Why the Twentieth Century Was Not a Chinese Century(delong.typepad.com)
delong.typepad.com
Why the Twentieth Century Was Not a Chinese Century
http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2013/08/where-was-china-why-the-twentieth-century-was-not-a-chinese-century-a-deleted-scene-from-my-slouching-towards-utopia-th.html
13 comments
Why then did math, astronomy and other sciences, and natural philosophy not originate in China, but centuries earlier in Europe (with a loose definition of "originate", I know Europeans were not the first)?
A few examples, Pythagoras Theorem is called 勾股定理 in China, named after its individual discoverer Gou Gu from China. Circa 1090~ AD, There is a book called 梦溪笔谈 by Sheng Kuo consisting of discussion of various topics such as Astronomy, Physics, Math etc. Some other books in Math include 数学九章，四元玉鉴。Circa 500～ AD, Zu Chong Zhi figured out Pi to 6 decimal digits. Sorry I didn't have time looking up the English name of those books.
I see you have made your edits thereafter. Though I would just like to say really it's hard to define what is 'awesome' or not as per your argument.
"China invented gun powder, but they didn't use it to gain a military advantage."
So is it awesome to utilize tools made to enhance men's life to slaughter men?
"Most of Chinese philosophy seems to me to be mostly about society and the duty of men etc."
This is largely correct, but it isn't any less than the modern science we have today. Iching in particular is really a science of life, the science of nature. Yet nobody can understand it now.
While I like some of your arguments about China missing out on further opportunities, but to simply dismiss China as not 'awesome' is also an over stretch.
A few examples, Pythagoras Theorem is called 勾股定理 in China, named after its individual discoverer Gou Gu from China. Circa 1090~ AD, There is a book called 梦溪笔谈 by Sheng Kuo consisting of discussion of various topics such as Astronomy, Physics, Math etc. Some other books in Math include 数学九章，四元玉鉴。Circa 500～ AD, Zu Chong Zhi figured out Pi to 6 decimal digits. Sorry I didn't have time looking up the English name of those books.
I see you have made your edits thereafter. Though I would just like to say really it's hard to define what is 'awesome' or not as per your argument.
"China invented gun powder, but they didn't use it to gain a military advantage."
So is it awesome to utilize tools made to enhance men's life to slaughter men?
"Most of Chinese philosophy seems to me to be mostly about society and the duty of men etc."
This is largely correct, but it isn't any less than the modern science we have today. Iching in particular is really a science of life, the science of nature. Yet nobody can understand it now.
While I like some of your arguments about China missing out on further opportunities, but to simply dismiss China as not 'awesome' is also an over stretch.
He is right though, in spite of your examples Chinese mathematics lagged far behind Western mathematics. E.g. By the 1700's, mathematicians were solving Newton's equations using sophisticated approximations, to calculate the future position of the moon.
I'm not inclined towards bold explanations of these differences, but the facts are clear: Western science and mathematics was far beyond anything else in the world at that time.
I'm not inclined towards bold explanations of these differences, but the facts are clear: Western science and mathematics was far beyond anything else in the world at that time.
Not to be pedantic but the Pythagorean Theorem was probably "discovered" and at least described much earlier than either Pythogoras or "the Chinese."
Gougo only provided a reasoning for the 3-4-5 triangle but not a general solution for other triangles. The Apastamba Sulba Sutra (~600BCE from "India") contained a numerical proof for the theorem. The Assyrians and Babylonians recorded "Pythagorean triples" but didn't mention triangles.
It's only until Euclid comes along that a proper axiomatic proof is provided. None of takes away from all those that contributed to the upward climb that is human history, though. It's high time to appreciate human achievements rather than "national or ethnic" ones.
Gougo only provided a reasoning for the 3-4-5 triangle but not a general solution for other triangles. The Apastamba Sulba Sutra (~600BCE from "India") contained a numerical proof for the theorem. The Assyrians and Babylonians recorded "Pythagorean triples" but didn't mention triangles.
It's only until Euclid comes along that a proper axiomatic proof is provided. None of takes away from all those that contributed to the upward climb that is human history, though. It's high time to appreciate human achievements rather than "national or ethnic" ones.
Sorry, I'm aware of Chinese, Indian and Islamic mathematics. By "originating" I don't necessarily mean first in everything, but it's hard to argue that Chinese mathematics had as much of an impact.
