I found this an interesting look into The US Forestry service's philosophy of road management through the lens of Washington State's Olympic National Forest.
"The Forest Service – a branch of the Department of Agriculture whose original purpose was to “furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of the people of the United States” – classifies their roads into five buckets based on their method of construction and maintenance needs. And the agency seems to be highly tuned to the lifecycle of their road infrastructure..."
Some folks are just not TradeMarksters. They'll teach you that Intel makes processors that implement x86 and amd64 instruction sets. You can Google things on DuckDuckGo. They'll blow their nose on the Kleenex that they bought from GenericPaperProductsCo. At some restaurants in the US South you'll have to let your server know what kind of Coke you want: cola, lemon-lime, or the Doctor one.
BIOS is often able to set mask bits in the CPU or chipset's pci bridges that prevent the devices from being reported to the OS. Before loading additional code like user DXEs or bootloader, BIOS commands a one-way sealing operation that prevents modifications until reset.
Specific Secure Boot policies, when provisioned, allow for testsigning to be
enabled, on any BCD object, including {bootmgr}. This also removes the NT loader
options blacklist (AFAIK). (MS16-094 / CVE-2016-3287, and MS16-100 / CVE-2016-3320)
Found by my123 (@never_released) and slipstream (@TheWack0lian)
Writeup by slipstream (@TheWack0lian)
First up, "Secure Boot policies". What are they exactly?
As you know, secureboot is a part of the uefi firmware, when enabled, it only
lets stuff run that's signed by a cert in db, and whose hash is not in dbx
(revoked).
As you probably also know, there are devices where secure boot can NOT be
disabled by the user (Windows RT, HoloLens, Windows Phone, maybe Surface Hub,
and maybe some IoTCore devices if such things actually exist -- not talking
about the boards themselves which are not locked down at all by default, but end
devices sold that may have secureboot locked on).
But in some cases, the "shape" of secure boot needs to change a bit. For example
in development, engineering, refurbishment, running flightsigned stuff (as of
win10) etc. How to do that, with devices where secure boot is locked on?
Enter the Secure Boot policy.
It's a file in a binary format that's embedded within an ASN.1 blob, that is
signed. It's loaded by bootmgr REALLY early into the windows boot process. It
must be signed by a certificate in db. It gets loaded from a UEFI variable in
the secureboot namespace (therefore, it can only be touched by boot services).
There's a couple .efis signed by MS that can provision such a policy, that is,
set the UEFI variable with its contents being the policy.
What can policies do, you ask?
They have two different types of rules. BCD rules, which override settings
in the on-disk BCD, and registry rules, which contain configuration for the
policy itself, plus configuration for other parts of boot services, etc. For
example, one registry element was introduced in Windows 10 version 1607
'Redstone' which disables certificate expiry checking inside mobilestartup's
.ffu flashing (ie, the "lightning bolt" windows phone flasher); and another one
enables mobilestartup's USB mass storage mode. Other interesting registry
rules change the shape of Code Integrity, ie, for a certain type of binary,
it changes the certificates considered valid for that specific binary.
(Alex Ionescu wrote a blog post that touches on Secure Boot policies. He teased a
followup post that would be all about them, but that never came.)
But, they must be signed by a cert in db. That is to say, Microsoft.
Also, there is such a thing called DeviceID. It's the first 64 bits of a salted
SHA-256 hash, of some UEFI PRNG output. It's used when applying policies on
Windows Phone, and on Windows RT (mobilestartup sets it on Phone, and
SecureBootDebug.efi when that's launched for the first time on RT). On Phone,
the policy must be located in a specific place on EFIESP partition with the
filename including the hex-form of the DeviceID. (With Redstone, this got
changed to UnlockID, which is set by bootmgr, and is just the raw UEFI PRNG
output.)
Basically, bootmgr checks the policy when it loads, if it includes a DeviceID,
which doesn't match the DeviceID of the device that bootmgr is running on, the
policy will fail to load.
