Heartbleed vulnerability tester(github.com)
github.com
Heartbleed vulnerability tester
https://github.com/titanous/heartbleeder
36 comments
We have the same version of OpenSSL on 2 different test nodes.
OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips
One came up positive, One negative. Shouldn't it be negative for both?
OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips
One came up positive, One negative. Shouldn't it be negative for both?
Did you "service httpd restart" after applying the update?
Different build flags?
Might one of them have been built with -DOPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS?
I think it's also possible you are getting a false positive, because it's timing out or whatever. The newer version of that check tells you if it's timing out.
Tried again. Still get the same result.
Weird. Can you try "openssl version -a" on both? Like this:
$ openssl version -a
OpenSSL 1.0.1 14 Mar 2012
built on: Mon Apr 7 20:33:29 UTC 2014
platform: debian-amd64
options: bn(64,64) rc4(8x,int) des(idx,cisc,16,int) blowfish(idx)
compiler: cc -fPIC -DOPENSSL_PIC -DZLIB -DOPENSSL_THREADS -D_REENTRANT -DDSO_DLFCN
-DHAVE_DLFCN_H -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -g -O2 -fstack-protector --param=ssp-buffer-size=4
-Wformat -Wformat-security -Werror=format-security -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
-Wl,-Bsymbolic-functions -Wl,-z,relro -Wa,
--noexecstack -Wall -DOPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50
-DMD32_REG_T=int -DOPENSSL_IA32_SSE2 -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT -DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5
-DOPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m -DSHA1_ASM -DSHA256_ASM -DSHA512_ASM -DMD5_ASM -DAES_ASM
-DVPAES_ASM -DBSAES_ASM -DWHIRLPOOL_ASM -DGHASH_ASM
OPENSSLDIR: "/usr/lib/ssl"
In any case, it could be that something else (not built with OpenSSL) is listening on port 443 in the one that's "safe".I'm surprised that I haven't been contacted by any sites yet with advice to reset my password. Is it the case that not many sites were actually running 1.0.1? Or are they just patching, creating new certs, and calling it a day?
It appears so. Many sites that were vulnerable earlier today haven't even inactivated sessions.
I may be wrong, but I think that your credentials with a site are only vulnerable if they had the heartbeats extension turned on.
I got contacted by Heroku 1h ago to reissue certificate and update my SSL endpoint.
As for re-issuing certs Namecheap is sucking in that department last night and today (it could be upstream with RapidSSL and PositiveSSL). GoDaddy seems to be speedy even though it looks like the notification emails are not being sent. Fun times :).
Tools like this and FiloSottile's[0] are great. But given how serious of a vulnerability this is, anything short of manually verifying your OpenSSL version is probably not enough.
0 - https://github.com/FiloSottile/Heartbleed
0 - https://github.com/FiloSottile/Heartbleed
True, but it's extremely useful when you're terminating SSL on Amazon's Elastic Load Balancer and want to know if they've fixed it yet or not.
Or, another example, when you want to know for sure that you've restarted your webserver and you weren't doing something stupid like running a version of nginx that was statically linked against openssl.
Or, another example, when you want to know for sure that you've restarted your webserver and you weren't doing something stupid like running a version of nginx that was statically linked against openssl.
How about Symantec? Those of you logging in to renew Verisign certificates might want to take note:
http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/#trustcenter.websecurity.symant...
It's vulnerable as well.
http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/#trustcenter.websecurity.symant...
It's vulnerable as well.
And this is what really makes me mad:
$ ./heartbleeder yahoo.com
VULNERABLE - yahoo.com:443 has the heartbeat extension enabled and is vulnerable to CVE-2014-0160
I can understand when some random service has vulnerability like this. But big corporations like yahoo should resolve this immediately.
$ ./heartbleeder yahoo.com
VULNERABLE - yahoo.com:443 has the heartbeat extension enabled and is vulnerable to CVE-2014-0160
I can understand when some random service has vulnerability like this. But big corporations like yahoo should resolve this immediately.
But isn't it because they're big & complex that it's more difficult to quickly resolve ... on the other hand, since they're so big & important (and have the means) they should have plans in place already to deal with such things.
I see a funny thing when I test it against yahoo.com:
I assume that the returned bytes are a peek inside the memory of a yahoo.com server, and we can see the padding supplied by Heartbleed, followed by some more bytes that depend on the server state.
