Depends on the access technology and environment. But usually there is not much choice to be made, by design. The cable or equivalent from the customer prem will go to exactly one aggregation location, and in that location, the choice of port generally doesn't matter. Among the potentially multiple cables or ports, they're all meant to be functionally the same. Maybe something is wrong with a cable or port, and that will hopefully come out in post-install testing, but there's not meant to be much of a decision to be made for commodity service like DSL or GPON (anything that'd use BNG). It's typically just going to be up to the last metre installer.
Metro ethernet services will be designed by an engineering team on a case-by-case basis, but they very rarely if ever use BNG.
> - Currently, the circuit where the user connects is arbitrarily decided by the demo user. In a real system with thousands of circuits, it'd be very difficult to properly assess which circuit the customer might connect to. When adding a new customer to a service, how does the operator decide, based on customer's location, which circuit to provide the service to ?
I'm not exactly sure what you're asking, but port allocation is, depending on the ISP's deployment model, either going to be fixed at the time the infrastructure was built, or whoever is doing the last metre install will choose a random available port on the switch. The subscriber will be assigned to that port in the RADIUS or equivalent database, and the BNG will query the subscriber based on DHCP Option 82 port information added by the switch. You could also map the subscriber based on MAC address, but this doesn't really work unless you don't support customer provided equipment on their end.
Why would it be non-standard? USB-PD is almost completely decoupled from the rest of USB, and USB-C connector doesn't imply 'super speed' lanes are available. The only thing it really changes from an implementation perspective is that you don't have to route high speed lanes to the port, and don't need them to be available on your USB controller.
Doesn't seem to be very Apple-like to have two identical looking ports with different function, though.
They don't even need to know it is a thing that exists. The defaults (ie. the status quo of implied trust in the OS vendor) are fine for this type of user.
So you think it's okay for manufacturers to take advantage of users as long as they continue buying the locked-down devices? I disagree, and I think this argument is incredibly disingenuous. You could make the same specious argument about nearly any consumer protection or antitrust case. Just because consumers will put up with it, or because they are manipulated into believing it's good for them, doesn't mean they shouldn't be protected.
Furthermore, if you fundamentally allow this behaviour, the market forces are sure to push us to an end state where users simply have no control, and there are no viable alternatives. We are most of the way there already when it comes to smartphones. The cost of entry to this market (many $billions over many years, if you can even manage to gain meaningful marketshare at all), and the amount of money that is on the table (30% of the $billions transacted on a successful platform today, but who knows how far they push with a real stranglehold) means that it is virtually impossible for competition to solve this problem.
That was intended to be a generic 'device manufacturer', not calling out Google and Apple specifically. It's my device. I should control it, full stop. It should simply not be legal for a device manufacturer to lock me out of a device I own, post sale. In the past it wasn't _possible_, so we didn't need to worry about it. But now the tech is at the point where manufacturers can create digital locks which simply cannot be broken, and give them full control of devices they sell (ie. which they no longer own), which are being used in anti-consumer ways.
Considering market forces are against it, I believe the only practical way to accomplish this in the long term is for this to be a right that is enforced by legislation. I don't think it is even far from precedent surrounding first sale doctrine and things like Magnuson-Moss, that the user should be the ultimate one in control post-purchase, it just takes a different shape when we're talking about computing technology.
Ultimate control over devices you own should be a basic right. Apple's wanton abuse of users and developers via the control they have over their platform, and Google's nipping at their heels, should be evidence enough of that.
Fundamentally, it is a trust issue. Why should I be forced to trust Google or Apple has my best interests in mind (they don't)? That is not ensuring 'device integrity', it's ensuring that I am at the whims of a corporation which doesn't care about me and will leverage what it can to extract as much blood as it can from me. You can ensure 'device integrity' without putting any permanent trust in Google or Apple.
If they're injecting targeted ads in the stream, then the stream producer must be 'smart'. It's not much of a stretch for it to enforce playing out the segments at approximately realtime (or whatever speedup they want to allow), and to force the advert segments to play out before anything past them. Some sidechannel could be used to inform the client about what's going on and produce a sensible playhead position.
It seems inevitable that this is the end game, and I don't really see viable ways around it for realtime playback. For offline playback, yeah, presumably that sidechannel includes enough information to cut out the ads.
Since we're talking about a legacy bank here, going to a branch and proving your identity is an option.
Worst case, you could always call and speak to a human who will do whatever verification they do if you forgot your password, which is functionally equivalent.
There is a distinction between the variable itself and its name. Const (and Rust's immutability-by-default) ensures that the variable does not change after assignment. This holds true even as references to it are passed to other functions or stored for later use. You "can't" accidentally pass a reference to that variable which will then be unexpectedly mutated a dozen calls deep into a library function you didn't write.
If you have shadowing, it simply means you can have a different variable with the same name later in the same (or child) scope, this usually must be explicit. The same name now refers to a different variable, but the original variable still exists and remains valid.
It's quite a useful pattern, particularly where the old value is no longer useful (for example transforming input), especially when using the old value might be valid code but would be a mistake.
It's an old anecdote, but years ago Samsung refused a warranty claim for a _failed USB port_ that would no longer charge the phone _because I had rooted it_ and the fuses were burnt. I think this was unreasonable of them, but it's not like I had any recourse. If vendors were really worried about this aspect, they would/could implement such draconian policies.
> I hadn't even imagined this constituting "brute force". Is my phone using "brute force" to find the WiFi router? At some point it's not really "Brute force" it's "There are a handful of options, try all of them" and GPS seems past that point especially on modern hardware.
Your phone only needs to listen to the WiFi router on one channel at a time in operation, and the signal parameters are well enough defined that they can be scanned quickly. A GPS receiver requires at least 4 parallel channels to achieve a position solution, and there are up to 32 possible codes the satellites could be at. Scanning 6 channels across 32 codes, and then also sweeping phase and doppler shift to lock them , just to 'discover' if there is a valid signal there takes time, and this is what older receivers had to do. Modern receivers tend to just 'brute force' this by having an entire receive pipeline dedicated to every possible PRN all the time, and possibly even correlate multiple doppler shifts simultaneously as well, so they effectively have 32 (or more) receive channels, despite only ever expecting a maximum of 12 birds being visible. The extra channels are necessary more or less exclusively to reduce acquisition time, so I think it's fair to call them 'brute force'.
No, the fact that all of these ships show the same false location strongly suggests that they are being spoofed from a single terrestrial source; this effect is not practical to achieve by modifying the signals transmitted by the satellites, even if the US wanted to for some reason.
> making everyone appear at exactly the same location would be nigh-impossible, though.
I don't think this is actually the case. In a spoofing scenario, all of the rogue signals would typically be generated by a single terrestrial station. The time of flight of all of the generated signals will be the same, so all that matters is the position solution reflected in the transmitted signals, as the fundamental principle of GPS based on TOF is no longer in play. So I'd think that in a typical spoofing scenario, all receivers thinking they're in more or less an identical location is what you'd expect.
It might be possible in a borderline case for the receiver to receive some spoofed signals and some real signals simultaneously, in which case you'd expect weird results, but I think you'd definitely see a correlation around the position being broadcast by the spoofer.
You're more or less inside a Faraday cage. I find you'll generally get a strong lock just holding your phone near the window, though TTFF can be relatively slow compared to normal due to the lack of AGPS.
Metro ethernet services will be designed by an engineering team on a case-by-case basis, but they very rarely if ever use BNG.