you (albeit haphazardly enforced with absurd requirements sometimes) even when all liquids were banned, and there has always been a gigantic backlash every time there was a news story about medically necessary liquids being tested or confiscated in unreasonable ways so TSA has never really dared to ban them in the first place. The best thing now is that they don't even bother to check that what you're carrying on is okay most of the time in my experience, nor have they ever cared that I didn't bother to bag things like inhalers separately and declare them to anyone. But they have thrown out a nearly empty toothpaste container for being an ounce too large - that I had gotten past security with a week before - just because.
I'm looking forward to traveling as a "trusted traveler" (aka pay them money!) tomorrow where TSA will even explicitly tell me to leave my baggies of liquids in my bag. :)
That right there is a beautiful example of idiocy regarding TSA policies. Remember that that wasn't even a result of 9/11, it was after police foiled a plot to blow up planes using liquids in the UK in 2006 before the terrorists even had a concrete plan. It's always after something happens that TSA reacts, making me believe even more strongly that what passengers get to personally deal with is mostly just security theater rather than anything actually useful.
Bonus points: there was never a limit on the medication you can bring with you (albeit haphazardly enforced with absurd requirements sometimes) even when all liquids were banned, and there has always been a gigantic backlash every time there was a news story about medically necessary liquids being tested or confiscated in unreasonable ways so TSA has never really dared to ban them in the first place. The best thing now is that they don't even bother to check that what you're carrying on is okay most of the time in my experience, nor have they ever cared that I didn't bother to bag things like inhalers separately and declare them to anyone. But they have thrown out a nearly empty toothpaste container for being an ounce too large - that I had gotten past security with a week before - just because.
I'm looking forward to traveling as a "trusted traveler" (aka pay them money!) tomorrow where TSA will even explicitly tell me to leave my baggies of liquids in my bag. :)
airport security is not built to prevent evil geniuses to act out a brilliant act of terror macguyver style.
airport security is there to prevent someone to walk onto a plane carrying a boxcutter knife - which they failed to prevent at 9/11.
it's to weed out the idiots, mentally unstable, etc. the times square bomber types.
it relies on underpaid, undereducated personnel. because it exists in reality, which means it is constrained by cost. it also relies on chance and probability. for every post here about sneaking stuff through you have posts of people being held in interrogation or even denied flying triggered by minor details.
and yeah, how many security researchers would post if they got caught? survivorship bias at play.
airport security is there to prevent someone to walk onto a plane carrying a boxcutter knife - which they failed to prevent at 9/11.
it's to weed out the idiots, mentally unstable, etc. the times square bomber types.
it relies on underpaid, undereducated personnel. because it exists in reality, which means it is constrained by cost. it also relies on chance and probability. for every post here about sneaking stuff through you have posts of people being held in interrogation or even denied flying triggered by minor details.
and yeah, how many security researchers would post if they got caught? survivorship bias at play.
"and yeah, how many security researchers would post if they got caught? survivorship bias at play."
Used to something similar at play with stock picking. You heard about people's successful investments but never their losses which they of course kept quiet. This is of course more old school. Now people are much more open about airing daily laundry. My guess is that Schnier would blog about something that didn't work not that that detracts from your point. A lesser known security researcher would not necessarily act the same. Not to mention separately that "getting caught" means you have an interesting story for the press.
Used to something similar at play with stock picking. You heard about people's successful investments but never their losses which they of course kept quiet. This is of course more old school. Now people are much more open about airing daily laundry. My guess is that Schnier would blog about something that didn't work not that that detracts from your point. A lesser known security researcher would not necessarily act the same. Not to mention separately that "getting caught" means you have an interesting story for the press.
> airport security is there to prevent someone to walk onto a plane carrying a boxcutter knife - which they failed to prevent at 9/11
That's the point of this sort of thing - it won't. As the article demonstrates, the tools to put together a weapon more lethal than a boxcutter are available within the airport terminal.
That's the point of this sort of thing - it won't. As the article demonstrates, the tools to put together a weapon more lethal than a boxcutter are available within the airport terminal.
Boxcutters are no longer effective tools of terror on airliners. They ceased to be so on the morning of 9/11/2001. Why try to stop them now?
I think you're underestimating the havoc that a group of well-trained individuals armed with knives could cause in the middle of a transcontinental flight even with a locked, reinforced cabin door.
I agree it's not as clear cut as a ban on firearms or explosives, but it seems like a sensible restriction to me, worth enforcing as best we can.
