The operator’s social “experiment” has all the scientific value of an angry person at a drive-thru McDonalds goading a child into shouting and throwing food at the employee.
The simplest explanation is often the best. He was attacked by... attacked by... the meat bag! Here’s how:
A Meat bag submits a PR and feels slighted the rejection. “This approver thinks I’m an AI? Well, he discerns not wisely but too well!! “
Feeling puckish, they put on the AI shoes (the shoe fits), sling mud all over the hapless maintainer’s nice house, and exit through a window.
The ruse works better than expected; their foil takes the bait, and doubles down with a dueling blog post: “I was Attacked by a Clanker!”
And here we are.
It may all be a show, but I going to tape the finale. (What will the meat bag do? How many people are driving this buggy? Does the clanker have a heart of iron or gold?)
A CSB safety video on the agency's investigation into the massive April 8, 2021, explosion and fire that fatally injured one worker at the Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corporation facility in Columbus, Ohio.
The marketing has 100% shifted to the creation of workloads using “Agents”.
Presumably the hyperscalers can begin conflating the number of “agents” created with “boring jobs eliminated” and thus herald the industrial revolution.
But first: Your subscription price is increasing and now includes 5 Agents.
What are some ways to avoid common methological pitfalls when generating test cases for "groundedness" benchmarks with automation?
Confirmation bias is one obvious pitfall that comes to mind, but also I wonder how it is possible to achieve reproducibility when the input is stochastic.
In a pure implementation, the same level of trust is implied (absolutely none at all) whether a device is connecting to a resource from the public internet or the same subnet.
There are four different micro-segmentation variations in the NIST reference guide: device-agent/gateway, enclaves, resource portals, and application sandboxing.
Basically a policy evaluation point (PEP) evaluates the security posture of both parties before and after a handshake, then creates a logical or physical path of some kind of between the actor and the resource. This can be done with software-defined virtual networks and stateful firewalls, at one or more of the OSI layers.
Microsoft’s version of “Zero Trust” doesn’t care if things are reachable from the public internet. They have been preaching “identity is the new perimeter” [1] for years, and it doesn’t wash.
The NIST Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) implementation guides (SP 1800-35) [2] cut through the nonsense and AI generated marketing smoke.
In ZTA, ALL network locations are untrusted. Network connections are created by a Policy Engine that creates and tears down tunnels to each resource dynamically using attribute-based-access-controls (ABAC). Per request.
Microsoft doesn’t have any products that can do full ZTA, so several pillars are missing from their “Zero Trust” marketing materials.
The terms “Cognitive decline” or “brain rot” may have sounded too sensational, and to be fair the authors note the limitations of the small sample size.
Indeed the paper doesn’t provide a reference or citation for the term “cognitive debt” so it is a strange title. Maybe a last minute swap.
Fascinating research out of MIT. Like all psychology studies it deserves healthy scrutiny and independent verification. Bit of a kitchen sink with the imaging and psychometric assessments, but who doesn’t love a picture of “this is your brain on LLMs” amirite?
Another reason to be worried by Microsoft’s Azure security guidelines which state “Identity is the new perimeter”.
Well, the perimeter is not a gate but a cattle guard, and I am not surprised to see some wolves eating a secret and a cow swaggering into the road.
Azure service APIs have always conflated the principles of “reachability from the public internet” and “anonymous access” into a single concept called “Public Access” which, for Azure KV, has 6 different public/private configuration combinations!
This vulnerability report did not include the Key Vault Networking settings for “Public network access”, so more testing (but not much more) is needed to see if the proxy side door can circumvent a resource ACL or private endpoint or both.