While I don't condone violence, military technology is a big part of the advantage of western powers up to this point. It has driven innovations in other areas as well.
And I didn't mean to say China is not awesome (just not as awesome back then), I love Chinese history and culture, but my reaction is against the popular sentiment that China was humiliated for ~two centuries and it was just a temporary fluke. I think it began way before then, and that it's not certain that China was on the cusp of a scientific and industrial revolution itself, had not western powers arrived there first.
While I don't condone violence, military technology is a big part of the advantage of western powers up to this point. It has driven innovations in other areas as well.
And I didn't mean to say China is not awesome (just not as awesome back then), I love Chinese history and culture, but my reaction is against the popular sentiment that China was humiliated for ~two centuries and it was just a temporary fluke. I think it began way before then, and that it's not certain that China was on the cusp of a scientific and industrial revolution itself, had not western powers arrived there first.
Nah no need to say sorry haha. You brought up some very valid points, just it's hard to category anything as awesome or not in a strictly objective sense.
Throughout human history, there's no telling whether or not a particular event or happening is awesome or not, it's just the natural progression of humankind seeking power and regime.
In terms of contribution towards modern science and industrial revolution though, you are perfectly right about China not participating too much in it. For me personally, I rather feel like the more I learn about life, the more I wonder about the power of mind and less about the materialistic world. Hence ancient Chinese's philosophies of life and Dao is surprisingly more powerful to me than modern scientific advances, yet it seemed to have entirely lost its roots throughout history sadly.
Throughout human history, there's no telling whether or not a particular event or happening is awesome or not, it's just the natural progression of humankind seeking power and regime.
In terms of contribution towards modern science and industrial revolution though, you are perfectly right about China not participating too much in it. For me personally, I rather feel like the more I learn about life, the more I wonder about the power of mind and less about the materialistic world. Hence ancient Chinese's philosophies of life and Dao is surprisingly more powerful to me than modern scientific advances, yet it seemed to have entirely lost its roots throughout history sadly.
What is the argument that you're trying to refute? I got more of a vibe from your comment. I feel like this is a great opportunity for the AskHistorians subreddit. But I think generalizing to just Europe says something, though, rather than comparing countries to countries. And while I do agree there has likely been some exaggeration, I also think you may be underestimating the logistics of massive populations considering the time period (as well as just how early they had certain things, if you're ever near the Met in NY, check out their Chinese stuff and the dates next to them, though their collection is pretty small).
The best hypotheses I've seen (which I can't find, it was in passing long ago somewhere), suggests European division fueled a lot of later innovation. War does seem to drive technology. When you're China back then, who are you really competing against? You've already finished the conquering and unification phase that individual European countries are still dreaming about. So why do you need guns? You're essentially Rome of East Asia (and Romans are no more, perhaps not a coincidence). Korea, Japan, and Vietnam are either vassals or non-threats. You've got silk, porcelain (which itself was pretty amazing compared to "European" alternatives), and tea to pass your time instead (and to trade with). You're already pretty huge for the time period, and managing a country of that size and technology level is already pretty challenging. Meanwhile, Europe is a perfect climate for border skirmishing and competition. When England came knocking on China's door in a more aggressive fashion, the Emperor at the time still had arrogant delusions about China's comparative might. And they paid for that. But the opium wars and WW2 were a wake up call.
Also, glass. China never discovered glass, and glass unlocked all sorts of technologies.
Edit: So the other way of looking at it is: The Han tribe did get ahead of their neighbors with all their fancy doodads early on, and perhaps that's why China is the size it is now. The Romans almost did it in their local sphere, and arguably England later, although by then technological spread was more uniform. If ancient Europe had been sitting next to ancient China, perhaps they'd be speaking Chinese now?
The best hypotheses I've seen (which I can't find, it was in passing long ago somewhere), suggests European division fueled a lot of later innovation. War does seem to drive technology. When you're China back then, who are you really competing against? You've already finished the conquering and unification phase that individual European countries are still dreaming about. So why do you need guns? You're essentially Rome of East Asia (and Romans are no more, perhaps not a coincidence). Korea, Japan, and Vietnam are either vassals or non-threats. You've got silk, porcelain (which itself was pretty amazing compared to "European" alternatives), and tea to pass your time instead (and to trade with). You're already pretty huge for the time period, and managing a country of that size and technology level is already pretty challenging. Meanwhile, Europe is a perfect climate for border skirmishing and competition. When England came knocking on China's door in a more aggressive fashion, the Emperor at the time still had arrogant delusions about China's comparative might. And they paid for that. But the opium wars and WW2 were a wake up call.