I agree it's not as clear cut as a ban on firearms or explosives, but it seems like a sensible restriction to me, worth enforcing as best we can.
A "group of well-trained individuals" is going to manage to create the weapons mentioned in the link in the OP. You're never going to be able to stop someone who really puts their mind to it.
The rationale in this sub-thread was to leave the current security in place "to weed out the idiots, mentally unstable, etc", and those people will be stopped by passengers after the mindset of what the goal of an airplane is changed on 9/11 (it used to be "they want to redirect the flight to Cuba" now it's "they want to redirect the flight into a building").
The rationale in this sub-thread was to leave the current security in place "to weed out the idiots, mentally unstable, etc", and those people will be stopped by passengers after the mindset of what the goal of an airplane is changed on 9/11 (it used to be "they want to redirect the flight to Cuba" now it's "they want to redirect the flight into a building").
Better be a big group or they're going to be drastically outnumbered. Since 9/11 here have been several cases of real or apparent threats on aircraft that were quickly ended when passengers piled on.
> I think you're underestimating the havoc that a group of well-trained individuals armed with knives could cause in the middle of a transcontinental flight even with a locked, reinforced cabin door.
Of course they can do a lot of damage. But they don't have to be on a plane for that. They can do a lot of damage on the street. The big question is: can they take control of the plane and use it as a weapon?
Nowadays, passengers know that hijacking means likely death. That knife won't stop everybody.
Of course they can do a lot of damage. But they don't have to be on a plane for that. They can do a lot of damage on the street. The big question is: can they take control of the plane and use it as a weapon?
Nowadays, passengers know that hijacking means likely death. That knife won't stop everybody.
Maybe I am. The way I envision such an attack, they pull out their knives and start threatening or cutting people. Then the rest of the passengers, knowing that they will die if they don't stop this, dogpile on the attackers and subdue them. They then tie them to their seats with whatever is handy and hand them over to the police when they land. Where does that go wrong?
When they pull their knives but immediately grab a child and threaten their life. Who is going to be the one to start this dog pile but also cause the demise of a child?
Passengers today know that everyone on the airplane is going to die if they don't act. That child is already dead if they don't act. People with nothing to lose are extremely dangerous, and that's what any hijacked passenger is now. Sun Tzu says never to back your enemy into a corner with no way out. 9/11 only worked because the passengers thought they had a way out. Nobody thinks that now.
What about extreme physical fitness and martial arts? Or, to quote Carlin, "really big hands" - does a knife or 10 really make the difference?
All the pilots have to do in that case is start maneuvering the plane in a manner that makes standing up impossible.
It's really very easy to stop this type of thing.
It's really very easy to stop this type of thing.
> airport security is there to prevent someone to walk onto a plane carrying a boxcutter knife
Sorry, but no. Sharpened edge of a credit card, pieces of belt, metal parts of the shoes, pins from the hat - that's just what I can come up with in seconds - these are the things I always get on the plane without issues and would be just as effective as weapons as the boxcutter knife. They may prevent boxcutter knifes, but they don't prevent sharp items in general.
If you want to go for dangerous, cutting items, you don't even have to take them with you. Buy a bottle of wine and smash the bottom off in the toilet - it's both better to hold in hand and more damaging when you wave it around.
Sorry, but no. Sharpened edge of a credit card, pieces of belt, metal parts of the shoes, pins from the hat - that's just what I can come up with in seconds - these are the things I always get on the plane without issues and would be just as effective as weapons as the boxcutter knife. They may prevent boxcutter knifes, but they don't prevent sharp items in general.
If you want to go for dangerous, cutting items, you don't even have to take them with you. Buy a bottle of wine and smash the bottom off in the toilet - it's both better to hold in hand and more damaging when you wave it around.
Flying last week I watched a food delivery man in front of me go through security. He rolled an aluminum dolly loaded with boxes of foot up and put all the boxes on the xray conveyor. He was then scanned by the TSA and they rolled the dolly through to the otherside of the checkpoint after looking under it.
Point: the dolly was a hollow tube framerail construction. They didn't xray it as it was too large. They just rolled it through the screaming metal detector. You could have put whatever you wanted inside those framerails. And that's just the victualler. There are myriad ways to get stuff through. Theater at its best.
Point: the dolly was a hollow tube framerail construction. They didn't xray it as it was too large. They just rolled it through the screaming metal detector. You could have put whatever you wanted inside those framerails. And that's just the victualler. There are myriad ways to get stuff through. Theater at its best.
> it's to weed out the idiots, mentally unstable, etc. the times square bomber types.
