All Apple mobile devices I've used have had some form of low-level forced reboot method, akin to holding down your PC's power button. Though I can't say whether it's also something one could subvert with a BootROM exploit.
Nope, the kernel can load static ELF binaries. ld.so is only needed for dynamically linked binaries, and in fact many Go applications (for example, as they're statically linked) ship as containers with nothing but the single binary.
I've found this to be effective as well. Claude generally immediately identifies the stupid code pattern it used and tries to fix it (with somewhat varying results).
I wonder how this compares to GrapheneOS in practice.
>Operated by Murena, your Murena Workspace account @murena.io is at the centre of the ecosystem, allowing to store, back up and retrieve your data safely on remote servers.
This sounds like their version is somewhat married to Murena. While probably better than Google, still not independent.
They're also advertising features such as "hiding your IP address [...] when you feel like it" – which sounds a lot like a VPN – without mentioning much about who the traffic is going through or how they might log it.
The Europeans have already cooperated with Americans so that each could read each other's citizens' private messaging which would be illegal for the locals.
Keeping the data overseas by design would just make this easier.
Python has LiteralString for this exact purpose. It's only on the type checker level, but type checking should be part of most modern Python workflows anyway. I've seen DB libraries use this a lot for SQL parameters.
Based on the various benchmarks linked here and in the OP, the name feels justifiable. "Mini" models tend to be a lot worse compared to the base model than this one seems to be.
> Are you aware that here you are arguing for criminal sanctions on the order of 10 years in prison, for writing a letter?
It's about writing a letter that can result in someone else receiving criminal sanctions on the order of 10 years in prison, when that someone might not have even written a letter.
Since the build is reproducible, it should not matter when it was built. If you want to trace a build back to its source, there are much better ways than a timestamp.
"Security through obscurity" can definitely be defined in a meaningful way.
The opposite of "bad security through obscurity" is using completely public and standard mechanisms/protocols/algorithms such as TLS, PGP or pin tumbler locks. The security then comes from the keys and other secrets, which are chosen from the space permitted by the mechanism with sufficient entropy or other desirable properties.
The line is drawn between obscuring the mechanism, which is designed to have measurable security properties (cryptographic strength, enumeration prevention, lock security pins), and obscuring the keys that are essentially just random hidden information.
Obscuring the mechanism provides some security as well, sure, but a public mechanism can be publicly verified to provide security based only on secret keys.
> The case I was making, is that weakhash(stronghash(m)) has the security of weakhash, no matter how strong stronghash is.
I'll have to disagree. There are no known collision attacks against SHA-1(SHA-3(M)), so in the applied case, a combination can be more secure for some properties, even if it isn't in the theoretical case.
> H0(H1(m)) has the security of just H0. Hashes are not made to protect the content of m, but instead made to test the integrity of m. As such, a flaw in H0 will break the security guarantee, no matter how secure H1 is.
But this isn't true for all flaws. For example, even with the collision attacks against SHA-1, I don't think they're even remotely close to enabling a collision for SHA-1(some_other_hash(M)).
Similarly, HMAC-SHA-1 is still considered secure, as it's effectively SHA-1-X(SHA-1-Y(M)), where SHA-1-X and SHA-1-Y are just SHA-1 with different starting states.
So there's some value to be found in nesting hashes.
https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/force-restart-iphone-...