America’s Hidden Duopoly(freakonomics.com)
freakonomics.com
America’s Hidden Duopoly
http://freakonomics.com/podcast/politics-industry/
26 comments
I'm going to have to spend some time reading over your reference when I have the free time, since it looks quite interesting.
But I can already tell you by the complexity of what that article is trying to show that most people won't understand it and won't care.
When I vote, it's in part to declare what I want and what I believe in. I generally don't like Democrats and I don't like Republicans. If I want to vote for the Green Party candidate, then I want to vote for the Green Party candidate and make it known that that's who I want to win. I don't want to be stating that I equally approve of both the Green Party candidate and the Democratic candidate since that doesn't accurately represent my opinion.
Given that the Green Party candidate is not going to win, I generally vastly prefer the Democratic candidate to the Republican candidate, even if I don't like the Democratic candidate one bit.
I don't want to vote in a way in which my statement is that I equally prefer the Democratic candidate to Green Party candidate. I want to vote in a way that states, "I want the Green Party candidate to win. And if I can't have that, I'll reluctantly settle for the Democratic candidate over the Republican candidate."
Voting in a way in which one's desires are clearly indicated is what most people would want, I imagine, even if it has some counterintuitive results at times.
Also, at least on a cursory reading, it seems that the author of the article has a bias towards "moderate" candidates winning. Who says that I want a moderate candidate to win? I want some serious progressive change!
But I can already tell you by the complexity of what that article is trying to show that most people won't understand it and won't care.
When I vote, it's in part to declare what I want and what I believe in. I generally don't like Democrats and I don't like Republicans. If I want to vote for the Green Party candidate, then I want to vote for the Green Party candidate and make it known that that's who I want to win. I don't want to be stating that I equally approve of both the Green Party candidate and the Democratic candidate since that doesn't accurately represent my opinion.
Given that the Green Party candidate is not going to win, I generally vastly prefer the Democratic candidate to the Republican candidate, even if I don't like the Democratic candidate one bit.
I don't want to vote in a way in which my statement is that I equally prefer the Democratic candidate to Green Party candidate. I want to vote in a way that states, "I want the Green Party candidate to win. And if I can't have that, I'll reluctantly settle for the Democratic candidate over the Republican candidate."
Voting in a way in which one's desires are clearly indicated is what most people would want, I imagine, even if it has some counterintuitive results at times.
Also, at least on a cursory reading, it seems that the author of the article has a bias towards "moderate" candidates winning. Who says that I want a moderate candidate to win? I want some serious progressive change!
It's not that the author is biased towards moderate candidates; the author wants the moderate candidate to win when the mean of the population's normally distributed political beliefs lie closest to the moderate candidate.
The posit is that the spoiler effect is bad: Fielding an additional extreme candidate on one side should not be helpful to the other side.
The posit is that the spoiler effect is bad: Fielding an additional extreme candidate on one side should not be helpful to the other side.
Well, I really should read the article you cite because it looks interesting, but take this example:
There are three candidates: Republican, Democrat, and Green. 60% of the population wants the Green candidate to win, but will settle for the Democrat reluctantly. They absolutely, positively do not want the Republican to win. 40% of the population wants the Republican to win but under no circumstance wants the Green candidate to win.
So with Instant Runoff elections, the majority gets their wish. The Green Candidate wins.
With Approval Voting, 60% of the people vote the Green Party Candidate, 40% of the people vote for the Republican Party Candidate, and 100% of the people vote for the Democratic Candidate. The Democratic candidate wins.
I don't see how this is a win for Approval Voting. The candidate that wins is a candidate that no one really wanted.
Well, clearly my example is rather contrived, but I suspect (perhaps out of ignorance) that any situation in which Instant Runoff would cause counter-intuitive results is also rather unlikely.
I'll definitely have to look at your reference, though. I do find such issues very interesting
So with Instant Runoff elections, the majority gets their wish. The Green Candidate wins.
With Approval Voting, 60% of the people vote the Green Party Candidate, 40% of the people vote for the Republican Party Candidate, and 100% of the people vote for the Democratic Candidate. The Democratic candidate wins.
I don't see how this is a win for Approval Voting. The candidate that wins is a candidate that no one really wanted.
Well, clearly my example is rather contrived, but I suspect (perhaps out of ignorance) that any situation in which Instant Runoff would cause counter-intuitive results is also rather unlikely.
I'll definitely have to look at your reference, though. I do find such issues very interesting
> I don't want to vote in a way in which my statement is that I equally prefer the Democratic candidate to Green Party candidate.
This is a pervasive logical fallacy, we call the "expressiveness fallacy". https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/expressiveness
In short, you could allow partial approvals (1/4, 1/3, etc.), or mathematically equivalent ratings on a 0-N scale. But Approval Voting behaves almost as well in aggregate. http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html
And IRV/RCV will maintain two-party duopoly. https://asitoughttobe.com/2010/07/18/score-voting/
Voting theory is highly counterintuitive.
This is a pervasive logical fallacy, we call the "expressiveness fallacy". https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/expressiveness
In short, you could allow partial approvals (1/4, 1/3, etc.), or mathematically equivalent ratings on a 0-N scale. But Approval Voting behaves almost as well in aggregate. http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html
And IRV/RCV will maintain two-party duopoly. https://asitoughttobe.com/2010/07/18/score-voting/
Voting theory is highly counterintuitive.
Expressiveness fallacy is averted if you use global scales and score system instead of ranking system. E.g. Majority Judgement.
It is not exactly counterintuitive that aggregated orderings have problems - the problems relate to the fact that ordering cannot be averaged and ties are not allowed. The latter problem also happens in the oldest score system called Bucklin voting.
Approval voting is essentially 0-1 score voting system with ties.
It is not exactly counterintuitive that aggregated orderings have problems - the problems relate to the fact that ordering cannot be averaged and ties are not allowed. The latter problem also happens in the oldest score system called Bucklin voting.
Approval voting is essentially 0-1 score voting system with ties.
Majority Judgement is severely flawed compared to Score Voting and Approval Voting.
http://scorevoting.net/MedianVrange
http://scorevoting.net/MedianVrange
> This is a pervasive logical fallacy, we call the "expressiveness fallacy"
I don't particularly like to argue over semantics, but this is not a "logical fallacy". It may be some sort of fallacy, but it's not a logical one.
I don't particularly like to argue over semantics, but this is not a "logical fallacy". It may be some sort of fallacy, but it's not a logical one.
I'm not sure I follow your "IRV favors duopoly" article. I looked at the data, and it's analysis and facts don't match. Kiss is the clear winner in Burlington 2009 almost any way you slice it.
Nope. Montroll is preferred to both rivals by a huge majority.
http://scorevoting.net/Burlington.html#UngerApp
http://scorevoting.net/Burlington.html#UngerApp
Well, right now, the system only lets you express that you prefer the Democratic candidate, to the exclusion of the Green Party candidate, unless you want to 'throw your vote away'. So it seems that approval voting still represents an improvement over the current state of the art. It warrants consideration as to whether it's worth making the perfect the enemy of the good in this issue.
Approval voting is robustly superior to ranked choice.
http://www.electology.org/approval-voting-vs-irv
http://www.electology.org/approval-voting-vs-irv
I know of two simple ways to vote:
Preferential voting. If your sincere choice (ie Greens) didn't win, your vote goes toward the second choice until a candidate gets clear majority.
Proportional voting, people can vote for their sincere choice and there's a pool of 10 representatives. That means each candidate needs at least 10% of vote. If over 10% people in the state for Greens but rest vote for Democrats/Republicans. Thats 1 Greens and 9 Democrats/Republicans.
In USA, it is not possible to have a sincere choice. Also known as the illusion of choice.
Preferential voting. If your sincere choice (ie Greens) didn't win, your vote goes toward the second choice until a candidate gets clear majority.
Proportional voting, people can vote for their sincere choice and there's a pool of 10 representatives. That means each candidate needs at least 10% of vote. If over 10% people in the state for Greens but rest vote for Democrats/Republicans. Thats 1 Greens and 9 Democrats/Republicans.
In USA, it is not possible to have a sincere choice. Also known as the illusion of choice.
your first option is seemingly the same as IRV.
We need to get rid of closed primaries and first past the post voting—those lead to more partisan and ideological candidates. Replacing the electoral college with a popular vote would also help.
Out of all the elected officials who have the power to help change the voting system, how many benefit from the current voting system (first past the post)? All of them, right?
It is possible to get politicians to make changes to things that benefit them. It's hard, it takes a lot of pressure and a lot of work, but it can be done.
Keep in mind that our system has changed a great deal already (e.g. women and non-whites being allowed to vote), the politicians at the time benefitted greatly from how things were set up before, but those changes were still accomplished. We shouldn't give up on the idea of reform just because politicians would resist it.
Keep in mind that our system has changed a great deal already (e.g. women and non-whites being allowed to vote), the politicians at the time benefitted greatly from how things were set up before, but those changes were still accomplished. We shouldn't give up on the idea of reform just because politicians would resist it.
Thanks, that gives me hope.
> Out of all the elected officials who have the power to help change the voting system
Elected officials are initially largely irrelevant, changes to the voting system will start with state-level voter initiatives.
Pretty much everything worth doing to voting systems aside from (1) replacing or reforming the electoral college, and (2) moving away from mandatory single-member districts in the House of Representatives, can be done entirely there in many states without elected officials being involved except in their ministerial role in certifying the results and implementing the dictated policies.
Elected officials are initially largely irrelevant, changes to the voting system will start with state-level voter initiatives.
Pretty much everything worth doing to voting systems aside from (1) replacing or reforming the electoral college, and (2) moving away from mandatory single-member districts in the House of Representatives, can be done entirely there in many states without elected officials being involved except in their ministerial role in certifying the results and implementing the dictated policies.
Thanks. Both #1 and #2 require a constitutional amendment, right?
#2 can be done with statute; the ban on other arrangements is statutory. For #1, some reforms could be done by way of legislation (e.g., changes to the safe harbor legislation for electoral votes), or coordinated state action (like the current national popular vote effort, which leaves the EC formally in place but relies on states coordinating assignment of electors).
I thought the consensus was that opening up the primaries outside of party insiders was a considerable force for increasing the idealogical and partisan candidates. When the party insiders choose, then want moderate candidates who can appeal to more voters and win a general election. When the party "base" decides, they want partisan and idealogical candidates.
There is a video demonstrating the simulations posted on the OPs reference.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4FXLQoLDBA
The video was created by the Equal Vote Coalition. They also have some good information on their site.
https://www.equal.vote/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-4FXLQoLDBA
The video was created by the Equal Vote Coalition. They also have some good information on their site.
https://www.equal.vote/
> If I want to vote for the Green Party candidate, then I want to vote for the Green Party candidate and make it known that that's who I want to win. I don't want to be stating that I equally approve of both the Green Party candidate and the Democratic candidate since that doesn't accurately represent my opinion.