Also, glass. China never discovered glass, and glass unlocked all sorts of technologies.
Edit: So the other way of looking at it is: The Han tribe did get ahead of their neighbors with all their fancy doodads early on, and perhaps that's why China is the size it is now. The Romans almost did it in their local sphere, and arguably England later, although by then technological spread was more uniform. If ancient Europe had been sitting next to ancient China, perhaps they'd be speaking Chinese now?
It makes sense to compare China to Europe instead of single European countries because they can both be considered civilizations. The difference being that China has always been striving for unification (although throughout much of it's history has actually been divided or in civil war if you'd call it that). Had Qin Shi Huang not imposed cultural and economical uniformity perhaps China would be more like Europe today?
My argument was mostly against popular literature presenting this world view where China just stumbled a little bit and where the rise of the west was almost accidental. I see this all over in "insight porn" type literature. This article sort of started out like that but my knee jerk reaction was wrong.
My argument was mostly against popular literature presenting this world view where China just stumbled a little bit and where the rise of the west was almost accidental. I see this all over in "insight porn" type literature. This article sort of started out like that but my knee jerk reaction was wrong.
The concepts of both Europe and China are pretty problematic.
The classical Greeks and Romans, for instance, would be utterly flummoxed if you called them Europeans. Their civilization was something much closer to what we might call the Mediterranean world. Even if you asked them about other civilizations they knew about or were competing with, they would have pointed out Persia long before places like Britain, Germany, or non-Mediterranean France, which are the North Atlantic nations that people are really talking about when they discuss the rise of Europe. And even today, the lived experiences of Greeks are much closer to the lived experiences of, say, Turks than they are to the typical Englishman.
And the "cultural and economical uniformity" of China is easily overstated, and developing it was a long process of colonialism, ethnic cleansing, and state building. With hindsight its easy to project our current conception of China back several millenia, but we shouldn't mistake convenient teleologies spouted by the Chinese state as descriptive of the ethno-cultural state of people in that expansive geography two millenia ago.
The classical Greeks and Romans, for instance, would be utterly flummoxed if you called them Europeans. Their civilization was something much closer to what we might call the Mediterranean world. Even if you asked them about other civilizations they knew about or were competing with, they would have pointed out Persia long before places like Britain, Germany, or non-Mediterranean France, which are the North Atlantic nations that people are really talking about when they discuss the rise of Europe. And even today, the lived experiences of Greeks are much closer to the lived experiences of, say, Turks than they are to the typical Englishman.
And the "cultural and economical uniformity" of China is easily overstated, and developing it was a long process of colonialism, ethnic cleansing, and state building. With hindsight its easy to project our current conception of China back several millenia, but we shouldn't mistake convenient teleologies spouted by the Chinese state as descriptive of the ethno-cultural state of people in that expansive geography two millenia ago.
Well, there is this, by Joseph Needham, in 7 volumes:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_Civilisation_in_Chi...
If you have access to an academic library, they may have a copy.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science_and_Civilisation_in_Chi...
If you have access to an academic library, they may have a copy.
Needham's book series is very interesting, but most professional historians who read ancient Chinese sources in the original language think that Needham engaged in huge amounts of axe-grinding to try to make his Marxist point about the development of science and technology in China.
That was an occupational hazard in Sinology for many years. Still, it's a great resource--the bibliography alone is a great resource.
Really he just says that china was way ahead in 1200 and way behind in 1870. It's really hard to say when one pulled ahead of the other since there are so many areas you could compare in, but I'd put the transition point somewhere around 1650, near the fall of the Ming.
My guess: What screwed China was the
Roman alphabet because China didn't
use it. Then when the written word
became important for the masses
in the West and for progress in the West, China
started falling behind.
