A re-instatement of Glass-Steagall(market-ticker.org)
market-ticker.org
A re-instatement of Glass-Steagall
http://market-ticker.org/archives/1710-Now-Were-Talking!-Glass-Steagall.html
5 comments
I know it is such a great thing that we have all these large financial institutions. You know because they are so large they become too large to fail, and then we get to subsidise them with out tax dollars. Who would want to end that?
If there's one thing the financial crisis has taught everyone, it's that we need less humility in the face of world-spanning systems no one person can possibly understand.
Sarcasm is definitely the way to go if you want to foster a productive debate.
Sarcasm is definitely the way to go if you want to foster a productive debate.
Too large to fail has always been bullshit; it really has no bearing on this. They got a handout, let's not pretend it was justified.
i seems like your beef with these companies is that we're subsidizing them.
so is the problem the institutions that are asking for money? or our politicians that are giving them money?
so is the problem the institutions that are asking for money? or our politicians that are giving them money?
Well, the institutions can hold the world economy to ransom, so not giving them money would be cutting off our nose to spite ourselves.
Better not to have such powerful and important banks.
Better not to have such powerful and important banks.
From the article: ...will prevent the economic meltdown we are in the middle of from ever happening again..by making it impossible for those banks with access to the sovereign's fractional reserve privilege to speculate with it.
The author doesn't seem to realize that Glass-Steagall won't prevent commercial banks from making bad home loans.
From the article: Lending went to finance productive assets (e.g. factories, machines, tractors, combines, etc) instead of financial speculation as it had in the 1920s.
Instead of speculating in "finance", lending went to speculate in "productive assets" like equities and bonds.
Seriously, what is this tripe doing on HN?
The author doesn't seem to realize that Glass-Steagall won't prevent commercial banks from making bad home loans.
From the article: Lending went to finance productive assets (e.g. factories, machines, tractors, combines, etc) instead of financial speculation as it had in the 1920s.
Instead of speculating in "finance", lending went to speculate in "productive assets" like equities and bonds.
Seriously, what is this tripe doing on HN?
Glass-Steagall will definitely prevent what happened in the current housing crisis. The bubble happened because banks were lending money for homes but were not keeping the loans. Instead they were packaging the loans as securities and selling the securities to third party investors. Thus, the banks did not need to worry that the loans were good, they just needed to worry the loans looked ok to the rating agencies at the time of sale of the securities. The third party investors had no idea who the borrowers were or how trustworthy they were, they just trusted the rating agencies. And the rating agencies turned out to be either stupid or corrupt or both.
This would not have been possible with Glass-Steagall in force. Banks can still make loans but they could not securitize or sell the loans. They had to keep the loans on their books. This means the institutions and even individual people that made the loans would be responsible that they got paid back. Furthermore, all loans that are on the books would be regularly examined by banking examiners from the FDIC. When securitizing the loans, banks mostly avoided examination, on the grounds that they got their money for the loans so it does not matter much whether the loans perform or not.
Now it cannot be guaranteed that Glass-Steagall will prevent bubbles in general, but it is certain that what happened last time could not possibly happen with Glass Steagall in effect.
Regarding your second statement, I think you are confused about it again. When Glass Steagall was in effect regular commercial banks were rather limited as to the securities they could purchase. I believe they were allowed to make only 10 percent of their income from securities. They had to make most of their money by making loans directly to borrowers, instead of trading securities. That is what the article is referring to.
This would not have been possible with Glass-Steagall in force. Banks can still make loans but they could not securitize or sell the loans. They had to keep the loans on their books. This means the institutions and even individual people that made the loans would be responsible that they got paid back. Furthermore, all loans that are on the books would be regularly examined by banking examiners from the FDIC. When securitizing the loans, banks mostly avoided examination, on the grounds that they got their money for the loans so it does not matter much whether the loans perform or not.