I'd probably check off both, personally, because I don't care. See, the system works!
I'd probably check off both, personally, because I don't care. See, the system works!
Ranked choice is simple to explain and understand.
Approval voting would encourage people to NOT vote for people they would accept, for fear that it would hurt their favorite.
Approval voting would encourage people to NOT vote for people they would accept, for fear that it would hurt their favorite.
There's a range of acceptance strictness among people. Some would only vote for their favorite. Some would vote for their favorite and someone who they're willing to accept.
That naturally leads to the same ability to discern support for compromise candidates as ranked choice. Each individual voter can't express that but the population as a whole will.
That naturally leads to the same ability to discern support for compromise candidates as ranked choice. Each individual voter can't express that but the population as a whole will.
Is ranked choice voting not susceptible to strategic voting?
It is, but if the ranking is exhaustive then it cannot regress to de facto FPTP.
You wind up with an arguably more benign form of strategic voting: preference deals.
The point here is that approval voting, range voting etc work better than IRV under a number of ideal conditions.
But political parties have no incentive to cooperate with the ideal conditions. They want to beat the other party.
You wind up with an arguably more benign form of strategic voting: preference deals.
The point here is that approval voting, range voting etc work better than IRV under a number of ideal conditions.
But political parties have no incentive to cooperate with the ideal conditions. They want to beat the other party.
> But political parties have no incentive to cooperate with the ideal conditions. They want to beat the other party.
It doesn't matter. Voters will do what's in THEIR best interest, regardless of what their favorite party wants. E.g. Ralph Nader wanted his supporters to vote for him, but 90% told pollsters they voted for someone else, mostly Gore.
I repeat: voters do what's in their own best interest.
With Approval Voting, that often means voting for your favorite PLUS one or more other candidates who are more electable.
In a large 2014 exit poll including Approval Voting, the result of the Maine gubernatorial race was completely REVERSED. http://scorevoting.net/Maine2014Exit
Sure, the Democrat didn't want his supporters also voting for the independent. But they DID IT ANYWAY, because they didn't want the Republican.
There is a reason that experts in game theory generally favor Approval Voting and/or Score Voting, such as outlined in the 2008 book "Gaming the Vote" by William Poundstone.
It doesn't matter. Voters will do what's in THEIR best interest, regardless of what their favorite party wants. E.g. Ralph Nader wanted his supporters to vote for him, but 90% told pollsters they voted for someone else, mostly Gore.
I repeat: voters do what's in their own best interest.
With Approval Voting, that often means voting for your favorite PLUS one or more other candidates who are more electable.
In a large 2014 exit poll including Approval Voting, the result of the Maine gubernatorial race was completely REVERSED. http://scorevoting.net/Maine2014Exit
Sure, the Democrat didn't want his supporters also voting for the independent. But they DID IT ANYWAY, because they didn't want the Republican.
There is a reason that experts in game theory generally favor Approval Voting and/or Score Voting, such as outlined in the 2008 book "Gaming the Vote" by William Poundstone.
> I repeat: voters do what's in their own best interest.
I disagree with this somewhat, and the reason is because some ballots have an option to vote for one party across the board, and people do that. Parties choose their candidates, therefore parties are telling people, who have the option of voting on their favorite color, who to vote for.
If you align yourself with one of the two big parties in the US, you're almost always going to vote for whatever they tell you to (of course there are exceptions, but I'm speaking generally). Generally people believe the party they like is acting in their best interest (because why else would they like it), and now we've come full circle. Ralph was not a member of one of the two major political parties.
That said, I agree with the rest of your comment.
I disagree with this somewhat, and the reason is because some ballots have an option to vote for one party across the board, and people do that. Parties choose their candidates, therefore parties are telling people, who have the option of voting on their favorite color, who to vote for.
If you align yourself with one of the two big parties in the US, you're almost always going to vote for whatever they tell you to (of course there are exceptions, but I'm speaking generally). Generally people believe the party they like is acting in their best interest (because why else would they like it), and now we've come full circle. Ralph was not a member of one of the two major political parties.
That said, I agree with the rest of your comment.
> It is, but if the ranking is exhaustive then it cannot regress to de facto FPTP.
Requiring exhaustive (or even second-level) ranking has been ruled unconstitutional (at the state level) in a couple of US states when forms of Bucklin voting were used; which makes any method that relies on compulsory multiple ranking (rather than accepting truncated rankings) more difficult to implement.
Which isn't a fundamental problem, but it's something to be tactically aware of.
Requiring exhaustive (or even second-level) ranking has been ruled unconstitutional (at the state level) in a couple of US states when forms of Bucklin voting were used; which makes any method that relies on compulsory multiple ranking (rather than accepting truncated rankings) more difficult to implement.
Which isn't a fundamental problem, but it's something to be tactically aware of.
It seems the US cannot have so many nice things (like preferential voting, and therefore a diversity of candidates) because someone might feel that their freedoms are under threat.
(I have thought this before about other things I have come across. Universal healthcare, and taxes to pay for it, come to mind)
(I have thought this before about other things I have come across. Universal healthcare, and taxes to pay for it, come to mind)
After an election cycle or two they would figure out this is helping their opponents - like in first-past-the-post how it takes a few election cycles for people realise that splitting the vote really helps their least-liked candidate.
> I don't understand why so many people working for reform support ranked choice voting instead of approval voting
Because IRV (“ranked choice voting”) may be the worst non-malicious use known of ranked choice ballots, but approval allows even less information about preferences to be expressed and does so in a way where the honest marking of ballots isn't even clear.
Plus, once you get people using ranked ballots, debate over better counting procedure is possible without disrupting how people cast ballots. Approval is a worse method from which any improvement is more disruptive.
Because IRV (“ranked choice voting”) may be the worst non-malicious use known of ranked choice ballots, but approval allows even less information about preferences to be expressed and does so in a way where the honest marking of ballots isn't even clear.
Plus, once you get people using ranked ballots, debate over better counting procedure is possible without disrupting how people cast ballots. Approval is a worse method from which any improvement is more disruptive.
I have an "engineering reason" for you. Look at this as a once-in-a-lifetime chance to redesign the user-interface and API of a major product with a huge and diverse set of extremely conservative users.
1. You need to support transitional back-ends for certain users (e.g. instant runoffs)
2. You strongly want to avoid a "new system" that cannot be replaced and has no room for expansion.
___
Any voting system able to handle ranked-preference voting can trivially be "dumbed down" for a certain set of customers who want approval-voting -- it's almost as simple as mapping integers to booleans.
In contrast, if everything is built assuming inputs are boolean values for each item in a set, your system is crippled. You either have to hope that everybody loves approval-voting, or admit defeat and switch it back to the old (i.e. current) stupid system of "pick one".
1. You need to support transitional back-ends for certain users (e.g. instant runoffs)
2. You strongly want to avoid a "new system" that cannot be replaced and has no room for expansion.
___
Any voting system able to handle ranked-preference voting can trivially be "dumbed down" for a certain set of customers who want approval-voting -- it's almost as simple as mapping integers to booleans.
In contrast, if everything is built assuming inputs are boolean values for each item in a set, your system is crippled. You either have to hope that everybody loves approval-voting, or admit defeat and switch it back to the old (i.e. current) stupid system of "pick one".
Or you could go for an even richer system of score voting with integers out of a limited set.
You can convert ordinal ranks to scores directly meaning the set exactly same as number of candidates. By that, each median score represents median ordering in a ranked ballot. You may lose certain properties that are relevant in case of direct ties but nobody really cares about that in big constituencies.
Heck, you can also keep counts of each score in case the dominant is needed for a tie breaker.
Approval voting is a score system with a binary score.
Rules are simple: in case of rank scores, candidate with lowest median rank wins, if there is a tie candidate with higher count of low scores wins. This converts IRV or other ranked system to Bucklin vote.
In case of approval scores, replace lowest with highest.
You can convert ordinal ranks to scores directly meaning the set exactly same as number of candidates. By that, each median score represents median ordering in a ranked ballot. You may lose certain properties that are relevant in case of direct ties but nobody really cares about that in big constituencies.
Heck, you can also keep counts of each score in case the dominant is needed for a tie breaker.
Approval voting is a score system with a binary score.
Rules are simple: in case of rank scores, candidate with lowest median rank wins, if there is a tie candidate with higher count of low scores wins. This converts IRV or other ranked system to Bucklin vote.
In case of approval scores, replace lowest with highest.
On problem with approval voting is you can only vote yes or no to each candidate. Imagine there are 3 candidates, Candidate-A you like, Candidate-B you dislike and Candidate-C you are so-so about. It's obvious how to vote for A and B, but not obvious for C.
Under ranking voting systems (such as AV) is is obvous how to vote. You do it in this in this order: Candidate-A, Candidate-C, Candidate-B.
Under scoring systems, where you give each candidate a score (say 10 for the best to 0 for the worst), it is also reasonably simple for to vote: Candidate-A 10, Candidate-B 0, Candidate-C somewhere in between. But here again there are problems? If I give C a high score, he is more likely to beat B (which I want) but also more likely to beat A (which I don't want). So that's an incentive for dishonest voting.
Under ranking voting systems (such as AV) is is obvous how to vote. You do it in this in this order: Candidate-A, Candidate-C, Candidate-B.
Under scoring systems, where you give each candidate a score (say 10 for the best to 0 for the worst), it is also reasonably simple for to vote: Candidate-A 10, Candidate-B 0, Candidate-C somewhere in between. But here again there are problems? If I give C a high score, he is more likely to beat B (which I want) but also more likely to beat A (which I don't want). So that's an incentive for dishonest voting.
Here's the voting system I would like to see implemented:
Every voter still gets a single vote in each race, but you can have your vote apply either toward or against a single candidate. The candidate with the highest total of "# of 'against' votes" subtracted from "# of 'for' votes" wins.
This would allow voters more freedom of expression than the current system, while being simpler than ranked voting. I understand that it could conceivably (and probably frequently would) result in the winner being the person with the smaller negative number of votes. But at least then they couldn't claim a "mandate for change" based on a broad support of the populace.
This would allow voters more freedom of expression than the current system, while being simpler than ranked voting. I understand that it could conceivably (and probably frequently would) result in the winner being the person with the smaller negative number of votes. But at least then they couldn't claim a "mandate for change" based on a broad support of the populace.
FYI what you are describing is https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disapproval_voting
The fact that the decision to approve of candidate C is not easy makes you effectively a swing voter; the chance that you do or don't vote for them is reflective of your approval of them.
Either way it doesn't incentivize dishonesty, and it doesn't cause weird squeeze-outs of the middle candidate the way IRV does.
