Free will is an illusion, biologist says(physorg.com)
physorg.com
Free will is an illusion, biologist says
http://www.physorg.com/news186830615.html
63 comments
In my opinion, any discussion about the "free will" or its non-existence should begin with the precise definition of the term. I observed in the past than people have different notions about what the term comprises, and without that common ground the discussions tends to be fruitless.
I'll try.
"Free will" is the hypothesis that it is, in principle, impossible to determine the outputs of a brain just by measuring its physical state with perfect accuracy. In other words, if you have two physically identical brains, with physically identical states, these brains can have different outputs.
"Free will" is the hypothesis that it is, in principle, impossible to determine the outputs of a brain just by measuring its physical state with perfect accuracy. In other words, if you have two physically identical brains, with physically identical states, these brains can have different outputs.
Heisenberg uncertainty principle prevents perfectly accurate measure of "physical state".
So, two brains as physically identical as possible will probably have (slightly) different outputs.
But those differences would have nothing to do with human will. They would be random, or, more precisely, non-deterministic (per definition, as you can't measure them). So, having a non-deterministic free will is like having no free will at all.
Conclusion: We have no free will nor fate ;)
So, two brains as physically identical as possible will probably have (slightly) different outputs.
But those differences would have nothing to do with human will. They would be random, or, more precisely, non-deterministic (per definition, as you can't measure them). So, having a non-deterministic free will is like having no free will at all.
Conclusion: We have no free will nor fate ;)
Conclusion: We have no free will nor fate ;)
The alternative interpretation is that all particles in the universe have free will. ;)
The alternative interpretation is that all particles in the universe have free will. ;)
At a bigger scale, they seem to act randomly, though.
But maybe if we could follow one particle in its everyday life, we see how it exercises its free will?
But maybe if we could follow one particle in its everyday life, we see how it exercises its free will?
" If we have free will, so do subatomic particles, mathematicians claim to prove."
http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/35391/title/Math_...
http://www.sciencenews.org/view/generic/id/35391/title/Math_...
Heisenberg uncertainty principle prevents perfectly accurate measure of "physical state".
So, two brains as physically identical as possible will probably have (slightly) different outputs.
You are right about the definition but wrong about your conclusion. It is impossible to measure 2 brains and be sure they are physically identical.
But this does not mean 2 brains cannot be physically identical.
So, two brains as physically identical as possible will probably have (slightly) different outputs.
You are right about the definition but wrong about your conclusion. It is impossible to measure 2 brains and be sure they are physically identical.
But this does not mean 2 brains cannot be physically identical.
I really thought that Heisenberg was talking about the reality and not the measure.
I think I'm wrong on this one: A deterministic behavior would rule out free will.
Free will would be non-deterministic, by definition.
Revised conclusion: We have as much free will as our particles.
Still no fate, though ;)
Free will would be non-deterministic, by definition.
Revised conclusion: We have as much free will as our particles.
Still no fate, though ;)
I think a better definition would be "the thing that makes people responsible for their choices." The really hard problem of free will is explaining how on earth people could be responsible for their actions if these actions aren't freely chosen. (Or of explaining what it means for something to be freely chosen if they are indeed freely chosen.) The issue of determinism vs. non-determinism is a complete red herring, IMHO. A belief in free will is not just a belief in non-determinism, or a rejection of physicalism.
You can stop thinking in terms of "responsibility" and start thinking in terms of "incentives." i.e. you can still send a criminal to jail even though they didn't decide to be a criminal, if jail time is more likely to discourage other criminals.
If you don't have free will, you still respond to stimuli. So instead of punishing someone for willful action, you subject them to stimuli.
If you don't have free will, you still respond to stimuli. So instead of punishing someone for willful action, you subject them to stimuli.
But I don't want to stop thinking in terms of responsibility.
I just can't view other people as black boxes who "respond to stimuli", because that's incompatible with any kind of moral or human outlook on the world. After all, I don't think of myself as a black box who responds to stimuli. And how can I be a truly moral person if I think others are fundamentally different from me?
