How We Decoded Some Nasty Multi-Level Encoded Malware(blog.sucuri.net)

46 pointsby cubictwo13 lat temu15 comments

blog.sucuri.net

How We Decoded Some Nasty Multi-Level Encoded Malware

http://blog.sucuri.net/2013/12/how-we-decoded-some-nasty-multi-level-encoded-malware.html

4 comments

I must admit, I think the last step was a little. uhm... well I just think its funny how you used Hacker News to decrypt a script then posted about that on Hacker News.

JonnieCache13 lat temu

hopefully noodly will turn up and tell us how he/she did it.

EDIT: obviously bruteforce, but still.

mkarr13 lat temu

A few months ago, I removed an almost identical piece of malware from a client's account. Looking through the server logs, I noticed that the script was still being accessed on a fairly regular basis. I dropped a simple script to dump the contents of the cookies and request variables to a file when accessed. It didn't take very long to obtain the key.

bediger400013 lat temu

It's an XOR encryption, with a largish key - 12 bytes if I make the old hacker news comment correctly. If you do the standard known-text XOR key finding algorithm, you need a 24-byte known text.

That's some brute forcing, if you ask me.

alexkus13 lat temu

But you're just looking for the text being in a certain range of characters. The first stage is determining the key length, you can do this by looking at the number of different character values in positions 1,2,3... then 1,3,5,... and 2,4,6,... then 1,4,7,... etc.

    keylength=1 127
    keylength=2 114 116
    keylength=3 107 102 106
    keylength=4 78 94 98 103
    keylength=5 111 118 115 114 119
    keylength=6 81 71 81 77 79 77
    keylength=7 104 112 110 104 110 110 109
    keylength=8 67 85 86 94 68 91 83 86
    keylength=9 87 86 86 90 92 85 83 85 82
    keylength=10 91 97 86 89 90 88 90 90 92 97
    keylength=11 90 101 102 98 99 93 100 100 100 95 93
    keylength=12 45 45 46 53 47 46 41 47 47 51 50 47
    keylength=13 89 85 100 90 89 91 94 95 82 90 86 88 92
    keylength=14 83 84 85 88 82 81 77 72 82 85 73 81 82 86
    keylength=15 73 81 72 76 76 70 75 73 74 72 77 76 73 71 73
    keylength=16 56 68 71 80 60 73 64 73 58 71 70 76 57 76 66 68
    keylength=17 81 86 82 74 77 82 85 87 81 87 78 84 77 77 79 80 82
    keylength=18 59 55 59 55 61 56 59 55 57 59 55 62 62 57 60 58 56 59
    keylength=19 77 80 80 77 71 89 78 76 73 74 68 80 80 80 74 76 78 79 72

The stand out line from that is keylength=12 as it provides a local minima for the number of different characters.

Having a good idea of the key length you can look at which of the possible 256 values for each position of the key produce the top numbers of printable characters. A quick perl script to do this gives:-

    POSS:0: n=211 chars=FHLRSUVZ]
    POSS:1: n=209 chars=cdjkouwx~
    POSS:2: n=208 chars=DIJKLORUW^_
    POSS:3: n=209 chars=BIKSVW
    POSS:4: n=206 chars=bejkntvy~
    POSS:5: n=210 chars=@CDEFKQXZ
    POSS:6: n=208 chars="#)+.023678>?
    POSS:7: n=206 chars=fgmorswz|
    POSS:8: n=208 chars=behjknt~
    POSS:9: n=205 chars=GMORSTW\
    POSS:10: n=207 chars=FLWXY[\
    POSS:11: n=208 chars=cdjkoux~

You'll note that the actual key (SjJVkE6rkRYj) is present in this output. I'll carry on with this if I get a chance tomorrow.

alexkus13 lat temu

OK, next pick a word you think will be in the output (it's php code so I'll guess the word "function" might be common). You then XOR each 8 character substring with "function", taking note of the position of the substring within the 12 character groupings, and count the resulting characters:-

    $ ./4.pl 12 "function"
    POS: 0: S->78 T->71 U->69
    POS: 1: j->76 l->64 m->59
    POS: 2: L->73 J->67 W->64
    POS: 3: V->65 Q->55 P->49
    POS: 4: m->68 v->50 `->49
    POS: 5: E->54 C->52 O->48
    POS: 6: 6->57 0->56 1->56
    POS: 7: u->56 t->54 x->50
    POS: 8: k->76 l->70 m->66
    POS: 9: R->69 U->57 H->51
    POS: 10: _->69 Y->62 ^->54
    POS: 11: j->70 m->59 l->55

Note that the correct key in each position is usually either the first or second possibility, but there are some times when it isn't there at all.

(It's better if you give it a longer string, if I give it "function " with the trailing space then it gets 9/12 as the most popular, 2/12 as second most popular and the remaining one as the third most popular. There are even better choices, see below, but I chose to go with this as it helps show how to continue with non-perfect information).

