I highly recommend the Economist for China reporting. As much as I love the New York Times, their China articles are typically negative, alarmist and selective. For a recent example of the Economist's superior China reporting, check out their articles on the summer crash. They called the heat up well in advance, and strongly advocated against over-reacting as things unwound. They really got it right while most other media focused on the gory day-to-day details. Furthermore, the Economist never dropped the thread on how China's long-term economic liberalization is really all that matters at this point given the relatively small size of their stock market.
>> Also: When you read the word 'Ponzi' in the context of macro-economics, as opposed to criminal prosecution, you should stop reading right then an there because the author is spouting drivel.
Ponzi borrowing is actually a concept in macro-economics, first explained by the economist Hyman Minsky. From Wikipedia: The "Ponzi borrower" (named for Charles Ponzi, see also Ponzi scheme) borrows based on the belief that the appreciation of the value of the asset will be sufficient to refinance the debt but could not make sufficient payments on interest or principal with the cash flow from investments;
Ponzi borrowing could be restated in terms of borrowing when your model does not take into account the possibility of asset stagnation/depreciation. This phenomenon became a popular topic in 2008, because the housing market had began behaving as though returns on real estate never dropped below 0.
> And I agree that it would be better for everyone if we collectively just ignored the 2015 incarnation of Niall Ferguson, but unfortunately being a tenured professor at Harvard (and now Stanford) gives you quite the bully pulpit! His first book is actually good, but it's been a downhill slide into largely fact-less political assertions and nasty ad hominem attacks since then...
I couldn't agree more. The 2011 Ferguson was pretty vapid when dealing in short-form too. He debated Zakaria and Kissinger in 2011 on the future of China: https://www.munkdebates.com/debates/china
It is hard to believe how frequently he resorts to ad hominem arguments. Furthermore, he can't seem to even acknowledge a the crux of a compelling argument made by Kissinger/Zakaria. Unsurprisingly, he drove the audience away from his argument in droves.
I have tried to take his work seriously. At first glance it looks like it should be thorough and center-right -- not a bad way to read history when read along-side differing accounts. However, he can't help himself from reducing his voluminous work to strangely simple political jabs. Maybe if he stuck to long-form topics from long-ago periods he could keep his credibility.
> Some of my fellow historians have asked the obvious question why Ferguson fixates on the fifth century, when the seventh century in the East, which saw the rise of Islam, might present more obvious food for thought. Perhaps Ferguson knows even less about that.
As the author notes, Niall Ferguson chose his Roman comparison to evoke fear of a fall from greatness, not because it is an insightful comparison. The rise of ISIS and its war with Al-Assad's Syria and Iraq should be seen in the context of an emerging revolutionary state like the Russian, Chinese, Cuban, Cambodian, and Iranian revolutions. The refugees are just like those that are typically cast out during the rise of a revolutionary state.
> In his ‘General considerations on the decline of the empire in the west’ that concluded volume 3 of his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Gibbon made this European dimension explicit by considering how a similar chain of events might impact on the Europe of his own day.
The best vaccine against alarmist predictions is looking at the previously incorrect alarmist predictions from the same source. This review is like @pessimistsarc on Twitter, except for angsty pundit-historians. Very gratifying.
That true. You could also make the argument that historically it hasn't been so easy to expose US government secrets to the world. So, maybe we're actually entering an era of greater (involuntary) transparency and we're actually witnessing a backlash to this as opposed to a renewed attempt at subduing dissidents.
> I hate to sound like a Pro-Russia troll, but the leaders weren't replaced in the West;
Right. That was my point. When we get bad leaders that make bad decisions that lose them support, they get cycled out and the legitimacy of the institutions is restored.
> America's government systematically destroyed the careers of every person...
This is a great example of how our western institutions often lead to big mistakes but then eject the responsible people. Institutions left more or less intact. It would be foolhardy to claim that the US has a track record of consistently smart domestic policies and foreign interventions (don't get me started...). I'm just making the point that it is much easier to achieve stability with a system where information flows freely.
> This just sounds like so much Russia is bad and inherently weak...
"Weak" is the wrong word. In many ways, the Russian government is demonstrating extraordinary strength in maintaining the "unstable equilibrium" that results from relying on controlling a society's interpretation of events.