The effect is still easy to see in Chinese culture, say, cooking: It's still strongly the case that Chinese cooking is essentially just not written down and, instead, is learned by apprenticeship. E.g., I have stacks of books on cooking -- US, French, Italian, German, and Chinese -- and far and away the worst written are the books on Chinese cooking. So, the books on American cooking I got from my family from, say, the 1930s, are very nicely done with times, temperatures, weights, and volumes, but the books on Chinese cooking have essentially no measurements at all. Then for explanations of the steps and details, again the Chinese books are far behind. Again, simply, Chinese cooking is so far nearly never actually written down in anything like what is common for thorough descriptions in countries that use the Roman alphabet.
Why the Roman alphabet? Because it's so darned easy to work with, and the Chinese little drawings severely throttle what that masses might do with reading and writing.
The effect is still easy to see in Chinese culture, say, cooking: It's still strongly the case that Chinese cooking is essentially just not written down and, instead, is learned by apprenticeship. E.g., I have stacks of books on cooking -- US, French, Italian, German, and Chinese -- and far and away the worst written are the books on Chinese cooking. So, the books on American cooking I got from my family from, say, the 1930s, are very nicely done with times, temperatures, weights, and volumes, but the books on Chinese cooking have essentially no measurements at all. Then for explanations of the steps and details, again the Chinese books are far behind. Again, simply, Chinese cooking is so far nearly never actually written down in anything like what is common for thorough descriptions in countries that use the Roman alphabet.
Why the Roman alphabet? Because it's so darned easy to work with, and the Chinese little drawings severely throttle what that masses might do with reading and writing.
Not a bad guess. The literacy rate at the end of the Chinese civil war (1949) was only about 11% or so. That can't possibly have been good.
Certainly a good theory that I've also considered myself. It's a fundamental cost that every person goes through. You can contribute to the social sphere until 20+ years of literature education.
It's an interesting topic - but this article is wrong on so many factual counts it's probably not worth bothering with. Here's three of them:
> The British Empire acquired the then nearly barren island of Hong Kong as a base
Which was then, and had been for some time, a major trade center
> And one's [ an upwardly mobile enterpreneur's ] children could do the most important thing needed for upward mobility: study the Confucian classics and do well on the examinations: first the local shengyan, then the regional juren, and then the national jinshi.
Nope. Succeeding in the examinations meant having been brought up in them, which only aristocratic children were. Though the examination system seemed meritocratic from the outside, in reality it was anything but.
> Perhaps 10 million people, 3% of China's population, died [ during the Taiping rebellion]
Nope, more like 50 million
It's an interesting question why China suddenly fell behind the West after 1700 and this article touches on some of them - the Qing were definitely part of the problem - but it veers off course so often it pretty much becomes worthless.
> The British Empire acquired the then nearly barren island of Hong Kong as a base
Which was then, and had been for some time, a major trade center
> And one's [ an upwardly mobile enterpreneur's ] children could do the most important thing needed for upward mobility: study the Confucian classics and do well on the examinations: first the local shengyan, then the regional juren, and then the national jinshi.
Nope. Succeeding in the examinations meant having been brought up in them, which only aristocratic children were. Though the examination system seemed meritocratic from the outside, in reality it was anything but.
> Perhaps 10 million people, 3% of China's population, died [ during the Taiping rebellion]
Nope, more like 50 million
It's an interesting question why China suddenly fell behind the West after 1700 and this article touches on some of them - the Qing were definitely part of the problem - but it veers off course so often it pretty much becomes worthless.
A very interesting article. However it is sometimes possible to overlook the basics and over-theorise about things:
1) Having ~50% of the population forcibly disabled probably did not help:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foot_binding
2) The importance of glass cannot be underestimated. Particularly when it comes to spectacles. It is something like two thirds of the population that wear glasses or contact lenses in the west. Being able to see is a prerequisite for so many things like being able to read. Being able to read is a prerequisite for so many things like being able to do science. Being able to do science is a prerequisite for an advanced civilisation.
Sure it took a while for glasses to be available to all, however, in the West it was feasibly possible to get glasses - not the case in China.
1) Having ~50% of the population forcibly disabled probably did not help:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foot_binding
2) The importance of glass cannot be underestimated. Particularly when it comes to spectacles. It is something like two thirds of the population that wear glasses or contact lenses in the west. Being able to see is a prerequisite for so many things like being able to read. Being able to read is a prerequisite for so many things like being able to do science. Being able to do science is a prerequisite for an advanced civilisation.