I just can't view other people as black boxes who "respond to stimuli", because that's incompatible with any kind of moral or human outlook on the world. After all, I don't think of myself as a black box who responds to stimuli. And how can I be a truly moral person if I think others are fundamentally different from me?
Byrneseyeview is presenting an overly simplistic view. It's true that we do respond to stimuli, but fortunately we don't respond only to stimuli but also to our internal states (thoughts, feelings, memories, and even moral judgments). As a result, I don't think that physicalism is incompatible with morality (even if it is incompatible with free will) because you can still interpret someone's actions in the context of their mental state--just like the legal system currently does.
Byrneseyeview is presenting an overly simplistic view. It is true that we respond to stimuli, but fortunately we don't respond only to stimuli but also to our internal states (thoughts, feelings, memories, and yes even moral judgments). As a result, I don't think that physicalism is incompatible with morality (even if it is incompatible with traditional concepts of free will) because you can still interpret someone's actions in the context of their mental state--just like the legal system currently does.
It doesn't really change the issue, as far as I can see. I don't think of myself as being nothing more than a very complex machine. The fact that people have mental states doesn't imply that they're responsible for the outcomes of the interaction of those states with the outside world.
Sorry for the double post above. I was replying right as noprocrast kicked and was not able to delete the extra one :-\
I have a couple responses regarding complex machines and responsibility. Firstly, as to whether or not we are complex machines, the fact that you don't want to think of yourself as a black box or a very complex machine is somewhat tangential to the issue. If we both agree that there is some sort of objective reality outside of ourselves than either we are complex machines (materialism) or not (dualism? please forgive me if I am putting words in your mouth) and the way we feel about it does not change that fact (whatever it actually is). My point here is just to be cautious about accepting or rejecting a hypothesis just because of the way it feels.
But as for responsibility, even if we were to suppose that we were "merely" complex machines, I see no reason why we cannot still be pragmatic and assign responsibility based on the ways people act, and what their states were that led up to their actions. Contemplating root causes beyond that level is problematic no matter how you view the universe--is there a devil that causes one to sin or does it depend on the initial state of the universe?
In my personal opinion, the only domains that materialism remains poor at explaining are free will and qualia. For free will I can hand-wave and assert that free will is an illusion which our brain provides us with because it has some sort of evolutionary advantage, perhaps in helping us decipher when actions arise from within the individual or from within the environment. For qualia I yet have no explanation. :)
I have a couple responses regarding complex machines and responsibility. Firstly, as to whether or not we are complex machines, the fact that you don't want to think of yourself as a black box or a very complex machine is somewhat tangential to the issue. If we both agree that there is some sort of objective reality outside of ourselves than either we are complex machines (materialism) or not (dualism? please forgive me if I am putting words in your mouth) and the way we feel about it does not change that fact (whatever it actually is). My point here is just to be cautious about accepting or rejecting a hypothesis just because of the way it feels.
But as for responsibility, even if we were to suppose that we were "merely" complex machines, I see no reason why we cannot still be pragmatic and assign responsibility based on the ways people act, and what their states were that led up to their actions. Contemplating root causes beyond that level is problematic no matter how you view the universe--is there a devil that causes one to sin or does it depend on the initial state of the universe?
In my personal opinion, the only domains that materialism remains poor at explaining are free will and qualia. For free will I can hand-wave and assert that free will is an illusion which our brain provides us with because it has some sort of evolutionary advantage, perhaps in helping us decipher when actions arise from within the individual or from within the environment. For qualia I yet have no explanation. :)
> I see no reason why we cannot still be pragmatic and assign responsibility based on the ways people act, and what their states were that led up to their actions
We can do that, but it's arguably treating people as means rather than ends. As I said, I don't view myself as merely a bundle of state, and it therefore seems somewhat immoral to treat others as if they were just bundles of state. It's kind of fundamental to a moral view of the world to believe that you are no more or less a person than any other person. So unless I can really persuade myself that I myself am just an automaton of some sort, I'm not sure I can deny free will and nonetheless maintain a satisfactory moral outlook.
