All the time. Many CA distrust events involved some degree of “amateurs” reporting issues. While I hesitate to call commenters like agwa an amateur, it certainly was not professionally sponsored work by root programs or CAs. This is a key thing that Certificate Transparency enables: amateurs, academics, and the public at large to report CA issues.
At the same time, it sounds like the issues you describe aren’t CA/issuance issues, but rather, simple misconfigurations. Those aren’t incidents for the ecosystem, although definitely can be disruptive to the site, but I also wouldn’t expect them to call trust or identity into disrepute. That’d be like arguing my drivers license is invalid if I handed you my passport; giving you the wrong doc doesn’t invalidate the claims of either, just doesn’t address your need.
Because it wasn’t actually a server misconfiguration, nor was it, as others have speculated, about Postel’s Law.
The way X.509 was designed - to the very first version - was the notion that you have your set of CAs you trust, I have my set, and they’re different. Instead of using The Directory to resolve the path from your cert to someone I trust, PKIX (RFC 2459-et-al) defined AIA.
So the intent here was that there’s no “one right chain to rule them all”: there’s _your_ chain to your root, _my_ chain to my root, all for the same cert, using cross-certificates.
Browsers adopted X.509 before PKIX existed, and they assumed just enough of the model to get things to work. The standards were developed after, and the major vendors didn’t all update their code to match the standards. Microsoft, Sun, and many government focused customers did (and used the NIST PKITS test to prove it), Netscape/later Mozilla and OpenSSL did not: they kept their existing “works for me” implementations.
https://medium.com/@sleevi_/path-building-vs-path-verifying-... Discusses this a bit more. In modern times, the TLS RFCs better reflect that there’s no “one right chain to rule them all”. Even if you or I aren’t running our own roots that we use to cross-sign CAs we trust, we still have different browsers/trust stores taking different paths, and even in the same browser, different versions of the trust store necessitating different intermediates.
Because this is not the “start of drafting” but roughly “final text that is largely a rubber stamp approval.” This is the output of having been through the the trilogue process - where the Parliament would/has shut things down before - and not been shut down.
The EU is currently proposing to mandate the inclusion of roots that have been government approved, and to limit browsers from removing/distrusting them without notice/approval.
It’s actually a huge issue - look at how eliminating a key difficulty in obtaining certificates massively increased HTTPS adoption (via LetsEncrypt and others)
Similarly, automation affects how easy or hard it is to replace a CA, for example, if moving to distrust a CA. If you rely on QWAC attributes, you can only use QWAC CAs, and changing CAs becomes significantly more complex.
The audit issue is definitely an issue: the audits used are fundamentally different than what browsers try to achieve, and so having to adopt the lower standard definitely impacts user security. However, my point was that in addition to those concerns, the technical design itself results in less robust and less agile systems, and that makes things less secure.
Yes, the current regulation is targeted at government sites authenticating citizens, but the goal with these revisions is to require VLOPs to support this, along with allowing them the ability to require this for all websites. The original roadmap called out by the European Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) suggests a long-term goal of making this mandatory, effectively reviving the idea of the “Internet drivers license” (for users) and “Authorized domestic website” (for servers).
The QWACs can be issued by anyone who meets the minimum requirements, which are substantially less than those required for TLS server CAs in browsers. So while it’s true that banks can issue these, in practice there are many small companies with fewer than a thousand or so certs out there which have the same requirement that they must be accepted.
The eID certificates do come with probative (legal) effect, but this is where it gets complicated.
If the CA is hacked or screws up, yes, the CA is liable. But only if you did everything you were supposed to, such as checking every element of the certificate. These certificates have a variety of fields, such as “liability only up to XX euros”, and you (the site or user) are liable if you use it for more than that.
PSD2 has shown that the standards are a nightmare to fully implement. https://wso2.com/blogs/thesource/all-you-need-to-know-about-... gives a useful overview of how it’s worked for PSD2, and the new Digital Identity Framework/eIDAS Revisions proposes to make that the approach the standard everywhere.
In practice, this means that the server accepting your certificate needs to implement all of this correctly (spoiler: they don’t), or they bear the liability if the CA gets hacked - and they can’t distrust that CA. It also means the CA potentially learns every site you visit, because the sites have to check with the CA (if using OCSP).
Of course, if the government themselves directed the CA to misissue - e.g. at the direction of law enforcement - no such liability would be presumed, because it was a presumably lawful issuance.
The proposed regulation requires that QWACs MUST be accepted and recognized as such, such as using the European List of Trusted Lists as part of the root store.
That is, if a QWAC is issued by a CA that is not part of the browser root store, it must not be rejected (as any other untrusted certificate would be).
One element that results in less security is that it becomes more difficult to replace.
For example, QWACs cannot legally be automated (e.g. via ACME), because of certain restrictions applied to needing to validate the natural or legal person making the certificate request. This actually was an issue for one CA (BuyPass) that tried to support ACME but ran afoul of the framework.
While originally QWACs were proposed as optional, regulation such as PSD2 attempts to make them mandatory for (financial services) servers to obtain. If one of those keys is compromised, then the server wishing you obtain a replacement certificate may have to wait weeks to obtain such a certificate, or make an in-person visit to the CA (e.g. the post office).
A considerable number of compromised or misissued certificates have failed to been revoked on the industry-agreed upon timelines (24 hours or 5 days, depending), because of challenges CAs have faced because their customers haven’t (or legally can’t) automate replacement, and because the additional information in the certificate requires manual validation, despite having no technical impact on the TLS connection.
