The entire point of this is that the complexity is encapsulated on the signing side - not the verifier. So it's more that you would split the keys between systems you control - say the reverse proxy and the application server.
Or one that's checked into your version control (representing that it is your company's code that's running) and one that lives on the server (representing that it is a server your company controls).
Or to take your example - a key in the repo, a key from the dev, and a key from the build server.
More like a failure on TechCrunch. There is an implied agreement and violating it will result in a flat refusal to talk outside of prepared press releases.
This isn't good journalism and should not be celebrated.
The H1-B visa is intended for bringing specific technical expertise that does not exist in the US for a set period of time. This is why one of the requirements is that you must have interviewed US persons first. Its the same reason it's a nonimmigration visa.
The rampant abuse of the visa has a remedy - criminal charges against the HR directors of any company who is found to have committed fraud, and capping the number of visas per company (setting up many shell companies is a strong signal that fraud is being committed).
If an H1-B worker can't negotiate on a global level for their expertise - they should not be on that visa.
Temperature sensors are a great example for alerting because they fluctuate constantly, have multiple seasonalities, and failures can be subtle. In the end, you'll want:
1. If the sensor dies and there is no data at all
2. If the sensor gets stuck (giving same value)
3. If the sensor slowly drifts (adjusting for daily, weekly, and yearly seasons) - indicating a clogged filter or leaking refrigerant
4. Statistical spikes - this is the hardest to tune so you need to treat it as a model that detects anomalies and it takes a long time to label extremely rare events
5. Static thresholds, over varying windows to deal with sensor error and transient spikes.
It also raises questions like "if the sensor is reporting 400C then either the building is on fire or the sensor is broken", or "how do we get the alert if the building is indeed on fire" and the inevitable followup: do we even need to get an alert if the building is on literal fire?
I'm fond of using KaTeX for my personal blog posts. There is support for server side rendering for KaTeX (but not on GitHub pages because it necessarily opens it to arbitrary code execution - I asked).
But it notably lacks tikz support and if it can emit SVGs I'm beginning to wonder why I even use KaTeX and not something like this (beyond my personal anti-JS sentiment)
It means that there is a statistically significant improvement, but that improvement is tiny, and will not make you happier than your peers all by itself (assuming a standard peer group of 200 people - you'd likely swap places with 1 or 2 people).
Of course, this study only considered normative people, not marginalized or those who were experiencing active harm from exposure to social media - your personal results may vary and it's important to remember that science is imperfect and social sciences are doubly so.
If going off Facebook improves your life - you do you.
TLS chose the threat model that includes MITM - there's no good reason that should ever change. All I'm arguing is that having a middle ground between http and https would prevent eavesdropping, and that investment elsewhere could have been used to mitigate the MITM attacks (to the benefit of all protocols, even those that don't offer confidentiality). Instead we got OpenSSL and the CA model with all it's warts.
More importantly - this debate gets raised in every single HN post related to TLS or CAs. Answering with a "my threat model is better than yours" or somehow that my threat model is incorrect is even more silly than offering a configuration of TLS without authenticity. Maybe if we had invested more effort in 801.x and IPSec then we would get those same guarantees that TLS offers, but for all traffic and for free everywhere with no need for CA shenanigans or shortening lifetimes. Maybe in that alternative world we would be arguing that nonrepudiation is a valuable property or not.
Yes. MITM attacks do happen in reality. But by their nature they require active participation which for practical purposes means leaving some sort of trail. More importantly is that by decoupling confidentionality from authenticity, you can easily prevent eavesdropping attacks at scale.
Which for some threat models is sufficiently good.
MITM attacks are common, but noisy - BGP hijacks are literally public to the internet by their nature. I believe that insisting on coupling confidentiality to authenticity is counterproductive and prevents the development of more sophisticated security models and network design.
The generic version in TFA puts the data type allocated alongside the next pointer - no additional allocation needed. The only functional difference is if the zig compiler is not sufficiently advanced to understand it can reorder the fields (hence the alignment question).
The removal scenario is merely specifying that you are passing in ConnectionListNode instead of a Connection. Although maybe it's a good idea to think about how they compose comparatively.
This feels like a net negative result. It removes some of the complexity of using generics, but it couples between the data type and the collections it can be indexed by.
What are the benefits of this approach? Is it limited to data alignment, or is it out of a greater desire to remove generics?
At no point did submeta qualify their statement to only apply to former soldiers. Quite the rather - they removed the nuance that did exist in their quoted propaganda articles and made it explicitly based on national origin only.
1. They're low stakes to get wrong.
2. The most common is MCPs or similar ai-tooling.
3. Making them look good takes time and effort still. It's a multiplier, not a replacement.
4. Quality and maintainability require investment. I had to restart an agentic project several times because it painted itself into a corner.