We can do that, but it's arguably treating people as means rather than ends. As I said, I don't view myself as merely a bundle of state, and it therefore seems somewhat immoral to treat others as if they were just bundles of state. It's kind of fundamental to a moral view of the world to believe that you are no more or less a person than any other person. So unless I can really persuade myself that I myself am just an automaton of some sort, I'm not sure I can deny free will and nonetheless maintain a satisfactory moral outlook.
It's kind of fundamental to a moral view of the world to believe that you are no more or less a person than any other person.
It would definitely be weird for one to have free will and everyone else not to, and I am certainly not making that claim. However, if you believe that one can behave morally with respect to dolphins, cockroaches or the environment--and most people would agree that some or all of the members of that set are mere bundles of state and/or lack free will--then it seems that one should be able to act morally with respect to a bundle of state person, too.
It would definitely be weird for one to have free will and everyone else not to, and I am certainly not making that claim. However, if you believe that one can behave morally with respect to dolphins, cockroaches or the environment--and most people would agree that some or all of the members of that set are mere bundles of state and/or lack free will--then it seems that one should be able to act morally with respect to a bundle of state person, too.
Does anyone here not experience qualia? What is that like?
The thing that I do that feels like "free will" is use adaptive heuristic problem solving to explore an imperfectly mapped problem/solution space while attempting to maximize value fulfillment payoff.
Why would that feel like free will? Wouldn't it just feel like using adaptive heuristic problem solving to explore an imperfectly mapped problem/solution space while attempting to maximize value fulfillment payoff?
It's of course logically possible that doing that could make someone feel like they had free will, but it seems a rather odd idea.
It's of course logically possible that doing that could make someone feel like they had free will, but it seems a rather odd idea.
Because the choice resulting from problem solving is adaptive and heuristic, I can't run it advance of the evidential state I'm in when I choose. I can't know the evidential state in advance, because the problem/solution space is imperfectly mapped. So it feels like my choices are not determined in advance. (However they're entirely determined at the instant I make them.)
I'm confused by the "because" in the first sentence and the "so" in the penultimate. I see no reason why the one thing should cause the other. As I say, it's logically possibly that there could be such a causal relation, but in general there's no reason to think that doing X should feel like doing Y -- you'd expect it to feel like doing X! If I don't know what my choice will be, I'd expect that to feel like not knowing what my choice will be. Which is a distinct state from feeling that I have freedom of choice.
In fact if you use your imagination, you can come up with scenarios in which you don't know what your future choice will be, but it clearly doesn't feel like a free choice. E.g. if you say "I will choose to get a coffee if I roll the die and the number is 3 or above, or a tea otherwise."
In fact if you use your imagination, you can come up with scenarios in which you don't know what your future choice will be, but it clearly doesn't feel like a free choice. E.g. if you say "I will choose to get a coffee if I roll the die and the number is 3 or above, or a tea otherwise."
Did you misread? That "because" is an internal connective inside the first sentence only. (I'd rephrase, but I'm not sure what would be clearer.)
The part explaining the causal relationship is the penultimate sentence, "it feels like my choices are not determined in advance".
"If I don't know what my choice will be, I'd expect that to feel like not knowing what my choice will be."
You expect to know what your choice will be only when you choose it. That equals the feeling of "freedom of choice".
The part explaining the causal relationship is the penultimate sentence, "it feels like my choices are not determined in advance".
"If I don't know what my choice will be, I'd expect that to feel like not knowing what my choice will be."
You expect to know what your choice will be only when you choose it. That equals the feeling of "freedom of choice".
My mistake regarding because. Yes, I was talking about the causal relationship in the penultimate sentence only.
>The part explaining the causal relationship is the penultimate sentence
It doesn't explain it, it just asserts it. There is no reason why a lack of foreknowledge about your future decisions should make you feel as if you have free choice. It could just as well make you feel like you're bobbing around at random in the causal flux.