Any policy that allows for enabling testsigning (MS calls these Retail Device
Unlock / RDU policies, and to install them is unlocking a device), is supposed
to be locked to a DeviceID (UnlockID on Redstone and above). Indeed, I have
several policies (signed by the Windows Phone production certificate) like
this, where the only differences are the included DeviceID, and the signature.
If there is no valid policy installed, bootmgr falls back to using a default
policy located in its resources. This policy is the one which blocks enabling
testsigning, etc, using BCD rules.
Now, for Microsoft's screwups.
During the development of Windows 10 v1607 'Redstone', MS added a new type of
secure boot policy. Namely, "supplemental" policies that are located in the
EFIESP partition (rather than in a UEFI variable), and have their settings
merged in, dependant on conditions (namely, that a certain "activation" policy
is also in existance, and has been loaded in).
Redstone's bootmgr.efi loads "legacy" policies (namely, a policy from UEFI
variables) first. At a certain time in redstone dev, it did not do any further
checks beyond signature / deviceID checks. (This has now changed, but see how
the change is stupid)
After loading the "legacy" policy, or a base policy from EFIESP partition, it
then loads, checks and merges in the supplemental policies.
See the issue here? If not, let me spell it out to you plain and clear.
The "supplemental" policy contains new elements, for the merging conditions.
These conditions are (well, at one time) unchecked by bootmgr when loading a
legacy policy. And bootmgr of win10 v1511 and earlier certainly doesn't know
about them. To those bootmgrs, it has just loaded in a perfectly valid, signed
policy.
The "supplemental" policy does NOT contain a DeviceID. And, because they were
meant to be merged into a base policy, they don't contain any BCD rules either,
which means that if they are loaded, you can enable testsigning. Not just for
windows (to load unsigned driver, ie rootkit), but for the {bootmgr} element
as well, which allows bootmgr to run what is effectively an unsigned .efi
(ie bootkit)!!! (In practise, the .efi file must be signed, but it can be
self-signed) You can see how this is very bad!! A backdoor, which MS put
in to secure boot because they decided to not let the user turn it off in
certain devices, allows for secure boot to be disabled everywhere!
You can see the irony. Also the irony in that MS themselves provided us several
nice "golden keys" (as the FBI would say ;) for us to use for that purpose :)
About the FBI: are you reading this? If you are, then this is a perfect real
world example about why your idea of backdooring cryptosystems with a "secure
golden key" is very bad! Smarter people than me have been telling this to you
for so long, it seems you have your fingers in your ears. You seriously don't
understand still? Microsoft implemented a "secure golden key" system. And the
golden keys got released from MS own stupidity. Now, what happens if you tell
everyone to make a "secure golden key" system? Hopefully you can add 2+2...
Anyway, enough about that little rant, wanted to add that to a writeup ever
since this stuff was found ;)
Anyway, MS's first patch attempt. I say "attempt" because it surely doesn't do
anything useful. It blacklists (in boot.stl), most (not all!) of the policies.
Now, about boot.stl. It's a file that gets cloned to a UEFI variable only boot
services can touch, and only when the boot.stl signing time is later than the
time this UEFI variable was set.
However, this is done AFTER a secure boot policy gets loaded. Redstone's
bootmgr has extra code to use the boot.stl in the UEFI variable to check
policy revocation, but the bootmgrs of TH2 and earlier does NOT have such
code.
So, an attacker can just replace a later bootmgr with an earlier one.
Another thing: I saw some additional code in the load-legacy-policy function in
redstone 14381.rs1_release. Code that wasn't there in 14361. Code that
specifically checked the policy being loaded for an element that meant this was
a supplemental policy, and erroring out if so. So, if a system is running
Windows 10 version 1607 or above, an attacker MUST replace bootmgr with
an earlier one.
On August 9th, 2016, another patch came about, this one was given the designation
MS16-100 and CVE-2016-3320. This one updates dbx. The advisory says it revokes
bootmgrs. The dbx update seems to add these SHA256 hashes (unless I screwed up
my parsing):
<snip>
I checked the hash in the signature of several bootmgrs of several
architectures against this list, and found no matches. So either this
revokes many "obscure" bootmgrs and bootmgfws, or I'm checking the wrong hash.
