Yep, isolated worlds is definitely what we want, and part of the inspiration for the particular (DOM modification) feature we proposed.
I think CSP helps with 1 & 2, unless I'm missing something? (Our labels map down to CSP policies pretty naturally.)
Points 3-4 and phishing, in general, are definitely a concern. Unfortunately, I'm not sure that a great solution that does not get in way exists, but we'll see how close we can get :)
"Unfortunately, since the entire point of it is to protect against malicious leaks..."
That's actually not the entire point. At least in this paper, we do
not claim to address attacks that leverage covert channels. But the
attacker model assumption is weaker (i.e., the attacker is assumed to
be more powerful) than that originally assumed by the Chrome design
(e.g., that only pages are malicious and will try to exploit
extensions). And this is important. Particularly because the design
that we end up with will be more secure than the current one. So, at
worst, the new system addresses the limitations of the existing system
under their attacker model. Then, depending on how far you are willing
to hack up the browser, underlying OS, or hardware you can also try to
address the covert channel leaks.
Rather than reply individually to the messages from this thread, I'm
going to try to clarify some things here. I think a lot of good points
were brought up both with regards to the "taint" mechanism and timing
covert channels.
IFC/tainting mechanism:
The style of IFC we are proposing is not not the tainting style used
by more typical language-level systems. In particular, we're proposing
a mostly-coarse grained system:
- A single label is associated with a context. A context can be the
main extension context or, more likely, a light-weight worker the
main extension context created. This single label is conceptually
the label on everything in scope. As such, when performing some I/O
this label is used by the IFC mechanism to check if the code is
allowed to perform the read/write. This coarse-grained approach
alleviates the need to keep track of tricky leaks due to control
flow: the branch condition has the label of the context so any
control flow within the context is safe. If you want to perform a
public computation after a secret computation, you need to
structure your program into multiple contexts (e.g. create a new
worker wherein you intend to perform the secret computation).
- Labels can also be associated with values. A new constructor Labeled
is provided for this task. You can think of it as a boxing the value
and, by default, only allowing you to inspect the label of the
value. You can pass such labeled values around as you see fit (and
this is pretty useful in real applications). Importantly, however,
when you read the underlying (protected) value the IFC system taints
your context---i.e., it raises the context label to let you read the
value, but also restricts your code from writing to arbitrary
end-points since doing so may leak something about the newly-read
value.
An important requirement of this IFC approach is that there be no
unlabeled (implicit) shared state between the different contexts. For
example, rand() in context A and B must not share an underlying
generator. This kind of isolation can be achieved in practice and is
an important detail when considering covert channels.
Timing channels:
It turns out that if you do IFC in this coarse-grained fashion you can
prevent leaks due to timing covert channels, if you are willing/able
to schedule contexts using a "secure scheduler." In [1] we showed how
to eliminate timing attacks of the style described in this thread
(internal timing channels) that are inherent to the more typical IFC
systems. In [2] we extended the system to deal with timing attacks due
to the CPU cache by using an instruction-based scheduler (IBS). IBS
and other techniques to deal with timing channels are nicely
described in [3]. (I'd be happy to expand here, but this is already a
long reply.)
Right, minimizing attack surface is pretty important. Though the
described attack scenario (a form of self-exfiltration attacks [1]) is
something we did think about. (The details of the core IFC mechanism
are describe in the COWL paper [2].) For example, if the extension
only needs to read data from gmail.com it is tainted with a unique
origin. (In general, IFC can be used to deal with both
confidentiality and integrity.)
"I believe that concerns like this are why Apple will introduce the
"content blocking" extensions in iOS 9 and OS X 10.11. They enable the
most popular types of extension (ad blocking and privacy protection)
without letting extension code run in your browser."
Fully agree. We actually described exactly that mechanism in an early
version of our paper (declarative APIs), but didn't have enough space
to do it for the final version.
"While the tainted data approach sounds interesting, I don't think there's an easy way to guarantee the safeness of arbitrary code executed on your machine. It's possible to sandbox code, but as soon as you allow any communication at all, there's no automated way to prevent data theft."
It turns out, it is possible with information flow control (IFC). The
simple idea behind IFC is to protect data by labeling/tagging it and
restricting code according to the kinds of labeled data it reads. Once
code in an execution context (e.g., iframe or process) reads some
labeled data, IFC restricts where it can further communicate. In the
simplest form: once you read data that is SECRET, you can't write to
any PUBLIC communication channel. (You can, of course, write to a
SECRET channel.)
"Do you mean that you'll compare the network requests made from the main and the shadow pages?"
Essentially, yes. Requests from the extension should be treated as if
they are of an origin different from the page. (We could potentially
piggy-back on existing notions of security principals (e.g., that
Firefox has) to avoid huge performance hits.) And if the extension is
tainted the kinds of requests will be restricted according to the
taint (as in COWL [1], likely using CSP for the underlying
enforcement).
"What if the main script is sensitive to the request receive time? Then the shadow DOM may act differently."
If by main script you mean a script on the page, then there should be no real difference.
"From more practical standpoint, having two DOMs for every page will eat even more of my laptop's RAM."
I hope this won't be so bad down the line (assuming we'd be able to
leverage some underlying shadow DOM infrastructure and that performs
relatively well).
That's a tricky question. Some extension (e.g., HTTPS Everywhere[1])
can improve your privacy on the Web and are arguably written by
developers that as trustworthy as your browser developers. But, in
general, I would be cautious.
Yep, you are right. If the crypto/label API didn't force a
fixed-length blob (which may be hard to do), it would certainly be
leaking some information.
Very good points. We proposed a way to deal with DOM manipulation in
the paper [1], but Stefan omitted this in the blog post. Specifically,
Section 4 of the paper (the "Page access" paragraph) briefly describes
this. (Sorry for referring you to the paper, but our wording in the
paper is probably better than my attempt to paraphrase here.)
Of course there are other ways malicious extensions can used to leak
data---pick your favorite covert channel. But the idea was to propose
APIs (and mechanisms) that are not overtly leaky. (We are early in the
process of actually building this though.)