I can see how that's less clear cut to a voter, though.
Either way it doesn't incentivize dishonesty, and it doesn't cause weird squeeze-outs of the middle candidate the way IRV does.
I can see how that's less clear cut to a voter, though.
I think that problem sort of fades in the aggregate: given 100 people who order the candidates A-C-B, A will get 100 votes, B will get zero, and C will get some value in between, because some people will go for it, and some won't. If you have a large number of voters, I expect approval voting to behave very similarly to score voting.
Let’s say there are three candidates, one I think is literally Satan, one I think is horrendous but a lot better than Satan, and then some boring but somehow unelectable person.
Obviously I vote for the last one and don’t vote for Satan, but do I vote for the middle one?
Obviously I vote for the last one and don’t vote for Satan, but do I vote for the middle one?
Some in your position would, some wouldn't. It's effectively stochastic sampled ranked choice across the population.
By that logic first past the post is ranked choice across the population.
The whole point of alternative vote systems is to be able to both designate your preferred candidate while also being able to specify your tertiary preferences so you can both vote for who you want to win while also not sabotaging your ability to vote against those you don't want to win.
Approval only lets you avoid the spoiler effect.
The whole point of alternative vote systems is to be able to both designate your preferred candidate while also being able to specify your tertiary preferences so you can both vote for who you want to win while also not sabotaging your ability to vote against those you don't want to win.
Approval only lets you avoid the spoiler effect.
But expressing your preferences doesn't actually accomplish anything useful.
You can do it, but what does it get you?
Instant runoff is not monotonic: there are times when the best strategy is to vote your favored candidate second and your second choice first so that the second choice can push out your least favored candidate.
You can do it, but what does it get you?
Instant runoff is not monotonic: there are times when the best strategy is to vote your favored candidate second and your second choice first so that the second choice can push out your least favored candidate.
How do I decide which to do? You make it sound simple, but “approve of” is not a simple concept.
Completely serious, no /s here's your strategy.
* Get a 5 sided die.
* Rank each candidate from 0-5.
* For each candidate roll the die and vote for them if your roll is less than or equal to your rank.
I very much dislike approval voting because the way to make people the happiest is to turn it into stochastic STAR.
* Get a 5 sided die.
* Rank each candidate from 0-5.
* For each candidate roll the die and vote for them if your roll is less than or equal to your rank.
I very much dislike approval voting because the way to make people the happiest is to turn it into stochastic STAR.
I think you mean rate, not rank. In any case this is silly. The correct strategy is outlined here.
http://scorevoting.net/RVstrat6.html
The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Approval Voting works well, arriving at outcomes that represent the will of the people.
http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html
http://scorevoting.net/RVstrat6.html
The evidence overwhelmingly shows that Approval Voting works well, arriving at outcomes that represent the will of the people.
http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html
Correct, I meant rate. My strategy isn't about strategic voting, it's how to represent the actual preferences of voters when all you have is approve/not approve.
That doesn't make sense. Your ballot can NEVER express your actual preferences except in a statistical sense—we can have some probability distribution for the actual preferences that created that Approval ballot.
Thus using the standard strategy I mentioned is the most accurate way to convey your preferences. If you want them to appear as honest as possible, you just treat all candidates as equally likely to win, such that the formula simplifies down to your approval threshold being "average utility of all candidates".
Thus using the standard strategy I mentioned is the most accurate way to convey your preferences. If you want them to appear as honest as possible, you just treat all candidates as equally likely to win, such that the formula simplifies down to your approval threshold being "average utility of all candidates".
You assume most people will vote at random? That is a completely uninteresting case that does not happen in reality.
People tend to approve of candidates they know of. Likewise they tend to not approve candidates they do not know of or they dislike for any number of reasons.
So these marks are not drawn from random distribution at all.
People tend to approve of candidates they know of. Likewise they tend to not approve candidates they do not know of or they dislike for any number of reasons.
So these marks are not drawn from random distribution at all.
Absolutely not. I'm saying that if in an election using approval voting people carried out my strategy that overall happiness with the results would be higher than if people voted according to the 'normal' instructions. Purely hypothetical, but to me illustrates the point that approval voting destroys valuable information about voter preferences because voters will turn out happier if they encode those preferences in their vote.
Total information throughput is about three major factors:
- Ballot expressiveness
- Strategic voting (which distorts sincere information)
- Tabulation efficiency (e.g. IRV has more data on the ballot, but destroys a lot of it due to inefficient tabulation)
You are making a common fallacy outlined here. https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/expressiveness
When you look at total combined information throughput, Approval Voting does exceptionally well. http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html
- Ballot expressiveness
- Strategic voting (which distorts sincere information)
- Tabulation efficiency (e.g. IRV has more data on the ballot, but destroys a lot of it due to inefficient tabulation)
You are making a common fallacy outlined here. https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/expressiveness
When you look at total combined information throughput, Approval Voting does exceptionally well. http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html
If you're truly on the line about approving of a candidate then it's exactly the same quandary as being on the line between two candidates in a plurality decided election.
There's literally no difference. It's up to you to make your choice.
There's literally no difference. It's up to you to make your choice.
In my hypothetical, I'm not on the line about approving of the middle candidate. I disapprove of them strongly... but I also vastly prefer them to Satan. If Satan and the middle candidate are the only ones with a shot at winning then I absolutely want to vote for the middle one. If the third candidate can win then I don't want to vote for the middle one. If I'm not sure who's viable then I need to figure it out and hope I get it right.
It's much simpler in a plurality system. First, I decide if I want to make a statement or a difference. If I want to make a statement, I vote for the candidate I like best and that's it. If I want to make a difference, I choose the candidate I prefer from the two major parties. In the unlikely event that I like them both equally, I can either keep looking until I find a reason to prefer one, or I can abstain knowing that either one is equally good (or bad). Note, I'm not saying this is good, just that it's simple.
It's much simpler in a plurality system. First, I decide if I want to make a statement or a difference. If I want to make a statement, I vote for the candidate I like best and that's it. If I want to make a difference, I choose the candidate I prefer from the two major parties. In the unlikely event that I like them both equally, I can either keep looking until I find a reason to prefer one, or I can abstain knowing that either one is equally good (or bad). Note, I'm not saying this is good, just that it's simple.
I'm saying that asking that question "should I approve of this candidate" is just as intractable as "who should I vote for" when you're on the line between two candidates.
The problem with instant runoff voting is that you can actually be harming your preferred candidate by ranking them ahead of the middle candidate.
The problem with instant runoff voting is that you can actually be harming your preferred candidate by ranking them ahead of the middle candidate.
And I’m saying that it’s not at all intractable in a plurality system. The closer the candidates are, the less it matters who you choose.
In my example, the decision of whether to “approve” of the horrible candidate has enormous stakes.
In my example, the decision of whether to “approve” of the horrible candidate has enormous stakes.
Yeah. Now answer every clarifying question about what it means to "approve of" someone.
Edit: I wasn't asking you to explain it to me; I was asking how you break it down for the average person so that they don't need to keep depending on the election officials to disambiguate every case.
Edit: I wasn't asking you to explain it to me; I was asking how you break it down for the average person so that they don't need to keep depending on the election officials to disambiguate every case.
Is that really necessary? Use the same definition you were already using.
You recon “approve” is exclusive? Write down the one you would have voted for in FPTP.
Had trouble deciding which of three to vote for? List all three.
Someone’s borderline? Go with your gut. Or your head, whichever.
You recon “approve” is exclusive? Write down the one you would have voted for in FPTP.
Had trouble deciding which of three to vote for? List all three.
Someone’s borderline? Go with your gut. Or your head, whichever.
You can give any candidates you like a tally. The one with the most tallies wins.
Do you want to increase some candidates' total tallies? Then "approve" of them on your ballot.
Do you want to increase some candidates' total tallies? Then "approve" of them on your ballot.
The beauty of it is that it doesn't have to be the same for everyone.
Let's hold a vote on the matter. Then, once we've determined the winner, let's hold another vote using the winner and cross our fingers that we reach a fixpoint.
(Seriously, if we get anything at all other than first-past-the-post in my lifetime, I'll be happy.)
(Seriously, if we get anything at all other than first-past-the-post in my lifetime, I'll be happy.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method
VERY Roughly: Eliminate the weakest candidates until there's a winner.
Only this method is a formal mathematical twist on that to make it computationally easier for computers to process while yielding the same result.
In previous posts I've wanted two additions to this method, but I'm modifying the second after thinking about it.
VERY Roughly: Eliminate the weakest candidates until there's a winner.
Only this method is a formal mathematical twist on that to make it computationally easier for computers to process while yielding the same result.
In previous posts I've wanted two additions to this method, but I'm modifying the second after thinking about it.
* None of the Above / No Confidence (same, this wins == new vote all old candidates banned)
* Allow for a single preference list but don't require all candidates ranked.
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I get that a single-winner voting system can't satisfy all criteria, but the contortions Range/Approval voting advocates go through to rationalize its failure of the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Majority_criterion is concerning.
Candidate X is loved by a slight majority and hated by the rest. (Maybe he campaigned on kicking the minority out of the country.) Literally everyone is lukewarm about candidate Y. What outcome should we want?
I can’t see this majority criterion as an absolute good.
I can’t see this majority criterion as an absolute good.
Candidate X for sure. I'd rather have some occasional chaos than guaranteed stagnation.
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Approval voting collapses to FPTP once the parties tell their voters "just mark one box".
This is an unavoidable vulnerability in any scheme that doesn't involve an exhaustive and exlusive ranking.
This is an unavoidable vulnerability in any scheme that doesn't involve an exhaustive and exlusive ranking.
It's okay if some voters decide to throw away 90% of their vote by approval-voting for one candidate instead of, say, 10 candidates. If half of the voters do that, while the other half vote rationally, then the voters who voted more rationally will have cast 91% of the votes in the election, and the voters who decided to "Just Vote 1" will be almost irrelevant, except in a close choice between two broadly-appealing candidates.
In approval voting, the strategy to maximize the influence of your vote is to vote for half of the candidates, or at least half of the candidates who are likely to win. (Well, except that arguably in nearly all election schemes, the instrumentally rational strategy is to stay home and do something productive, like baking a pie, having sex, or writing some software; this is why voting is obligatory in nearly all functioning democracies.)
In approval voting, the strategy to maximize the influence of your vote is to vote for half of the candidates, or at least half of the candidates who are likely to win. (Well, except that arguably in nearly all election schemes, the instrumentally rational strategy is to stay home and do something productive, like baking a pie, having sex, or writing some software; this is why voting is obligatory in nearly all functioning democracies.)
Why would the voters listen to them if they did in fact approve of multiple candidates?
For the same reason they don't vote for a third-party candidate in the general, even if they like that candidate much more - they want to maximize the chance of winning for the "lesser evil" and not risk the "greater evil" winning.