Next I knocked up a quick program to allow me to try different keys to decrypt it, it prints out the code in blocks of the appropriate keylength so it's easy to see if a specific character position is correct or not. The program takes various commands from stdin (k = print key, S = set key, s = set individual key character, p = print in keylength sized blocks, P = print entire decrypted block):-

    $ ./5.pl 12
    k
    key is aaaaaaaaaaaa
    S SjLVmE6ukR_j
    key is now SjLVmE6ukR_j
    p
    /)abjutt uy
    stcm&vauiadl
    es\12i`(!Gisue
    t("_UERQER/)
    {$YCIOKNE= $
    HTRPYCOHKIC_
    VATS=$_WOSR=
    &$NTRP_WOSR_
    VATS=$_@ET;&
    $HRTV_GBT_PA
    RS=}\12//cie&w
    itn crrhr
    `u
    ncriin \127_doe
    ($k)}@hbadcr
    ('NTRP/6.1&5
    ...

Getting there, but still a way off. There are a few strings like COIKOE[#n]= which could be COOKIE, so we fiddle with the 3rd column and see some interesting things in the output:-

    s 2 J
    p
    ...
    elseof(oasYp
    ...
    COOKOE[#n]=
    ...
    systcm(#c)=}
    ...

Neither of the other two choices for column 4 produce the right string, but it's simple enough to find the ciphertext and find what is needed to make elseof -> elseif, COOKOE -> COOKIE and systcm -> system. It's k:-

    s 4 k
    k
    key is SjJVkE6ukR_j
    p
    ...
    elseif(oasYp
    ...
    COOKIE[#n]=
    ...
    system(#c)=}

We carry on doing this based on more clues like this (it gets easier and easier!) and we end up with:-

    k
    key is SjJVkE6rkRYj
    p
    //adjust sy
    stem variabl
    es
    if(!@isse
    t($_SERVER))
    {$_COOKIE=&$
    HTTP_COOKIE_
    VARS;$_POST=
    ...

And printing out the entire decrypted buffer without extra linebreaks every 12 chars gives:-

    P
    
    //adjust system variables
    if(!@isset($_SERVER)){$_COOKIE=&$HTTP_COOKIE_VARS;$_POST=&$HTTP_POST_VARS;$_GET=&$HTTP_GET_VARS;}
    //die with error
    function x_die($m){@header('HTTP/1.1 500 '.$m);@die();}
    //check if we can exec
    define('has_passthru',@function_exists('passthru'));
    define('has_system',@function_exists('system'));
    define('has_shell_exec',@function_exists('shell_exec'));
    define('has_popen',@function_exists('popen'));
    ...

Interestingly, trying known plaintext of "define" gives us the entire key as the most probably choice first time:-

    $ ./4.pl 12 "define"
    POS: 0: S->75 X->56 _->54
    POS: 1: j->77 a->51 f->47
    POS: 2: J->71 A->55 F->49
    POS: 3: V->61 ]->44 Z->43
    POS: 4: k->59 h->43 *->40
    POS: 5: E->55 8->48 4->44
    POS: 6: 6->52 w->47 <->43
    POS: 7: r->55 d->43 s->40
    POS: 8: k->75 `->51 g->51
    POS: 9: R->59 Y->55 X->49
    POS: 10: Y->69 R->49 U->47
    POS: 11: j->61 `->43 m->42

JonnieCache13 lat temu

This is roughly what I was imagining doing in my head when I brashly wrote "obviously bruteforce." Hooray! Apparently I've still got it, at least to some small extent.

Thanks for your writeup!

Why does define work so well? Chance?

alexkus13 lat temu

Not sure, "define" only appears 10 times but "function" appears 19 times. It's probably because 'e' is more popular in the code and "define" has two of them. Looking at the decrypted code there are much better strings to try; "function_exists" gives the right key first time too.

It could have been made a lot harder by using comments at the end of each line to pad the code with extra characters to equal out the frequency distribution and make this kind of frequency analysis impossible.

JonnieCache13 lat temu

Could I make it even worse using ruby's unicode support?

eg this kind of nonsense:

    π = Math::PI
    alias λ proc

    ● = λ {|r| π*r**2}
    puts ●.call 5

    # 78.53981633974483

alexkus13 lat temu

Oh yes, although too many "alias" commands will mean that it's possible to search for the known plaintext of 'alias'. But the more non-ascii bytes there are the more it will put off my analysis which dependeds on isprint().

alexkus13 lat temu

Base64 of the encrypted php malware (after the initial decryption phase but before the XOR decryption): http://pastebin.com/YfcKSLQq

I tidied up the code I used to analyse it and uploaded it here:-

xor.pl: http://pastebin.com/NBhmSu1k

(Focus was on a quick hack not code quality or documentation!)

bediger400013 lat temu

I'm letting the above comment stand, so that the rather cogent reply will make sense in the future.

It just so happens that I have a sample of that same malware. A read through shows that the XOR key actually arrives in the HTTP request made on the original (first level) PHP code. The 2nd level code looks for a 'key' in $_COOKIE, $_POST and $_GET.

VMG13 lat temu

And re-encoded it into low-res PNGs?

aroch13 lat temu

Huh, how strange...I just cleaned the perl version of this out of a compromised user account on a server I manage.

bbsec13 lat temu

Great!