Great tool! Does going through ytcast have any impact on whether the played video influences youtube's recommendation algorithm (which annoys me a lot)?
I really don't get the hate that Linux Desktop gets. When comparing Mac OS to Gnome the difference feels marginal (at least for normal users) these days - everything feels snappy, consistent and looks nice. What exactly are the pain points?
I can't seem to think of any instances where that is the case. So my conclusion would be that it can not really be done. Or can you give some pointers?
What's going on in this comment section? It seems more like of a reddit thread than the usual thoughtful HN comments. Propaganda? Ghostbusters? Whitehouse? "They"? Are troll farms targeting HN now?
"higher level X would be rife with inner circle politics" - sadly seems to be in line with human nature.
FWIW, anecdotally, in my interactions with academia involved parties have mostly been surprisingly respectable - which is more that I can say for industry.
Have you seen the machinery needed to cool down IBM's tiny qubit chip at the bottom? [1]
It would be nice if you could just stick these things into your PC over PCIe some day.
"This is not a vulnerability in Tutanota. We have built Tutanota with multiple layers of protection for our users. We currently use TLS and DANE to protect authentication and data integrity and (only tunneled) RSA-OAEP and AES-CBC to provide confidentiality. We have always communicated this transparently, it is nothing new. Neither the confidentiality nor the integrity of our users' data has been at risk. However, we know that the implementation is not perfect regarding this detail. That is why we are going to implement the following features as soon as possible: - Signatures/MAC - 2-factor authentication - Algorithms resistant to attacks of quantum computers - Simple verification of downloaded Tutanota apps Regarding the described issue, we know of two possible attacks on AES-CBC. Neither of them is feasible against Tutanota users: - Bit flipping: You need access to the plain text email and you have to be the MITM. - -Plaintexts are available at the sender and recipient only. We use secure TLS algorithms and DANE to protect against MITM. - Padding oracle: There is no padding oracle in Tutanota. Tl;dr There is no known vulnerability in Tutanota. Security is the heart of Tutanota, and we will fix vulnerabilities immediately."
"This is not a vulnerability in Tutanota. We have built Tutanota with multiple layers of protection for our users. We currently use TLS and DANE to protect authentication and data integrity and (only tunneled) RSA-OAEP and AES-CBC to provide confidentiality. We have always communicated this transparently, it is nothing new. Neither the confidentiality nor the integrity of our users' data has been at risk.
However, we know that the implementation is not perfect regarding this detail. That is why we are going to implement the following features as soon as possible:
- Signatures/MAC
- 2-factor authentication
- Algorithms resistant to attacks of quantum computers
- Simple verification of downloaded Tutanota apps
Regarding the described issue, we know of two possible attacks on AES-CBC. Neither of them is feasible against Tutanota users:
- Bit flipping: You need access to the plain text email and you have to be the MITM. - -Plaintexts are available at the sender and recipient only. We use secure TLS algorithms and DANE to protect against MITM.
- Padding oracle: There is no padding oracle in Tutanota.
Tl;dr
There is no known vulnerability in Tutanota. Security is the heart of Tutanota, and we will fix vulnerabilities immediately."
