Ask HN: I'm having doubts about LastPass security, what should I switch to?
32 comments
I prefer to avoid placing my password store/database on the web in any form. I like to use KeePass + key file + long password on a thumb drive. [1] There are ports for pretty much every platform, and the Windows and Android ones that I've used are pretty convenient once you incorporate them. The Windows program offers a lock-screen reprompt, say if you are stepping away from your screen. Also, it offers the option of only using a key file, rather than entering a long password each time you access the database store. Lastly, the Windows version offers an auto-type keyboard shortcut that you can customize based on the window title in your browser (e.g. to match a specific webpage). It is susceptible to keyloggers, but at that point you might have other issues than your password stores being compromised.
[1] http://keepass.info/help/base/keys.html
[1] http://keepass.info/help/base/keys.html
Windows Pro-Tip: KeePass supports Windows' "Secure Desktop" (the same place where Windows UAC prompts launch into) for the reprompt. This really should be the default now, but it's simple to enable and incredibly worth enabling given that malware has been discovered in the wild trying to keylog/grab master passwords for programs like LastPass, 1Password and KeePass.
Cross-Platform Pro-Tip: KeePass 2.x runs great as is on the Mono VM with only the obvious Windows-only functionality unavailable.
Cross-Platform Pro-Tip: KeePass 2.x runs great as is on the Mono VM with only the obvious Windows-only functionality unavailable.
[deleted]
On OSX, a good open source project to check out is MacPass: https://github.com/mstarke/MacPass It does a pretty good job of supporting the KDBX format.
Thanks for the tip! KeepassX works great, but the author(s) don't seem to bother with pull requests and therefore useful features like keepasshttp or autotype won't get implemented. Keepass 2.x with mono never worked for me.
I've been keeping my KeePass files in Dropbox but I like your idea to put it on a USB drive a lot better. The only downside is if you lose the USB drive; if you have one, what's your strategy for backing up the KeePass file?
That's the tricky part: I carry a USB drive which I make sure has the latest and most up to date file (for example, when I have to sign up on one-off online stores). Every so often I will manually back it up to laptop/desktop/cell phone/tablet. That's a minimum of five separate devices, and I'm not sure I'm ever carrying more than 3 of them at the same time. It's definitely not six-sigma, but I'll accept it for now I guess.
Of course, all of this is in addition to service provided 2FA where applicable, e.g. Google, banks, web hosts, via SMS/Authenticator.
Of course, all of this is in addition to service provided 2FA where applicable, e.g. Google, banks, web hosts, via SMS/Authenticator.
I'm actually going through and setting up KeePass with two factor auth (just using Google's Authenticator app for now, maybe a yubikey in the future) right now and have a similar question. After looking into KeePass and kicking the tires a bit I really, really wish someone would step in and make a nice cross platform version to simplify setting up a password store with two factor auth and other best practices (long pass phrases, etc.).
Right now from what I see it's a horrible mish-mash of different apps on different platforms written by different people with an unknown level of support for each of them. Frankly I don't even know if most of the KeePass apps are compatible with each other, and that kind of scares me. Setting up two factor access to KeePass is also pretty obtuse and requires tracking down blog posts and such to figure it out.
I don't mean to denigrate any of the contributions or work people have done in this space (in fact I am incredibly thankful), but it does feel like some leadership to put all these pieces together is badly needed.
I would absolutely love and be more than happy to spend some money on a polished app that's cross platform and is 'batteries included' so you can setup two factor auth & use devices like yubikeys without any extra screwing around. Bonus points if it doesn't require Mono too.
Right now from what I see it's a horrible mish-mash of different apps on different platforms written by different people with an unknown level of support for each of them. Frankly I don't even know if most of the KeePass apps are compatible with each other, and that kind of scares me. Setting up two factor access to KeePass is also pretty obtuse and requires tracking down blog posts and such to figure it out.
I don't mean to denigrate any of the contributions or work people have done in this space (in fact I am incredibly thankful), but it does feel like some leadership to put all these pieces together is badly needed.
I would absolutely love and be more than happy to spend some money on a polished app that's cross platform and is 'batteries included' so you can setup two factor auth & use devices like yubikeys without any extra screwing around. Bonus points if it doesn't require Mono too.
I spent forever trying to get KeePass/KeePassX to work on Linux, Windows, and Android. I eventually gave up due to version incompatibility and continue to use Lastpass as it works well on all three.
