German intelligence agencies can decrypt PGP?(translate.google.com)
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German intelligence agencies can decrypt PGP?
http://translate.google.com/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.golem.de%2Fnews%2Fbundesregierung-deutsche-geheimdienste-koennen-pgp-entschluesseln-1205-92031.html
17 comments
This is a pointless article, and I'm going to be maintaining skepticism until there's some detail. For example:
Do they have an actual method for breaking PGP, or do they have some sort of backdoor they've planted? Or some sort of access to the keys through other means?
If they have an actual method to break PGP, does it work against all the algorithms, or just one or a few? Does it work against arbitrary key length, or is there a maximum they can break?
If it's general-purpose enough to be just "PGP" regardless of algorithm/key length, how quickly can they decrypt? Is this real time? Is it "we can decrypt in time to find out where next week's attack will be"? Is it "we can decrypt in time to present evidence at this guy's trial next year"?
Without that sort of information this reads like a scary mistranslation, and not the sort of thing a government would disclose anyway.
Do they have an actual method for breaking PGP, or do they have some sort of backdoor they've planted? Or some sort of access to the keys through other means?
If they have an actual method to break PGP, does it work against all the algorithms, or just one or a few? Does it work against arbitrary key length, or is there a maximum they can break?
If it's general-purpose enough to be just "PGP" regardless of algorithm/key length, how quickly can they decrypt? Is this real time? Is it "we can decrypt in time to find out where next week's attack will be"? Is it "we can decrypt in time to present evidence at this guy's trial next year"?
Without that sort of information this reads like a scary mistranslation, and not the sort of thing a government would disclose anyway.
Correct. PGP mixes symmetric and public key encryption algorithms, letting you choose your favorite ciphers and key lengths. You can choose RSA, DSA, AES, CAST5, TripleDES, etc. To say you've "cracked PGP" is akin to saying you've cracked pretty much all of the widely-accepted ciphers out there. I don't buy it.
I'm looking for any algorithms among those you listed that is considered weak.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_DES#Security - ok, that has chosen plaintext weaknesses.
I don't see much information on CAST5 aka CAST128, can someone chime in with its current status?
I suppose you could encrypt an image using ECB. Would PGP allow this kind of broken configuration? http://pthree.org/2012/02/17/ecb-vs-cbc-encryption/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_DES#Security - ok, that has chosen plaintext weaknesses.
I don't see much information on CAST5 aka CAST128, can someone chime in with its current status?
I suppose you could encrypt an image using ECB. Would PGP allow this kind of broken configuration? http://pthree.org/2012/02/17/ecb-vs-cbc-encryption/
PGP uses CFB mode. To my knowledge there is no implementation that would let you use ECB.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880
Right. That may be what "at least partially" refers to. They may be able to crack one in some conditions...
It's not a scary mistranslation, just a lousy title in the original article. The question is posed in such a general way that it can be answered without providing any specifics or making any claims about particular crypto technologies. And that's exactly how it's answered.
Ok, in the fist sentence of the original, it says that they can decrypt PGP partially. The whole report is based on one sentence that a spokesperson said at some point.
For some context: The news releases from German security agencies tend to be imprecise on technical details in a way that suggests that the lack of precision is not on purpose. From all that I've heard on the German media, practically all surveillance techniques they use to get at encrypted communications consist of compromising your machine and thus getting at the unencrypted data. At least that was the real story when they claimed they wanted to "wiretap" skype.
For some context: The news releases from German security agencies tend to be imprecise on technical details in a way that suggests that the lack of precision is not on purpose. From all that I've heard on the German media, practically all surveillance techniques they use to get at encrypted communications consist of compromising your machine and thus getting at the unencrypted data. At least that was the real story when they claimed they wanted to "wiretap" skype.
That's just the first sentence of the original, poorly titled article. Click through to the PDF and see what you make of it - in my reading, neither the question nor the answer say anything specific about PGP at all - especially the answer.
The answer provided by the government does not make a specific claim they can decrypt PGP or SSH.
The question is quite vague - can the government decrypt, at least partially, encrypted communications (e.g. PGP or SSH)
The answer is even vaguer, something along the lines of 'The deployed technology is, in principle, capable of that, depending on the type and quality of encryption'.
Both the question and the answer are so woolly they can mean anything from 'German intelligence can partially decrypt ROT13' to 'German intelligence can read 4096 bit PGP encrypted messages like a morning newspaper'.
One can also be reasonably sure that in the extremely unlikely event some entity somewhere were capable of breaking PGP, they'd go to great lengths not to tell anyone about it - such a (again, wildly improbable) capability becomes a lot less valuable if it was common knowledge.
The question is quite vague - can the government decrypt, at least partially, encrypted communications (e.g. PGP or SSH)
The answer is even vaguer, something along the lines of 'The deployed technology is, in principle, capable of that, depending on the type and quality of encryption'.