I do like approval voting as well, for the same mentioned reasons, but I worry that after a few elections people would start voting strategically, and then it could take another few decades to change the voting system again.
The more important part isn't ranked choice or approval voting anyway - both are single-winner voting systems which are far from ideal for elections involving Congress/Parliaments and local legislature. It's much preferable to have a proportional representation voting system for those.
I do like approval voting as well, for the same mentioned reasons, but I worry that after a few elections people would start voting strategically, and then it could take another few decades to change the voting system again.
The more important part isn't ranked choice or approval voting anyway - both are single-winner voting systems which are far from ideal for elections involving Congress/Parliaments and local legislature. It's much preferable to have a proportional representation voting system for those.
How is there any increased risk of "greater evil" winning from third party voting in approval voting?
You may safely rely on both the greater evil and lesser evils saying so.
Maybe. But it should be less effective when it's obviously bullshit than when there's at least a kernel of truth.
> Why would the voters listen to them if they did in fact approve of multiple candidates?
What does “approve of multiple candidates” even mean?
Preferring one candidate over another has a clear meaning. Approval does not; as well as meaning honest, uninfluenced ballots are going to vary from voter to voter even with the same actual assessment of candidates, that makes it a lot easier for voters to be manipulated by influencers as to the right way to map preferences to ballot markings.
Approval is good for open-ballot voting on, e.g, where to go to lunch (where “approve” means “commit to attend if the option is chosen”.) It's a poor choice for public, secret-ballot elections.
What does “approve of multiple candidates” even mean?
Preferring one candidate over another has a clear meaning. Approval does not; as well as meaning honest, uninfluenced ballots are going to vary from voter to voter even with the same actual assessment of candidates, that makes it a lot easier for voters to be manipulated by influencers as to the right way to map preferences to ballot markings.
Approval is good for open-ballot voting on, e.g, where to go to lunch (where “approve” means “commit to attend if the option is chosen”.) It's a poor choice for public, secret-ballot elections.
Contrary to your intuition, approval voting performs exceptionally well with any mixture of strategic or honest voters.
http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html
http://scorevoting.net/AppCW
And this is true regardless of whether there is any objective "meaning" to the votes.
In mathematical terms, approving the candidate means you prefer that candidate to the expected utility of the winner.
http://scorevoting.net/BayRegsFig.html
http://scorevoting.net/AppCW
And this is true regardless of whether there is any objective "meaning" to the votes.
In mathematical terms, approving the candidate means you prefer that candidate to the expected utility of the winner.
I disapprove of all main parties in the UK. I’d still prefer one of them over the other metaphorical Adams’ Lizard, and have voted accordingly, given the parties I do approve of get so few votes that my vote does make a difference but only for the question “do they get their deposit back”.
I genuinely can’t comprehend the problem you’re raising. Even if it can’t solve Arrows Impossibly Theorem, and even though I’m leaning towards technocracy rather than democracy anyway, it doesn’t seem worse than the current systems.
I genuinely can’t comprehend the problem you’re raising. Even if it can’t solve Arrows Impossibly Theorem, and even though I’m leaning towards technocracy rather than democracy anyway, it doesn’t seem worse than the current systems.
Approval doesn't have to mean the same thing for everyone.
> Approval doesn't have to mean the same thing for everyone.
If it doesn't, then your ballots have no consistent meaning and any process for aggregating them produces garbage output in terms of aggregating social preference.
Consistency of meaning of ballot markings and the resolution process being sensible in terms of that meaning are the most critical minimal standards for a voting system. Otherwise, voting is a farce and distraction, not a serious way of guaranteeing that government is accountable.
If it doesn't, then your ballots have no consistent meaning and any process for aggregating them produces garbage output in terms of aggregating social preference.
Consistency of meaning of ballot markings and the resolution process being sensible in terms of that meaning are the most critical minimal standards for a voting system. Otherwise, voting is a farce and distraction, not a serious way of guaranteeing that government is accountable.
That problem already exists.
Arguably, sure, that's one characterization of the problem alternative voting systems seek to solve.
That isn't a reason to choose a system that maximizes the degree to which that problem is preserved.
That isn't a reason to choose a system that maximizes the degree to which that problem is preserved.
The system works because it's relying on the fact that different people have different thresholds for accepting candidates, not despite it.
It's still consistent in that in any case, the candidates you're approving of are all preferable (for you) to all of the candidates you're not.
There's no ambiguity.
It's still consistent in that in any case, the candidates you're approving of are all preferable (for you) to all of the candidates you're not.
There's no ambiguity.
FPTP shares little meaning from voter to voter.
I'll be an anecdote here, from 2016. I voted for Sanders in the Democratic primary. I voted for Johnson in the general election, but had I been in a battleground state where Clinton had a chance I'd have voted for her.
Did how she was doing in the pre-election polling and exit polls determine whether or not she was my favorite candidate? Of course not. Would my single vote for her to try to avoid electing Trump have looked any different from a devout partisan Democrat's vote for the same office if I had voted for her? No, not at all. What FPTP almost convinced me to do is to VOTE FOR SOMEONE WHO WAS NOT MY FIRST CHOICE.
That's the problem, you see. If I'm tempted to vote for someone I really didn't care for rather than who I prefer because of the mechanics of the counting, that dilutes my voting power. I wanted to vote for Johnson. If I could have ranked the general, it would have been Johnson, Clinton, Stein, Trump. If I could have voted Approve/Disapprove, it would have been Johnson and Clinton approve and the others disapprove. If it was Approve, Neutral, Disapprove for each I'd have either voted J+C, S, T or J, C+S, T.
The last thing I want is to have to choose between my candidate of preference and some tolerable major party candidate based upon who else is running.
I'll be an anecdote here, from 2016. I voted for Sanders in the Democratic primary. I voted for Johnson in the general election, but had I been in a battleground state where Clinton had a chance I'd have voted for her.
Did how she was doing in the pre-election polling and exit polls determine whether or not she was my favorite candidate? Of course not. Would my single vote for her to try to avoid electing Trump have looked any different from a devout partisan Democrat's vote for the same office if I had voted for her? No, not at all. What FPTP almost convinced me to do is to VOTE FOR SOMEONE WHO WAS NOT MY FIRST CHOICE.
That's the problem, you see. If I'm tempted to vote for someone I really didn't care for rather than who I prefer because of the mechanics of the counting, that dilutes my voting power. I wanted to vote for Johnson. If I could have ranked the general, it would have been Johnson, Clinton, Stein, Trump. If I could have voted Approve/Disapprove, it would have been Johnson and Clinton approve and the others disapprove. If it was Approve, Neutral, Disapprove for each I'd have either voted J+C, S, T or J, C+S, T.
The last thing I want is to have to choose between my candidate of preference and some tolerable major party candidate based upon who else is running.
> FPTP shares little meaning from voter to voter.
Perhaps, but the question was why people seeking to replace FPTP advocate IRV instead of Approval, so pointing out FPTP has the same problem being pointed to in Approval when compared to IRV is missing the point.
Perhaps, but the question was why people seeking to replace FPTP advocate IRV instead of Approval, so pointing out FPTP has the same problem being pointed to in Approval when compared to IRV is missing the point.
My point is that Approval, especially Net Approval, is better than FPTP and is no worse in that respect. Either Approval or RCV is an improvement. The rest is a matter of degree and weighting your priorities.
The last few ranks in ranked choice voting go unused or are randomly filled, except that making an explicit ranking of a least favorite candidate requires ranking them all. The first few ranks also may well be random, as the first two or three candidates may all be equally acceptable to a voter. On a ballot with city council for a ward, council members at large, mayor, county board, county chair/county judge, school board, sheriff, constable, state House, state Senate, governor, lieutenant governor, comptroller, secretary of state, land office commissioner, agriculture commissioner, several judges, school board members, US House, US Senate, President, and more that's a lot of ranking and a lot of time to do so. It may no better support the voter's will than Approval after all the effort by the voter and effort to update the counting process. However, some people may well have a strong opinion on where each candidate in a seven-way race belongs in a list.
Approval/Disapproval or Net Approval voting, especially with a neutral option, solves that problem of having to support candidates you don't care about higher or lower relative to other candidates that neither RCV / IRV nor FPTP solves. In FPTP, you can choose just one and either Approval or RCV solves that. In Approval you can denote clearly that you approve of any number of candidates, without your first four choices being arbitrarily ranked. You can disapprove of any number as well, without your last choice of disapproval getting ranked right behind your choice for winning the office.
The last few ranks in ranked choice voting go unused or are randomly filled, except that making an explicit ranking of a least favorite candidate requires ranking them all. The first few ranks also may well be random, as the first two or three candidates may all be equally acceptable to a voter. On a ballot with city council for a ward, council members at large, mayor, county board, county chair/county judge, school board, sheriff, constable, state House, state Senate, governor, lieutenant governor, comptroller, secretary of state, land office commissioner, agriculture commissioner, several judges, school board members, US House, US Senate, President, and more that's a lot of ranking and a lot of time to do so. It may no better support the voter's will than Approval after all the effort by the voter and effort to update the counting process. However, some people may well have a strong opinion on where each candidate in a seven-way race belongs in a list.
Approval/Disapproval or Net Approval voting, especially with a neutral option, solves that problem of having to support candidates you don't care about higher or lower relative to other candidates that neither RCV / IRV nor FPTP solves. In FPTP, you can choose just one and either Approval or RCV solves that. In Approval you can denote clearly that you approve of any number of candidates, without your first four choices being arbitrarily ranked. You can disapprove of any number as well, without your last choice of disapproval getting ranked right behind your choice for winning the office.
First, because the parties will say "don't risk your vote!" and deliberately muddy the waters. Second, because in a voluntary voting situation the voter population is dominated by partisans, who are more motivated to vote.
This isn't a hypothetical. Queensland introduced "optional" preferential voting and one of the majors promptly campaigned on "Just Vote 1" in order to wedge the opposing coalition.
This isn't a hypothetical. Queensland introduced "optional" preferential voting and one of the majors promptly campaigned on "Just Vote 1" in order to wedge the opposing coalition.
GP was talking about approval voting.
What Queensland uses, (which they call) Preferential voting, is IRV (instant-runoff voting). That's not approval voting.
It might initially seem like IRV's ranking (A>B>C>D>E) would be a better voting system than Approval Voting (where voters simply say A-yes, B-yes, others-no). Relative rankings seem at first glance to express more information. But it turns out that the way you have to count relative rankings either leads to pathological consequences for 3rd parties (see IRV), just like winner-takes-all voting, or the counting method becomes complex and byzantine in corner cases (see Condorcet). It's all explained on rangevoting.org
What Queensland uses, (which they call) Preferential voting, is IRV (instant-runoff voting). That's not approval voting.
