> considering they are searching for one specific image
That was not the case. They were authorized by warrant to search for the following, which I transcribed from a copy of the affidavit in support of application for warrant:
A. Personal computer hardware to include, the computer system case with internal components, motherboard, CPU, memory, etc., internal and peripheral storage devices (such as fixed disks, external hard disks, floppy disk drives and diskettes, tape drives and tapes, zip drives, optical storage devices, transistor-like binary devices, video cameras, digital cameras, cell phones, and any other memory storage devices); peripheral input/output devices (such as keyboards, mouse/track ball/pad, video display monitor); and all related cables, power cords and connections, RAM or ROM units or CD ROM; as well as any devices, mechanisms, or parts that cat be used to restrict access to computer hardware (such as physical keys and locks).
B. Computer software applications used by the computer system and any related components.
C. Computer-related documentation that explains or illustrates how to configure or use the computer hardware, software, or other related items/devices. The documentation consists of written, recorded, printed, or electronically stored material.
D. Computer-related passwords and other data security devices designed to restrict access or hide computer software, documentation, or data.
E. Digital data that may be kept on any computer related storage device listed in 'A' above. The specific data will be (or will contain or incorporate) digital video and/or image files depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, any digital data related to the trading or exchange of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and any digital "user attribution" evidence to include, but not limited to, registry information, configuration files, user profiles, e-mail, e-mail address books, "chat," instant messaging logs, photographs, and correspondence (and the data associated with the foregoing, such as file creation and last accessed dates) that may be evidence of who used or controlled hte computer or storage medium at a relevant time.
F. Photographs of the interior and exterior of the listed residence.
G. Papers showing dominion and control.
H. Any other evidence of the crimes of RCW 9.68A.070, to include but not limited to videotapes, books, magazines, catalogs, photographs, film, diaries, or other documents pertaining to the possession or dealing of child pornography, to include printed material documenting any communication with other persons regarding the trading or exchange of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
> If [police who conducted the search] knew he was running an exit node
They did know. Martin Kaste of National Public Radio [reported](http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/04/04/472...), "Seattle police spokesman Sean Whitcomb says the department understands how Tor relays work, and they knew Robinson was a Tor host."
Common-carrier delivery service, like UPS, DHL, or FedEx are "aware of the "`type-of-content-that-may-be-in-the-box'." They are not held responsible for the actions of their clients of which they are unaware. The same holds true for telephone companies, Internet backbone providers, Internet service providers, and more. The same should hold true of Tor exit node operators.
> I believe that a package forwarding service may have some problems with the police from time to time.
Yes, of course, they may. Police act in unethical or even unlawful manners from time to time. At question is not whether judges may warrant searches by police that they should not warrant, it is whether those searches should be warranted.
A fourth-party tip relayed through a third party about someone allegedly transferring via a computer network that provides locational privacy a file that apparently contains evidence of crime committed by an unidentified person in an unknown place at an unknown time is not any indication that the operator of the machine from which the file exited the anonymizing network onto the open Internet is party to any crime, whether that operator performs the service for fee, for free, at a commercial property, or at a residential property, as an individual, or as part of a group.
Imagine that police got a tip from some clearinghouse about contraband someone else claimed to have received via FedEx delivery of a sealed container, so they convinced a judge to authorize them to go into the FedEx depot to search for and seize any delivery vehicle, shipping carton, shipping label, or related documentation in sight. That's roughly what happened here, but worse, the Tor exit relay operator could not trace backward from the package they delivered to the person from whom it originated, and the police knew it.
Sure, the package could have been injected by somebody at the FedEx depot, but there is no evidence of such, and thus no cause for search.
Your assertion was based on the flawed premise that police observed a violation of law in this case. I have seen no indication that they saw such. They reportedly acted on a fourth-party tip about a third party claim that an unknown person transferred a file apparently containing evidence of a past crime to that third party's computer. I edited my comment to quote yours in clarification of this.
> If the police see the law being broken, they have an obligation to investigate
I have seen no reporting--not even in Detective Daljit Gill's affidavit in support of her application for search warrant (which I've read)--that police observed any violation of law related to the search. They claim to have received a tip, from 4chan, filtered through a national clearinghouse, that about seven weeks prior someone had allegedly transferred to 4chan a video of an unidentified woman abusing an unidentified child in an unknown location at an unknown time, allegedly from an IP address that they discovered was assigned by an ISP to David and that they learned prior to the search was the exit point from an anonymizing proxy network.