Why? They don't seem to be attacking large stadiums or subways.
Why? They don't seem to be attacking large stadiums or subways.
At this point, airport security is there to make people feel safe. That's it.
Do you really think a plane full of people who know they will die unless they do something about it, will let a terrorist get away with it? On the other hand, do you really think so many people would have continued to fly as often as they did before 9/11 without some sort of reassurance that something is being done to prevent highjacks?
Terrorism can be anywhere, and it does not need an airplane to happen. Now, if terrorists are not going to use planes to cause terror then you should be thinking on the next thing that's going to be used. There are many uses for perceived security and not all of them involve keeping people safe.
Do you really think a plane full of people who know they will die unless they do something about it, will let a terrorist get away with it? On the other hand, do you really think so many people would have continued to fly as often as they did before 9/11 without some sort of reassurance that something is being done to prevent highjacks?
Terrorism can be anywhere, and it does not need an airplane to happen. Now, if terrorists are not going to use planes to cause terror then you should be thinking on the next thing that's going to be used. There are many uses for perceived security and not all of them involve keeping people safe.
"I think the answer is simple: airplane terrorism isn't a big risk. There are very few actual terrorists, and..."
This is very true. Terrorism isn't a very serious problem or threat - it just got disproportionate attention from a combination of 9/11 and ignorance of the American public. I almost hate to say it, but it is sadly true.
I've 'evaded' airport security a few times - and they give me extra hassle for being an arab. I have nothing against profiling - even if it wastes my time it is /sensible/ and not racist at all.
By far the worst case is the one time I turned up at an airport suited and booted and looking especially white. They found the liquids in my hand luggage that I accidentally left there, and let me keep them.
Its all for show, the idea that a government is in control and secure when they make 101 security fuckups like meeting in the same place regularly (!).
If I was in anyway inclined to be a terrorist the result would be devastating - I'm glad the people we are dealing with in that regard are exceptionally rare and stupid (stupid enough to try what they do... as well as stupid enough to not have anything like an organised or well prepared strategy).
This is very true. Terrorism isn't a very serious problem or threat - it just got disproportionate attention from a combination of 9/11 and ignorance of the American public. I almost hate to say it, but it is sadly true.
I've 'evaded' airport security a few times - and they give me extra hassle for being an arab. I have nothing against profiling - even if it wastes my time it is /sensible/ and not racist at all.
By far the worst case is the one time I turned up at an airport suited and booted and looking especially white. They found the liquids in my hand luggage that I accidentally left there, and let me keep them.
Its all for show, the idea that a government is in control and secure when they make 101 security fuckups like meeting in the same place regularly (!).
If I was in anyway inclined to be a terrorist the result would be devastating - I'm glad the people we are dealing with in that regard are exceptionally rare and stupid (stupid enough to try what they do... as well as stupid enough to not have anything like an organised or well prepared strategy).
Trying to stop a terrorist plot with TSA security checks is like trying to prevent a divorce by hiding your wife's car keys.
It's indicative of a shortsighted, reactionary way of thinking that glosses over the nuances of the problem.
It's indicative of a shortsighted, reactionary way of thinking that glosses over the nuances of the problem.
If you want to really worry - think about all the Iraqui and Afgani insurgents that for the last 10 years have waged war against US and survived. They have worldclass IED making capabilities and it is not that hard to smuggle them in US to begin ground warfare.
Security is hard. Physical security is hard too. Just a thought: you can stuff anything you want in your big suitcase. So if someone wants to set an alarm bomb with some destructive chemical it is possible, no? Though I am in favor of airport security - even if false sense is better than zero. If it can prevent idiots or unstable from carrying a steel knife we should. Yes, you can't prevent more major terrorist attack easily - one could just drive a van full of gas and explode in the lobby if one wishes to do so - but we still need that basic security if it is doable.
The truth is we as a civilization tends to blame all the time. When we fear danger we blame the government not doing enough and when we find inconvenience we ask for less protection. I see no one has yet attempt to provide a better solution - only complaint.
Is TSA making people waiting? I often get to the airport two hours early so I think the waiting is fine. Is it embarrasing when someone stops you and scans you? I have been stopped before for carrying a coin in my pocket before going through the scanner. It's okay. Everyone is too busy to get through.
The last point is last time when Schneier talked about the dry ice bomb he was wrong it being harmless. He just won't admit he is wrong.
The truth is we as a civilization tends to blame all the time. When we fear danger we blame the government not doing enough and when we find inconvenience we ask for less protection. I see no one has yet attempt to provide a better solution - only complaint.