It might initially seem like IRV's ranking (A>B>C>D>E) would be a better voting system than Approval Voting (where voters simply say A-yes, B-yes, others-no). Relative rankings seem at first glance to express more information. But it turns out that the way you have to count relative rankings either leads to pathological consequences for 3rd parties (see IRV), just like winner-takes-all voting, or the counting method becomes complex and byzantine in corner cases (see Condorcet). It's all explained on rangevoting.org
> Preferential voting is IRV.
Most real and proposed balloting methods (other than range/score voting) are preferential, they differ in the restrictions on he expressed preferences; IRV (and lots of other systems), as usually defined, relies on a fully-ranked forced-preference (no ties) ballot. Approval has an implicitly fully-ranked two-preference-rank ballot with unlimited ties, FPTP (whether plurality or majority/runoff) has an implicitly fully-ranked two-preference-rank ballot with ties allowed only in the second rank.
> Relative rankings seem to express more information
They do, there is no “seem". They also do so more consistently. Forced preferences can have the reverse problem of forced ties, though (which is abstractly a point in favor of unforced ranking ballots, but there's less work done on resolution procedures for them.)
> but it turns out that the way you have to count relative rankings either leads to pathological consequences for 3rd parties (see IRV), just like winner-takes-all voting, or the counting method becomes complex and byzantine in corner cases (see Condorcet).
Bucklin is simpler to count than IRV and doesn't have it's pathological effects; the main concrete criticism I've seen is that if truncation is allowed rather than forced-preference, and if the no-majority fallback is highest-vote-total-on-last-round, it may encourage truncation and devolve to plurality. (But a similar charge of incentive to bullet-vote is made against approval.)
Most real and proposed balloting methods (other than range/score voting) are preferential, they differ in the restrictions on he expressed preferences; IRV (and lots of other systems), as usually defined, relies on a fully-ranked forced-preference (no ties) ballot. Approval has an implicitly fully-ranked two-preference-rank ballot with unlimited ties, FPTP (whether plurality or majority/runoff) has an implicitly fully-ranked two-preference-rank ballot with ties allowed only in the second rank.
> Relative rankings seem to express more information
They do, there is no “seem". They also do so more consistently. Forced preferences can have the reverse problem of forced ties, though (which is abstractly a point in favor of unforced ranking ballots, but there's less work done on resolution procedures for them.)
> but it turns out that the way you have to count relative rankings either leads to pathological consequences for 3rd parties (see IRV), just like winner-takes-all voting, or the counting method becomes complex and byzantine in corner cases (see Condorcet).
Bucklin is simpler to count than IRV and doesn't have it's pathological effects; the main concrete criticism I've seen is that if truncation is allowed rather than forced-preference, and if the no-majority fallback is highest-vote-total-on-last-round, it may encourage truncation and devolve to plurality. (But a similar charge of incentive to bullet-vote is made against approval.)
I am aware of the difference between IRV and approval voting. I am pointing out that there are examples in the wild of non-exhaustive systems being exploited. Approval is non-exhaustive by design, but even in a system where exhaustiveness had been the norm for decades a single political party in a single election was able to substantially regress its performance.
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People understand the current system well, so the new system collapsing to it isn't that bad.
Why is it commonly assumed that "our system is broken"? What is the evidence for it? Do people consider the evidence against it? Usually not. It is very easy to fixate on things which could be better, and completely ignore things that are already great.
I am reminded of Justice Scalia's testimony regarding "gridlock"
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4580812/scalia-gridlock
I am reminded of Justice Scalia's testimony regarding "gridlock"
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4580812/scalia-gridlock
FPTP elections are broken almost anywhere they are used, because FPTP’s only real positive feature is that it is simple to understand. It demonstrably rarely delivers electoral results that actually reflect the desires of the electorate.
Combine FPTP with the electoral college system and you get arguably absurd presidential outcomes like we saw in 2016, where the winning candidate can receive less votes than the runner up and still win. Huge majorities on minority shares are often found in FPTP systems, because anyone who didn’t vote for the winning candidate might as well have not voted. It can also create the opposite outcomes, minority seat shares in the legislature on majority vote shares.
It’s just a plain bad voting system if you believe the legislature should at least vaguely reflect the wishes of voters.
Combine FPTP with the electoral college system and you get arguably absurd presidential outcomes like we saw in 2016, where the winning candidate can receive less votes than the runner up and still win. Huge majorities on minority shares are often found in FPTP systems, because anyone who didn’t vote for the winning candidate might as well have not voted. It can also create the opposite outcomes, minority seat shares in the legislature on majority vote shares.
It’s just a plain bad voting system if you believe the legislature should at least vaguely reflect the wishes of voters.
FPTP did exactly what it was designed to do during 2016. It stopped extremely lopsided states like California and new York (6 million vote difference right there).
The Electoral College did that, not FPTP.
FPTP elections are where the candidate with the most votes wins. By that definition, it ALWAYS delivers results that reflect the desires of the electorate. I think you're overstating it when you say that it leads to situations where anyone who didn't vote for the winning candidate might as well have not voted. I think it's more accurate to say that every vote mattered, but the voters who pushed the leading candidate above the runner up mattered more.
Of course, the underlying problem with those situations is that minorities are ignored via the tyranny of the majority. So if you think the presidential outcome was absurd because Hillary received the majority of votes you're arguing that in just this particular election ignoring the minority, and going solely by majority vote, would have been a good thing. You can't pick and choose like that.
Combining FPTP with the electoral college did what it was supposed to, it compensated for the tyranny of the majority.
Of course, the underlying problem with those situations is that minorities are ignored via the tyranny of the majority. So if you think the presidential outcome was absurd because Hillary received the majority of votes you're arguing that in just this particular election ignoring the minority, and going solely by majority vote, would have been a good thing. You can't pick and choose like that.
Combining FPTP with the electoral college did what it was supposed to, it compensated for the tyranny of the majority.
FPTP with the electoral college makes my vote count for nothing voting in a solid red or blue state. I despise this fact. Elections only really focus on swing states and thus swing states have undue influence.
> FPTP elections are where the candidate with the most votes wins. By that definition, it ALWAYS delivers results that reflect the desires of the electorate.
How is this tautology helpful at all? Why would we want this definition of what the most desirable candidate is?
How is this tautology helpful at all? Why would we want this definition of what the most desirable candidate is?
It's also plain wrong. Candidates win on minority shares in FPTP regularly, especially when there is more than two candidates.
In the UK for example, it's pretty common to win your seat with just 40% or less of the vote. The desires of 60% or more of the electorate in that constituency is simply ignored - a majority can vote for someone else entirely, hardly a reflection of the electorate's desire.
> I think you're overstating it when you say that it leads to situations where anyone who didn't vote for the winning candidate might as well have not voted.
I'm really not. The outcome remains the EXACT SAME if everyone who voted for a losing candidate stays at home. This isn't really my opinion - it's a widely known limitation of FPTP electoral systems.
In the UK for example, it's pretty common to win your seat with just 40% or less of the vote. The desires of 60% or more of the electorate in that constituency is simply ignored - a majority can vote for someone else entirely, hardly a reflection of the electorate's desire.
> I think you're overstating it when you say that it leads to situations where anyone who didn't vote for the winning candidate might as well have not voted.
I'm really not. The outcome remains the EXACT SAME if everyone who voted for a losing candidate stays at home. This isn't really my opinion - it's a widely known limitation of FPTP electoral systems.
You can look at the work of Page and Gilens, who have shown that the US is not democratic in any meaningful sense.
That is, if you know that policy A is preferred over B by 95% of the citizens of the USA (an incredible supermajority), that gives you no information about whether A or B will be implemented by the government. Has no predictive value. But if I provide the additional information that B is preferred over A by a majority of US elites, then now you can predict whether A or B will be implemented: B will be implemented, most likely.
That situation is the current state of affairs in the US, and it shouldn't be. The system is broken.
That is, if you know that policy A is preferred over B by 95% of the citizens of the USA (an incredible supermajority), that gives you no information about whether A or B will be implemented by the government. Has no predictive value. But if I provide the additional information that B is preferred over A by a majority of US elites, then now you can predict whether A or B will be implemented: B will be implemented, most likely.
That situation is the current state of affairs in the US, and it shouldn't be. The system is broken.
This is such an important point and key to so many political discussions, yet is almost never made. As we've continued to tweak and tune and optimize the process we've lessened the differences between the parties. The vitriol that is shouted from the rooftops for each party is the echo chamber that reverberates with additional power of clicks and views. Being "just alright" doesn't generate a call to action, even if "just alright" is how things have progressed year over year.
The question really isn't whether or not it's broken. It's more of a question of 'for whom it is broken'.
Or, more accurately; what is the true purpose to the state and how well does it fulfill that purpose?
If you assume that the purpose to the state is to carefully and thoughtfully use the resources and powers granted to it by the public to serve the public then, yes, the system is utterly broken. It's so completely and fundamentally broken that it is not salvageable.
However if the purpose of the state is use the political power granted to it to advance the interests of people who are politically connected to the state... then it works very very very well.
In fact what people call 'corruption' is fundamental to how politics is able to function in the first place!
Get rid of the 'corruption' and get 'money out of politics' then you eliminate the purpose, reason, and forces that caused the state to come into existence.
Any time you attempt to exercise political power to enact any sort of change to the country you must give the powerful people of your country a reason to go along with you. Whether your goal is to eliminate poverty, save the environment, or make your brother a billionaire... you must first convince the key individuals go along with your program.
And powerful and wealthy don't work for free.
And how this works in a country like the USA is by having the state gain significant control over markets so they can use regulation and policy to benefit people who play along and punish those companies that resist.
Money and power go hand in hand. You can't have big government without big corporations. You can't have big corporations without big governments.
These groups are not opposing forces, the state does not balance out the 'greed' or 'excesses' of market capitalism. Instead it is the nature of the state to feed into these negative effects and exploit them. Big business and Big government are complementary.
So, yes, if the purpose of the state is to exploit the wealth of the country for the purposes of the politically elite within and without the state... then it works extremely well.
Not broken one bit.
Or, more accurately; what is the true purpose to the state and how well does it fulfill that purpose?
If you assume that the purpose to the state is to carefully and thoughtfully use the resources and powers granted to it by the public to serve the public then, yes, the system is utterly broken. It's so completely and fundamentally broken that it is not salvageable.
However if the purpose of the state is use the political power granted to it to advance the interests of people who are politically connected to the state... then it works very very very well.
In fact what people call 'corruption' is fundamental to how politics is able to function in the first place!
Get rid of the 'corruption' and get 'money out of politics' then you eliminate the purpose, reason, and forces that caused the state to come into existence.