It's quite misleading to state only that "they had evidence of child pornography that traced back to his computer network."
What they (Seattle Police Department) claim to have was a tip, from 4chan, filtered through a national clearinghouse, that about seven weeks prior someone had allegedly transferred to 4chan a video of an unidentified woman abusing an unidentified child in an unknown location at an unknown time, allegedly from an IP address that they discovered was assigned by an ISP to David and that they learned prior to the search was the exit point from an anonymizing proxy network.
SPD staff involved were familiar with Tor and thus knew that there was no more reason to suspect David--an outspoken critic of their public surveillance programs and other privacy-invading programs--of uploading the evidence of some woman's crime to 4chan than to suspect any of the many thousands of users of the Tor network of such. This was pure harassment.
Right--a common-carrier delivery service, like UPS, DHL, or FedEx, only they cannot snoop into the clients' private business, and clients are by design anonymous.
Should they investigate libraries and coffee shops as well? How about the offices of businesses that offer VPN-based proxy services? Homes of those businesses' staff?
And this return-address analogy needs to include the fact that a Tor node operator is cryptographically prevented from tracing backward toward the sender.
I'm one of the subjects of the article. Regarding the 2009 incident at ABQ: I was acquitted of all criminal charges by a jury in 2011. The trial ran two days, during which I did not testify and presented no evidence. Bizarrely, the prosecution presented the [video I made of the incident](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pc5DBUK1K8M) (that he police erased and I recovered) as evidence against me. The jury deliberated just one hour to reach their decision.
Later that year, I filed a related civil rights lawsuit. March of this year, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals heard arguments on dismissal of that suit. There's no set timeline for a response from the court.
GoDaddy's service is non-exceptional, their Web UI is clearly focused more on up-sales than on helping customers get work done, their [advertisements are sexist][1], their [attempts to police the Internet][2] are an affront to free speech, they [lobbied for the horrible SOPA until it appeared likely that continuing to do so would hurt their bottom line][3], and their [founder/former-CEO][4] is a hyperaggressive douchebag who [kills elephants for fun][5].
When I run dropship with a file containing the JSON you quoted, it prints, "('Oops, blocks are not known: %s', [u'8_dUpdzZPyca0BOl7oT0laNtqE8VLgof7EZGNFsMENY'])".
That was not the case. They were authorized by warrant to search for the following, which I transcribed from a copy of the affidavit in support of application for warrant:
A. Personal computer hardware to include, the computer system case with internal components, motherboard, CPU, memory, etc., internal and peripheral storage devices (such as fixed disks, external hard disks, floppy disk drives and diskettes, tape drives and tapes, zip drives, optical storage devices, transistor-like binary devices, video cameras, digital cameras, cell phones, and any other memory storage devices); peripheral input/output devices (such as keyboards, mouse/track ball/pad, video display monitor); and all related cables, power cords and connections, RAM or ROM units or CD ROM; as well as any devices, mechanisms, or parts that cat be used to restrict access to computer hardware (such as physical keys and locks).
B. Computer software applications used by the computer system and any related components.
C. Computer-related documentation that explains or illustrates how to configure or use the computer hardware, software, or other related items/devices. The documentation consists of written, recorded, printed, or electronically stored material.
D. Computer-related passwords and other data security devices designed to restrict access or hide computer software, documentation, or data.
E. Digital data that may be kept on any computer related storage device listed in 'A' above. The specific data will be (or will contain or incorporate) digital video and/or image files depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, any digital data related to the trading or exchange of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and any digital "user attribution" evidence to include, but not limited to, registry information, configuration files, user profiles, e-mail, e-mail address books, "chat," instant messaging logs, photographs, and correspondence (and the data associated with the foregoing, such as file creation and last accessed dates) that may be evidence of who used or controlled hte computer or storage medium at a relevant time.
F. Photographs of the interior and exterior of the listed residence.
G. Papers showing dominion and control.
H. Any other evidence of the crimes of RCW 9.68A.070, to include but not limited to videotapes, books, magazines, catalogs, photographs, film, diaries, or other documents pertaining to the possession or dealing of child pornography, to include printed material documenting any communication with other persons regarding the trading or exchange of depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.