Sure it took a while for glasses to be available to all, however, in the West it was feasibly possible to get glasses - not the case in China.
"A thousand years before—-in 800, say—-the technological and civilizational cutting edges of humanity were to be found in the Caliph Haroun al-Rashid’s capital of Baghdad and the Tang Dynasty Emperor Dezong’s Chang’an, rather than London or Bristol of Manchester or New York or Washington or Cleveland." (Emphasis mine)
As a North East Ohioan, I was shocked and flattered that we were mentioned, even if ironically. Cleveland rocks, indeed.
Edit: formatting.
As a North East Ohioan, I was shocked and flattered that we were mentioned, even if ironically. Cleveland rocks, indeed.
Edit: formatting.
Where's the irony? Cleveland in 1900 was a hugely wealthy city with a rapidly growing population and innovative industries, near the forefront of technologies like electric railroading, automobiles, and aviation. It's fallen from prominence, as has Manchester, but it had a good run in its day, not unlike Silicon Valley.
I thought there was a chance the author was being mildly ironic, but don't get me wrong, I'm a huge fan of the Forest City, both in its history and its current iteration of commerce, culture, and identity.
I just thought it was flattering that my favorite city, being less than 250 years old with claim to no world-moving historical events, should occupy the same list as Baghdad, London, New York, and Washington in terms of historical and cultural significance.
I just thought it was flattering that my favorite city, being less than 250 years old with claim to no world-moving historical events, should occupy the same list as Baghdad, London, New York, and Washington in terms of historical and cultural significance.
There is a fantastic book - "Why the west rules, for now" that deals with this question (the name sounds quite right-wingish, but it's actually a great history book). I highly recommend anyone interested in this topic to read it.
If I can bring some interesting observations of the author to this discussion, it's that West (including mid east+europe+later america) and East (mostly China+later japan) led at different times. West had a 2000 year head start and reached its peak during Roman empire. East finally caught up around 600 AD and was ahead till the eve of western industrial revolution. Backwardness in some period of history (whether it's in nature resource, technology, social organization), became advantages in others. So you see the power shift constantly happening.
The ultimate reason (obviously i'm doing a huge reduction here) the writer claimed that caused the last shift of power between East and West was simply that America was too far from China. China got the thoughts/technology it needed. Europe found a flood of new problems and solved them with new thoughts/technology.
While I don't completely agree with his arguments, it's nonetheless an interesting and well supported point of view and much better than many other books out there that deals with big history topic (eg. "Guns, Germs and Steel")
If I can bring some interesting observations of the author to this discussion, it's that West (including mid east+europe+later america) and East (mostly China+later japan) led at different times. West had a 2000 year head start and reached its peak during Roman empire. East finally caught up around 600 AD and was ahead till the eve of western industrial revolution. Backwardness in some period of history (whether it's in nature resource, technology, social organization), became advantages in others. So you see the power shift constantly happening.
The ultimate reason (obviously i'm doing a huge reduction here) the writer claimed that caused the last shift of power between East and West was simply that America was too far from China. China got the thoughts/technology it needed. Europe found a flood of new problems and solved them with new thoughts/technology.
While I don't completely agree with his arguments, it's nonetheless an interesting and well supported point of view and much better than many other books out there that deals with big history topic (eg. "Guns, Germs and Steel")
I just finished reading this book, and I found it extremely insightful. The overview of Western and Eastern history from paleolitic to the modern era really puts the entire question of West vs. East into a grander perspective.
However, the biggest twist and conclusion in the book comes from projecting the trends of social development into the future. Ultimately, this question will not matter as we march towards singularity or apocalypse at a frighteningly fast pace.
However, the biggest twist and conclusion in the book comes from projecting the trends of social development into the future. Ultimately, this question will not matter as we march towards singularity or apocalypse at a frighteningly fast pace.
LoL. There were exactly two political groups/parties to blame for the collapse of Northen Song dynasty and the following stagnation of everything in China.
They were Yuanyou(元佑党人) the reformists, and Yuanfeng(元丰党人) the conservatives.
Damn.
Now, there is a similar case in US.
I hope this time, politicians can do much better than ruin all good things.
They were Yuanyou(元佑党人) the reformists, and Yuanfeng(元丰党人) the conservatives.
Damn.