>The part explaining the causal relationship is the penultimate sentence
It doesn't explain it, it just asserts it. There is no reason why a lack of foreknowledge about your future decisions should make you feel as if you have free choice. It could just as well make you feel like you're bobbing around at random in the causal flux.
Splitting the phrase/concept "free choice" into "free" and "choice", I have been mostly talking about the "free", because it describes the feeling that a choice "might be anything and I won't know until I've made it". Above, you are more concerned with whether it's a "choice" (versus "bobbing around at random") - but you know implicitly the mechanism is adaptive and heuristic and that it attempts to maximize value fulfillment payoff. So it will make a "choice" (defined in this context as a purposeful decision). Therefore, free choice.
I don't think your analysis of "free choice" captures the relevant meaning. You can't answer these sorts of questions by playing with words. You need to think about the phenomenon that is being referred to, not the phrase I used to describe it.
>but you know implicitly the mechanism is adaptive and heuristic and that it attempts to maximize value fulfillment payoff
Actually, I'm not sure that I know any of those things (it might help if one of those terms actually meant something).
>but you know implicitly the mechanism is adaptive and heuristic and that it attempts to maximize value fulfillment payoff
Actually, I'm not sure that I know any of those things (it might help if one of those terms actually meant something).
"I don't think your analysis of "free choice" captures the relevant meaning."
Can you tell me why you think it doesn't? You think I was playing word games. I think I was cleanly picking a concept apart into fundamentals and relating my definition to each piece.
I assert that free choice means
1. you make purposeful choices
2. your choices don't feel like they are definite until you choose them
and that I have sufficiently shown why each of these relates to the definition I gave.
"it might help if one of those terms actually meant something"
They are all very clear AI terminology except value fulfilment, which should be self evident.
Can you tell me why you think it doesn't? You think I was playing word games. I think I was cleanly picking a concept apart into fundamentals and relating my definition to each piece.
I assert that free choice means
1. you make purposeful choices
2. your choices don't feel like they are definite until you choose them
and that I have sufficiently shown why each of these relates to the definition I gave.
"it might help if one of those terms actually meant something"
They are all very clear AI terminology except value fulfilment, which should be self evident.
>I think I was cleanly picking a concept apart into fundamentals and relating my definition to each piece.
You were picking a particular stipulated definition apart, but the definition in question doesn't correspond to the concept of "free will" or "free choice" that people actually have. Playing around with definitions like this doesn't address any important issue.
Tthere is no sense in which (1) and (2) explain our sense of freedom of choice. You can perfectly well imagine that even if both (1) and (2) were true, you might nonetheless have no sense of free will. Even if you don't know what you future decisions will be, you can still feel like a "cog in the machine" with no power to act of your own volition. In fact, I sometimes really do feel like this. For example, if you've ever been extremely angry, you've probably had the feeling of not knowing exactly what you're going to do next, but nonetheless feeling that you have very little control over your actions.
>They are all very clear AI terminology except value fulfilment, which should be self evident.
Really? If I google for "value fulfillment payoff", the only result is a link to these posts. I'm know what the individual words mean, but I find the phrase a little baffling.
You were picking a particular stipulated definition apart, but the definition in question doesn't correspond to the concept of "free will" or "free choice" that people actually have. Playing around with definitions like this doesn't address any important issue.
Tthere is no sense in which (1) and (2) explain our sense of freedom of choice. You can perfectly well imagine that even if both (1) and (2) were true, you might nonetheless have no sense of free will. Even if you don't know what you future decisions will be, you can still feel like a "cog in the machine" with no power to act of your own volition. In fact, I sometimes really do feel like this. For example, if you've ever been extremely angry, you've probably had the feeling of not knowing exactly what you're going to do next, but nonetheless feeling that you have very little control over your actions.
>They are all very clear AI terminology except value fulfilment, which should be self evident.
Really? If I google for "value fulfillment payoff", the only result is a link to these posts. I'm know what the individual words mean, but I find the phrase a little baffling.
