I once had a cheap Timex watch die from water ingress after running a track workout during a torrential downpour. At the time I joked that it only failed because we ran farther than the 100m rating
If I remember correctly it's up to the client program to set up the session, not something to do with the vendor's implementation. It's conceptually similar to how an HTTPS client performs a TLS handshake after opening a socket before it can work with plain HTTP content.
Correct, unless you're using a self-encrypting drive the FVEK sits in RAM once it's been released by the TPM during boot. The TPM is only a root of trust; for fast crypto operations without keeping the key in kernel memory you would need something like Intel SGX or ARM TrustZone.
Take a look at Fretboard Theory by Desi Serna - it spends a lot of time on how different scales are constructed and relating different patterns and chord forms back to the underlying concepts.
Greater Appalachia definitely extends through PA in a T shape across the center of the state and the northern border (sometimes called Pennsyltucky) and covers at least the Southern Tier in New York.
I'm not convinced this analysis is reading the draft fairly:
... if you need to circumvent a DRM for personal use, you are now liable for criminal penalties. Traditionally, for many jurisdictions, circumventing DRM is typically reserved for civil penalties. Criminal penalties implies that the government would foot the bill for enforcement. In civil cases, it is typically rights holders that go after individuals."
Except that here's the actual text:
> Each [7] Party [US/SG/MX/NZ/PE/JP/BN/AU/CL/MY propose: shall] [CA propose: may] provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied where any person is found to have engaged willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain in any of the above activities.
That doesn't sound like "if you need to circumvent a DRM for personal use, you are now liable for criminal penalties" to me.
That is not what the linked patent describes. In that patent, the base key in the hierarchy (the one created by the administrator, NOT the storage root of trust or SRK) is created outside the TPM and stored elsewhere, then imported and used. If the TPM is cleared or reset, then loading the key will fail and the base key will need to be imported again.
Creating key hierarchies under the SRK that can be duplicated or moved is actually very clearly specified in the TPM 2.0 spec, and is at least partially meant for exactly this sort of recovery process. The seed that's used to derive the SRK itself will still never leave the TPM, so any keys that are in a separate hierarchy under the SRK (instead of the imported base key) are still secure.