Now, there is a similar case in US.
I hope this time, politicians can do much better than ruin all good things.
So modern Chinese consider their country to have been stagnant during the entirety of the Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties? I've read a number of Western books about Qing-era China trying to understand the same questions the linked article discusses - why China doesn't already rule the world. The way things are presented, the Qing rulers and court just seem to be generally incompetent and isolated from their contemporary reality.
So within China the understanding is that the problems go back to before the Qing?
So within China the understanding is that the problems go back to before the Qing?
Net Neutrality, Copyrights, Patents, sensible immigration laws, friendliness to entrepreneurship.
No. We're screwed too.
No. We're screwed too.
I may have not been clear that I think the US is failing badly at handling all of those things, and it will cost us in the long run.
If what I was saying was clear, and you still disagree, then by all means down-vote it.
If what I was saying was clear, and you still disagree, then by all means down-vote it.
A pertinent pair of novels (by a Westerner) are "Under Heaven" and "River of Stars" by Guy Gavriel Kay. While set in the author's usual "slightly alternate" history, they are effectively set in the Tang and Song dynasties respectively. I have no idea how the Chinese regard these novels, but the linked essay could have been written, in part, on these novels instead of actual history. The second book's central theme is the peril presented by an isolated ruling class, institutionalized military incompetence, and the lack of trust in military leaders. They're good reads if fiction is more your speed.
As it often happens, when you try too hard to make your point, you get carried away.
Perhaps there are just many dimensions to observe one object/thing. And most of time, people are just not able to figure out the single point(if it does exist and can be achieved with the given conditions) that can make sense for all the dimensions.
We strive for simple explanation - as the OP says, the "root cause" - but there can't be a simple explanation for such big phenomena, encompassing hundreds of years and hundreds of millions of people.
I think it's worth noting that there certainly can be simple explanations for big phenomena, even those within human cultures (the concept of currency as a trading medium being a fairly simple idea that has spawned uncountable and unfathomably complex, ever-evolving results). I would agree that the topic here, though, is one that's unlikely to be traced to just one or two such elementary concepts.
As you wrote, even an apparently simple idea like currency is actually incredibly complicated in its historical reality, so complicated that there are thousands of books about it, very active research, and competing school of thoughts that propose completely different and incompatible theories about what are the "causes" and what are the "effects".
So, my opinion is that every simple explanation of any big phenomena regarding human history actually explains very little.
So, my opinion is that every simple explanation of any big phenomena regarding human history actually explains very little.
That was a delightful article--I do wish that more information and thinking was articulated about China during the 20th century.
Perhaps the thesis is that, by the mid 1800s, the race was lost.
Perhaps the thesis is that, by the mid 1800s, the race was lost.
[deleted]
Societies seem to want to organize themselves in a few different ways -- the most common is to organize for stability. It's understandable since everything from irregular weather to power struggles in leadership often lead to untimely and unpleasant deaths.
Massive social and technological revolutions were likely to be sources of misery for everybody.
Let's not forget that massive social and technological change was not common in the West either -- despite lots of smart folks, the Classical Greeks of 430BC weren't really all that behind the Romans of 220AD in terms of technology and these are widely considered among the smartest, most vigorous and most impressive of ancient Western Civilizations. The Russ, Germanic Tribes etc. pretty much had lived the same for thousands of years.
Organizing for stability creates stagnation, but in most cases this is perfectly normal. The kinds of fast change we've seen in the West post Middle-ages is pretty bizarre -- and has in many ways conformed to the idea I mentioned above. Some of the bloodiest and deadliest times in known history have all occurred since the start of the Renaissance.
For whatever reason; lots of competing non-unified territories, guns germs and steel, the black death, whatever; the West, starting in the late 15th century has managed to make fast massive social and technical change the norm.
In China, massive upheavals like this were usually a sign the empire was falling apart, or the Mongols were invading, or a dynasty was about to crumble. So every effort was made to stop these things from happening. Like I said, this is totally normal in human history. In fact, there are arguments that one of the reasons democracy is a viable option is that it largely resolves the painful succession problems in totalitarian/authoritarian systems -- it's a kind of social stabilizer. In India it was the caste system, in China it's probably attributable to Confucianism.