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If a scientist tells you something doesn't exist, remind them of the problem of induction.
If you hold a prior belief that the physical world is all there is (or that physical explanations are the only valid explanations, which the physical sciences take as their starting point), you can come up with endless circular rationalizations of materialism.
If you hold a prior belief that the physical world is all there is (or that physical explanations are the only valid explanations, which the physical sciences take as their starting point), you can come up with endless circular rationalizations of materialism.
"It doesn't exist" is a shorthand for "There is insufficient evidence for it or against it, and it has minimal explanatory power, and it's not amenable to proof or disproof, so your life will be simpler if you assume it doesn't exist."
This, at least, is the attitude that many people have to ghosts, gods, and werewolves.
This, at least, is the attitude that many people have to ghosts, gods, and werewolves.
Your argument is still circular. What do you think proof and disproof mean in this context? Why don't you think that materialism suffers from the same flaws?
This is why scientists make bad philosophers. They do not acknowledge the boundaries of their philosophy.
This is why scientists make bad philosophers. They do not acknowledge the boundaries of their philosophy.
This is the difference between science and scientism.
Science is an extremely powerful and well-proven set of tools for learning about the natural world. Scientism is a crock of baloney.
Science is an extremely powerful and well-proven set of tools for learning about the natural world. Scientism is a crock of baloney.
I always thought that "it doesn't exist" means "we have a test which would prove that it does exist, and it has failed that test." If "it doesn't exist" means "I can't prove it either way and I don't think it matters," what category is left for phlogiston?
Does something have to be physical to be real? It seems like no to me. What is a "movie" but pixels on a screen flashing in a certain order, or a song but a series of sounds. But these patterns, or forms have predictable effects on the material world--the sound of a fire alarm will change the position of people around it. If these patterns exist apart from the physical world--their implementations in some sense, then why does free will need a physical basis? Couldn't it be a property that exceeds the sum of parts?
My favorite thinking on this comes from Pratt:
http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech
My favorite line in the paper, cogito ergo sum should be cogito ergo eram :)
It's all Chu spaces -- enjoy!
http://chu.stanford.edu/guide.html#ratmech
My favorite line in the paper, cogito ergo sum should be cogito ergo eram :)
It's all Chu spaces -- enjoy!
Free will is an algorithm, nothing more or less. Input genetics and experience, output decision and behavior.
What's more, your beliefs about free will get integrated into the algorithm as well; someone who believes that they are not responsible for their actions will behave quite differently than someone who believes they are capable of choosing. Like many human ideas, free will is a necessary (or at least, useful) illusion.
What's more, your beliefs about free will get integrated into the algorithm as well; someone who believes that they are not responsible for their actions will behave quite differently than someone who believes they are capable of choosing. Like many human ideas, free will is a necessary (or at least, useful) illusion.
It depends on how you define "free will".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism
To determine if I have free will, I shall now attempt to willfully raise my arm. Raises arm. I don't know, that's pretty hard evidence to refute.
You've probably evolved to avoid asking too many boring existential questions when you could be breeding, instead. You probably have no choice but to trick yourself into trivially proving that you have free will.
You've probably evolved to produce offensive body odors and to fear social interactions with your own species. You probably have no choice but to trick yourself into thinking you are good at trivial reading comprehension.
And yet the nerve impulses which caused the muscles in your arm to contract left your brain about 500ms before you became aware of deciding to raise your arm. (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/6640273) Additionally, the mechanisms which sent that nerve impulse were spinning up for up to 10s before that (http://www.nature.com/neuro/journal/v11/n5/abs/nn.2112.html).
The you that lifts your arm and the you which feels like it decided to lift your arm are on different schedules.
The you that lifts your arm and the you which feels like it decided to lift your arm are on different schedules.
I'm guilty of only scanning the article, so I could have missed something, but I expected from the title "biologist says" to find some empirical evidence. Instead I got just another philosophizing speculative article.