Now it cannot be guaranteed that Glass-Steagall will prevent bubbles in general, but it is certain that what happened last time could not possibly happen with Glass Steagall in effect.
Regarding your second statement, I think you are confused about it again. When Glass Steagall was in effect regular commercial banks were rather limited as to the securities they could purchase. I believe they were allowed to make only 10 percent of their income from securities. They had to make most of their money by making loans directly to borrowers, instead of trading securities. That is what the article is referring to.
The bubble happened because banks were lending money for homes but were not keeping the loans....This would not have been possible with Glass-Steagall in force.
False. This happened all the time with Glass-Steagall in force. Glass Steagall was repealed in 1999, mortgage backed securities were issued and sold long before then. Many commercial banks traded MBS under Glass-Steagall as a way of reducing their risk; in fact regulatory bodies encouraged them to do this.
You are incorrectly conflating many activities, and assuming Glass-Steagall prevents all of them.
As for my second statement, I'm mocking the article's silly idea that investing in "productive assets" is somehow different from "financial speculation." I'm not making any claims about what percentage of their assets they would speculate with (either in the form of equities or bonds).
False. This happened all the time with Glass-Steagall in force. Glass Steagall was repealed in 1999, mortgage backed securities were issued and sold long before then. Many commercial banks traded MBS under Glass-Steagall as a way of reducing their risk; in fact regulatory bodies encouraged them to do this.
You are incorrectly conflating many activities, and assuming Glass-Steagall prevents all of them.
As for my second statement, I'm mocking the article's silly idea that investing in "productive assets" is somehow different from "financial speculation." I'm not making any claims about what percentage of their assets they would speculate with (either in the form of equities or bonds).
"False. This happened all the time with Glass-Steagall in force. Glass Steagall was repealed in 1999, mortgage backed securities were issued and sold long before then. Many commercial banks traded MBS under Glass-Steagall as a way of reducing their risk; in fact regulatory bodies encouraged them to do this."
We are really getting into details here. This was technically partially true, because Glass Steagall was being progressively watered down long before it was actually repealed. So commercial banks were allowed to underwrite some securities but again there were limits as to how much they could do. I think the limit started at 5% of revenue and then progressively expanded to 25% as GS was being further watered down. But I doubt banks would have been allowed to create the huge amounts of mortgage backed securities they did after the repeal, even in the most watered down version of GS. Also, when the original article argued for the reinstation of Glass Steagall they probably argued for it in its original non-watered down version.
As to your second statement, you said "Instead of speculating in "finance", lending went to speculate in "productive assets" like equities and bonds." To me this means that you misunderstood what the original article was trying to say. By productive assets the original article meant direct loans to businesses and individuals instead of financial instruments.
We are really getting into details here. This was technically partially true, because Glass Steagall was being progressively watered down long before it was actually repealed. So commercial banks were allowed to underwrite some securities but again there were limits as to how much they could do. I think the limit started at 5% of revenue and then progressively expanded to 25% as GS was being further watered down. But I doubt banks would have been allowed to create the huge amounts of mortgage backed securities they did after the repeal, even in the most watered down version of GS. Also, when the original article argued for the reinstation of Glass Steagall they probably argued for it in its original non-watered down version.
As to your second statement, you said "Instead of speculating in "finance", lending went to speculate in "productive assets" like equities and bonds." To me this means that you misunderstood what the original article was trying to say. By productive assets the original article meant direct loans to businesses and individuals instead of financial instruments.
Glass-Steagall prevented banks from running a trading desk, not from securitizing and selling their loans. You are simply mistaken as to what the law actually means.
By productive assets the original article meant direct loans to businesses and individuals instead of financial instruments.
A direct loan to a business is, by definition, speculating on a corporate bond.
By productive assets the original article meant direct loans to businesses and individuals instead of financial instruments.
A direct loan to a business is, by definition, speculating on a corporate bond.