Both the question and the answer are so woolly they can mean anything from 'German intelligence can partially decrypt ROT13' to 'German intelligence can read 4096 bit PGP encrypted messages like a morning newspaper'.
One can also be reasonably sure that in the extremely unlikely event some entity somewhere were capable of breaking PGP, they'd go to great lengths not to tell anyone about it - such a (again, wildly improbable) capability becomes a lot less valuable if it was common knowledge.
The most important sentence is this:
"Eine starke Verschlüsselung mit PGP gilt als sicher, wenn es Angreifern nicht gelingt, den privaten geheimen Schlüssel, den nur der Empfänger besitzt, und sein Kennwort zu stehlen."
A strong encryption with PGP can be considered as secure, if attackers do not succeed in stealing the private secret key that only the recipient holds.
Basically, as long as they can't get your secret key and brute-force it because of a stupid password, you'll be fine.
Edit: fixed numerus
"Eine starke Verschlüsselung mit PGP gilt als sicher, wenn es Angreifern nicht gelingt, den privaten geheimen Schlüssel, den nur der Empfänger besitzt, und sein Kennwort zu stehlen."
A strong encryption with PGP can be considered as secure, if attackers do not succeed in stealing the private secret key that only the recipient holds.
Basically, as long as they can't get your secret key and brute-force it because of a stupid password, you'll be fine.
Edit: fixed numerus
Es würden Anwendungen der deutschen Firmen Utimaco,
Ipoque oder Trovicor genutzt, um möglichst tief in die
private Kommunikation einzudringen.
They use applications of the German companies Utimaco
Ipoque or Trovicor to penetrate as deeply as possible
into the private communications.
If true it might be interesting that former PGP lead developer Gerhard Eschelbeck is CTO of Sophos (owner of Utimaco).
"It's all broken folks, you may as well not use anything at all!"
I don't understand why some NSA leaks suddenly make people think the state of crypto is any different than it was two weeks ago. The Snowden leaks thusfar have ZERO relevance to what the collective crypto community considers good ways of securing data.
Nothing changed, technically speaking. The NSA merely broke rules. They didn't do anything technologically special.
Nothing changed, technically speaking. The NSA merely broke rules. They didn't do anything technologically special.
It doesn't necessarily make people think the state of crypto has changed so much as suddenly take note of and wonder about the state of crypto. Many such people ignored it completely prior to this but are now interested in it.
Funny thing is that google translates ZKA as CCC in the linked PDF.
ZKA is Zollkriminalamt (customs police) and CCC is Chaos Computer Club - quite different organisations.
ZKA is Zollkriminalamt (customs police) and CCC is Chaos Computer Club - quite different organisations.
The actual document [1] is remarkably vague. ( And the answer states in the least charitable interpretation that the German intelligence agencies are capable of partially analyzing ROT13 or detecting traffic on port 443...)
But actually I did only comment to ask, if there is a way to switch from Google translate to the actual site, not the "original" button which still goes through Google servers. ( Especially since Google also renders PDF as HTML, when I click on a PDF link in the page.)
[1]http://www.andrej-hunko.de/start/download/doc_download/225-s... (pdf, German)
But actually I did only comment to ask, if there is a way to switch from Google translate to the actual site, not the "original" button which still goes through Google servers. ( Especially since Google also renders PDF as HTML, when I click on a PDF link in the page.)
[1]http://www.andrej-hunko.de/start/download/doc_download/225-s... (pdf, German)
Could we please all relax a bit.
If the government tells you, they have a technology that can in principle be used, depending on type and quality of encryption, history shows us that this either means they can decrypt almost everything, or, most likely, not much. Both ways, they are not telling the complete truth at all.
Especially the german government likes to tell us that they have something that can in principle be used for something, like using your issued ID for online activities, a nation wide health-card system, a working toll collect system, etc., the list just goes on and on and on...
Anecdote: I remember, a couple of years ago, sitting in the audience of the yearly Chaos Communication Congress in Berlin in a talk by a pretty popular lawyer specializing in internet laws and regulation (IIRC the title was something like You have the right to stay silent; if you understand german, watch it, it's hilarious), where in the Q&A session somebody jumps up and tells the audience (paraphrased):
...the last time the police raided my home (much laughter from the audience) they took my encrypted disks with them (probably dmcrypt/luks or truecrypt) and after almost one year they still have not been able to decrypt a single bit of it...
I'm pretty sure not much has changed with ciphers becoming even stronger these days. I, at least, sleep well at night, trusting that my PGP2 encrypted mails are safe.
If the government tells you, they have a technology that can in principle be used, depending on type and quality of encryption, history shows us that this either means they can decrypt almost everything, or, most likely, not much. Both ways, they are not telling the complete truth at all.
Especially the german government likes to tell us that they have something that can in principle be used for something, like using your issued ID for online activities, a nation wide health-card system, a working toll collect system, etc., the list just goes on and on and on...
