I've read about this strategy and am giving it a shot this year.
If I understand it correctly, the reasoning is that until the late summer, the underground root system is putting its energy towards growing the stalks and leaves, so you _want_ it to grow as much as possible. If you trim daily, you'll never let it get into the rapid growth stage where it's really depleting its energy reserves. In other words if you trimmed daily or monthly til the end of time, eventually you'd kill the plant, but it might ironically die more quickly if you trimmed monthly.
It's a bummer knowing that it'll be hard to fully eradicate it given how widespread it is in the area (I'm also in Massachusetts), but I guess there aren't really any permanent victories in life when you think about it.
This is a bit like saying earnings going up isn't good for stockholders, because they would have been charged a higher price to buy the stock if people had known the earnings were going to go up.
Once you've taken out a fixed-rate mortgage, inflation absolutely has the effect of reducing the value of the debt you owe. It's more if you're about to take out a mortgage that you're rooting against (expectations of) inflation, as lower inflation will also serve to decrease the prevailing interest rate.
It's just like any hiring process: get referrals from people you trust, look at prior work (previous purchases/sales in this case), learn the right questions to ask when interviewing.
Sarah & Duck and Bluey are my favorite kids shows, but they're very different. S&D is more quiet and contemplative, whereas Bluey tends to be more playful and energetic. My daughter grew out of S&D and into Bluey at around age 4.
I used to be frustrated that the parents in Bluey seem to have endless energy and attention to devote to their kids – at least with S&D, I didn't feel like there was such a lofty version of parenting with which to compare myself. But I've come to realize that the playful and fun dad in Bluey is a much better role model, for me personally, than the dads who are just sort of vanilla and kind (Daniel Tiger, Doc McStuffins), not to mention the dads who are just awful (Peppa Pig). Physical comedy, imaginary play, and committing to the bit, are all great for having fun while also connecting with young kids. Sarah and Duck obviously didn't teach my any of that, so it's been a useful change of pace as my daughter has gotten older.
> It sounds like a lot of it just went to unprofitable SaaS companies
U.S. GDP is north of $25 trillion and has grown 75% since 2009. Annual VC investments appear to be in the $200-300 billion range, from a quick search - presumably not all of it going to unprofitable SaaS companies. I'd go with the statistics over the gut intuition here.
There are plenty of never-profitable businesses that have gone bankrupt in the past. See e.g. pets.com from the dot com bust. And this downturn has seen "functioning" businesses like SVB and First Republic go under too. So I'm not sure this time is different, at least to the extent you're suggesting.
I do agree that this era of low interest rates has led to some companies getting absolutely massive without ever turning a profit. But hey, that playbook worked for Amazon. Most tech companies have substantially lower capital requirements than WeWork, and can weather this sort of downturn as long as they have a reasonable cash position. Sure, Uber might not make back the amount of funding it's burned through, but that's different than it having a business where the unit economics will never work out.
Protecting bike lanes is a hugely impactful problem that is also far more expensive to solve. That doesn't mean we should be dismissive of a solution to a less impactful (but still important!) problem. Think how many orders of magnitude less money it would take for a municipality to buy and loan out some bike sweepers than to fully redesign its bike lanes.
I go to https://www.reddit.com/r/bikewrench for bike maintenance Q&A. The responders there are often extremely knowledgeable, although it doesn't have the article structure of Sheldon's site.
Adjusting water chemistry is extremely prevalent in brewing. For example, if you've ever had a hazy IPA, part of the softer bitterness comes from high levels of chloride in the water. The cost of common brewing salts (gypsum, calcium chloride, etc) is a small fraction of a penny per beer.
I'm guessing that the beer brewer you spoke with was talking about the cost of buying distilled or RO water, as opposed to the cost of the water adjustment itself. It's probably a lot more economical if you're cleaning and reusing graywater, vs. trucking in distilled water, or running municipal water through an RO filter and essentially paying twice for water treatment.
They're worth $80m today, and then maybe $82m next year, $84m the year after, and so on until they're worth $100m at maturity. (Obviously these numbers depend on current and future interest rates, and you'd be earning some interest in the meantime).