Glass-Steagall will definitely prevent what happened in the current housing crisis. The bubble happened because banks were lending money for homes but were not keeping the loans. Instead they were packaging the loans as securities and selling the securities to third party investors. Thus, the banks did not need to worry that the loans were good, they just needed to worry the loans looked ok to the rating agencies at the time of sale of the securities. The third party investors had no idea who the borrowers were or how trustworthy they were, they just trusted the rating agencies. And the rating agencies turned out to be either stupid or corrupt or both.
That is how securities markets work. Exactly the same forces affect, say, the CEO who owns .1% of his company's outstanding stock. Not an ideal situation, but not one that should be banned.
I believe they were allowed to make only 10 percent of their income from securities. They had to make most of their money by making loans directly to borrowers, instead of trading securities. That is what the article is referring to.
You're probably talking about the time before S&L deregulation, when, at one point, savings and loans had an aggregate negative net worth because they could only make long-term loans (mortgages and treasuries) and thus got buried when rates went up. Despite our current problems, I don't believe the US's financial sector has had a negative net worth since then. It should be pretty compelling to you that despite higher leverage, intertwined derivatives, the disastrous market manipulations of Fannie and Freddie, etc., our less regulated system is still less of a disaster than what came before it.
That is how securities markets work. Exactly the same forces affect, say, the CEO who owns .1% of his company's outstanding stock. Not an ideal situation, but not one that should be banned.
I believe they were allowed to make only 10 percent of their income from securities. They had to make most of their money by making loans directly to borrowers, instead of trading securities. That is what the article is referring to.
You're probably talking about the time before S&L deregulation, when, at one point, savings and loans had an aggregate negative net worth because they could only make long-term loans (mortgages and treasuries) and thus got buried when rates went up. Despite our current problems, I don't believe the US's financial sector has had a negative net worth since then. It should be pretty compelling to you that despite higher leverage, intertwined derivatives, the disastrous market manipulations of Fannie and Freddie, etc., our less regulated system is still less of a disaster than what came before it.
"That is how securities markets work. Exactly the same forces affect, say, the CEO who owns .1% of his company's outstanding stock. Not an ideal situation, but not one that should be banned."
Ok that's how securities markets work. So what's your point? It is still the case that this would not have happened if Glass Steagall was in effect because it ensured that certain types of banks were simply not exposed to the securities markets. Oh and by the way Glass Steagall does not ban owning securities, it still allows other types of banks (investment banks) to own all the securities they want.
"You're probably talking about the time before S&L deregulation ... "
No I am not talking about the S&L deregulation, I am talking about the Glass-Steagall act. You know, the thing I said I was talking about. That whole paragraph is a rather confused straw man argument.
"The disastrous market manipulations of Fannie and Freddie." Huh? Another straw man argument.
Ok that's how securities markets work. So what's your point? It is still the case that this would not have happened if Glass Steagall was in effect because it ensured that certain types of banks were simply not exposed to the securities markets. Oh and by the way Glass Steagall does not ban owning securities, it still allows other types of banks (investment banks) to own all the securities they want.
"You're probably talking about the time before S&L deregulation ... "
No I am not talking about the S&L deregulation, I am talking about the Glass-Steagall act. You know, the thing I said I was talking about. That whole paragraph is a rather confused straw man argument.
"The disastrous market manipulations of Fannie and Freddie." Huh? Another straw man argument.
Ok that's how securities markets work. So what's your point?
That there are ways to deal with it? That we've been dealing with it for a couple centuries now? That agent-principal conflicts are well-understood? There are costs and benefits to separating ownership from control. One of the benefits is that talented people can manage established companies; you don't have to be a Goldman or a Sachs to run Goldman Sachs.
No I am not talking about the S&L deregulation
That portion of the comment was sarcastic. I was making fun of your assumption that a regulatory regime that rendered S&Ls insolvent was somehow superior to one that didn't render the (much more leveraged) investment banks insolvent.
