> The Guardian was able to create short videos of people stripping to bikinis from photographs of fully clothed, real women. It was also possible to post this adult content on to X’s public platform
> Both the possession and publication of such material will be a criminal offence, under amendments to the Crime and Policing Bill currently going through Parliament.
> The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) said the change would make choking in pornography a "priority offence" under the Online Safety Act, *putting it on the same level as child sexual abuse material and terrorism content.*
> "Services who choose to restrict access rather than protect UK users remain on our watchlist"
How does withdrawing service from UK users not "protect UK users"? How does age verifying UK IPs provide more protection than withdrawing the service entirely?
"Borges warned in the complaint that if this information were compromised, “it is possible that the sensitive [personally identifiable information] on every American including health diagnoses, income levels and banking information, family relationships, and personal biographic data could be exposed publicly, and shared widely.”"
Yeah, but this is always true. And it didn't happen.
CSAM is an impossible problem to solve, especially when it's text-based solicitation.
But it's concerning that they seem to not have integrated proper hashing solutions until now:
> We are proud to provide an important update on our continuous work detecting Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) content, announcing today that we have launched additional CSAM hash matching efforts.
> This system allows X to hash and match media content quickly and securely,
The existing hashing tools are perfectly fit for purpose, but if the CSAM isn't known (and it's not, because it's either new or AI generated) then no amount of hashing will detect it.
Not sure why X developed something new instead of using PhotoDNA, if it all still uses the same hash databases!