I think you're smart to try to test the validity of the converse of my claims. However, it's also important to acknowledge that there is enormous variation in the freedom of the media to operate across countries. There are highly repressive media domains where a single actor represses others and achieves a near monopoly. Could the US improve freedom of expression domestically? Yes. Do we systematically repress dissenters as is common Russia, Bangladesh, etc? No
> ...our system has become increasingly hostile to "real" investigative journalism...
The burden of proof that there has been a degradation of information quality remains on your side of the court. This "lost paradise" argument may very well be right but it's far from evident to me.
I would broadly characterize media quality as always having been low on average throughout history. We had a brief period of oligopoly after mass media (the networks) monopolized a lot of what we call news but that period was more of an exception to the rule (and it certainly had its own problems).
> America and North Korea have both been doing it successfully for years.
Much is lost in this comparison. The American media landscape is pluralistic. Take for example our most popular news network: Fox News. Do they kowtow to the federal government? Russia + NK however, rely repressing dissent internally to retain legitimacy.
Back to the USSR. East-West relations are reverting to the Cold War days. From saber-rattling, proxy wars to propaganda campaigns, few will dispute that there has been a back-slide in recent years.
But here is what I find amazing: we have already seen this movie and we know what forces are at play and what the likely outcome is. Namely, it is very difficult to maintain legitimacy as a government through a propaganda campaign. It is a highly unstable equilibrium. At any time, information can get out of the hands of the propagandists and the system will find a more stable equilibrium -- ie. leaders will be replaced. It's just a matter of time.
Right now the Kremlin is likely undergoing an intense debate on how to spin the downing of the recent Russian flight as something other than a reaction to the Russian air war in Syria. This is a heavy lift. Maybe they will succeed in this and maybe not. If so, they will have found a temporary reprieve but will no doubt find themselves encountering a similar issue in the future. The legitimacy of the Russian leadership will continually find itself teetering so long as it relies on propagandists to hold back a flood of disapproval.
Compare this system to the inherent stability of responsive governments with rule of law: healthy democracies (ie. Western democracy), responsive authoritarian systems (Singapore, China). Both these systems have release valves. In the case of democracies, elections reassert legitimacy with election cycles. In the case of responsive authoritarian systems, the government relies on surveys and technocratic leadership.
Russia has neither method of achieving stable equilibrium and so the propaganda will serve as a shaky dike holding back an ever growing force.
What works:
* Use open questions.
* Employ the element of surprise.
* Watch for small, verifiable details.
* Observe changes in confidence.
What people think works (but doesn't):
* Watch for certain body language
* Watch for certain eye movements
Just how badly does the old way work: "According to one study, just 50 out of 20,000 people managed to make a correct judgement with more than 80% accuracy. "
What journals do you read? I find it hard to believe you are reading mainstream foreign policy journals. Is there an issue of Foreign Affairs that supports your take?
To support your argument I think you'd best be served by referring to history books, not foreign policy journals. I think your argument generally fits with a dated foreign policy regime where weaker nations were seen along lines of resource extraction (see colonialism all the way to the first Gulf War) and ideological domination (see '53 Iran coup, Bay of Pigs attempted coup, VOA).
Fast-forward a few decades and energy security for NATO states has become quite strong primarily due to fracking. Key threats consist primarily in non-state actors radicalizing people abroad and anarchic environments abroad enabling the export of terrorism. Key opportunities consist in stable energy prices and opening new markets for goods/services. It's a lot easier to square the recent Iran deal with that world view.
To me it's about getting congress to legislate in favor of startups and young tech companies rather than big business interests. With the SOPA protests, we showed what is possible with a grassroots effort. I think a similar effort could work with startup funding.
I've been amazed how supportive the start-up ecosystem in Providence has been to us newcomers. This is really a phenomenal place to run a start-up and anybody considering launching their company in the northeast should give Providence a close look!
Oddly enough, this resonates, however how can a claim like this be supported? It can't. Seemingly small UI changes, which might appear to fall in that "last 10%" category can require immense research and iteration to achieve.
This quote should be restated: "10% of variation in features can account for acquiring 90% of market share."
In other words, seemingly small variations in features tend to lead to product differentiation. This does not however mean that simply refining your product a little bit more will get you the runaway success you are seeking.
I love the concept but it seems to lack substantiation by students. Could this actually work in a lecture where students don't know what's coming next and how it relates to what was said 20 minutes ago?
And what about the fact that far too much information is presented in a given class to possibly fit on a notebook page?
I suppose the software is meant to address these impracticalities, but again I don't see the proper substantiation by students to lead me to believe that this product could be widely adopted.