"The disastrous market manipulations of Fannie and Freddie." Huh? Another straw man argument.
Surely guaranteeing trillions of dollars of tax-subsidized mortgage loans had nothing to do with the real estate bubble! It was those perfidious bankers!
That there are ways to deal with it? That we've been dealing with it for a couple centuries now? That agent-principal conflicts are well-understood? There are costs and benefits to separating ownership from control. One of the benefits is that talented people can manage established companies; you don't have to be a Goldman or a Sachs to run Goldman Sachs.
No I am not talking about the S&L deregulation
That portion of the comment was sarcastic. I was making fun of your assumption that a regulatory regime that rendered S&Ls insolvent was somehow superior to one that didn't render the (much more leveraged) investment banks insolvent.
"The disastrous market manipulations of Fannie and Freddie." Huh? Another straw man argument.
Surely guaranteeing trillions of dollars of tax-subsidized mortgage loans had nothing to do with the real estate bubble! It was those perfidious bankers!
This is all off topic, and does not have much to do with Glass Steagall at all. Glass Steagall did allow separation of ownership and control.
Right. I think your claim is that the repeal of Glass-Steagall created agent-principal conflicts: someone could make a loan, and underwrite debt to prop it up. This kind of conflict shows up all the time in business -- a classic example being the CEO who says that the company needs a generous executive compensation plan in order to retain talent, knowing that he'll benefit from it without paying for much of it at all.
Since Glass-Steagall restricted just a tiny subset of those conflicts, I'm wondering why you are so focused on it. If agent-principal conflicts need to be placed under government supervision, so be it -- but that's a much bigger issue than just whether a bank needs to own only 0% or 100% of the loans it initiates, and nothing in between.
Since Glass-Steagall restricted just a tiny subset of those conflicts, I'm wondering why you are so focused on it. If agent-principal conflicts need to be placed under government supervision, so be it -- but that's a much bigger issue than just whether a bank needs to own only 0% or 100% of the loans it initiates, and nothing in between.
Glass-Steagall covers the specific case of banks that accept deposits. This is where the average Joe Schmoe sends their paycheck.
Yes there are multiple agent principle conflicts associated with securities, but that is ok, because people that invest with securities should be able to know, understand and value the risks. This is not true of the average plumber, electrician or waiter. You cannot expect them to understand the complexities of international finance and all the byzantine securities banks sell and buy just to be able to judge whether an individual bank is safe to deposit your pay check in.
Thus, we can either have a system where some regulation exists that ensures that depositor's money is safe or we can say buyer beware, which means that after being burned a couple of times the average person will simply not trust and not use the banking system. This is actually what happened after the crash of 1929 and before Glass Steagall was passed and the FDIC was set up.
We know from that period that if ordinary people do not use the banking system, enormous amounts of capital are simply not put to work (i.e., they are stowed away under matresses, etc.) and the economy contracts greatly.
So that we have discovered that it is generally beneficial for the government to insure the bank deposits of ordinary people up to a certain amount. This is something that happens in pretty much every modern industrialized nation nowadays.
Now it is obvious that if the government is to insure certain banks, it should take steps to make sure that these banks are safe, and that is what the requirements of Glass Steagall are all about. Of course Glass Steagall allows for banks that do not take deposits (i.e., investment banks) to invest in as much securities as they want and to generally to engage in much riskier behaviour.
Yes there are multiple agent principle conflicts associated with securities, but that is ok, because people that invest with securities should be able to know, understand and value the risks. This is not true of the average plumber, electrician or waiter. You cannot expect them to understand the complexities of international finance and all the byzantine securities banks sell and buy just to be able to judge whether an individual bank is safe to deposit your pay check in.
Thus, we can either have a system where some regulation exists that ensures that depositor's money is safe or we can say buyer beware, which means that after being burned a couple of times the average person will simply not trust and not use the banking system. This is actually what happened after the crash of 1929 and before Glass Steagall was passed and the FDIC was set up.