I use KeePassX (macosx) + MiniKeePass (iOS). They use the same password database format. I only generate new passwords on my macosx device. Occasionally, I manually copy my password database to my iOS device.
It's a bit annoying, and it means that recently generated passwords might not be available from iOS, but overall seems to work!
It's a bit annoying, and it means that recently generated passwords might not be available from iOS, but overall seems to work!
I tried KeePassX, but found it crashed a lot on my Mac. Have you checked out MacPass? https://github.com/mstarke/MacPass It's another open source reader/writer of KeePass files.
We open sourced (GPL3) Mitro (https://www.mitro.co). You can find the code here: https://github.com/mitro-co/mitro.
We have a similar model for reprompting, but you can alter the code as you see fit. Someone was working on a command line client too, but I'm not sure what became of it.
We have a similar model for reprompting, but you can alter the code as you see fit. Someone was working on a command line client too, but I'm not sure what became of it.
Looks good but you should consider changing that frontpage headline ("Mitro is now Open Source! Unfortunately, that means there is no support") which makes it sound like open-source always equates to no support.
Maybe an asterisk after the first sentence with a footnote stating "this product comes as is with no support" or something similar.
Maybe an asterisk after the first sentence with a footnote stating "this product comes as is with no support" or something similar.
I've been a skeptic of browser extensions. Your service probably doesn't have millions compared to thousands, of users, because your service name does not have the word "pass" in it.
Just tried your service. It's not bad. You are exporting CSV but not importing it.
Just tried your service. It's not bad. You are exporting CSV but not importing it.
I love Mitro, but it doesn't have 2FA.
How about the Bruce Schneier-built Password Safe?
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/security_of_p...
Although, in addition to being a non-cloud-based option, it seems he only vouches for the original, Windows-compatible version. That said, the Android and iOS versions do seem to be open source, so at least you can build inspect them for yourself.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/security_of_p...
Although, in addition to being a non-cloud-based option, it seems he only vouches for the original, Windows-compatible version. That said, the Android and iOS versions do seem to be open source, so at least you can build inspect them for yourself.
Password Safe is great. I have a long password, and sync it to my phone and 4 computers using btsync. Windows, Mac, Linux and Android clients all work seamlessly.
I started on Password Safe for Windows and then shifted to the Mac version which works but is not particularly user friendly.
Just to be clear, you do realize that any pw manager that runs as a browser plugin has the same issue, right? If you want the convenience of being able to auto-fill your passwords into the browser, that kind of limits your options.
I don't think being a browser plugin has anything to do with it. If the problem is what mschulkind describes, then it can be fixed by changing the UI a little to have an autofill button while logged out, and to automatically log out after doing an autofill.
I think the underlying issue, which KeePass also has, is that the entire database is encrypted. So to be able to search the database to see if a password exists, you need to decrypt the whole thing, including the passwords. If the passwords were each individually encrypted separately from the database, this could be fixed.
I think the underlying issue, which KeePass also has, is that the entire database is encrypted. So to be able to search the database to see if a password exists, you need to decrypt the whole thing, including the passwords. If the passwords were each individually encrypted separately from the database, this could be fixed.
I believe this is the same issue that 1Password had in the past, and a lot of users complained about exposed urls/titles in their storage format. I believe they now decrypt the urls & titles on startup in their plugins and keep them in memory, and only read the passwords at will, but I am not 100% on that.
I'd definitely settle for an option where autofill is requested by the extension, but communicated via a bridge to a native application which can safely handle reprompts and cut off communication after a timeout.
I'm a little confused about the issue. I understand the problems you have with the reprompt option, and if that causes you to switch from LastPass, it's your decision.
But could this issue be solved by keeping your computer locked when you're not using it? I understand that might not fit your general computer usage, but it's how I use LastPass, and I certainly wouldn't use the service without locking my machine (reprompt enabled or otherwise--reprompt is turned off for most of my passwords).
You also mention trying very fast autologout policies, but that it gets annoying to have to enter your password twice. My question is, if you're logging out immediately, why do you need the reprompt option enabled at all? If a user can log in, they can certainly reenter the password, so the only thing the reprompt does is annoy you, with no added security.
I don't know your particular computer use, though, so forgive me if what I'm saying isn't applicable.
