The code injected to steal passwords in Tunisia(blog.jgc.org)
blog.jgc.org
The code injected to steal passwords in Tunisia
http://blog.jgc.org/2011/01/code-injected-to-steal-passwords-in.html
8 comments
Or they just redirect all HTTPS requests back to HTTP. How many people would notice?
Presumably a Tunisan blogger may be "paranoid" enough to notice.
When it's your your password on the line (and possibly your ass in jail) data security is more than aggregate statistics.
When it's your your password on the line (and possibly your ass in jail) data security is more than aggregate statistics.
Err, well, I'm pretty sure they could have logged in via HTTPS all along by just manually typing in http://www.facebook.com
If the URL starts with "http:", the attacker gets to decide which parts (if any) are going to be sent HTTPS.
Sorry, either either the autolinker or I screwed up that post. My point was that if people cared about security, they could have been visting the facebook login page by manually typing HTTPS in the first place.
True.
I don't use FB, but someone on Slashdot was saying it likes to reply with every link going to http anyway. Based on my experience with Twitter and other sites, this sounds very plausible.
I don't use FB, but someone on Slashdot was saying it likes to reply with every link going to http anyway. Based on my experience with Twitter and other sites, this sounds very plausible.
This is why mixed content warnings from browsers are an oh-so-important annoyance.
No mixed content warnings here though. The ISP is editing the login page to include JavaScript that posts the password back, seemingly, to Facebook at http://www.facebook.com/wo0dh3ad. Being a man in the middle, the ISP can capture all requests to this non existent URL and harvest the passwords. The browser can't suspect a thing.
Also why the entire login page needs to be served via SSL.
and surely the entire site, if you want to avoid session hijacking.
(and after that, all the government needs to do is require an ssl signing authority to be used by all tunisian banks, and it's back in!)
(and after that, all the government needs to do is require an ssl signing authority to be used by all tunisian banks, and it's back in!)
There is no such thing as Security - only the illusion, that too of Selective, Government Controlled Security :)
Also why real companies need to be much better about not ignoring them on poorly written https pages that refer to http assets.
Isn't it time for Godaddy to take the password box off their unencrypted home page now?
Similar HN post (2.5 weeks ago): http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=2079223
It is very easy to get someones password if they have checked "remember me" and gone out for a coffee.
By very easy I mean it requires almost no talent.
Long time back (even)I wrote a script to grab password and username using DOM and JavaScript.
By very easy I mean it requires almost no talent.
Long time back (even)I wrote a script to grab password and username using DOM and JavaScript.
If you mean using the browser or OS password mechanism, then sure, if you're logged in as the user you can access their secrets.
But this doesn't should not be true for "remember me" cookies. Those just need some identifier.
At any rate, you still need "talent": to know where the person is, when they're going for coffee, ability to access their machine without bystanders asking questions, etc.
But this doesn't should not be true for "remember me" cookies. Those just need some identifier.
At any rate, you still need "talent": to know where the person is, when they're going for coffee, ability to access their machine without bystanders asking questions, etc.
If you control any firewall or router along the way you can inject iframes which retrieve any url you like and run script in the same-origin context. Except for "https only" sites, but note that Microsoft helpfully provides the government of Tunisia with a trusted root CA in their products. Try https://www.certification.tn/ . I wonder if it's a code-signing cert?
> Microsoft helpfully provides the government of Tunisia with a trusted root CA in their products
Isn't this rather huge news? Why did they do this sort of downgrading hackery when they could do a more elegant (and slightly more transparent) man in the middle?
Isn't this rather huge news? Why did they do this sort of downgrading hackery when they could do a more elegant (and slightly more transparent) man in the middle?
A) It's better to avoid using your capability even if you have it.
B) Probably a lot of users prefer Mozilla, though it may defer to the system store on Windows anyway, I'm not sure.
C) For the same reasons it's a pain for FB to use https everywhere, it's a pain for Tunisia to set up SSL interception on their outbound connections. There are certainly off-the-shelf boxes which can do it though.
B) Probably a lot of users prefer Mozilla, though it may defer to the system store on Windows anyway, I'm not sure.
C) For the same reasons it's a pain for FB to use https everywhere, it's a pain for Tunisia to set up SSL interception on their outbound connections. There are certainly off-the-shelf boxes which can do it though.
Yes, it's a code signing cert.
If you have access to a Windows machine, visit http://bit.ly/eWYRbA in IE then check your personal cert store for Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique
If you have access to a Windows machine, visit http://bit.ly/eWYRbA in IE then check your personal cert store for Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique
I might have missed this, but how was the javascript injected in the first place? Did they have a URL param being displayed (unescaped) on the page?
Attacker sits at network / ISP level, and can therefore inject any (js, ...) payload in non-https web pages, on the fly.
Nope, nothing of the sort.
The government has absolute control over the internet infrastructure here, and they manipulated the page's markup on the fly (or maybe the served an already modified and cached copy) when requested.
I don't see how Javascript is to blame here, which is I think what the author is implying with the "game over" link to slides about JS insecurity.
This attack only worked because the attacker could subvert the same-domain origin policy, by posting usernames and passwords to a page at the facebook.com domain (but which was routed to an attacker's host at a lower level.) The security failure happened at a lower layer than where Javascript security would be responsible.
This attack only worked because the attacker could subvert the same-domain origin policy, by posting usernames and passwords to a page at the facebook.com domain (but which was routed to an attacker's host at a lower level.) The security failure happened at a lower layer than where Javascript security would be responsible.
"... was stealing usernames and passwords from common sites like Google Mail and Facebook".
Gmail always opens with SSL for me. Didn't Google make this the default after Chinagate?
Gmail always opens with SSL for me. Didn't Google make this the default after Chinagate?
Nope, at the time of these incidents, I could request GMail's login page over HTTP, though the login form action pointed to a HTTPS url. This was fixed a day or two later though. Same with Yahoo.
If you're the ISP, can't you fake ssl certs all the way down to the root?
sorry if i'm being ignorant
sorry if i'm being ignorant
SSL certificates usually come with the OS or the browser. AFAIK there's no easy way for the ISP to add certificates.
The only real protection here is to go full SSL and not forget to set the SSL only flag on session cookies. Even then, you only have to wait till Tunisia buys a forged certificate for Facebook.