Either way, it'd be impossible in practise for MS to revoke every bootmgr
earlier than a certain point, as they'd break install media, recovery partitions,
backups, etc.
- RoL
disclosure timeline:
~march-april 2016 - found initial policy, contacted MSRC
~april 2016 - MSRC reply: wontfix, started analysis and reversing, working on
almost-silent (3 reboots needed) PoC for possible emfcamp demonstration
~june-july 2016 - MSRC reply again, finally realising: bug bounty awarded
july 2016 - initial fix - fix analysed, deemed inadequate. reversed later rs1
bootmgr, noticed additional inadequate mitigation
august 2016 - mini-talk about the issue at emfcamp, second fix, full writeup
release
credits:
my123 (@never_released) -- found initial policy set, tested on surface rt
slipstream (@TheWack0lian) -- analysis of policies, reversing bootmgr/
mobilestartup/etc, found even more policies, this writeup.
tiny-tro credits:
code and design: slipstream/RoL
awesome chiptune: bzl/cRO <3
It actually resides in the pch. The processor is called the management engine. In newer platforms, it gets to decide if the processor even gets to see the bios executable code.
I couldn't find much data on the Curie module, but it looks like the only pins required are power and slow io, so I can't imagine it's a super dense bga or anything. Even on the high end Intel socs with over 1k balls a good designer can escape all the signals without microvias.
A few years ago I implemented the storage system for a special-purpose diagnostic camera. The specification defined (very long) filenames for the saved images using a timestamp and some other data. I used a mostly off-the-shelf microcontroller/NAND/USB mass storage reference implementation, hooked it up a side-channel to the FPGA, and had everything working pretty nicely. Until the test harness that just continuously commanded pictures to be taken reached 105 iterations. After that, the camera timed out waiting on the storage subsystem to store the image.
The problem turned out to be the code that found the 8.3 filename: it did the longfi~1.bin, checked to see if that file existed and if so, incremented to longfi~2.bin, then checked that... but never did the checksum trick described here, just kept iterating. (bear in mind this was a tiny 8-bit microcontroller that didn't have the RAM to just read all the directory entries at once and keep them around for comparison) Finding the proper 8.3 filename this way took longer than the timeout period after 104 collisions.
Of course, we only cared about the long filename and never saw the 8.3 filename, so my fix was simply to use an appropriate hash of the long filename to ensure a good probability of uniqueness.
I'm not sure which ones you're referring to, but the
NVDIMMs I'm familiar with [0]
are are normal DRAMs with an additional hold-up supercap, controller, and flash. When power goes away, the controller streams DRAM contents to flash.
Linux block device Drivers [1] exist as does some filesystem support [2] for ext4fs.
>Why can't the HDD vendors publish a md5/sha1 hash of the firmware so we know what the value should be?
Because the only way to actually verify the hash of the firmware is to connect to the drive's controller outside of the firmware's control with something like JTAG or a direct dump of the flash. Otherwise, the PC would send a command to ask the HD firmware what it's own hash is. The compromised HD firmware can then simply respond with a published vendor hash.
The most likely explanation is that 64Mb (8MB) was the highest density part available in the footprint (SOIC-8?) at the time of manufacture and was priced at a significant premium to the 32Mb part.
By mundane coincidence, I discovered uefi-firmware-parser yesterday. Along with a radare2 session, it made it much easier to find a null-pointer dereference in an Intel FSP binary blob.
(U)EFI is essentially a little OS that eventually loads the OS that runs the software you care about. Intel sponsors most of the core OS code (mirrored) at:
https://github.com/tianocore/edk2
A Bios vendor takes that code, drops in a bunch of hardware init code from Intel (or AMD), adds thier own user interface, "csm16" old-school BIOS implementation, and value-adds like debugging and automation for factory test and provisioning.