But could this issue be solved by keeping your computer locked when you're not using it? I understand that might not fit your general computer usage, but it's how I use LastPass, and I certainly wouldn't use the service without locking my machine (reprompt enabled or otherwise--reprompt is turned off for most of my passwords).
You also mention trying very fast autologout policies, but that it gets annoying to have to enter your password twice. My question is, if you're logging out immediately, why do you need the reprompt option enabled at all? If a user can log in, they can certainly reenter the password, so the only thing the reprompt does is annoy you, with no added security.
I don't know your particular computer use, though, so forgive me if what I'm saying isn't applicable.
This has been my system for a while now:
- For each new account, generate a long, random but pronounceable password using apg [1].
- Don't let it touch disk. Immediately save it to a gpg-encrypted password file. I use gnupg.vim. [2]
- After a few logins the pronounceable password usually sticks. If I can't remember though:
YMMV depending on paranoia level / threat model.
[1] http://linux.die.net/man/1/apg
[2] http://www.vim.org/scripts/script.php?script_id=661
- For each new account, generate a long, random but pronounceable password using apg [1].
- Don't let it touch disk. Immediately save it to a gpg-encrypted password file. I use gnupg.vim. [2]
- After a few logins the pronounceable password usually sticks. If I can't remember though:
gpg -d passwords.gpg | grep example.com
YMMV depending on paranoia level / threat model.
[1] http://linux.die.net/man/1/apg
[2] http://www.vim.org/scripts/script.php?script_id=661
Bruce Schneier still recommends using copy and paste to transfer passwords from a password manager to the browser: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/security_of_p...
I've been using Emacs and GPG files (one for personal stuff, one for work accounts) as a password manager since GNU Emacs 22 came out with GPG integration in 2007. Works almost anywhere without needing any other applications. I back up the GPG files to remote servers and keep my private keys on several private devices to get the benefit of remote backups without the risk.
Both iOS and Android are pretty much designed as surveillance devices, I would not recommend putting your private keys or password list on them.
I've been using Emacs and GPG files (one for personal stuff, one for work accounts) as a password manager since GNU Emacs 22 came out with GPG integration in 2007. Works almost anywhere without needing any other applications. I back up the GPG files to remote servers and keep my private keys on several private devices to get the benefit of remote backups without the risk.
Both iOS and Android are pretty much designed as surveillance devices, I would not recommend putting your private keys or password list on them.
> Bruce Schneier still recommends using copy and paste to transfer passwords from a password manager to the browser
That's just a justification for his password manager which has no other way to transfer passwords. There's no security benefit.
Keyloggers don't literally "log keys." A stream of typed keys with no context is utterly useless. Particularly when the goal is automated data theft (rather than a dedicated attacker targeting you personally).
Most keyloggers are embedded somewhere on the HTTP stack (e.g. browser extensions/plugins, Win32 message hooking (e.g. steal the password from a specifically named element when that element is destroyed), TCP driver, etc).
Why do otherwise intelligent people continue to think that malware literally logs their keys? Even a cursory thought about the subject would flag all kinds of issues and better alternatives.
I strongly suggest everyone with an interest in the topic go grab some malware source code and read. It isn't like it is hard to find.
That's just a justification for his password manager which has no other way to transfer passwords. There's no security benefit.
Keyloggers don't literally "log keys." A stream of typed keys with no context is utterly useless. Particularly when the goal is automated data theft (rather than a dedicated attacker targeting you personally).
Most keyloggers are embedded somewhere on the HTTP stack (e.g. browser extensions/plugins, Win32 message hooking (e.g. steal the password from a specifically named element when that element is destroyed), TCP driver, etc).
Why do otherwise intelligent people continue to think that malware literally logs their keys? Even a cursory thought about the subject would flag all kinds of issues and better alternatives.
I strongly suggest everyone with an interest in the topic go grab some malware source code and read. It isn't like it is hard to find.
If you're paranoid about password security why are you storing them on a server you don't own?
You can try KeyPass (http://keepass.info/), but if you're upset with the usability of LastPass you probably won't like KeyPass.
You can try KeyPass (http://keepass.info/), but if you're upset with the usability of LastPass you probably won't like KeyPass.
There's nothing wrong with storing them on a server you don't own... just so long as all information the server sees is encrypted. E.g. you can keep your KeePass file on DropBox because DropBox only sees the encrypted file.