We know from that period that if ordinary people do not use the banking system, enormous amounts of capital are simply not put to work (i.e., they are stowed away under matresses, etc.) and the economy contracts greatly.
So that we have discovered that it is generally beneficial for the government to insure the bank deposits of ordinary people up to a certain amount. This is something that happens in pretty much every modern industrialized nation nowadays.
Now it is obvious that if the government is to insure certain banks, it should take steps to make sure that these banks are safe, and that is what the requirements of Glass Steagall are all about. Of course Glass Steagall allows for banks that do not take deposits (i.e., investment banks) to invest in as much securities as they want and to generally to engage in much riskier behaviour.
I think the difference between equity speculation and bond speculation is important. Debt bubbles are much more catastrophic than equity bubbles.
Right, the problem wasn't as much the home loans as all of the side-wagering. Nobody really knows the exact extent, but the credit default swaps are believed to be one to two orders of magnitude more money than the CDOs they were based on. Lehman and AIG in particular were destroyed by them.
Lehman was not destroyed by swaps. They just took a large position in subprime loans and held many of the riskier tranches.
This is exactly what the article advocates forcing commercial banks to do.
Of course, the article doesn't make any distinctions that either matt or karzeem make, such as debt vs equity or CDO vs CDS.
This is exactly what the article advocates forcing commercial banks to do.
Of course, the article doesn't make any distinctions that either matt or karzeem make, such as debt vs equity or CDO vs CDS.
Actually you're right, they had $150b in CDOs against which over $400b in CDS were written. Still illustrates the point handily.
While there might have been $400b in CDS written against their CDOs, many of those CDS had mutually exclusive triggers, or were used to hedge against each other.
For example, say I make a $200 bet with you that a coin comes up heads, and a $200 bet with pg thatit comes up tails. I've made $400 in bets, but I have only $200 in liabilities. Or I might buy a long position in apple, thinking it will go up. Then I think Steve Jobs might die, so I buy a short position. I now hold twice as many contracts, but my liability is completely covered.
$400b in CDS is a meaningless number until we know how much of it was a liability.
For example, say I make a $200 bet with you that a coin comes up heads, and a $200 bet with pg thatit comes up tails. I've made $400 in bets, but I have only $200 in liabilities. Or I might buy a long position in apple, thinking it will go up. Then I think Steve Jobs might die, so I buy a short position. I now hold twice as many contracts, but my liability is completely covered.
$400b in CDS is a meaningless number until we know how much of it was a liability.
I don't really know how to get around the problem of people placing bets with money they possess probabilistically. Clearly, if enough people are doing it, and enough of them make the same bad, massive bet, we all get screwed.
But at the same, everyone in finance — even the most vanilla, small-town, we-just-take-deposits-and-make-safe-loans banks — works with money that has some nonzero chance of shrinking. The difference is that some correctly account for their worst-case scenario and others don't.
Not sure where I'm going with that except to wonder whether there's some system that allows for speculation (i.e. opportunities to make money by making the right bet where someone else made the wrong one) while not tolerating a nonzero chance of a 2008-style meltdown.
But at the same, everyone in finance — even the most vanilla, small-town, we-just-take-deposits-and-make-safe-loans banks — works with money that has some nonzero chance of shrinking. The difference is that some correctly account for their worst-case scenario and others don't.
Not sure where I'm going with that except to wonder whether there's some system that allows for speculation (i.e. opportunities to make money by making the right bet where someone else made the wrong one) while not tolerating a nonzero chance of a 2008-style meltdown.
> Right, the problem wasn't as much the home loans as all of the side-wagering.
Not so fast. US banks were basically required to own Fannie and Freddie stock plus if they didn't make "enough" loans to people who realistically couldn't pay them back, they got dinged by regulators. (Wells Fargo was getting hammered over this.)