Yes. It requires the EU Trustmark, a logo designed through a secondary-school competition, to be displayed with certain colors and sizing, as directed through Implementing Acts (which have the force of law, but decided at the Commission level).
The draft revisions actually propose such authentication to be mandatory to implement for service providers if their users would like to use it.
That is, it specifically targets websites (particularly Very Large Online Platforms) that they MUST accept such ID in lieu of an email or password, at the user’s request. This was part of the original motivation for the revisions, to target “Sign in with Facebook” or “Sign in with Google” and require such sites also offer a “Login with EU” option.
Do you have links to documentation on the Apple Pay requirement?
That sounds like Apple Pay is encouraging certificate pinning, and I suspect the Apple Root Program may have opinions to the contrary, given how it puts Apple users at risk to encourage pinning.
As others have noted, many of these issues are fundamental to XML DSig, which is insecure by design. [1]
However, the “what does the future hold” of OIDC is not much brighter. OIDC is based on JSON Web Tokens (JWT), which manages to avoid some of these issues (e.g. signs the encoded value), but introduces new ones (JSON interpretation bugs, algorithm substitution bugs, etc). They’re similarly terrible by design [2].
However, what OIDC does relating to signing is far worse. In many OIDC deployments, the idea is you use something called “OIDC Discovery” [3] to discover the expected signing keys for the OIDC server. You fetch those regularly (e.g. daily), and do so over TLS. With SAML, you exchange certificates, and then rotate them every 2-3 years (with things blowing up on expiration), but with OIDC, you often end up using OIDC-Discovery, and thus can change keys daily.
This means that a single malicious TLS certificate can be used to MITM your OIDC Discovery exchange, and from there, impersonate any user from the identity provider to your system, the relying party.
I spend my days in the TLS trenches, working to improve the CA ecosystem, but I absolutely would not trust the security of all users to a TLS certificate. The reality is that BGP hijacks are still a regular thing, as are registrar hijacks. Even if you find out about a malicious certificate (via Certificate Transparency), and revoke it, virtually none of your tools doing the OIDC-Discovery fetch (like programming languages or curl) support revocation checking, and even if they did, it doesn’t work at Internet scale. To deal with this problem, some relying parties do a form of poor-man’s certificate pinning, but now they’re at risk of even greater operational failures than SAML expiration in the start.
In practice, it seems plenty of OIDC clients just shrug and go “yolo” - if they’re talking TLS to the IDP, that’s good enough, and no need to bother with signature validation of the assertion at all.
For all my hatred of XML DSig and SAML, I’ve seen few auth standards as bad as OIDC: because it looks good, but is hell to implement correctly. At least with SAML, you know it looks bad to begin with, so you’re hopefully on guard.
It used SSL/TLS and S/MIME roots to verify code signing and timestamping responses. When Symantec, which was removed for TLS trust, was also removed for S/MIME, NuGet broke, because it was no longer able to verify the TSA signature.
Any application using the ca-certificates package thus end up trusting CAs that Mozilla does not trust, despite being derived from the Mozilla Root Store.
So the news is already out there, this was just a reminder to folks to not do silly things like Microsoft did.
No more related to Android than any other Chrome supported OS.
The post linked in the article, https://g.co/chrome/root-policy makes it clear: the goal is to provide a consistent, cross-platform experience to the Web.
Users, and developers, hate “it doesn’t work on my machine” bugs, which are incredibly common. Sites that work on Chrome on macOS 10, but not macOS 11, or work on Chrome on Windows 10 but not Chrome on Windows 7. Giving developers and site operators predictable guidance, so that it “works in Chrome, works in Firefox” is good, no different than what Web Platform features you can use as https://caniuse.com
Yes, Android is important, but it’s a bit like saying the forest exists because of this specific tree here, when in fact it’s made up of hundreds of trees, of all sorts of types.
There’s more that could be said, but I can see this is an emotionally loaded subject for you, so perhaps it’s best dealt with as it rolls out. Every feature has a cost: to complexity (CTLs are notoriously ‘weird’ on Windows, for example), to security (LDAP is a terrible protocol due to BER), or simply in the maintenance costs that prevent security improvements. Software engineering is about weighing those trade-offs: do you implement the feature that 10-100 users use, or do you spend time improving things for the other billion users? There are limits to what can be supported, and limits to what is even good to support in the first place, and while such pragmatism may seem like arrogance, the reality is less malicious: it just isn’t good software.
In any event, making sure usage statistics are enabled, and bugs are filed when actually, is a good way to help prioritize.
Some of this isn’t correct (e.g. Firefox totally reads HKCU - https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/security/manage... - which is necessary to work with AV ), but I’ll the the first to tell you that a number of these things aren’t planned to be supported, because the goal is not to reimplement CAPI and it’s 200+ undocumented (except by support contract) flags and features. LDAP CDPs are definitely a no-go, for example. CTLs, as another, are almost exclusively for server apps like IIS, and don’t correctly work in Chrome today, so no regression there. Definitely, making sure to enable metrics, and report issues, is a good way to help prioritize things that are important vs things that are possible, but profoundly ill-considered.
At the same time, it sounds like the issues you describe aren’t CA/issuance issues, but rather, simple misconfigurations. Those aren’t incidents for the ecosystem, although definitely can be disruptive to the site, but I also wouldn’t expect them to call trust or identity into disrepute. That’d be like arguing my drivers license is invalid if I handed you my passport; giving you the wrong doc doesn’t invalidate the claims of either, just doesn’t address your need.