LastPass supports 2FA through Google Authenticator, maybe that will help you rest easier?
https://helpdesk.lastpass.com/security-options/multifactor-a...
https://helpdesk.lastpass.com/security-options/multifactor-a...
I use Yubikey 2FA. That still doesn't fix the problem that all of your data is accessible while logged in, and that the usability goes to hell if you don't stay logged in.
"That still doesn't fix the problem that all of your data is accessible while logged in"
This sounds like a non-vulnerability to me.
You can't get mad at Ford because someone stole your car when you sat them in the front seat and left the keys in the ignition. Why not log out?
This sounds like a non-vulnerability to me.
You can't get mad at Ford because someone stole your car when you sat them in the front seat and left the keys in the ignition. Why not log out?
Okay, this is a crappy metaphor, but imagine they had a feature where you could put the car in standby while you went out for a quick errand, and just press a button to start the car up again without inserting the key, but the key has to be in your pocket. Except, as it turns out, you don't need the key, it'll just start if you jiggle the wires under the steering column a bit. So the standby feature is useless.
LastPass has a series of reprompt options for all sorts of actions, such as opening password /secure note entries, logging in with a password, etc., and you can make those reprompts time out; so, for example, you can keep the thing turned on (so autofills will be prompted, passwords can be generated, etc), but doing anything meaningful with it will require a reprompt after a short amount of time.
As I've discovered, even with the reprompts enabled, you can access the data, so the option is IMO totally useless.
LastPass has a series of reprompt options for all sorts of actions, such as opening password /secure note entries, logging in with a password, etc., and you can make those reprompts time out; so, for example, you can keep the thing turned on (so autofills will be prompted, passwords can be generated, etc), but doing anything meaningful with it will require a reprompt after a short amount of time.
As I've discovered, even with the reprompts enabled, you can access the data, so the option is IMO totally useless.
Are... you sure it's possible to get what you think it is you want to get? Because it sounds like you want to have your cake and eat it too, which may not be possible in this case.
I like the reprompt feature as they have it - you can stay logged in, you can be prompted to autofill on websites, and you can use the password generator, but in order to open or save a site or note you are reprompted after a timer (x minutes since the last reprompt). That reprompt doesn't require the 2FA device but it still requires your master password.
Perhaps I am overreacting but this was a really nice workflow, and it's disappointing to see that it doesn't quite work from a security standpoint. It is perhaps better to not use it at all, but to set a very fast idle timeout so in case of a stolen laptop, in the time it would take an attacker to crack your login password (if it happens at all), LastPass completely logs out.
Perhaps I am overreacting but this was a really nice workflow, and it's disappointing to see that it doesn't quite work from a security standpoint. It is perhaps better to not use it at all, but to set a very fast idle timeout so in case of a stolen laptop, in the time it would take an attacker to crack your login password (if it happens at all), LastPass completely logs out.
> I've been looking at 1Password but I was turned off by their lack of meaningful 2FA support (Yubikey), and their exposure of data if used in any sort of convenient fashion (I would like access from my phone, which is part of the reason I want Yubikey support).
What exactly are you referring to by that? The 1Password keychain is encrypted using PBKDF2 with a large number of iterations so they're rather resistant to offline attacks, particularly since I'd assume all of your devices have FDE enabled. If you're too paranoid to trust iCloud/Dropbox for the actual file exchange there's also a local WiFi sync option.
What exactly are you referring to by that? The 1Password keychain is encrypted using PBKDF2 with a large number of iterations so they're rather resistant to offline attacks, particularly since I'd assume all of your devices have FDE enabled. If you're too paranoid to trust iCloud/Dropbox for the actual file exchange there's also a local WiFi sync option.
I like 1Password.
I use http://www.alexhornung.com/2014/01/15/introducing-bpasswd2/ because it doesn't store anything anywhere except some settings for some sites that need different options when generating the password.
I used something similar until 2011 or so.
If the site's password is always a function of the master password and the site URL, what do you do when a site was breached and you need to change its password? What if the site changes URL (eg twttr.com became twitter.com)?
If the site's password is always a function of the master password and the site URL, what do you do when a site was breached and you need to change its password? What if the site changes URL (eg twttr.com became twitter.com)?
If you don't need something that keeps your passwords sync'd accross devices, then you have many more options.
