> "When accomplished at 1.4 Mach or greater (as required per the SpaceShipTwo checklist procedures and the PF-04 test card) the feather system remained retracted due to a sufficient closing pre-load from the feather actuators and favorable, tail-down aerodynamic loads."
> "On normal rocket-powered flights, checklist procedures called for this step to occur after rocket motor burn out while in space just prior to apogee."
I still haven't seen any information on exactly why this particular flight test card called for actuating the feather mechanism at some time other than apogee. Were they trying to test the flying qualities while feathered at a particular dynamic pressure? It doesn't make any sense for the copilot to move the unlock lever while the aircraft was still accelerating unless the test card called for it. And if it did, then did the engineers and test planners fail to take this possible failure mode into account before the flight?
Your comments about modern air-to-air missiles may be correct, but in 1968, the beyond-visual-range (BVR) engagement was more of a bomber general's fantasy than a reality. Kill probability of the AIM-7 Sparrow missile in those days was less than 10% [1].
Pilots' accounts of air combat in Vietnam routinely mention the firing of a salvo of missiles --rather than just one-- when a firing solution presented itself, due to the notorious unreliability of missiles.
Instead of asking ourselves which particular jobs are "bullshit" and which are not, maybe we should ask why we need or want "jobs" at all. If every citizen received some minimum universal basic income, what might we do with our time instead of going to jobs we hate?
I think the point might be that we've reached a state of technological progress where many of the functions of a modern civilization can be handled by a very few people. Maybe it's time to redefine what we mean by "work" and why we do it.
Here's a recent video from NASA's Armstrong Flight Research Center discussing the Automatic Collision Avoidance Technology and the DROID UAV platform specifically.
I agree completely with the laser-pointer analogy, and I think UAV operators who make "stupid flights" will eventually suffer similar federal penalties to the laser operators.
I wouldn't say I "blame" the UAV community at all, because, as you say, there are always outliers who can't/won't be educated.
But since I imagine the UAV forum-readers and would-be professional operators are interested in keeping government oversight out of their industry as much as possible, I'd say it's their responsibility to take action on this matter, much like the EAA and AOPA do with personal aircraft.
And I think this simple ignorance illustrates the looming problem for the UAV community. As a commercial pilot and experimental aircraft owner, I can tell you that if the UAV community does not start to self-police these types of excursions, either by education or with software solutions (like the GPS-limiter mentioned in the article), then the regulating bodies will do it for them.
Most HN readers would agree that there is huge potential for UAV technology, but one needs only to look at the glacial progress of certified aviation technology in both the US and Europe to see that over-regulation can and does stifle innovation.
For readers familiar with the differing regulations in the US for experimental category amateur-built aircraft vs. certified light aircraft, you've seen the wide gap between what is possible to do with technology and what is legal to certify. In most cases, an aircraft built in your garage is far superior in display and sensor technology than your average certified airplane. This trend has only recently started to self-correct.
The point is, US organizations such as the EAA and AOPA do a tremendous amount of work to educate their members and to lobby Congress to ensure that what limited freedoms we have are maintained. I think the UAV community needs something similar or their industry will get regulated to death -- especially after the first drone gets ingested into a jet engine.
The best thing one can say about the F-35 is something akin to what rocket designer Robert Truax once said about the Space Shuttle, that it "represents a truly marvelous implementation of an absolutely absurd concept."
If you've read the "Boyd" biography mentioned here by other commenters, you'll recognize many of Boyd's and Sprey's criticisms of the so-called "F-X" fighter procurement program (which eventually led to the F-15) in his critique of the F-35. [1]
None of the Fighter Mafia actually "designed" any of these aircraft, but Boyd, Sprey, Christie and others did play a pivotal role in changing how the Pentagon defined and proved the specifications of the fighters it was buying. The F-X was supposed to be a larger, swing-wing, multi-role behemoth, similar to the abysmal F-111, which Boyd proved to Pentagon brass to be inferior to virtually all enemy fighters, by way of his brilliant "Energy-Maneuverability" theory. In this way, Boyd and Sprey influenced the final design of the F-15, but to a much lesser extent than the designs of the F-16 or A-10. [2]
One key point Sprey brings up in several of his other interviews on the F-35 topic (which he curiously leaves out of this one) is that, regardless of the capabilities (or lack thereof) of the F-22 or F-35, neither will ever be as successful as the historically-great fighters like the P-51, F-4, F-15, or F-16, simply because they'll never be built in sufficient numbers.
For a fighter to be great, its pilots must also be great, and to do that they must train regularly and often, something which has proven impossible with the low dispatch reliability of these complex fifth-gen fighters. Sprey notes that in WWII, the U.S. P-51 fleet triumphed over the vastly superior German fleet of ME-262s, by first developing tactics that could defeat this amazing jet (i.e., shooting them down while taking off or landing), and because there were simply more P-51s available to fight.
Sprey and Boyd were right about a few things: build them light (which helps make them fast and maneuverable), build them cheap, and build lots of them.
Actually, portions of the SR-71 skin were corrugated, much like the older (and much slower) Ford Tri-Motor, because the high temperatures of Mach 3+ flight caused the skin to expand and contract dramatically throughout the flight profile. This corrugation was actually against the wishes of the aerodynamicists, who would have preferred a smooth surface.