The best place to look is probably Coreboot. It's the boot firmware used by Google Chromebooks. (Github mirror links used here for politeness to the project's servers.) Taking Intel Haswell processors as an example (because I know this code path) we can sketch the general process.
From there, mainboard-specific code sets up things like which SuperIO chip to configure, the i2c addresses to interrogate for information on RAM geometry and timing, and how the chipset is wired to connectors on the board. Commong chipset (northbridge and southbridge) init code is run using that configuration data.
https://github.com/coreboot/coreboot/blob/master/src/mainboa...
Then DRAM is initialized (the Haswell example is a bit lame in that currently a binary blob of compiled code from Intel does this job.) The Sandybridge DDR3 init was recently reverse-engineered and re-implemented and fully exemplifies the training processes required.
https://github.com/coreboot/coreboot/blob/master/src/northbr...
Now that Gigagbytes of RAM are available, another boot stage is fetched from flash. When generic framework gets back to cpu-specific stuff, power management is configured,Inter-Processor Interrupt handlers are installed, and other cores go through a quick init sequence.
https://github.com/coreboot/coreboot/blob/master/src/cpu/int...
An invalid or debug instruction causes the processor to throw an exception and jump to a specific address where "handler" code should exist. This is managed by the OS, so in this case, the OS would look up the proper thing to do as configured by the earlier ptrace calls -- probably executing your debugger code to let you inspect variables and memory. When you're done inspecting the proper instruction gets re-installed in the target process, the OS restores state saved by the exception trap, and transfers execution back to the debugged process. Most processors have a single-step flag so that the next instruction to execute and the following trigger the exception.
There is typically only one (or a small set) of hardware instruction pointer breakpoints. Every time the CPU is about to execute an instruction, it compares IP to the IP breakpoint register (or set of registers) and if they match, a debug exception is thrown. These are what you must use to debug the BIOS/bootloader executing in-place from ROM with a JTAG or XDP hardware debugger attached. Later, software can add the proper exception handler once enough of the hardware platform is configured. (Not all architectures exit power-on reset with exceptions enabled or even exception vectors mapped to a valid memory location.)
If the code you are debugging is executing out of write-able memory, then your debugger can support an effectively infinite list of breakpoints by writing some instruction that causes an exception to be thrown anywhere you want a break, then handling that exception by looking up the faulting instruction address in your breakpoint list.
Most processors also give you hardware data access breakpoints as well. These typically sit on the CPU's data bus interface and can fire when the address or data that's about to hit the bus match the respective breakpoint registers. There is usually an option to only trap reads, writes, or both. Sometimes you get interesting things like a mask register that lets you trap on a whole block of memory.
One of the most interesting hardware debug features of modern processors is the branch trace which keeps a running list of the last N branch instructions that lets you reconstruct a "how did we get here" story.
To be a bit more explicit, using a separate httpd and application server allows a division of labor between the resource-bound task of handling the request + building the response from the network-bound task of dibbling bytes back to the original requestor.
Nginx (and the general class of highly concurrent servers) is good at handling lots of connections largely because it tries to minimize the resources (memory, process scheduler time, etc) required to manage each connection as it slowly feeds the result down the wire.
The application server generally wants an instance per CPU so that it can hurry up and crank through a memory-, cpu-, or database-hungry calculation in as few microseconds as possible, hand the resulting data back to the webserver and proceed to put the memory, DB, and CPU to the task of processing the next request.
This is in contrast to the (simplified here) old-school CGI way that say ancient Apache would receive a request, then fork off a copy of PHP or Perl for each one, letting the app get blocked by writing to the stdio pipe to Apache then Apache to the requesting socket. All the while maintaining a full OS process for each request in play.
"The Forest Service – a branch of the Department of Agriculture whose original purpose was to “furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of the people of the United States” – classifies their roads into five buckets based on their method of construction and maintenance needs. And the agency seems to be highly tuned to the lifecycle of their road infrastructure..."
(Discovered through https://kagi.com/smallweb/ featured on HN a few weeks ago)