Chrome on OSX uses the OSX Keychain to store passwords -- and I figure if you can't trust OSX Keychain, then you're kinda doomed anyway using OSX. (But I actually think it's pretty solid software). (I am not sure if Firefox on OSX also uses the OSX Keychain? Safari surely does.)
And it's easy to share a Keychain file accross multiple OSX computers, even over dropbox -- but just OSX.
There are also of course a number of third-party, and in some cases multi-platform, password storage systems that simply keep your passwords in an encrypted file. I am not sure if any of them have as good browser integration as LastPass (or built-in browser auto-fill) though. Anyone know of any good ones?
Chrome on OSX uses the OSX Keychain to store passwords -- and I figure if you can't trust OSX Keychain, then you're kinda doomed anyway using OSX. (But I actually think it's pretty solid software). (I am not sure if Firefox on OSX also uses the OSX Keychain? Safari surely does.)
And it's easy to share a Keychain file accross multiple OSX computers, even over dropbox -- but just OSX.
There are also of course a number of third-party, and in some cases multi-platform, password storage systems that simply keep your passwords in an encrypted file. I am not sure if any of them have as good browser integration as LastPass (or built-in browser auto-fill) though. Anyone know of any good ones?
It's been mentioned here before, but there is also password manager that uses a mix of git, bash, and gnupg. Not exactly as convenient as LastPass or your OS's keychain:
http://www.passwordstore.org
http://www.passwordstore.org
This is the solution i've adopted a few weeks ago. I use it with the CCID / JavaCard functionality of my Yubikey NEO. I like the blend of ease-of-use of the PIN + device authentication, and it even works over NFC with this app: https://github.com/zeapo/Android-Password-Store
I think the usability needs to be a bit improved (I'm looking at maybe making a Chrome extension), but overall I think it's a pretty good solution.
I like the fact that it builds upon reliable, solid blocks to provide a solution: gnupg for encryption / decryption and git for synchronization between machines / backup.
I think the usability needs to be a bit improved (I'm looking at maybe making a Chrome extension), but overall I think it's a pretty good solution.
I like the fact that it builds upon reliable, solid blocks to provide a solution: gnupg for encryption / decryption and git for synchronization between machines / backup.
The issue described in the linked article is a vulnerability where credentials set to reprompt for use still autofill into fields on the page.
This doesn't seem like intended behavior and I'm surprised it hasn't been fixed yet.
In any case, couldn't you avoid it by simply turning off the autofill function as well for that credential? Then in order to access the site you would need to go through the menu and reprompt.
Update: The other weaknesses addressed in the following have been resolved in my chrome instance of lastpass https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6622154
This doesn't seem like intended behavior and I'm surprised it hasn't been fixed yet.
In any case, couldn't you avoid it by simply turning off the autofill function as well for that credential? Then in order to access the site you would need to go through the menu and reprompt.
Update: The other weaknesses addressed in the following have been resolved in my chrome instance of lastpass https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6622154
I do it like this:
- Password database in KeePass (the mainline version, not KeePassX or one of the other spinoffs)
- Database requires both password and key file to unlock
- Key file only lives on a USB thumb drive, which lives on the keychain in my pocket
- Database lives in a folder that is auto-synced to my various devices via SpiderOak (https://spideroak.com/)
- Password autofill provided by KeeFox (http://keefox.org/)
Using a password and a key file provides a "kinda sorta 2FA" solution, since the key file is tied to a physical artifact (the thumb drive, "something I have") while the password provides "something I know." It's not perfect, however, since the key file could theoretically be separated from the thumb drive if someone got ahold of it.
A better 2FA solution would be one that incorporates a key that's completely tied to the physical token. However, I haven't found a great consumer-oriented product along those lines yet, despite much looking. The YubiKey is the closest, but after buying two of them and spending hours fighting with them, I eventually gave up trying to make them work; they force a choice between their one-time-password (OATH) implementation, which is theoretically awesome but in practice very finicky, and just using a static password stored on the key, which isn't really any better than my USB stick solution.
I chose SpiderOak for syncing the database over alternatives like Dropbox, primarily because SpiderOak appears to actually give a shit about security and privacy. But it doesn't really matter that much because without both the keyfile and the password they couldn't look into the database anyway.
