I disagree with the claim that harm to the U.S. IPO market was "not the intention" of the "people who wrote" Sarbanes-Oxley.
I have two pieces of evidence.
First, it was well-known and easy to see that Sarbanes-Oxley would be extremely expensive. It was well-known when passed that its costs fall disproportionately on small public companies. Because IPOs by definition are small public companies, the costs fall disproportionately on them. Thus, it must have been known when enacted that the bill would harm IPOs.
Second, suppose in fact it is the case, as Graham seems to advocate, that Congress "inadvertently" harmed IPOs. His argument is that Congress just accidently happened to overlook the harm of the bill to IPOs. In that case, when the harm to IPOs became factually clear, the bill would have been changed or amended. The fact that the law was not amended even after the harm to IPOs became clear proves that it was Congress' intention all along to harm small public companies (the companies most dangerous to the large corporations who have the most lobbying pull).
I have two pieces of evidence.
First, it was well-known and easy to see that Sarbanes-Oxley would be extremely expensive. It was well-known when passed that its costs fall disproportionately on small public companies. Because IPOs by definition are small public companies, the costs fall disproportionately on them. Thus, it must have been known when enacted that the bill would harm IPOs.
Second, suppose in fact it is the case, as Graham seems to advocate, that Congress "inadvertently" harmed IPOs. His argument is that Congress just accidently happened to overlook the harm of the bill to IPOs. In that case, when the harm to IPOs became factually clear, the bill would have been changed or amended. The fact that the law was not amended even after the harm to IPOs became clear proves that it was Congress' intention all along to harm small public companies (the companies most dangerous to the large corporations who have the most lobbying pull).