You would think the belief in free will, or its absence, becomes a feedback mechanism in human behavior. How many different ways can that seed be planted? Why does the belief/disbelief amplitude vary among individuals? Is the belief/disbelief meme just another meme that's been around a long time, and affects us far less than we believe? I once knew a successful Indian woman who completely believed in fate, which surprised me because with all her energy and drive I thought she was living her life as a free willer.
You would think the belief in free will, or its absence, becomes a feedback mechanism in human behavior. How many different ways can that seed be planted? Why does the belief/disbelief amplitude vary among individuals? Is the belief/disbelief meme just another meme that's been around a long time, and affects us far less than we believe? I once knew a successful Indian woman who completely believed in fate, which surprised me because with all her energy and drive I thought she was living her life as a free willer.
Let's assume free will does not exist. It follows then, that you should theoretically be able to perfectly predict the actions of a human given enough information about their current chemical & physical state.
I have never seen evidence of such a machine, so I don't think you can prove it either way. I like to believe whichever theory seems to benefit me most at the time.
I have never seen evidence of such a machine, so I don't think you can prove it either way. I like to believe whichever theory seems to benefit me most at the time.
I volunteer myself as such a machine, though I won't say I can perfectly predict the actions of another human and many others are better than I am. Nevertheless I find I can make pretty good estimates from time to time depending on information.
I'm curious about your "I like to believe" stance. Are you saying you'll ignore any evidence for any theory if you don't think the theory benefits you more than another theory, even if your theory has been shown to be wrong?
I'm curious about your "I like to believe" stance. Are you saying you'll ignore any evidence for any theory if you don't think the theory benefits you more than another theory, even if your theory has been shown to be wrong?
Take heart entrepreneurs, John Calvin had this idea almost 500 years ago when he introduced Calvinism.
There are no new ideas, just new implementations.
There are no new ideas, just new implementations.
Free will is a little like Hume's idea of miracles. Which is more likely: that physical entities created from (roughly) deterministic processes would develop free will, or that it would be a valuable evolutionary adaptation for them to think they had free will, and to narrate their lives as if they did?
Free will doesn't really matter. Only an illusion of free will matters. You give me an illusion of free will, I'm fine with that. But if you take away any perception I have that I'm making choices, I won't like it.
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I love how 'conscious thought' goes into a little circle like it's a solved problem. Same with 'unconscious thought'.
I'm not exactly sure how relevant this is the the free will conversation, but it's related and something I think about on a regular basis.
When I see a person who grew up in a wonderful environment with presumably good genetics, judge and condemn someone who did not, I wonder how they justify their superiority. It's as if they believe that, if they were that person, they would make better choices and do better things with their life. My question is, if you were that person, with exactly the same genetics and environment, then wouldn't you, by definition, BE that person and live your life in exactly the same way?
I suspect their answer would eventually come down to something about a "soul" which, even if it exists, would still be something that you were born with and thus completely out of your control. So, again, I would ask how they deserve their superiority, especially if they don't go for the soul argument.
I can then imagine some of them going for the "I deserve it because I was so awesome in my past-life.", which also doesn't hold up because it's a circular argument. So, again, how can they justify their superiority?
I'd say it's just luck, but I can see some people using that as an excuse to never do the right thing. "I was born this way so that's how I'm going to be." I could probably argue with myself for hours about this kind of stuff.
When I see a person who grew up in a wonderful environment with presumably good genetics, judge and condemn someone who did not, I wonder how they justify their superiority. It's as if they believe that, if they were that person, they would make better choices and do better things with their life. My question is, if you were that person, with exactly the same genetics and environment, then wouldn't you, by definition, BE that person and live your life in exactly the same way?
I suspect their answer would eventually come down to something about a "soul" which, even if it exists, would still be something that you were born with and thus completely out of your control. So, again, I would ask how they deserve their superiority, especially if they don't go for the soul argument.
I can then imagine some of them going for the "I deserve it because I was so awesome in my past-life.", which also doesn't hold up because it's a circular argument. So, again, how can they justify their superiority?