I chose KeeFox for the browser integration primarily because it's well-reviewed and open-source. But if you're concerned about the security of autofill in the browser, you could omit it entirely and just copy the password from the KeePass app when you need it. As always, the right balance of security vs. convenience will vary from person to person.
- Password database in KeePass (the mainline version, not KeePassX or one of the other spinoffs)
- Database requires both password and key file to unlock
- Key file only lives on a USB thumb drive, which lives on the keychain in my pocket
- Database lives in a folder that is auto-synced to my various devices via SpiderOak (https://spideroak.com/)
- Password autofill provided by KeeFox (http://keefox.org/)
Using a password and a key file provides a "kinda sorta 2FA" solution, since the key file is tied to a physical artifact (the thumb drive, "something I have") while the password provides "something I know." It's not perfect, however, since the key file could theoretically be separated from the thumb drive if someone got ahold of it.
A better 2FA solution would be one that incorporates a key that's completely tied to the physical token. However, I haven't found a great consumer-oriented product along those lines yet, despite much looking. The YubiKey is the closest, but after buying two of them and spending hours fighting with them, I eventually gave up trying to make them work; they force a choice between their one-time-password (OATH) implementation, which is theoretically awesome but in practice very finicky, and just using a static password stored on the key, which isn't really any better than my USB stick solution.
I chose SpiderOak for syncing the database over alternatives like Dropbox, primarily because SpiderOak appears to actually give a shit about security and privacy. But it doesn't really matter that much because without both the keyfile and the password they couldn't look into the database anyway.
I chose KeeFox for the browser integration primarily because it's well-reviewed and open-source. But if you're concerned about the security of autofill in the browser, you could omit it entirely and just copy the password from the KeePass app when you need it. As always, the right balance of security vs. convenience will vary from person to person.
What happens if you lose that USB thumb drive, or if it gets damaged?
I would guess there is a copy somewhere. Safety deposit box, etc.
You can use a easy trick to have a unique password for each website you need to log in into:
1- Choose a common base ie. laroS-14
2- Take the two first characters of your login and slide one character back in the alphabet ie. mylogin = lx
3- Take the two first characters of the websites and slide again one character back in the alphabet ie. dropbox = cq
4- Concatenate 1-2-3 ie. laroS-14-lx-cq
Voilà! You have now uniq combinaisons for each website/login. Of course, change the rules to suit your habit and make it yours. It's stronger than using an external service or a software and you don't have to rely on anything!
1- Choose a common base ie. laroS-14
2- Take the two first characters of your login and slide one character back in the alphabet ie. mylogin = lx
3- Take the two first characters of the websites and slide again one character back in the alphabet ie. dropbox = cq
4- Concatenate 1-2-3 ie. laroS-14-lx-cq
Voilà! You have now uniq combinaisons for each website/login. Of course, change the rules to suit your habit and make it yours. It's stronger than using an external service or a software and you don't have to rely on anything!
> It's stronger than using an external service or a software
How do you figure? Your scheme clearly has less entropy than a randomly generated string of the same length, and if an attacker learn two of your passwords, then they know they only have four characters to brute force for every other password you possess.
How do you figure? Your scheme clearly has less entropy than a randomly generated string of the same length, and if an attacker learn two of your passwords, then they know they only have four characters to brute force for every other password you possess.
Your scheme suffers from low Kolmogorov complexity
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
You're better off just doing something like concatenating a secret password with the fully qualified domain name and sha256'ing that and using that.
Or using a "correct horse battery staple" XKCD password generator (I'd use 5 or 6 random words, though, at this point).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolmogorov_complexity
You're better off just doing something like concatenating a secret password with the fully qualified domain name and sha256'ing that and using that.
Or using a "correct horse battery staple" XKCD password generator (I'd use 5 or 6 random words, though, at this point).
I use 1Password and very happy with it.
Create a pattern in your head. Let me try to explain what I'm using.
1. Create a prefix that will be in every password, like: MniJ33 -- quite easy to remember "My name is John, 33 years old".
2. Based on the service you want to use, apply that to the password as well, like: Hnews
3. A suffix with some special chars is also nice, to make it more complicated, like: #$%
The final result would be "MniJ33Hnews#$%". Better than giving your password to anyone.
Edit: Forgot the numbers in the final result.
1. Create a prefix that will be in every password, like: MniJ33 -- quite easy to remember "My name is John, 33 years old".
