that said, I don't expect to see any of these attacks in the wild. they're primarily demonstrations of the technique and to show that the channel is there
as is often the case with side-channel attacks, a serious attacker would much more likely go for un-/recently patched traditional vulnerabilities
It's always hard to communicate fairly academic side channels in a way that the audience of a press-release (which is typically anyone) can get any level of detail.
We tried to walk the line between enough information and not overwhelming, but it doesn't always work out :D
Luckily there's always the paper.
short version: only the lower bits of an address are compared at first, because the rest might take a while to resolve
so the cpu can speculate that the rest is gonna match as well and start to work with the data, and then either keep it or throw it away once the rest of the address is known
it affects all loads, but for sgx the attacker scenario is that you have compromised the OS, which makes it significantly easier to create the conditions (faults/microcode assists) that cause the LVI than if you were just another userspace program (but it's not impossible there either)
the inclusivity types don't really play a role in these types of attack (until you get to a very practical stage where this might matter), not least because there are other sidechannels that can be exploited.
an inclusive llc is just convenient.
that said, some newer Intel LLCs are non-inclusive, and amd changed its cache relations as well in ryzen
I guess you could call it an evolution, because memory deduplication is not always enabled anymore (research like this might have played a role here ;)
that said, I don't expect to see any of these attacks in the wild. they're primarily demonstrations of the technique and to show that the channel is there
as is often the case with side-channel attacks, a serious attacker would much more likely go for un-/recently patched traditional vulnerabilities