Is TSA making people waiting? I often get to the airport two hours early so I think the waiting is fine. Is it embarrasing when someone stops you and scans you? I have been stopped before for carrying a coin in my pocket before going through the scanner. It's okay. Everyone is too busy to get through.
The last point is last time when Schneier talked about the dry ice bomb he was wrong it being harmless. He just won't admit he is wrong.
Just a thought: you can stuff anything you want in your big suitcase.
Of course this isn't true. Checked baggage is screened just as carry-on luggage is.
Of course this isn't true. Checked baggage is screened just as carry-on luggage is.
Baggage screening, of course! That's why your laptop, camera, or tablet gets stolen if you check it.
The amount of thefts from luggage during the security process is simply mind-boggling. One would think that anyone unscrupulous enough to boldly steal a $200 item--even under the supposed scrutiny of cameras and co-workers--and get the item home from the airport undetected could likewise do the reverse for an anonymous envelope of cash.
If people can steal from luggage, they can also drop something into it. If you absolutely, positively must do evil in the air, you just apply for a low-wage unskilled job at the airport and do it as an insider.
The amount of thefts from luggage during the security process is simply mind-boggling. One would think that anyone unscrupulous enough to boldly steal a $200 item--even under the supposed scrutiny of cameras and co-workers--and get the item home from the airport undetected could likewise do the reverse for an anonymous envelope of cash.
If people can steal from luggage, they can also drop something into it. If you absolutely, positively must do evil in the air, you just apply for a low-wage unskilled job at the airport and do it as an insider.
Throwing many millions of dollars on a non-existent problem is fine?
Checked bags get screened. They sometimes get opened and rooted through by hand. Sometimes they leave notes saying they have rooted through your checked bags just for "peace of mind." I've gotten such notes.
Checked bags get screened. They sometimes get opened and rooted through by hand. Sometimes they leave notes saying they have rooted through your checked bags just for "peace of mind." I've gotten such notes.
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> If it can prevent idiots or unstable from carrying a steel knife we should.
Should we spend hundreds of millions and molest millions of passengers to prevent this?
> Is TSA making people waiting? I often get to the airport two hours early so I think the waiting is fine.
What is the cost in lost productivity of this? We are spending money to lost productivity to prevent a knives on planes??
Should we spend hundreds of millions and molest millions of passengers to prevent this?
> Is TSA making people waiting? I often get to the airport two hours early so I think the waiting is fine.
What is the cost in lost productivity of this? We are spending money to lost productivity to prevent a knives on planes??
> Should we spend hundreds of millions and molest millions of passengers to prevent this?
And talk about job creation too. Maybe. Often we use statistics. Well, we don't have good statistics or can't do experiment on whether or not the chance of surviving is higher or lower with/out the TSA screening. Can you?
> What is the cost in lost productivity of this? We are spending money to lost productivity to prevent a knives on planes??
Losing how much time? An extra 10-20 minutes on average? You understand why terrorists like to plot terrorism on airplane right? Because we can't control an airplane once it is flying. On the ground you can run away or hope a rescue unit come to you in 5 minutes. So losing 20 minutes on average (which you should plan ahead for any air travel ANYWAY), versus keeping a sharp knife away from the mentally unstable passenger next to you is probably a good thing.
Maybe the chance is very low, near zero. When that comes, your life might be over and that 20 minutes is negligible.
Some people are happy to trade 20 minutes away but I am not.
And talk about job creation too. Maybe. Often we use statistics. Well, we don't have good statistics or can't do experiment on whether or not the chance of surviving is higher or lower with/out the TSA screening. Can you?
> What is the cost in lost productivity of this? We are spending money to lost productivity to prevent a knives on planes??
Losing how much time? An extra 10-20 minutes on average? You understand why terrorists like to plot terrorism on airplane right? Because we can't control an airplane once it is flying. On the ground you can run away or hope a rescue unit come to you in 5 minutes. So losing 20 minutes on average (which you should plan ahead for any air travel ANYWAY), versus keeping a sharp knife away from the mentally unstable passenger next to you is probably a good thing.
Maybe the chance is very low, near zero. When that comes, your life might be over and that 20 minutes is negligible.
Some people are happy to trade 20 minutes away but I am not.
> Some people are happy to trade 20 minutes away but I am not.
Do you step out of your flat each day, take a cab, bus, walk short distances? Cross the road?
The death risk in all of theses activities is many times higher than dying on an airplane because a mentally unstable passenger manages to stabs you with a knife he deliberately brought on board.