Any time you attempt to exercise political power to enact any sort of change to the country you must give the powerful people of your country a reason to go along with you. Whether your goal is to eliminate poverty, save the environment, or make your brother a billionaire... you must first convince the key individuals go along with your program.
And powerful and wealthy don't work for free.
And how this works in a country like the USA is by having the state gain significant control over markets so they can use regulation and policy to benefit people who play along and punish those companies that resist.
Money and power go hand in hand. You can't have big government without big corporations. You can't have big corporations without big governments.
These groups are not opposing forces, the state does not balance out the 'greed' or 'excesses' of market capitalism. Instead it is the nature of the state to feed into these negative effects and exploit them. Big business and Big government are complementary.
So, yes, if the purpose of the state is to exploit the wealth of the country for the purposes of the politically elite within and without the state... then it works extremely well.
Not broken one bit.
How is
>>the purpose to the state is to carefully and thoughtfully use the resources and powers granted to it by the public to serve the public
not an accurate representation? Services are at an all-time high, while today is the best year to have been born vs. any in history.
>>the purpose to the state is to carefully and thoughtfully use the resources and powers granted to it by the public to serve the public
not an accurate representation? Services are at an all-time high, while today is the best year to have been born vs. any in history.
A political duopoly is the inevitable consequence of a first-past-the-post voting system existing at every layer of government. Compare to some parliamentary systems, where proportional voting means that no vote is ever "wasted" as long as you can scrape together the bare minimum for at least a single MP.
Parliaments are not defined by proportional representation; the defining feature is that government is formed on the floor of the lower house.
Parliaments which have proportional lower houses tend to be a mess. Executive government needs at least some stability, so single-member electorates for the lower house and multi-member electorates for the upper house is a reasonable compromise.
Parliaments which have proportional lower houses tend to be a mess. Executive government needs at least some stability, so single-member electorates for the lower house and multi-member electorates for the upper house is a reasonable compromise.
> Parliaments which have proportional lower houses tend to be a mess.
Citation needed. There are many European countries where very diverse lower houses work fine.
Citation needed. There are many European countries where very diverse lower houses work fine.
> Parliaments are not defined by proportional representation; the defining feature is that government is formed on the floor of the lower house.
> Parliaments which have proportional lower houses tend to be a mess.
If by “be a mess” you mean have higher public participation in elections, higher public satisfaction with government, and lower rate of cabinet turnover...you're right.
> Executive government needs at least some stability,
Proportional systems have greater stability; while coalitions may change more frequent than in FPTP systems, there is less frequent total turnover in membership in either the governing coalition in Parliament or the Cabinet itself in proportional systems. This is sometimes masked by the fact that the same language of government “falling” being used for partial and total turnover.
> Parliaments which have proportional lower houses tend to be a mess.
If by “be a mess” you mean have higher public participation in elections, higher public satisfaction with government, and lower rate of cabinet turnover...you're right.
> Executive government needs at least some stability,
Proportional systems have greater stability; while coalitions may change more frequent than in FPTP systems, there is less frequent total turnover in membership in either the governing coalition in Parliament or the Cabinet itself in proportional systems. This is sometimes masked by the fact that the same language of government “falling” being used for partial and total turnover.
The point that the interviewees make, as I understand it, is that money is not really the "problem" in American national politics, it's the way a two-party system has emerged and over the past century, increased its 'duopoly' with policy, gerrymandering, etc. I found this argument very compelling. I'm not sure if there is enough will to make the changes that might lead to some changes here, but it does seem that the intention of the constitutional framers has been lost by creating a binary that doesn't allow for some ideas, such as fiscal conservatism, to succeed at all (though I wouldn't say the framers themselves were always on the good side of history). Great book on that topic is "The Founders' Coup," which puts a lot of where we've come into perspective.
I listened to this episode yesterday. Several interesting points and discussion, and the political industrial complex is real, but I'm not 100% convinced by the argument that the two parties are a duopoly therefore they do not serve the public. While the political system basically ensures that there are only two parties, they rotate over time and adopt or discard ideas as the public needs them to.
Clay Shirky discusses this argument in https://medium.com/@cshirky/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-protes...
Clay Shirky discusses this argument in https://medium.com/@cshirky/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-protes...
One stern warning is that in multiple party systems, you can get one party that dominates everything, and then all the smaller representative powers are meaningless.
Argentina is a case-study with Peronism. Since the return of democracy, no party has yet to finish a term but the peronists.
Argentina is a case-study with Peronism. Since the return of democracy, no party has yet to finish a term but the peronists.
While that's true, the current president, Mauricio Macri, is currently non-Peronist, and although he's unpopular and the economy is collapsing, he's made it three years, and he has a substantial chance of lasting to the end of his term in December 2019.
The exception that proves the rule. And maybe not even, as he actually got to power thanks to the peronists, and keeps it becuase they need him.
What if the public prefers some ideas from one party, and other ideas from the other party?
No mention of the problems of the countries that have multiparty systems. Italy (6 major parties) and Israel (18 parties in the Knesset) have dysfunctional governments with too many parties. The UK has five parties with 10 or more seats in Parliament.
The US is having lockup trouble with two parties, but that's historically unusual.
The US is having lockup trouble with two parties, but that's historically unusual.
In Italy, it has happened in the past that you had a result like Party A: 45%, Party B: 45%, Party C: 10%. Party C forms a coalition with Party A to form a government, but constantly bargains for 'more' than their 10% would merit - because otherwise, they pull their support and you have new elections. They eventually did and IIRC, Berlusconi got voted in again...
I think the goal should be so have so much factional diversity you never reach a coalition state. It only degrades into the status quo when politicians see a path to enshrining their ideology into law without compromise.
Part of the problem is also that most governments have flawed establishing documents that make it possible for legislatures to put innumerable barriers up against a propositioned bill. It should be much easier to force a proposal to vote and that should always be public record. Politicians love being able to kept their intentions "in committee" forever or on a divided floor where nobody ever calls for cloture. Having a firm record of actionable legislative motions is the last thing anyone wants when they expect a lifelong career on a house floor.
Part of the problem is also that most governments have flawed establishing documents that make it possible for legislatures to put innumerable barriers up against a propositioned bill. It should be much easier to force a proposal to vote and that should always be public record. Politicians love being able to kept their intentions "in committee" forever or on a divided floor where nobody ever calls for cloture. Having a firm record of actionable legislative motions is the last thing anyone wants when they expect a lifelong career on a house floor.
I would rather have a 18 parties and a dysfunctional government than 2 and a dysfunctional government. At least with the 18 party situation, the flip/flopping is not straight forward and predictable.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_G...
There are a handful for Germany, and they generally form coalitions.
There are a handful for Germany, and they generally form coalitions.
Most multiparty systems in Europe and elsewhere don't have these problems though. I know Italy has a curious system of government goes far to explain their impasse.
I think the Coke/Pepsi remarks are a bit facile, and play into some people's cynical attitude that "they're all the same". For someone with pre-existing conditions, that was manifestly not true. For Iraq, its people, and the thousands of soldiers who served there, it was not true. Just to rattle off a couple of examples.
I think they get that, but it's a kind of carrot-and-stick tactic. You don't really get an option; you get a guarantee that you either vote for 1: pure, eldritch evil, 2: milquetoast status quo with vague promises of reform that you aren't really enthused for but at least it's not Satan himself, or 3: throwing your vote directly into a landfill for a foolish ideal that is literally impossible under the current system.
Pragmatists should vote for the realistic option that benefits us the most, but that's not how most people work. People aren't really rational actors. If you continuously prove to the public that real reform is a stupid dream and that they must play the game and take the shitty carrot instead of the incredibly shitty stick, they rebel--even if it's not in their best interest. It's not reasonable to point out that they shouldn't do this. Of course they shouldn't, but they always will.
For authoritarians, they see options 1: and 2: from the first paragraph switched around relative to progressives. They aren't the same at all--not even a little--yet still there isn't really any meaningful choice to be made. There is only a vicious, cynical threat. Vote for what your region's culture considers least evil or watch as Armageddon devours you and your loved ones.
The constant near-perfect tie races are suspicious as hell. Haven't you ever noticed that? It's always 51-49 or somewhere thereabouts after the electoral college, gerrymandering and all the other forms of sophistry obfuscate the direct vote tallies--which always differ far more. Always. Also notice the incumbency rate compared to approval ratings. Incumbency is nearly perfect, even though approval is always sub-20%. Often it's far lower than 20%. This should obviously be impossible in pure democracy, but it should also be incredibly rare in our representative republic. But it's the rule, not the exception. In my opinion this is a smoking gun that just can't be dismissed.
This is rigged. Not the same way that crude authoritarian regimes fake their elections, with blatant but effective mafia tactics. This is structurally rigged. This is a hateful ploy that is designed to make real reform impossible, or at least slow enough for existing power structures to readjust and maintain full ownership of new trends, and furthermore to make us grateful for the barest minimum of political functioning: simply that we aren't living under a violent totalitarian state.
Both sides are certainly not the same. But the structure within which both sides operate is not designed with the best interests of the American people or the world in mind. I don't think it's some shadowy conspiracy that was masterminded by a single agent, it's just a ludicrously shitty system that naturally evolved out of our country and was taken advantage of by various opportunists. Our market style makes that very easy and very rewarding. Or at least it was at the outset, before power structures ossified and became strongly entrenched.
Pragmatists should vote for the realistic option that benefits us the most, but that's not how most people work. People aren't really rational actors. If you continuously prove to the public that real reform is a stupid dream and that they must play the game and take the shitty carrot instead of the incredibly shitty stick, they rebel--even if it's not in their best interest. It's not reasonable to point out that they shouldn't do this. Of course they shouldn't, but they always will.
For authoritarians, they see options 1: and 2: from the first paragraph switched around relative to progressives. They aren't the same at all--not even a little--yet still there isn't really any meaningful choice to be made. There is only a vicious, cynical threat. Vote for what your region's culture considers least evil or watch as Armageddon devours you and your loved ones.
The constant near-perfect tie races are suspicious as hell. Haven't you ever noticed that? It's always 51-49 or somewhere thereabouts after the electoral college, gerrymandering and all the other forms of sophistry obfuscate the direct vote tallies--which always differ far more. Always. Also notice the incumbency rate compared to approval ratings. Incumbency is nearly perfect, even though approval is always sub-20%. Often it's far lower than 20%. This should obviously be impossible in pure democracy, but it should also be incredibly rare in our representative republic. But it's the rule, not the exception. In my opinion this is a smoking gun that just can't be dismissed.
This is rigged. Not the same way that crude authoritarian regimes fake their elections, with blatant but effective mafia tactics. This is structurally rigged. This is a hateful ploy that is designed to make real reform impossible, or at least slow enough for existing power structures to readjust and maintain full ownership of new trends, and furthermore to make us grateful for the barest minimum of political functioning: simply that we aren't living under a violent totalitarian state.
