Have each team member generate his own key. Copy everyone's key in a folder and have a script to generate an authorized_keys file. Use puppet or chef (or anything else) to dispatch the authorized_keys on every server.
A single shared key is a security disaster waiting to happen.
Unfortunately biometrics are near to useless for remote authentication. The only context in which biometrics work is when the whole authentication chain (reader, cable, computer, network) is tamper-proof. When one of these elements can be tampered with (e.g. unplugging the fingerprint reader and sniffing to the USB traffic), it becomes "something you know, that anyone can collect, that you can reproduce with an HD picture, and that you cannot revoke without losing your physical integrity".
I think biometrics may have a place in tamper-proof devices like iphones (infamous error 53) or biometric smartcards (need fingerprint to unlock secrets).
Sorry, I don't have time to do so much work just to log on quickly on my email the morning or when relogging for the 25th time in the ticket manager at work, that has too short sessions.
Also, enjoy explaining your method to a lambda user, I'd bring popcorn and watch :)
No, they plan on removing the PRNG from their release. I understand better why my POC worked without triggering the bug. From the mail archive:
". When the discard occurs the data must not be output and the Dual EC DRBG state must be updated, but that state update isn't done. In the case of no additional input this has no effect, but additional input is used by the "FIPS capable" OpenSSL. Note that additional input does not effectively defeat the backdoor vulnerability[3]."
I do not use the reseed functionality either, because I only generate two or three output blocs and never call an explicit reseed.