2. Based on the service you want to use, apply that to the password as well, like: Hnews
3. A suffix with some special chars is also nice, to make it more complicated, like: #$%
The final result would be "MniJ33Hnews#$%". Better than giving your password to anyone.
Edit: Forgot the numbers in the final result.
> However after noticing (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6621560) that LastPass' vault is easily broken into when open
So to use an analogy, you're unlocking your front door, showing a stranger into your home, and then are upset because they can steal stuff once inside?
They've already defeated all of your security if they have complete unrestricted access to your LastPass vault. The fact they can hit F12 and use the developer bar to inspect the DOM or restrive passwords from behind ###### is both expected and not a security issue.
> even with strict reprompt settings
That wasn't in your link. How do you bypass reprompt?
> I'm starting to trust their security model less and less.
Why? None of the reasons you've given are technically sound.
> I opened a support ticket about the obvious password breach detailed above, and they say it's an inevitable consequence of Chrome's broken security model in extensions.
It has nothing to do with Chrome's "security model." If you have completely unrestricted access you have complete unrestricted access. End of.
You are literally accessing a UI that can display all of your passwords in plain text and you're complaing because you can see your passwords in plain text... Well, yeah...
> Well, if that model is broken, I don't want to use it.
You haven't explained how it is.
> I find it misleading that LastPass even offers a reprompt option, since it is so easy to retrieve passwords from the application when it is logged in, even if a reprompt is required.
Huh? Can you explain how you're able to bypass the reprompt prompt?
> Sure, it would slow down unsophisticated attackers, but you don't need to be that sophisticated to change the type of an input.
It shouldn't slow anyone! You've giving the attackers complete unrestricted access to your password database. Nobody should be slowed, everyone should have a complete overview.
> I have been trying to use it with very fast autologout policies but it very annoyingly asks for a password twice (once to login, once as a reprompt) as well as the Yubikey for every single site. The usability is garbage.
Then turn the reprompt off and just have it ask for login...
> What do you use and what do you like/dislike about it?
I use LastPass, but I'd consider something else if any of your complaints had any technical credibility at all.
So to use an analogy, you're unlocking your front door, showing a stranger into your home, and then are upset because they can steal stuff once inside?
They've already defeated all of your security if they have complete unrestricted access to your LastPass vault. The fact they can hit F12 and use the developer bar to inspect the DOM or restrive passwords from behind ###### is both expected and not a security issue.
> even with strict reprompt settings
That wasn't in your link. How do you bypass reprompt?
> I'm starting to trust their security model less and less.
Why? None of the reasons you've given are technically sound.
> I opened a support ticket about the obvious password breach detailed above, and they say it's an inevitable consequence of Chrome's broken security model in extensions.
It has nothing to do with Chrome's "security model." If you have completely unrestricted access you have complete unrestricted access. End of.
You are literally accessing a UI that can display all of your passwords in plain text and you're complaing because you can see your passwords in plain text... Well, yeah...
> Well, if that model is broken, I don't want to use it.
You haven't explained how it is.
> I find it misleading that LastPass even offers a reprompt option, since it is so easy to retrieve passwords from the application when it is logged in, even if a reprompt is required.
Huh? Can you explain how you're able to bypass the reprompt prompt?
> Sure, it would slow down unsophisticated attackers, but you don't need to be that sophisticated to change the type of an input.
It shouldn't slow anyone! You've giving the attackers complete unrestricted access to your password database. Nobody should be slowed, everyone should have a complete overview.
> I have been trying to use it with very fast autologout policies but it very annoyingly asks for a password twice (once to login, once as a reprompt) as well as the Yubikey for every single site. The usability is garbage.
Then turn the reprompt off and just have it ask for login...
> What do you use and what do you like/dislike about it?
I use LastPass, but I'd consider something else if any of your complaints had any technical credibility at all.
I think you're misunderstanding how you bypass the reprompt. LastPass has two separate features - auto-logoff and reprompt, and you can tick a bunch of boxes to decide which features you want reprompt for. I usually tick most of them.
You can then set a reprompt delay (from 0 to 24 hours), and while still logged in, you are reprompted at every interval when you try to use LastPass' features. This is a nice alternative to simply having it log out at intervals or log out when idle; some defense against a swiped computer or malicious coworker, etc. Of course the usual rules apply and you should never leave your computer unlocked but it is a nice feature.