Am I interpreting that correctly?
$ ./Heartbleed yahoo.com:443
(bunch of returned bytes)
2014/04/08 12:59:46 yahoo.com:443 - VULNERABLE
Near the front of the returned bytes is the sequence "yheartbleed.filippo.ioYELLOW SUBMARINE". That is some padding buried inside the Heartbleed source code.I assume that the returned bytes are a peek inside the memory of a yahoo.com server, and we can see the padding supplied by Heartbleed, followed by some more bytes that depend on the server state.
Am I interpreting that correctly?
Interestingly, I just got that for HackerNews, but not on a second try. I thought they were using CloudFlare anyway?
(And yes, you interpreted that correctly. Notice that this online test does not request even a fraction of the 64k possible, and you can always repeat it to get more)
(And yes, you interpreted that correctly. Notice that this online test does not request even a fraction of the 64k possible, and you can always repeat it to get more)
The Qualys SSL Lab server test is also checking for Heartbleed now:
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/index.html
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/index.html
The bug also leaves the client vulnerable.
Has anyone a link to test client implementations? (E.g Browsers,... Windows,... Android, Apps, etc)
Has anyone a link to test client implementations? (E.g Browsers,... Windows,... Android, Apps, etc)
The vulnerability is in OpenSSL only, and no major browser uses OpenSSL. Firefox and Chromium use NSS, IE uses a Microsoft library, and Safari uses Apple's SecureTransport.
Other OpenSSL-using clients are definitely vulnerable though - best bet to tell if you're vulnerable is to check the OpenSSL version.
Other OpenSSL-using clients are definitely vulnerable though - best bet to tell if you're vulnerable is to check the OpenSSL version.
What about Opera 12, still major browser in CIS countries? OpenSSL license is listed on opera:about page, but version is not specified. How to find out?
Opera 12 should be safe, as it doesn't support the heartbeat extension
I tested it using openssl's s_server (with a quickly generated cert using tinyca) and then connecting to https://localhost:12345
I tested it using openssl's s_server (with a quickly generated cert using tinyca) and then connecting to https://localhost:12345
openssl s_server -accept 12345 -tlsextdebug -cert cert.pem | grep ^TLS
TLS client extension "server name" (id=0), len=14
TLS client extension "renegotiation info" (id=65281), len=1
TLS client extension "status request" (id=5), len=5
TLS client extension "next protocol" (id=13172), len=0Here it is: https://reverseheartbleed.com/
Yahoo mail appears to be vulnerable
Well, Here we go... https://twitter.com/WarrenGuy/status/453510021930680320
pikachu@BATTLEGYM ~/heartbleeder $ date
Tue Apr 8 08:37:08 PDT 2014
pikachu@BATTLEGYM ~/heartbleeder $ ./heartbleeder mail.yahoo.com
INSECURE - mail.yahoo.com:443 has the heartbeat extension enabled and is vulnerable
pikachu@BATTLEGYM ~/heartbleeder $
pikachu@BATTLEGYM ~/heartbleeder $ date
Tue Apr 8 08:37:08 PDT 2014
pikachu@BATTLEGYM ~/heartbleeder $ ./heartbleeder mail.yahoo.com
INSECURE - mail.yahoo.com:443 has the heartbeat extension enabled and is vulnerable
pikachu@BATTLEGYM ~/heartbleeder $
> https://twitter.com/WarrenGuy/status/453510021930680320
Heh. Eliding the hex values of the password might have been a good idea.
Heh. Eliding the hex values of the password might have been a good idea.
An online tester: http://possible.lv/tools/hb/
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Does heartbleed affect ssh or only TLS?
This does not impact SSH, see http://heartbleed.com/
There is no information about SSH on this page. OpenSSH is a program depending on OpenSSL the library, specifically OpenSSH uses the libcrypto part of OpenSSL. So after updating OpenSSL ssh service should be restarted anyway.
ssh doesn't need to be restarted. As you said, OpenSSH never uses the vulnerable part of OpenSSL code. When the ssh service was started, libcrypto (which isn't vulnerable) was loaded into memory and made available to OpenSSH code. That memory isn't going to be invalidated if libcrypto's on-disk copy changes.
[deleted]
Oh, this time, the (free)ssl cert provider(s) is/are vulnerable!
* Live version: http://filippo.io/Heartbleed/
* Code: https://github.com/FiloSottile/Heartbleed