Do you step out of your flat each day, take a cab, bus, walk short distances? Cross the road?
The death risk in all of theses activities is many times higher than dying on an airplane because a mentally unstable passenger manages to stabs you with a knife he deliberately brought on board.
I already said the risk is nearly zero. Read it carefully.
Yet, if there is a risk, even if it is at 0.1%, precaution is required. And when this impacts the lives of hundreds of passengers, the risk is more than just me dying on the street tomorrow.
-- edit --
whoever downvote is probably a kid.
Yet, if there is a risk, even if it is at 0.1%, precaution is required. And when this impacts the lives of hundreds of passengers, the risk is more than just me dying on the street tomorrow.
-- edit --
whoever downvote is probably a kid.
"a risk exists" does not really imply "precaution is required" - there is a risk that you'll be fatally struck by a lightning tomorrow, but it doesn't imply that you need to stay indoors as a precaution.
"Nearly zero" does not equal other "nearly zero" - most "nearly zero" effects are with very, very different nearness to zero. Me dying in a traffic accident tomorrow is a near-zero chance, and me dying of a lightning strike tomorrow is a near-zero chance, but they are very different chances.
The sole fact of you mentioning 0.1% indicates a problem with such comparisons - risk of dying in any terrorist attack is orders of magnitude different than 0.1% and thus deserves uncomparably smaller attention than a real 0.1% risk.
Your short trip from home to airport deserves more precautions than terrorists on the planes. Even taking into account 'hundreds or passengers', the risk is uncomparably much smaller than you simply dying on the street tomorrow - that's how the numbers work out in reality, even if it may feel otherwise emotionally.
"Nearly zero" does not equal other "nearly zero" - most "nearly zero" effects are with very, very different nearness to zero. Me dying in a traffic accident tomorrow is a near-zero chance, and me dying of a lightning strike tomorrow is a near-zero chance, but they are very different chances.
The sole fact of you mentioning 0.1% indicates a problem with such comparisons - risk of dying in any terrorist attack is orders of magnitude different than 0.1% and thus deserves uncomparably smaller attention than a real 0.1% risk.
Your short trip from home to airport deserves more precautions than terrorists on the planes. Even taking into account 'hundreds or passengers', the risk is uncomparably much smaller than you simply dying on the street tomorrow - that's how the numbers work out in reality, even if it may feel otherwise emotionally.
> Well, we don't have good statistics or can't do experiment on whether or not the chance of surviving is higher or lower with/out the TSA screening. Can you?
What? Unless you are suggesting that the TSA screening increases attacks, we can easily assume that the TSA screening does add some small amount of security (perhaps tiny). We can look at survival rates before and after TSA screenings to see how many people were killed by mentally unstable people. Surely there were mentally unstable people prior to the existence of the TSA?
> You understand why terrorists like to plot terrorism on airplane right? Because we can't control an airplane once it is flying. On the ground you can run away or hope a rescue unit come to you in 5 minutes.
What terrorists? Terrorists as we defined them post 9/11 liked airplanes because they could use them as a weapon to cause much more damage. Why would 5 minutes away from help on the ground matter if they are detonating bombs?
You've shifted the goal posts from "getting to the airport 2 hours early" to "losing 20 minutes."
What? Unless you are suggesting that the TSA screening increases attacks, we can easily assume that the TSA screening does add some small amount of security (perhaps tiny). We can look at survival rates before and after TSA screenings to see how many people were killed by mentally unstable people. Surely there were mentally unstable people prior to the existence of the TSA?
> You understand why terrorists like to plot terrorism on airplane right? Because we can't control an airplane once it is flying. On the ground you can run away or hope a rescue unit come to you in 5 minutes.
What terrorists? Terrorists as we defined them post 9/11 liked airplanes because they could use them as a weapon to cause much more damage. Why would 5 minutes away from help on the ground matter if they are detonating bombs?
You've shifted the goal posts from "getting to the airport 2 hours early" to "losing 20 minutes."
I have not shifted from 2 hours to 20 minutes. I was pointing out that even during a busy morning I would only expect 20 minutes to be added to the overall processing time. And since I already plan to arrive at the airport two hours before the time to take off, 20 minutes is nothing. In essence, the impact on productivity is little.
Yup - 9/11 has been used, along with its many other uses, to create fear and sell 'security'.
Follow the money and you will find that the same 'security' profiteers are surprisingly linked to events surrounding 9/11:
http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/commentary/item/3938-g...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11_Truth_movement
Just look at how easy it is to profit from and sell false 'security' in war-torn Iraq: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/02/fake-bomb-detector...