The stock holding is what pushed many of them into technical insolvency when Fannie and Freddie cratered. Combine that with regulators pushing mortgage-backed securities and you've covered the bulk of the problem.
Throw in some govt officials who decided to pay off Goldman et al with taxpayer money instead of letting them rely on the "insurance" and collateral that they'd arranged, and the rest is a minor blip.
Not so fast. US banks were basically required to own Fannie and Freddie stock plus if they didn't make "enough" loans to people who realistically couldn't pay them back, they got dinged by regulators. (Wells Fargo was getting hammered over this.)
The stock holding is what pushed many of them into technical insolvency when Fannie and Freddie cratered. Combine that with regulators pushing mortgage-backed securities and you've covered the bulk of the problem.
Throw in some govt officials who decided to pay off Goldman et al with taxpayer money instead of letting them rely on the "insurance" and collateral that they'd arranged, and the rest is a minor blip.
I heard about Glass-Steagall last month on NPR via Robert Reich (http://marketplace.publicradio.org//display/web/2009/11/04/p...)
It sounds like a better approach then many regulations that lead to very little.
It sounds like a better approach then many regulations that lead to very little.
This Robert Reich?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opxuUj6vFa4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nT1TkLgfinE
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opxuUj6vFa4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nT1TkLgfinE
Unfortunately, even if I do agree with you that Robert Reich is a racist, that is an ad hominem argument and I don't see how his racism would have a strong influence on his view of the Glass-Steagall Act.
If you think it's racist then you must have skipped the history lesson on The New Deal whereby, in an effort to secure the votes necessary, they (House/Senate) basically had to promise key members that the recovery would touch the "right" people. The right people in this case being white males. Blacks, Asians, and Women of all races were largely cut out of the New Deal unless hiring them was a necessity due to lack of able-bodied white men.
Whenever economists speak of jobs programs for everyone, not just "white male construction workers", this is what they're eluding to.
Whenever economists speak of jobs programs for everyone, not just "white male construction workers", this is what they're eluding to.
Thank you, I did not know that.
The unemployment rate among non-Asian minorities is much higher than that of the rest of the country (e.g. Nov African-American unemployment rate is 15.7%)
Are you suggesting that Reich is a racist because he sees this as a problem and wants to ensure that African Americans and Hispanics get employment opportunities ?
Are you suggesting that Reich is a racist because he sees this as a problem and wants to ensure that African Americans and Hispanics get employment opportunities ?
This seems kind of like closing the barn door after the horse has already gotten out (and lions have eaten the horse). Just an empty barn full of taxpayers’ money that is not being lent out. A case of the fox watching the henhouse and we taxpayers seem to be the chickens.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass%E2%80%93Steagall_Act
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glass%E2%80%93Steagall_Act
That had more totally non-applicable down-home folksy sayings per paragraph than the average Sarah Palin speech. Kudos.
The barn door was closed with this act until 1999 when it was repealed. How is that "closing the barn door after the horse has already gotten out"?
Reinstating it now is like closing the door. The damage has already been done, the system has been raped and pillaged already. Closing the door will not fix the damage.
Closing the door is a Paraphrase.
Definition: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paraphrase
Closing the door is a Paraphrase.
Definition: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paraphrase
I agree with you Tome, I am not saying it is bad, just that it was allowed to happen and that is where the problem is. Now we taxpayers have to pay those who did this with our earnings after they knowingly shot the system down in flames.
I think you'll find that there are a whole load of baby horses still in the barn, and you're going to want to close the door to stop them getting out in the future.
Remind me who was the POTUS then?
this entire article is just conclusory. why will these things happen? he doesn't give any evidence..
In his closing he says that passing this measure will "usher in a productive explosion in America that we have not seen in the last 50 years."
The last 50 years have already seen the largest sustained economic expansion in all of human history. Is that not good enough somehow?
I want my ten minutes back.