When Rome was starting to have ambitions of growing from a bunch of farmers into something larger, Confucius was out teaching rigid social order. But the Confucian revival in the Tang Dynasty during the start of the Dark Ages in the West is where it was really cemented in. It's also often called one of the most stable in Chinese history.
Another thing to note is that it's also very common, after a large social collapse, to look back at a previous golden age and to try and recapture it in some way. In the West this movement was called the Renaissance. You might say the post-Ottoman world is kind of "Dark Ages" for the central Asian Muslim world (you might notice that lots of the focus of groups like Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab is to recapture the former glory of the ancient Golden Age of the caliphates). A post Dark Age Renaissance in the Muslim world would be welcomed by many.
It might be argued that China is just now emerging from a kind of "Dark Age" that could be argued to have started with the end of the Song Dynasties into a Western Style period of rapid continuous revolution.
In the West we had the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, etc. China is going through something right now that's similar, what it'll be called is anybody's guess but history will have to wait for it to play out.
Massive social and technological revolutions were likely to be sources of misery for everybody.
Let's not forget that massive social and technological change was not common in the West either -- despite lots of smart folks, the Classical Greeks of 430BC weren't really all that behind the Romans of 220AD in terms of technology and these are widely considered among the smartest, most vigorous and most impressive of ancient Western Civilizations. The Russ, Germanic Tribes etc. pretty much had lived the same for thousands of years.
Organizing for stability creates stagnation, but in most cases this is perfectly normal. The kinds of fast change we've seen in the West post Middle-ages is pretty bizarre -- and has in many ways conformed to the idea I mentioned above. Some of the bloodiest and deadliest times in known history have all occurred since the start of the Renaissance.
For whatever reason; lots of competing non-unified territories, guns germs and steel, the black death, whatever; the West, starting in the late 15th century has managed to make fast massive social and technical change the norm.
In China, massive upheavals like this were usually a sign the empire was falling apart, or the Mongols were invading, or a dynasty was about to crumble. So every effort was made to stop these things from happening. Like I said, this is totally normal in human history. In fact, there are arguments that one of the reasons democracy is a viable option is that it largely resolves the painful succession problems in totalitarian/authoritarian systems -- it's a kind of social stabilizer. In India it was the caste system, in China it's probably attributable to Confucianism.
When Rome was starting to have ambitions of growing from a bunch of farmers into something larger, Confucius was out teaching rigid social order. But the Confucian revival in the Tang Dynasty during the start of the Dark Ages in the West is where it was really cemented in. It's also often called one of the most stable in Chinese history.
Another thing to note is that it's also very common, after a large social collapse, to look back at a previous golden age and to try and recapture it in some way. In the West this movement was called the Renaissance. You might say the post-Ottoman world is kind of "Dark Ages" for the central Asian Muslim world (you might notice that lots of the focus of groups like Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab is to recapture the former glory of the ancient Golden Age of the caliphates). A post Dark Age Renaissance in the Muslim world would be welcomed by many.
It might be argued that China is just now emerging from a kind of "Dark Age" that could be argued to have started with the end of the Song Dynasties into a Western Style period of rapid continuous revolution.
In the West we had the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, etc. China is going through something right now that's similar, what it'll be called is anybody's guess but history will have to wait for it to play out.
Sure you can have smart and advanced people, but how will you control them? Better to hire idiots you can control than to risk losing control to advancement?
edit: it seems that further down this article gives more explanations and actually states that China was in stagnation from 1200 onwards. However, there are many other articles and books making the argument I'm trying to refute. For me, the interesting part of the article is:
Perhaps the root problem was the absence of a new world rich in resources to exploit and helpless because of technological backwardness.
Perhaps the root problem was the lesser weight attached to instrumental rationality as a mode of thought
Perhaps the root problem was the absence of dissenting hidey-holes for ideological unconformity.
Perhaps the root problem was the fact that the merchants and hand-manufacturers of China's cities were governed by landlords appointed by the central government rather than governing themselves.
Perhaps the root problem was that large-muscled animals like oxen and horses turned out to be powerful productive multipliers for temperate rain-irrigated wheat-based agricultural but not for sub-tropical paddy-irrigated rice-based agriculture
Perhaps the root problem was some combination of these.
Perhaps the root problem was one or a combination of any of a host of other possibilities over which historians will struggle inconclusively (but thoughtfully and fruitfully) for the rest of time.