Both sides are certainly not the same. But the structure within which both sides operate is not designed with the best interests of the American people or the world in mind. I don't think it's some shadowy conspiracy that was masterminded by a single agent, it's just a ludicrously shitty system that naturally evolved out of our country and was taken advantage of by various opportunists. Our market style makes that very easy and very rewarding. Or at least it was at the outset, before power structures ossified and became strongly entrenched.
I don't understand how this keeps happening where certain people get all this free marketing and mysterious drum-up, and then their panacea is frigging Instant Runoff Voting.
At some point the discussion is going to have to evolve past IRV.
One thing to remember - ranked choice voting is just the UI/UX. It doesn't mean you have to count it IRV style. The IRV zealots know this, which is why they re-branded it to name it "Ranked Choice Voting". It's a weak method.
And Condorcet is not complicated. If one candidate would beat all others head to head, that candidate wins. It's only the tiebreaking methods that are complicated, and ties (loops; smith sets) are rare in large elections. Much rarer than additional-round Instant Runoff scenarios.
There was a long discussion just a week ago here (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18391757) on voting variants.
At some point the discussion is going to have to evolve past IRV.
One thing to remember - ranked choice voting is just the UI/UX. It doesn't mean you have to count it IRV style. The IRV zealots know this, which is why they re-branded it to name it "Ranked Choice Voting". It's a weak method.
And Condorcet is not complicated. If one candidate would beat all others head to head, that candidate wins. It's only the tiebreaking methods that are complicated, and ties (loops; smith sets) are rare in large elections. Much rarer than additional-round Instant Runoff scenarios.
There was a long discussion just a week ago here (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18391757) on voting variants.
Minimum feature-set of a sensible psephocracy:
- no campaigning or special interest ads a week before voting
- only public funding and named individual small donations for public servant campaigns: no PACs, no super-PACs, no huge check fundraisers and no dark-money SIGs.
- nationally-unified, same-day voting, no prior registration required
- nationally-unified, three prior weeks of voting-by-mail
- media blackout on counts until all final results are in
- overturn Citizens' United (by amendment via state legislatures)
- eliminate the primary
- end the Electoral College
- free & open source tech unified, national e-voting system, open for all to audit
- public blockchain for permanent results
- printed receipt with barcode of hash saved in the blockchain
- ranked choice voting (as it provides an instant run-off should the favorite be disqualified, die or resign; also provides N picks for boards, vice positions and directors)
- no campaigning or special interest ads a week before voting
- only public funding and named individual small donations for public servant campaigns: no PACs, no super-PACs, no huge check fundraisers and no dark-money SIGs.
- nationally-unified, same-day voting, no prior registration required
- nationally-unified, three prior weeks of voting-by-mail
- media blackout on counts until all final results are in
- overturn Citizens' United (by amendment via state legislatures)
- eliminate the primary
- end the Electoral College
- free & open source tech unified, national e-voting system, open for all to audit
- public blockchain for permanent results
- printed receipt with barcode of hash saved in the blockchain
- ranked choice voting (as it provides an instant run-off should the favorite be disqualified, die or resign; also provides N picks for boards, vice positions and directors)
It's sad you liked ranked choice voting last. That's all we need to end the duopoly.
I also feel, as the supreme court does, that Citizens United is a free speech issue. You should listen to this podcast about it to get some perspective: https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/citizens-united
In a beautiful piece of irony, if it hadn't been for Michael Moore shamelessly using his corporation to produce political speech, the Citizens United court case might not have been successful.
I also feel, as the supreme court does, that Citizens United is a free speech issue. You should listen to this podcast about it to get some perspective: https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/citizens-united
In a beautiful piece of irony, if it hadn't been for Michael Moore shamelessly using his corporation to produce political speech, the Citizens United court case might not have been successful.
With regard to Washington, this quickly devolves into a semantical discussion about what "broken" means. The observation is that it is working as intended, an outcome that is perpetuated by both parties pandering to everyone that it is broken and they can fix it.
That doesn't mean it ISN'T broken, that proves that it is. Correct, it is a selective evolution that works the way selective evolution works. But it doesn't cross the threshold of egalitarian representative democracy where the representatives get to express the will of the people they represent, which is what the masses of people it represents mean by "its broken".
That doesn't mean it ISN'T broken, that proves that it is. Correct, it is a selective evolution that works the way selective evolution works. But it doesn't cross the threshold of egalitarian representative democracy where the representatives get to express the will of the people they represent, which is what the masses of people it represents mean by "its broken".
Does one ask virgins for sex advice?
Criticisms like Porter's aren't even wrong. They're not even talking about politics as practiced in the USA. At best, they're kibitzing about folk notions of democracy.
Everyone should run for office at least once. Give stump speeches. Earn endorsements. GOTV. Cold call strangers for cash. Wrestle over policy. Build coalitions. Etc.
People should still criticize, make demands.
I'm just saying that once you've played the game, everyone's behaviour will make perfect sense. And then you'll see where reform is needed, desirable, useful.
Source: Election integrity activist, ran for office.
Criticisms like Porter's aren't even wrong. They're not even talking about politics as practiced in the USA. At best, they're kibitzing about folk notions of democracy.
Everyone should run for office at least once. Give stump speeches. Earn endorsements. GOTV. Cold call strangers for cash. Wrestle over policy. Build coalitions. Etc.
People should still criticize, make demands.
I'm just saying that once you've played the game, everyone's behaviour will make perfect sense. And then you'll see where reform is needed, desirable, useful.
Source: Election integrity activist, ran for office.
I think this is inevitable in a 'first past the post' voting system. The dynamic is identical in the UK.
So just to talk about the Coke vs Pepsi thing a bit...
I love Diet Coke, I'm a Coke person for sure. But I have to admit that Pepsi is winning the business wars, not because of their beverage business, but because of all their other investments. Pepsi used to own KFC, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut (later spun off into Yum! brands), and they still own Frito Lay chips. Coke I don't think has been as good about diversifying their income stream.
To take this to the political sphere, the way to win a Duopoly is to cheat and outsmart your opponent. I'd say the republicans are winning this one though, with the electoral college, citizens united, and the way they are playing for votes with fear and hatred.
Now to be sure, I'm a democrat, and I don't like what is going on, but even I have to admire an evil genius and how they manage to somehow hold on. It's finding ways around your opponent, not trying to attack them head on. I think if we changed the voting system to a ranked choice system, this would be a big way to swing things back toward the democrats.
I'm still always freaked out by people that vote green, and you can see how blue + green > red, but red is still the plurality. Ranked voting would really change this. Even I want to vote green, but am worried that I will affect the spread. Being able to bring in new blood with low risk of going with the worst option would be a huge improvement.
I love Diet Coke, I'm a Coke person for sure. But I have to admit that Pepsi is winning the business wars, not because of their beverage business, but because of all their other investments. Pepsi used to own KFC, Taco Bell, and Pizza Hut (later spun off into Yum! brands), and they still own Frito Lay chips. Coke I don't think has been as good about diversifying their income stream.
To take this to the political sphere, the way to win a Duopoly is to cheat and outsmart your opponent. I'd say the republicans are winning this one though, with the electoral college, citizens united, and the way they are playing for votes with fear and hatred.
Now to be sure, I'm a democrat, and I don't like what is going on, but even I have to admire an evil genius and how they manage to somehow hold on. It's finding ways around your opponent, not trying to attack them head on. I think if we changed the voting system to a ranked choice system, this would be a big way to swing things back toward the democrats.
I'm still always freaked out by people that vote green, and you can see how blue + green > red, but red is still the plurality. Ranked voting would really change this. Even I want to vote green, but am worried that I will affect the spread. Being able to bring in new blood with low risk of going with the worst option would be a huge improvement.
> Coke I don't think has been as good about diversifying their income stream
Coca Cola definitely has a diverse brand set of income streams including Minute Made, Nature's Own, Odwalla, and Vitamin Water
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Coca-Cola_brands
Coca Cola definitely has a diverse brand set of income streams including Minute Made, Nature's Own, Odwalla, and Vitamin Water
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Coca-Cola_brands
It's true they have a lot of brands, but a lot of them are drinks (for example, Monster energy drinks too are on that list). Whereas I think the combination of salty snack food + drinks is a winning combination.
They touch on how true bipartisan laws like the New Deal and the Civil Rights Act just don't get passed anymore, but legislation tends to get passed based on which party has the majority of reps at that time. (Then they immediately digress into a long discussion about Trump, unfortunately).
This, to me, is a much more interesting issue than assessing the different ways of counting ballots like ranked choice or approval voting, which seem more like a dry mathematical exercise in tweaking some technical process that we don't fully understand to begin with.
There was this interview I heard on C-Span with Sue Myrick where they asked her about this lack of bipartisanship in Washington. She said that it's simply because politicians no longer relocate there, but just fly in on Monday and fly back out on Friday. So their spouses don't get together anymore for social events, and their kids don't play on the same baseball teams anymore. They don't socialize in any meaningful way with the other representatives.
If representatives are anything like normal people, then I'd wager the revocation of the Fairness Doctrine in 1985 had something to do with it, too. The news media does a pretty good job conditioning people into hating the other party.
This, to me, is a much more interesting issue than assessing the different ways of counting ballots like ranked choice or approval voting, which seem more like a dry mathematical exercise in tweaking some technical process that we don't fully understand to begin with.
There was this interview I heard on C-Span with Sue Myrick where they asked her about this lack of bipartisanship in Washington. She said that it's simply because politicians no longer relocate there, but just fly in on Monday and fly back out on Friday. So their spouses don't get together anymore for social events, and their kids don't play on the same baseball teams anymore. They don't socialize in any meaningful way with the other representatives.
If representatives are anything like normal people, then I'd wager the revocation of the Fairness Doctrine in 1985 had something to do with it, too. The news media does a pretty good job conditioning people into hating the other party.
> They also mention how true bipartisan laws like the New Deal and the Civil Rights Act just don't get passed anymore,
The New Deal and Civil Rights Act were earthshaking bills that broke the existing partisan alignment and caused a realignment around them; they didn't happen often before, the two of them happening without a few decades was essentially unprecedented in US history.
Bemoaning that things like that don't happen anymore is...odd.
And, yes, the period of realignment that started with the New Deal, was just seeming to settle out before being reignited with the Civil Rights Act, and was largely complete by the mid-1990s, when the few surviving conservative Democratic holdouts finally jumped ship in the wake of the 1994 election had more other “bipartisan” legislation than was normal before or since, because the national parties and the major national ideological factions were out of alignment.
The New Deal and Civil Rights Act were earthshaking bills that broke the existing partisan alignment and caused a realignment around them; they didn't happen often before, the two of them happening without a few decades was essentially unprecedented in US history.