I'd say it's just luck, but I can see some people using that as an excuse to never do the right thing. "I was born this way so that's how I'm going to be." I could probably argue with myself for hours about this kind of stuff.
"I can then imagine some of them going for the "I deserve it because I was so awesome in my past-life.", which also doesn't hold up because it's a circular argument. So, again, how can they justify their superiority?"
I'd personally go with "I deserve it because I was so awesome in this life."
I'd personally go with "I deserve it because I was so awesome in this life."
"Free will" is a philosophical issue, not a biological one. It's somewhat comical that a neurobiologist thinks he has something relevant to say on the subject.
Would anyone take seriously an article like "Phagocytosis is a myth, philosopher says"?
Would anyone take seriously an article like "Phagocytosis is a myth, philosopher says"?
Yeah, it's not like philosophy should update itself based on science, pfft!
See also this story of a biologist thinking that even fruit flies have free will: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1532077920070516
True story: I major decision early in my life by flipping a coin.
Now whether or not I was programmed by the universe to make that decision that way or not, from the outside there is no way a universal observer could determine what eventual choice I would make. It easily passes the duck test as being free will.
Now whether or not I was programmed by the universe to make that decision that way or not, from the outside there is no way a universal observer could determine what eventual choice I would make. It easily passes the duck test as being free will.
Determinism = age-old philosophical stance. Nothing new here.
As programmers we have to understand how we can program something to seem incredibly intelligent. If we had access to time and resources that universe "contributed" to us - we may be able to come up with the type of program that looks, acts, learns, emotionally reacts 100% like a normal human being. Even currently we can get pretty far using image recognition, sound recognition, learning algorithms and fast-lookup data structures. The question of free will is - at which exact point in developing those data structures and algorithms the program gains an illusion of controlling its own actions? Moreover — how can you verify that it did?
What the article essentially says is that our brain is nothing but a CPU, programmed over millions of years by natural evolution in a way that it gained all kinds of responses to multitude of various inputs (our 5 senses) in all kinds of combinations, self-improving learning algorithm, and that illusion of consciousness emerged as a by-product of this complex system. Pretty interesting what exact data-structure/algorithm/etc caused this peculiar side effect.
It could have something todo with the observation that our brain doesn't need to be whole in order to have consciousness. In different types of physical brain damage, even major ones, a human was able to remain conscious. Same could happen with the other part of brain damaged, which was healthy in another example. So I'm thinking - maybe our the sense of conscoiousness is like a potential difference which makes electrical current flow through the wire - you need to have multiple parts of brain with potential difference to create an illusion of consciousness. This is pretty vague but I like this concept - may be onto something. Consciousness does feel a lot like different parts of brain interacting, or one part /observing/ another and reacting to it just like it'd be reacting to the outside world.
Meh.
What the article essentially says is that our brain is nothing but a CPU, programmed over millions of years by natural evolution in a way that it gained all kinds of responses to multitude of various inputs (our 5 senses) in all kinds of combinations, self-improving learning algorithm, and that illusion of consciousness emerged as a by-product of this complex system. Pretty interesting what exact data-structure/algorithm/etc caused this peculiar side effect.
It could have something todo with the observation that our brain doesn't need to be whole in order to have consciousness. In different types of physical brain damage, even major ones, a human was able to remain conscious. Same could happen with the other part of brain damaged, which was healthy in another example. So I'm thinking - maybe our the sense of conscoiousness is like a potential difference which makes electrical current flow through the wire - you need to have multiple parts of brain with potential difference to create an illusion of consciousness. This is pretty vague but I like this concept - may be onto something. Consciousness does feel a lot like different parts of brain interacting, or one part /observing/ another and reacting to it just like it'd be reacting to the outside world.
Meh.
I discovered this video a few months ago researching for an essay; it's a great source on this topic.
http://www.ucsd.tv/search-details.aspx?showID=11190
http://www.ucsd.tv/search-details.aspx?showID=11190