Preliminary Summary of the FAA’s Review of the Boeing 737 Max [pdf](faa.gov)
faa.gov
Preliminary Summary of the FAA’s Review of the Boeing 737 Max [pdf]
https://www.faa.gov/news/media/attachments/737-MAX-RTS-Preliminary-Summary-v-1.pdf
3 comments
For reference, the report’s conclusion: “Through a thorough, transparent, and inclusive process, the FAA preliminarily determined that Boeing’s proposed changes to the 737 MAX design, flight crew procedures and maintenance procedures effectively mitigate the airplane-related safety issues that contributed to the Flight 610 and Flight 302 accidents. The FAA further preliminarily determined that the proposed design change also addressed additional safety concerns beyond those identified during the accident investigations. This report does not address other safety issues that might have contributed to the accidents but are not related to airplane design, including maintenance, aircraft operator, and air traffic control. The FAA believes recommendations related to these other potential contributing factors should be addressed bythe appropriate organizations. Further, the FAA will evaluate Boeing’s proposed flight crew training through the Flight Standardization Board process. The FAA will issue a draft Boeing 737 Flight Standardization Board Report documenting the results of the operational evaluation. The report will be posted for public comment. You may subscribe to this page to receive notification when the FAA posts the draft report.”
>Duration of the MCAS command is a function of AOA and airspeed. At higher airspeeds, flight control surfaces are more effective than at lower airspeeds. Therefore, a smaller MCAS command at higher airspeed has the same effect as a larger MCAS command at low speeds. Without MCAS, the 737 MAX would not meet FAA’s regulatory requirements.
>Without MCAS, the 737 MAX would not meet FAA’s regulatory requirements.
First, called it.
Secondly, how in the hell did a system on which certification of compliance with all regulations governing it's primary intended use case not get vetted more thoroughly?
This determination casts a rather large pall of doubt over why the FAA accepted pilot' s as a satisfactory failsafe for an MCAS failure if the failure of MCAS should have constituted an emergency requiring immediate landing and removal from passenger service of the aircraft.
Even though the report says the development process was essentially followed to the letter, we ended up with an aircraft which is leagues away from what I would call a reasonably sound civilian transport aircraft.
So it sounds to me like someone is either pulling punches, or specifically avoiding asking the hard Or uncomfortable questions.
Namely:
How is the process not to blame when following it led to a sub-par implementation?
Or if you really insist the process as it stands is sufficient, why was Boeing capable of following the process yet still delivering a dangerous product"