This excerpt from the article describes the risk well.
> In Firefox Private Browsing mode, the identifier can also persist after all private windows are closed, as long as the Firefox process remains running. In Tor Browser, the stable identifier persists even through the "New Identity" feature, which is designed to be a full reset that clears cookies and browser history and uses new Tor circuits.
I've been using SSH for ~15 years and never knew about these escape sequences. I'm eagerly awaiting my next hung session so that I can test `~.`. It's much nicer than my current approach of having to close that terminal window.
`setHTML` is meant as a replacement for `innerHTML`. In the use case you describe, you would have never wanted `innerHTML` anyway. You'd want `innerText` or `textContent`.
In Apple's case, starting with macOS Tahoe, Filevault saves your recovery key to your iCloud Keychain [0]. iCloud Keychain is end-to-end encrypted, and so Apple doesn't have access to the key.
As a US company, it's certainly true that given a court order Apple would have to provide these keys to law enforcement. That's why getting the architecture right is so important. Also check out iCloud Advanced Data Protection for similar protections over the rest of your iCloud data.
> We’re gradually transitioning the AWS European Sovereign Cloud to be operated exclusively by EU citizens located in the EU. During this transition period, we will continue to work with a blended team of EU residents and EU citizens located in the EU.
I find it fascinating that the goal is to staff this exclusively with EU citizens, thereby excluding non-citizen residents of the EU.
The docs explicitly describe this cloud's independence from the US.
> The AWS European Sovereign Cloud will be capable of operation without dependency on global AWS systems so that the AWS European Sovereign Cloud will remain viable for operating workloads indefinitely even in the face of exceptional circumstances that could isolate the AWS European Sovereign Cloud from AWS resources located outside the EU, such as catastrophic disruption of transatlantic communications infrastructure or a military or geopolitical crisis threatening the sovereignty of EU member states.
Here's the PR[0] that resolved the SSRF issue. This fix was shipped within 24 hours of receiving the initial report.
It's worth noting that at the time of this report, this only affected PostHog's single tenant hobby deployment (i.e. our self hosted version). Our Cloud deployment used our Rust service for sending webhooks, which has had SSRF protection since May 2024[1].
Since this report we've evolved our Cloud architecture significantly, and we have similar IP-based filtering throughout our backend services.
I work on security at PostHog. We resolved these SSRF findings back in October 2024 when this report was responsibly disclosed to us. I'm currently gathering the relevant PRs so that we can share them here. We're also working on some architectural improvements around egress, namely using smokescreen, to better protect against this class of issue.
I utilized SSE when building automatic restart functionality[0] into Doppler's CLI. Our api server would send down an event whenever an application's secrets changed. The CLI would then fetch the latest secrets to inject into the application process. (I opted not to directly send the changed secrets via SSE as that would necessitate rechecking the access token that was used to establish the connection, lest we send changed secrets to a recently deauthorized client). I chose SSE over websockets because the latter required pulling in additional dependencies into our Golang application, and we truly only needed server->client communication.
One issue we ran into that hasn't been discussed is HTTP timeouts. Some load balancers close an HTTP connection after a certain timeout (e.g. 1 hour) to prevent connection exhaustion. You can usually extend this timeout, but it has to be explicitly configured. We also found that our server had to send intermittent "ping" events to prevent either Cloudflare or Google Cloud Load Balancing from closing the connection, though I don't remember how frequently these were sent. Otherwise, SSE worked great for our use case.
> The Secure Enclave randomizes the data volume’s encryption keys on every reboot and does not persist these random keys, ensuring that data written to the data volume cannot be retained across reboot. In other words, there is an enforceable guarantee that the data volume is cryptographically erased every time the PCC node’s Secure Enclave Processor reboots.
Security at PostHog (W20);
Former Co-Founder & CTO at Doppler (W19)