Bemoaning that things like that don't happen anymore is...odd.
And, yes, the period of realignment that started with the New Deal, was just seeming to settle out before being reignited with the Civil Rights Act, and was largely complete by the mid-1990s, when the few surviving conservative Democratic holdouts finally jumped ship in the wake of the 1994 election had more other “bipartisan” legislation than was normal before or since, because the national parties and the major national ideological factions were out of alignment.
Radiolab just did a similar podcast "Tweak the Vote" about new voting variations. It digs into some real examples in Ireland, San Francisco and Maine.
https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/tweak-vote
Fargo, ND just adopted Approval Voting (better and simpler than Ranked Choice Voting/IRV) by a 64% supermajority.
https://ballot-access.org/2018/11/06/fargo-north-dakota-vote...
https://ballot-access.org/2018/11/06/fargo-north-dakota-vote...
There are no shortage of precedents when "winner takes all" systems were broken square and fair, keep trying
The point isn't that it can't be done, it's that voters are strongly incentivized against trying, so they only do so when the political system is completely broken and they feel like they have nothing left to lose, or they feel like there's such massive support for their third party candidate that the party shift has already occurred. It's a chicken-and-egg problem.
Depending on that to fix problems with the two dominant parties is like seeing an infection and doing nothing to treat it until gangrene sets in and you have to cut off their leg (and give them a robotic prosthetic that you hope will be better than their real leg).
It can and does happen, there's even a term for it, iirc: electoral realignment. But it hasn't happened recently, despite a clear sense by everyone that our political system is broken and stupid. Ross Perot tried to incite one in '92 and look what happened.
Depending on that to fix problems with the two dominant parties is like seeing an infection and doing nothing to treat it until gangrene sets in and you have to cut off their leg (and give them a robotic prosthetic that you hope will be better than their real leg).
It can and does happen, there's even a term for it, iirc: electoral realignment. But it hasn't happened recently, despite a clear sense by everyone that our political system is broken and stupid. Ross Perot tried to incite one in '92 and look what happened.
So the comments here seem to be debating the merit of various kinds of voting systems.
Does that mean we fairly unanimously agree that non-partisan primaries are a good thing? Those are something that could be passed state by state via ballot measure.
Does that mean we fairly unanimously agree that non-partisan primaries are a good thing? Those are something that could be passed state by state via ballot measure.
Can we bring back the Bull Moose part? http://www.progressivebullmoose.party/
Hidden?
Hidden?
Hidden?
Duopoly?
To paraphrase the late Gore Vidal, "We have one political party, the property party, with two wings."
Here's the full quote:
“There is only one party in the United States, the Property Party … and it has two right wings: Republican and Democrat. Republicans are a bit stupider, more rigid, more doctrinaire in their laissez-faire capitalism than the Democrats, who are cuter, prettier, a bit more corrupt — until recently … and more willing than the Republicans to make small adjustments when the poor, the black, the anti-imperialists get out of hand. But, essentially, there is no difference between the two parties.”
― Gore Vidal
To paraphrase the late Gore Vidal, "We have one political party, the property party, with two wings."
Here's the full quote:
“There is only one party in the United States, the Property Party … and it has two right wings: Republican and Democrat. Republicans are a bit stupider, more rigid, more doctrinaire in their laissez-faire capitalism than the Democrats, who are cuter, prettier, a bit more corrupt — until recently … and more willing than the Republicans to make small adjustments when the poor, the black, the anti-imperialists get out of hand. But, essentially, there is no difference between the two parties.”
― Gore Vidal
This kind of thinking trivializes real progressive policies that “help the poor, the black, and the anti-imperialist” as “small adjustments”, and not the matter of life or death as things like torte law, affordable healthcare, unions, and public infrastructure can be. I hope there is more to that in the full context.
Worse, in this context it seems to suggest that you should bargain with neither side and instead seek some new power dynamic. That would be a recipe for disappointment, especially when I think an engaged citizenry can make real (albeit slow) progress by bargaining with the major political parties.
Worse, in this context it seems to suggest that you should bargain with neither side and instead seek some new power dynamic. That would be a recipe for disappointment, especially when I think an engaged citizenry can make real (albeit slow) progress by bargaining with the major political parties.
You could replace "property" with some other totally common sense and reasonable position and lo and behold, both parties agree with it! Where is the problem here?
Hotelling's law is at work here.
Changing the voting system doesn't actually solve that, either.
Changing the voting system doesn't actually solve that, either.
My pet theory is that Trump managed to get elected because he's good for audience ratings.
So, what were the ratings for the 2018 election show?
(In past years they barely cleared 30% of voters. QED?)
So, what were the ratings for the 2018 election show?
(In past years they barely cleared 30% of voters. QED?)
While neither party has serious incentive to increase competition in politics, one party engages in government breaking behavior, which it then uses as an argument for small government.
It's frustrating to see the Republican party actively sabotage government, then turn around and use it as proof the government doesn't work. All the while gerrymandering their way into house seats.
It's frustrating to see the Republican party actively sabotage government, then turn around and use it as proof the government doesn't work. All the while gerrymandering their way into house seats.
The three stated solutions:
> 1. Non-partisan, single-ballot primaries.
Seems reasonable by itself, but it won't scale to more than a few parties.
> 2. Instant-runoff voting, (commonly known as IRV, but in the article/transcript they call it Ranked-choice voting).
No. Absolutely not. IRV is awful.
https://rangevoting.org/
The good options are range voting (which collapses in the pathological case to simple approval voting, which isn't too bad itself). Or, if you're willing to live with some compromises, one of the Condorcet variants. The problem with the Condorcet voting system family is that it's more complex, less intuitive, and doesn't nicely aggregate: to break ties/loops you have to have granular voting data. The complexity means that when someone doesn't like the voting outcome, FOX or CNN can find some talking head to say "voting system is unfair! election stolen!" nonsense, and get traction because most people wouldn't understand Condorcet or why it works the way it does.
> 3. Non-biased non-gerrymandered redistricting.
Sure, but this needs to be defined strictly, with each voting district bounded by significant geographical features (rivers, mountains), and when geo features aren't available as boundaries, the boundary must be within a certain percentage of a convex hull. In other words, severely constraining the volume of concave points. Nothing like (-1,-1) to (-1, 1) to (1, 1) to (-0.5, 0), to (1, -1). That -0.5, 0 takes a big pacman-like bite out of the square volume, so it wouldn't be permitted. There are actual districts like that, or more like a blocky-letter-C or a blocky-letter-L shape, and it's absurd.
> 1. Non-partisan, single-ballot primaries.
Seems reasonable by itself, but it won't scale to more than a few parties.
> 2. Instant-runoff voting, (commonly known as IRV, but in the article/transcript they call it Ranked-choice voting).
No. Absolutely not. IRV is awful.
https://rangevoting.org/
The good options are range voting (which collapses in the pathological case to simple approval voting, which isn't too bad itself). Or, if you're willing to live with some compromises, one of the Condorcet variants. The problem with the Condorcet voting system family is that it's more complex, less intuitive, and doesn't nicely aggregate: to break ties/loops you have to have granular voting data. The complexity means that when someone doesn't like the voting outcome, FOX or CNN can find some talking head to say "voting system is unfair! election stolen!" nonsense, and get traction because most people wouldn't understand Condorcet or why it works the way it does.
> 3. Non-biased non-gerrymandered redistricting.
Sure, but this needs to be defined strictly, with each voting district bounded by significant geographical features (rivers, mountains), and when geo features aren't available as boundaries, the boundary must be within a certain percentage of a convex hull. In other words, severely constraining the volume of concave points. Nothing like (-1,-1) to (-1, 1) to (1, 1) to (-0.5, 0), to (1, -1). That -0.5, 0 takes a big pacman-like bite out of the square volume, so it wouldn't be permitted. There are actual districts like that, or more like a blocky-letter-C or a blocky-letter-L shape, and it's absurd.
IRV is only awful in irrelevant corner cases that only political science wonks care about.
When the electorate's preferences is a statistical tie, it doesn't matter who wins, as long as one party isn't forcing all the tiebreaks to go their way.
When the electorate's preferences is a statistical tie, it doesn't matter who wins, as long as one party isn't forcing all the tiebreaks to go their way.
> When the electorate's preferences is a statistical tie, it doesn't matter who wins
I wish this was more front and center in these types of discussions. Imagine a race between Alice and Bob. Alice gets 9,500 votes, Bob 9,521 votes. But—due to some controversial rules—10 of Alice's and 40 of Bob's votes are invalidated. Alice wins.
This is not a scandal or a problem. The original vote totals were a tie. The new vote totals are also a tie. Essentially a coin flip determined the winner.
For purposes of determining who won, 49%===51%. If a candidate is truly wanted by the electorate, then they need to do better than 50% +1 anyway.
I wish this was more front and center in these types of discussions. Imagine a race between Alice and Bob. Alice gets 9,500 votes, Bob 9,521 votes. But—due to some controversial rules—10 of Alice's and 40 of Bob's votes are invalidated. Alice wins.
This is not a scandal or a problem. The original vote totals were a tie. The new vote totals are also a tie. Essentially a coin flip determined the winner.
For purposes of determining who won, 49%===51%. If a candidate is truly wanted by the electorate, then they need to do better than 50% +1 anyway.
It's awful precisely when it would start delivering a different result than FPTP, because that's when strategic voting comes into play.
I don't think that's true at all. It provides the illusion of compatibility with 3rd party voting, while saddling it with strategic voting pathologies not so different from winner-take-all.
Here's a summary: https://rangevoting.org/IrvPathologySurvey.html
Here's a summary: https://rangevoting.org/IrvPathologySurvey.html
It seems to me that the weirdness comes from this if/else block in how IRV works.
if (highest voted candidate has more than 50%) {
That candidate is winner
} else {
use 2nd picks of voters for least voted candidate
IRV() // recursive
}Prescriptions #3 are nice in spirit, but there are practical constraints to consider. For one thing, in addition to geographical boundaries, congressional districts also need to conform to existing administrative boundaries like county lines. These, in turn, are tied to services, taxes, etc. Not to say whether it can or cannot be done, nor whether it should or should not, but it's far from simple to just redraw congressional districts.
For anyone interested in gerrymandering and related issues, I've found this to be a nice resource: https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering . (In full disclosure, I know some of the people responsible for this but am not involved in the work.)
For anyone interested in gerrymandering and related issues, I've found this to be a nice resource: https://sites.duke.edu/quantifyinggerrymandering . (In full disclosure, I know some of the people responsible for this but am not involved in the work.)
It only takes one sentence to describe: "Vote for everyone you approve of."
It also gracefully handles incomplete information—if you don't know about someone, just don't vote for them.
[0] http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/