Follow the money and you will find that the same 'security' profiteers are surprisingly linked to events surrounding 9/11:
http://www.thenewamerican.com/economy/commentary/item/3938-g...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9/11_Truth_movement
Just look at how easy it is to profit from and sell false 'security' in war-torn Iraq: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/02/fake-bomb-detector...
Don't they also use screening by looking at passengers? Don't know about USA but in my country there's usually a few security people just looking at the people who go through the security check. I suppose they are trained to see nervous people behaving oddly and so forth.
The TSA tried this and failed miserably...
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/11/13/21428350-...
http://www.alamogordonews.com/alamogordo-opinion/ci_24584454...
http://www.alamogordonews.com/alamogordo-opinion/ci_24584454...
Such things require extensive training of smart people, which conflicts with the TSA's technique of hiring large numbers of warm bodies at low pay.
The videos are short on details, and I'm a little sceptical. A lot of it seems to involve removing Lithium from Lion batteries. I'm told that can be done with wire cutters, but I don't think you can buy those inside the sterile zone.
Read the links Scheiner posted in the OP; apparently Lithium batteries is a really new thing, only the last couple of months.
Funnier thing is mall securities, you can't bring a small knife into mall but you can buy a chainsaw
> Funnier thing is mall securities, you can't bring a small knife into mall but you can buy a chainsaw
Can you fuel up (or charge up) a chainsaw in a mall? How dangerous is a chainsaw when it can't be turned on?
And that's assuming small knives really are banned from malls. Do they really care if you have a pocketknife on your belt? Maybe things are different where I live (Montana).
Can you fuel up (or charge up) a chainsaw in a mall? How dangerous is a chainsaw when it can't be turned on?
And that's assuming small knives really are banned from malls. Do they really care if you have a pocketknife on your belt? Maybe things are different where I live (Montana).
what happens if a terrorist tries to open the door or an emergency exit window in-flight?
Absolutely nothing, except maybe panicking some passengers. Planes are pressurized, and the exits all open inward. It's not possible for a human being to overcome that force.
http://www.askthepilot.com/questionanswers/exits/
http://www.askthepilot.com/questionanswers/exits/
The odds of someone EVER actually opening the door mid flight are ridiculous. Plus how many people would stop that from happening once they knew was occurring - I know I'd be one of the first people up and trying to get on top of that person to prevent that from happening - and I know I'm not alone on that thought.
Biological and chemical agents are perhaps the big next threat?
Well, guess this guy is now on the No Fly list.
>the answer is simple: airplane terrorism isn't a big risk
It will be a massive wake up call to America (and the rest of the world, too) when Wikileaks publishes the reports of how 9/11 was a victim simulation[0]. Can't wait.
[0] http://septemberclues.info/vicsims.htm
It will be a massive wake up call to America (and the rest of the world, too) when Wikileaks publishes the reports of how 9/11 was a victim simulation[0]. Can't wait.
[0] http://septemberclues.info/vicsims.htm
Yes, a "victim simulation", of course -- carried out at the ultimate behest of the Reticulans, no doubt.
Instead of providing such edgy commentary (what even are Reticulans?), care to explain why they clearly decided to Photoshop pictures of the victims? Why relatives (which have never spoken up) did not supply the media with better pictures other than pixelated 80px by 80px frames? How come if there is more than one picture of a victim, they all look the same? This is are only basic questions you should be able to answer if you think 9/11 is real, I am not even taking into account all the other discrepancies encircling 9/11.
I know, it is very hard to cope with the fact that you got tricked into believing something for years on end and find out that all of it was one big lie - a set up.
I know, it is very hard to cope with the fact that you got tricked into believing something for years on end and find out that all of it was one big lie - a set up.
It would obviously be tragic and damaging for someone to attack "defenseless" passengers with "traditional" weapons, but -- in my eyes -- it's not terribly different from a random attack in the street or a shopping mall.
Airline personnel and the typical cohort of passengers would simply never let a terrorist take the cockpit, which effectively removes that entire element of danger. The only super-substantial potential damage stems from an explosive of some sort, not a box-cutter, knife, or anything of the sort.
The cost of TSA (direct and indirect through delays, etc.) is immense, and truly does feel like security theater at this point. I'd be all-for doubling down on bomb-sniffing dogs, behavior analysts, and all that; but this apparent focus on "traditional" weapons seems totally asymmetric to the risk it presents.