Sure but a system that breaks if it doesn't get exactly 86,400,000 millisecond scale scheduled events in a day has already been driving your SRE team insane.
I don't understand why people are so negative about IPv6. I have done essentially zero home networking work and I just ran this successfully. It just works!
```
> ping6 google.com
PING6(56=40+8+8 bytes) 2605:59c0:236f:3a08:7883:9d04:c26d:5fa1 --> 2607:f8b0:4005:806::200e
16 bytes from 2607:f8b0:4005:806::200e, icmp_seq=0 hlim=117 time=22.262 ms
16 bytes from 2607:f8b0:4005:806::200e, icmp_seq=1 hlim=117 time=26.124 ms
16 bytes from 2607:f8b0:4005:806::200e, icmp_seq=2 hlim=117 time=26.807 ms
^C
--- google.com ping6 statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 packets received, 0.0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/std-dev = 22.262/25.064/26.807/2.001 ms
```
Why would you be running sudo in production? A production environment should usually be setup up properly with explicit roles and normal access control.
Sudo is kind of a UX tool for user sessions where the user fundamentally can do things that require admin/root privileges but they don't trust themselves not to fat finger things so we add some friction. That friction is not really a security layer, it's a UX layer against fat fingering.
I know there is more to sudo if you really go deep on it, but the above is what 99+% of users are doing with it. If you're using sudo as a sort of framework for building setuid-like tooling, then this does not apply to you.
Can you share how the scripts work? That seems to be the most interesting part, but is omitted from the article. The only technical details are UART + an opto-coupler.
> Both devices run custom scripts designed to handle data transmission reliably rather than quickly. This approach limits throughput, but reliability is paramount for critical monitoring, where losing data is unacceptable. The scripts are finely tuned to ensure that every log entry is transmitted securely without risk of cross-contamination between networks.
I'm not sure which dimensions you're talking about, but in terms of bed size the F-150 has been very consistent over the years (although I think Crew Cabs — although they always existed — have become more popular). The Ranger still cannot fit a full sized sheet of plywood flat in the bed.
Quick research: the new Ranger's bed size has only increased 0.9" (width) relative to the 1990 version. Bed length seems to be the same.
I was considering getting a Rivian and decided that in fact I would probably not allow the 24 year old dude at my local construction supply co to use a skid steer to drop a load of gravel into the bed of my $75k+ electric vehicle.
So instead I got a used Ford F150 (gas) and when the skid steer guy drops gravel into the bed I feel fine.
The only disappointing aspect of the Iocaine maze is that it is not a literal maze. There should be a narrow, treacherous path through the interconnected web of content that lets you finally escape after many false starts.
If this is a concern, pass your UUIDv7 ID through an ECB block cipher with a 0 IV. 128 bit UUID, 128 bit AES block. Easy, near zero overhead way to scramble and unscramble IDs as they go in/out of your application.
There is no need to put the privacy preserving ID in a database index when you can calculate the mapping on the fly
This is a lot of fuss when you can get a batch update to stay within a few minutes of latency. You only have this problem if you are very insistent on both (1) very near real-time, and (2) Iceberg. And you can't go down this path if you require transactional queries.
I think most people who need very near real-time queries also tend to need them to be transactional. The use case where you can accept inconsistent reads but something will break if you're 3 minutes out of date is very rare.
256 bit symmetric cryptography keys are a bit like picking one atom in the universe (10^80 atoms, or 100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000). Your opponent would have to test half of the atoms in the universe to have a reasonable chance of getting the right key.
> Could someone like the NSA with limitless resources do it? Quite probably, sure.
If you're not worried about a fairly well-resourced government agency uncovering whatever network activity you believe needs to be anonymized, why would you be using Tor at all?