Hidden Services, Current Events, and Freedom Hosting(blog.torproject.org)
blog.torproject.org
Hidden Services, Current Events, and Freedom Hosting
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/hidden-services-current-events-and-freedom-hosting
3 comments
All of these US "freedom" projects are about undermining governments that are not conducive to American interests and their ability to control rogue elements which would destabilize the State.
It's now evident that managed democracy with a massive surveillance state is what's behind the veil of global freedom and liberty. The most you can expect from the US government is to leave you alone, and they will only do that as long as you're not interfering with their economic or social interests.
It's now evident that managed democracy with a massive surveillance state is what's behind the veil of global freedom and liberty. The most you can expect from the US government is to leave you alone, and they will only do that as long as you're not interfering with their economic or social interests.
That's certainly one reasonable way to interpret what's going on.
So, is there actually somewhere some news? All I have seen ( I did not check too carefully) that some people claim that the script includes some 0days, but without any detail that would convince me that it is not trolling by 12 year olds...
(Obviously the Tor guys say something more reasonable, but actually they also just say that they are watching the news.)
In light of the Freedom Hosting kerfluffle, as well as the Snowden revelations, I don't see much incentive to run an exit node.
Prior to these recent events I fooled around with setting up hidden services for my own educational purposes, but the fact that someone could use my Tor exit node to access illegal content was enough to preclude my setting up an exit on any of my servers.
Then I read about some guy in Austria who was arrested for running a Tor exit node and my decision was justified.
The problems inherent to running any sort of anonymizing service are just too many, and too serious, as we have recently seen.
Prior to these recent events I fooled around with setting up hidden services for my own educational purposes, but the fact that someone could use my Tor exit node to access illegal content was enough to preclude my setting up an exit on any of my servers.
Then I read about some guy in Austria who was arrested for running a Tor exit node and my decision was justified.
The problems inherent to running any sort of anonymizing service are just too many, and too serious, as we have recently seen.
Hidden services don't require exit nodes. That's only for public websites.
>In light of the Freedom Hosting kerfluffle, as well as the Snowden revelations, I don't see much incentive to run an exit node.
I don't see how this has anything at all to do with snowden, and as achille points out this story is about a host of the some of the most infamous Tor Hidden Services, it has nothing to do with exit nodes.
Running an Exit Node is a somewhat risky activity since your ip address will be seen when a Tor user hacks/views CP/Torrents.
Running a hidden service allows one to anonymously host a website, so it will require significant effort to unmask you, and is usually alot safer than running an exit node.
>The problems inherent to running any sort of anonymizing service are just too many, and too serious, as we have recently seen.
There are actually two completely safe ways to contribute to the Tor network:
Running a (non-exit) relay routes traffic internally through the Tor Network and is therefore a risk-free activity that can be bandwidth intensive.
Running a bridge allows is a risk-free activity that requires much less bandwidth.
Even exit nodes aren't as dangerous to run as you may think, according to https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html there are about 2000 exit nodes and you have only brought up one case of a prosecution resulting from the operation of one.
I don't see how this has anything at all to do with snowden, and as achille points out this story is about a host of the some of the most infamous Tor Hidden Services, it has nothing to do with exit nodes.
Running an Exit Node is a somewhat risky activity since your ip address will be seen when a Tor user hacks/views CP/Torrents.
Running a hidden service allows one to anonymously host a website, so it will require significant effort to unmask you, and is usually alot safer than running an exit node.
>The problems inherent to running any sort of anonymizing service are just too many, and too serious, as we have recently seen.
There are actually two completely safe ways to contribute to the Tor network:
Running a (non-exit) relay routes traffic internally through the Tor Network and is therefore a risk-free activity that can be bandwidth intensive.
Running a bridge allows is a risk-free activity that requires much less bandwidth.
Even exit nodes aren't as dangerous to run as you may think, according to https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html there are about 2000 exit nodes and you have only brought up one case of a prosecution resulting from the operation of one.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732467720457818...
"Created in part to hide the online activity of dissidents in countries such as Iran and China that censor the Internet ... [Tor] gets about 80% of its $2 million annual budget from branches of the U.S. government ... [It] began in 1996 as a project of the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory called Onion Routing ..."