The FIDO Alliance (who wrote the WebAuthn spec with the W3C) has a draft specification for a format (Credential Exchange Format) and protocol (Credential Exchange Protocol) for migrating passkeys and other credentials [1]. I don't think this is implemented by any providers yet, but it's being worked on.
Fantastic research by NinjaLab. One of the most interesting parts to me from Yubico's advisory is that the Webauthn protocols attestation [1] is also defeated by this local cloning. Could the protocol have been better designed to resist this local cloning attack?
> An attacker could exploit this issue to create a fraudulent YubiKey using the recovered attestation key. This would produce a valid FIDO attestation statement during the make credential resulting in a bypass of an organization’s authenticator model preference controls for affected YubiKey versions.
> The where operator will validate that the syntax is valid, but it will pass unknown function calls through to the underlying database. In RunReveal's case, we use Clickhouse under the hood, so if we wanted to do a case-insensitive match we could still use Clickhouse's lower function.
From the release blog [1] they mention that unknown functions are passed through to the underlying SQL engine -- this let's them target anything from mysql, Postgres, ClickHouse or proprietary engines like Snowflake.
Shameless self-plug for an alternative tax that affects operational security and reliability teams: https://audit-logs.tax
Understanding how your breach impacts me, or detecting how the abuse of your tools are used to impact our organizations shouldn't cost additional money or be gated to only enterprise contracts.
Regardless of where it's rolled out first, this is a good example of reducing the attack surface from remote exploits (which China is known to have and use at contests like Tianfu Cup). Seems in line with changes they made with "Lockdown Mode" that users can opt into.
1. https://www.investing.com/news/stock-market-news/openai-unve...