I wonder if the next obvious attack - 2 pushes in rapid succession, one to show and one to hide - has been handled. The browser should debounce and replace the notification with a notice instead of hiding if it’s removed too quickly. Human time scales.
Given that Windows 11 isn't that different from Windows 10, I assume the app compatibility toolkit can be coaxed to work.
Or, more excitingly, probably more versatile in the longer term, and a pile of hacks upon hacks, it might be possible to run in the browser with the likes of jslinux + wine.
I was thinking more for communicating the “mass disruption in progress” message - or even just distributing the manually verified “traffic lights down” data between vehicles.
> When you run Get-Mailbox -Identity <MailboxIdentity> | Format-List AuditEnabled, the AuditEnabled property always displays as True. This hardcoded display value doesn't reflect the actual mailbox-level audit configuration.
> To verify the actual mailbox audit status, use the Filter parameter in the following command:
PowerShell
> If the command returns the mailbox object, mailbox-level auditing is enabled. If the command returns an error stating the object couldn't be found, mailbox-level auditing is disabled.
Suprised no one has mentioned RFC 8914 Extended DNS Errors, specifically section 4.17[1]:
> 4.17. Extended DNS Error Code 16 - Censored
> The server is unable to respond to the request because the domain is on a blocklist due to an external requirement imposed by an entity other than the operator of the server resolving or forwarding the query. Note that how the imposed policy is applied is irrelevant (in-band DNS filtering, court order, etc.).
Which would be relevant for Google DNS's "Query refused" at least. Although I guess it's possible maybe they do support it but Windows/Chromium don't...
Binary compatibility is necessarily at odds with the “recompile the world” philosophy. This global view has some advantages, eg. performance can be improved system wide LTO, calling conventions changes, security with hardening options, etc.
The local view, where a program with no knowledge of its runtime environment could appear at any time to a runtime environment that similarly knows nothing about a program, loses all those advantages and costs added constraints but gains.. the ability to run those programs.
The article argues that the balance should be shifted, to their (eventual) benefit, sure. I wonder how long until that would take.
I wonder if there’s more “pay for play” path. I guess that’s containers. Or maybe what they argue for but bundled software could stay the way it is now. Further bifurcation seems bad, adding more code paths to test etc.
Presumably there's some reason Go can't just use an embedded manifest[1] like everyone else?
Ahh, I'm inferring (from [2]) even with the manifest entry, a system wide registry key is also required to get long paths working:
> I'm working with the Windows security team to find a way to enable long path support without having to modify the registry, just by using the embedded manifest, but the chances of this happening soon are quite low.
I guess "hibernating" (writing VRAM to swap) works better than expecting userspace to gracefully handle device resets. One linear read vs. a thundering herd of processes re-initialising, decompressing, etc. should be more predictable/reliable at least.
I do wonder however how much VRAM is "volatile" - ie. framebuffers - and could just be thrown away. And web browsers seem to handle GPU resets just fine, so maybe they could opt-in?
Traditionally they have a bias towards "working"/delivering traffic. It's easier to issue a refund than answer a urgent support request.
I can also imagine the biggest customers have all sorts of multi-vendor failover plans that may be affected.