TrustDavis: A Non-Exploitable Online Reputation System [pdf](web.cs.ucdavis.edu)
web.cs.ucdavis.edu
TrustDavis: A Non-Exploitable Online Reputation System [pdf]
http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~defigued/index_files/trustdavis.pdf
4 comments
> If you had to put up a deposit to buy on eBay or to get a Gmail account or to post on Facebook or Hacker News, few would bother.
MetaFilter charges a $5 fee to create an account, which is necessary to post (but not to read). This is probably a major contributor to the quality of discussions there, since it means doing something that would get you banned has a real cost.
MetaFilter charges a $5 fee to create an account, which is necessary to post (but not to read). This is probably a major contributor to the quality of discussions there, since it means doing something that would get you banned has a real cost.
Also, one has to assume, it's easily exploitable by those for which the deposit is not an obstacle... e.g., the rich, and also those making money off of their scams.
Totally worthwhile to pay a $5,000 if it means I can successfully defraud someone for > $5,000 to cover it. If I can time the frauds well enough, I can defraud a number of people with my "good" reputation, then just abandon it.
Totally worthwhile to pay a $5,000 if it means I can successfully defraud someone for > $5,000 to cover it. If I can time the frauds well enough, I can defraud a number of people with my "good" reputation, then just abandon it.
The whole point is that system will be stable and secure if cost to fraud X amount of money will be higher than X. Otherwise there will be always a way to scam people - just waiting to be discovered.
There's also EigenTrust, a competing algorithmic approach: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EigenTrust
TrustDavis is more like distributed escrow than reputation.
i've been working for a while on this:
https://github.com/neyer/dewDrop
https://github.com/neyer/dewDrop
Interesting. You might be interested in some of the discussions we've been having in the http://opencreds.org/ group.
I've skimmed the paper. What if the refers default on their liability, too? Could a big enough net of cascading defaults cause unbounded damage?
"In TrustDavis, the ability to issue multiple identities or to change identity does not provide a significant advantage to a malicious party, since a malicious party must back each identity with funds that other players can use to protect their transactions".
"Individuals with no references can join TrustDavis through the use of security deposits."
"There should be some incentive for parties to provide references and take on risk. Thus, parties can function as insurers and charge a premium for the references they provide."
From that, you can see where this is going. The basic problem with online reputation systems, of course, is that creating a new pseudonym is usually quite cheap. This is a way to make it more expensive.
From a marketing perspective, it's not going to fly. If you had to put up a deposit to buy on eBay or to get a Gmail account or to post on Facebook or Hacker News, few would bother. There are, however, dating sites which require this of men.