> Not true - in firewall and security circles this was long ago observed and addressed in many different ways - it is now standard in at least the major Enterprise Firewall Vendors.
Hmm, what kind of measures are taken against this, then? Because aside from ingress filtering for RFC1918 addresses and the like, I don't see how you could prevent this attack effectively. You could make it more difficult by rejecting wildly incorrect acknowledgement numbers, but I don't see how to really prevent it.
> Still though; the analysis is good, and clearly determined through work, observation, and sound logic. I would work alongside a person like this anytime.
Then again, I did read (parts of) the RFC from '81, some paper (from Morris iirc) about predicting the ISN from '85, lots of research in the 90's and early 00's regarding predictions and preventing it... but nothing actually just guessed the number, and people seemed to agree that "if the ISN is unpredictable then yeah it's secure right?" That's why I considered this a new thing.
Hmm, what kind of measures are taken against this, then? Because aside from ingress filtering for RFC1918 addresses and the like, I don't see how you could prevent this attack effectively. You could make it more difficult by rejecting wildly incorrect acknowledgement numbers, but I don't see how to really prevent it.
> Still though; the analysis is good, and clearly determined through work, observation, and sound logic. I would work alongside a person like this anytime.
Thank you! :)