I would except that many LastPass users use the reprompt model instead of the auto-logout model, as it allows you to use some nice features (like site/form detection) that you wouldn't get when logged out. So the workflow with reprompt is simply: go to a site, click the autofill button, get prompted & type password, continue on. This is significantly easier than clicking the extension button, deliberately logged in, waiting for decryption, then clicking the autofill button.
Unfortunately, if you rely on reprompts and somebody does get a hold of your computer, they can do some trickery with the inspector and lift your passwords so long as you are still logged in. This makes the reprompt useless; may as well not have it at all.
You can then set a reprompt delay (from 0 to 24 hours), and while still logged in, you are reprompted at every interval when you try to use LastPass' features. This is a nice alternative to simply having it log out at intervals or log out when idle; some defense against a swiped computer or malicious coworker, etc. Of course the usual rules apply and you should never leave your computer unlocked but it is a nice feature.
I would except that many LastPass users use the reprompt model instead of the auto-logout model, as it allows you to use some nice features (like site/form detection) that you wouldn't get when logged out. So the workflow with reprompt is simply: go to a site, click the autofill button, get prompted & type password, continue on. This is significantly easier than clicking the extension button, deliberately logged in, waiting for decryption, then clicking the autofill button.
Unfortunately, if you rely on reprompts and somebody does get a hold of your computer, they can do some trickery with the inspector and lift your passwords so long as you are still logged in. This makes the reprompt useless; may as well not have it at all.
So your reason to drop LastPass is that you don't like their implementation of an optional feature even though an alternative is readily available (auto-logout)?
I think you've hit on a really interesting limitation of end-user password managers. They are really convenient in some cases, but they have crazy bad failure modes, and they aren't always easier to use.
In this landscape, I would be highly paranoid about those kinds of applications. They don't provide the level of protection I would really want for that kind of sensitive data.
In this landscape, I would be highly paranoid about those kinds of applications. They don't provide the level of protection I would really want for that kind of sensitive data.
I use KeePass these days. It appears to have plugins browser integration if that's the important thing.
I don't find it especially good or bad, but it does the job and it's all stored locally -- I'm not concerned with accessing most accounts across different machines.
http://keepass.info/
I don't find it especially good or bad, but it does the job and it's all stored locally -- I'm not concerned with accessing most accounts across different machines.
http://keepass.info/
The description of how to see the password in the linked HN comment doesn't work as described - if it's set to reprompt then you have to enter the master password before it ever gets to the detail form, so you can't just jump into the dev console and make it display the password.
I use KeePassX:
http://www.keepassx.org/
http://www.keepassx.org/
I use Yubikey but I don't keep any high security passwords stored in it. Those I type by hand. It's annoying but as Scotty would say, "ye cannae change the laws o' physics"!
I've been using Roboform for 7 years very surprised it isn't better represented in here tbh. Cloud option or desktop option and does a really good job of not invading your entire workspace.
I've been using UPM (http://upm.sourceforge.net/) for quite a few years. It's portable and full of great features.
You could try http://masterpasswordapp.com/.
I like its philosophy, even if some of the versions could use a bit more polish.
I like its philosophy, even if some of the versions could use a bit more polish.
Hiding shared passwords is a polite fiction. If you share the password, it's accessible via many ways. (JS, stack intercept, network intercept, etc)
I'm happy with KeePassX self-hosted in Dropbox
However after noticing (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6621560) that LastPass' vault is easily broken into when open, even with strict reprompt settings, I'm starting to trust their security model less and less. I opened a support ticket about the obvious password breach detailed above, and they say it's an inevitable consequence of Chrome's broken security model in extensions.
Well, if that model is broken, I don't want to use it. I find it misleading that LastPass even offers a reprompt option, since it is so easy to retrieve passwords from the application when it is logged in, even if a reprompt is required. Sure, it would slow down unsophisticated attackers, but you don't need to be that sophisticated to change the type of an input.
I have been trying to use it with very fast autologout policies but it very annoyingly asks for a password twice (once to login, once as a reprompt) as well as the Yubikey for every single site. The usability is garbage.
I've been looking at 1Password but I was turned off by their lack of meaningful 2FA support (Yubikey), and their exposure of data if used in any sort of convenient fashion (I would like access from my phone, which is part of the reason I want Yubikey support).
What do you use and what do you like/dislike about it?