As I was trying to point out to the parent commenter, conflating "$100m today" with "$100m at maturity" leads to clear contradictions, like saying that a bank could earn $20m on paper simply by buying bonds trading below par value. Or to put it another way – if bank A holds $100m face value of 10-year bonds yielding 4%, and bank B holds $100m face value of 10-year bonds yielding 2% (but worth, say, $80m at market price), how can you claim that those banks are on equally good footing?
Valuing liquid bonds at par value is pretty clearly a hack to reduce volatility and increase confidence in banks' balance sheets, even if some people in the comments seem to view it as a more logical way of accounting. (Although to be clear, I don't mind companies doing their own fuzzy math as long as they give investors enough information to do proper due diligence. It's similar to the non-GAAP earnings that a lot of tech companies report.)
You're saying that if a bank paid $100m for low-yielding bonds in 2021 which are now worth $80m, those bonds should be valued at $100m on the bank's balance sheet. What if a different bank pays $80m today for the same bonds? Should they be able to show an immediate $20m increase in their book value because those bonds are "worth $100m"?
In 2008 the Fed was decreasing interest rates, which helped support asset prices. Banks held a lot of bad loans which were worth much less than their balance sheets showed. Both of these factors could have caused the unrealized losses in 2008 to look somewhat small, but the high leverage at banks caused forced asset sales, and the uncertainty around credit losses led to asset prices tanking.
In 2023 the situation isn't necessarily worse, but it is certainly different. Asset prices seem relatively well-understood, in that their declines are a straightforward function of interest rates as opposed to an uncertain function of credit losses. Bank leverage is less than in 2008 as a result of regulation.
If the situation in 2008 was "some banks are _super_ insolvent, and it's hard to tell which ones", in 2023 it seems to be "some banks are mildly insolvent, and it's fairly clear which ones". A mildly insolvent bank can probably stay afloat as long as it continues to have access to capital, which the Fed is giving them. But if people start withdrawing their deposits from one of the mildly insolvent banks, it will become increasingly difficult for that bank to dig out of even a small solvency hole, so there's still some uncertainty as to whether the Fed lifeline is enough to save them.
You keep referring to this 40% number and calling it a "significant discount", when in actuality it's only a 7-8% decrease in asset value that would be needed to wipe out shareholders ($211B assets vs $195B liabilities on their latest balance sheet). In your original comment you mention the bank selling assets at a 8.5% discount as a point _in favor_ of your thesis. You seem to not only be missing the contradiction there, but also making a vaguely optimistic case for investors getting money back in an asset firesale.
I don't mean to dunk here, I just get nervous seeing someone propose a super-high-variance trade that goes empirically wrong an hour later, and then quote Benjamin Graham. As the responder above said, given the size of the dodged bullet you should really be updating your priors on investing strategy, but you seem to barely even regard your thesis as mistaken.
You're mistaking assets and equity. A 40% discount in asset value absolutely would wipe out shareholders. To be a bit blunt, given your thesis here I would advise against trading in individual stocks, at least in the banking sector.
Great question, although I'm not sure there's a concrete answer to it other than "it depends". You can think of that metric as representing the number of logs that haven't been garbage collected, so as it goes up, performance will get worse.
If you're seeing spikes in RollbackSegmentHistoryListLength that coincide with dips in DB performance, you've probably identified the culprit. In the scenario described in our post, that metric would have grown monotonically for the duration of the long-lived ETL query – probably a more overt problem than what you're describing with short spikes to 100,000.
From what I can tell, they provisioned their DB instance(s) in a single AZ, but weren't aware that Aurora automatically provisions its own storage and always uses multiple AZs. We touch on the separation of compute and storage in the post.
I think the surprise is that it's not possible to have a truly "single AZ" Aurora database, even though you might have thought you provisioned your DB instances that way.
If I understand it correctly, the reasoning is that until the late summer, the underground root system is putting its energy towards growing the stalks and leaves, so you _want_ it to grow as much as possible. If you trim daily, you'll never let it get into the rapid growth stage where it's really depleting its energy reserves. In other words if you trimmed daily or monthly til the end of time, eventually you'd kill the plant, but it might ironically die more quickly if you trimmed monthly.
It's a bummer knowing that it'll be hard to fully eradicate it given how widespread it is in the area (I'm also in Massachusetts), but I guess there aren't really any permanent victories in life when you think about it.