Anecdote: I remember, a couple of years ago, sitting in the audience of the yearly Chaos Communication Congress in Berlin in a talk by a pretty popular lawyer specializing in internet laws and regulation (IIRC the title was something like You have the right to stay silent; if you understand german, watch it, it's hilarious), where in the Q&A session somebody jumps up and tells the audience (paraphrased):
...the last time the police raided my home (much laughter from the audience) they took my encrypted disks with them (probably dmcrypt/luks or truecrypt) and after almost one year they still have not been able to decrypt a single bit of it...
I'm pretty sure not much has changed with ciphers becoming even stronger these days. I, at least, sleep well at night, trusting that my PGP2 encrypted mails are safe.
the document and translations are all very unclear and unprecise.
Note that they would also claim that they can decode SSH, ie SSL.
Note that they would also claim that they can decode SSH, ie SSL.
The translation is not too bad in this case and the PDF looks legit. Btw this is from 2012.
The question was if the technology they have is capable of decoding encrypted transmissions (e.g. SSH or PGP).
The reply was that in general yes, depending on the type and quality of the encryption.
What I would note is that neither the question nor the reply are about a particular encryption technology. I would not take it to mean that they can decrypt PGP in general.
The question was if the technology they have is capable of decoding encrypted transmissions (e.g. SSH or PGP).
The reply was that in general yes, depending on the type and quality of the encryption.
What I would note is that neither the question nor the reply are about a particular encryption technology. I would not take it to mean that they can decrypt PGP in general.
The answer is technically correct, if someone uses a weak enough cipher, they would be able to decode it. What else could they say? "We spend a lot of money on eavesdropping software, but really if people are encrypting their communication, it's all pretty useless."?
SSH is not 'ie SSL'.
Besides that SSL has CA's, what is the difference between SSH and SSL?
Just expanding the acronyms should give you a decent general idea - one is a 'secure shell' the other a 'secure socket layer'. For more details, it's pretty googleable.
But aren't the encryption algorithms involved pretty similar? Public key exchange of symmetric keys for some well-known algorithm?
Yes.
For example, you can generate your own RSA private key (say, from the command line on a UNIX/Linux box).
You can use that key and generate an "SSL certificate" and have it signed by a certificate authority (a "public" for-profit CA or your own private internal CA).
You can use that same key with SSH for authentication.
You can use that same key with GnuPG for e-mail signing and authentication.
For example, you can generate your own RSA private key (say, from the command line on a UNIX/Linux box).
You can use that key and generate an "SSL certificate" and have it signed by a certificate authority (a "public" for-profit CA or your own private internal CA).
You can use that same key with SSH for authentication.
You can use that same key with GnuPG for e-mail signing and authentication.
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I hope all they've discovered is a technicality allowing for partial decoding. If they can break PGP/SSL in a way that isn't just brute forcing the hashing algorithm, then we'll have a lot more trouble than just the government(s) spying on us.
There is an asic bitcoin miner which can generate 500GH/s which retails for 22k$. What if you had a billion dollars to crack encryptions?
You would be able to break weak passwords, but you wouldn't be able break PGP with decent key sizes.
Reason? Physics: http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/25375/why-not-us...
Reason? Physics: http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/25375/why-not-us...
Let's assume one hash is exactly equivalent to one attempt at brute force and the keys are 256 bits. 5GH/s * ($5B / $22K) is about 10^17 GH/s. There are 2^256 possibilities, which is about 10^77. So to try them all you need about 10^60 seconds. Granted that is the worst case for the cracker, but the average case is also going to take quite a while.
> Granted that is the worst case for the cracker, but the average case is also going to take quite a while.
The average case for finding something equaly distributed in a space is half the time, or about 5 * 10^59 seconds, what is about the same thing, because with numbers that big "about" usualy means anything from *10 to /10.
Of course, RSA keys aren't equaly distributed at the key space. That gives an speedup of sume number between 1 and 2 that I can remember (still about the same thing), and there are search algorithms that reduce the number of tries by some non-trivial amount. I'm not up-to-date on them.
The average case for finding something equaly distributed in a space is half the time, or about 5 * 10^59 seconds, what is about the same thing, because with numbers that big "about" usualy means anything from *10 to /10.
Of course, RSA keys aren't equaly distributed at the key space. That gives an speedup of sume number between 1 and 2 that I can remember (still about the same thing), and there are search algorithms that reduce the number of tries by some non-trivial amount. I'm not up-to-date on them.
I guess pretty good wasn't quite good enough.
Special hardware can speed-up brute forcing.
Means (answering the question if the technology can partially decrypt or analyze SSH or PGP):
"Yes, the used technology is basically (or in principle) capable of doing that, depending on the kind and quality of decryption."
This sentence is so much generalized that the writer almost certainly meant "yes, we can bruteforce a weak encryption".
Also the question includes the capability of "analyzing" SSH or PGP. That would (imo) include reading meta-data. So, in fact, if they are capable of telling the encryption scheme used in a PGP message, they would qualify to answer "yes, we can" here.
So, that's not surprising and the article is kind of link-bait.