Besides the JVM part, this is my take on it: as a language, Racket defines a vast possibility space, which is a superset of that defined with Clojure. You could implement Clojure (barring the JVM) quite naturally in Racket, while the other way around would be impractical. Now, Clojure is a pretty sweet spot in that design space, and someone else has done the immense work to carve it out, define it, implement it, and foster a sizable community around it.
And sometimes I can do fine with no wrapper at all. Not only there's a lot of JVM code available, but interfacing with it is pretty quick, straightforward and smooth compared to wrapping C (or, god forbid, C++) from any Scheme I tried. I found that's very important. You can have lots of code theoretically available for wrapping, but there's more of an impedance mismatch between C and Scheme (think continuations/TCO, garbage collection, type conversion, and the fact that some tools in Racket/Scheme ecosystems will be blind to what happens in C land) so in practice it's a lot more work.
Echoing back the verb is a common way to reply affirmatively in Portuguese and (traditional) Galician. I hear that was common in Latin too. For some old Galician people, replying "yes" to a question is comprehensible but a mark of rudeness.
I remember no big changes, nor any breaking changes, from Python 1.5.2 to Python 2. The major version bump was mostly a marketing move. At that time, a 1.x.y version number didn't look mature enough for some companies.
Could you elaborate on Varoufakis' confrontational manners? I think you may be misattributing to Varoufakis some moves by other actors in the Greek government.
As for high stakes... well, the stakes for someone coming into the finance ministry of Greece in this Europe are huge no matter how you look at it.
FWIW, @barbijaputa is a contraction for "Barbie hija puta", which would be literally translated as "Barbie, daughter of a whore", although it's best understood as "Barbie the bastard". See her profile pic:
A non-difference is that most of those loans went to service old loans anyway. And the main reason Greece can't get loans on the markets is because its current debt is obviously unsustainable and its position as a deficit country in a badly designed monetary union is hopeless.
I'm not disagreeing categorically, but I don't think it's that one-sided.
I was (i) considering the cascading effect of a Greek exit from the Euro, and (ii) thinking in relative terms: I'm not arguing that Germany will be worse off, but perhaps it has more to lose at this point.
I'm aware that this article describes the dynamics of countries going to the receiving side of EFSF, not of countries leaving the Euro altogether, but I think the perverse dynamics described apply to the latter too.
Relying heavily on exports, as Germany does, may mean you have more to lose in a crisis like this. Consider what happens after a few more European countries stop generating demand for German goods, at the same time that demand from the US is weak too. Demand from the rest of EU and from the US was a big part of what made Germany 'a country like Germany'.
Yes, imports would be unaffordable for Greece with the new currency and that will generate a lot of pain (not that devoting a big share of the national budget to servicing debt is helping a lot), but that will also force the country to correct that imbalance, making what's left of local industry more competitive. That pain would be a price to pay for adapting to a more self-reliant setup, while the one currently being endured (mostly on ideological grounds, I claim) seems more pointless.
Re: tourism, having their own currency to devaluate might help with that.
Re: standard of living, it's not like Greece's current situation, and their prospects within the demands of the memorandum are rosy either.
Corruption and nepotism won't help, but they aren't helping within the Euro either. If anything, those problems are made worse in colonial economies, which the deficit countries in Europe have been, for good and ill, to a large extent.
All in all, a Greek exit from the eurozone is a big lose-big lose proposition for anyone. I don't think it matters a whole lot who stands to lose more. But to the extent that it matters, I think it must be considered in relative terms. Overall, Germany has a better deal in the Eurozone than Greece, and it has more to lose.