When I click on "unreasonable searches and seizures," I get this... excellent... explanation:
This part of the Constitution is supposed to guarantee that 5-0 can’t fuck with you (unless they have “probable cause”)
But — the Conservatives found a way around this by allowing a “stop and frisk” aka “Terry stop” if cops have “reasonable suspicion” (this is why they are still allowed to fuck with you) (see Terry v. Ohio)
In an automobile, cops are often held to the “plain view” standard, although the Roberts court has recently increased their ability to fuck with you (see Beacoats v. Georgia)
Nowadays, keeping “your glove compartment locked” is not enough to protect you, as it was in the Jay-Z/Clinton era of liberal jurisprudence in criminal procedure.
While this is a wonderful text and an unimpeachable use of the technology, I can't avoid reflecting that certain initial choices of brand identification may present serious practical concerns in a prospective attempt to pivot and expand.
I've lived in San Francisco for 20 years. You might be interested in knowing where your General Tso's will end up:
When work crews pulled open a broken BART escalator at San Francisco's Civic Center Station last month, they found so much human excrement in its works they had to call a hazardous-materials team.
While the sheer volume of human waste was surprising, its presence was not. Once the stations close, the bottom of BART station stairwells in downtown San Francisco are often a prime location for homeless people to camp for the night or find a private place to relieve themselves.
I don't think we're arguing about anything substantive. For the record, I shave my neck every day. I also have no problem with thinking of IP as the new Ethernet.
By "layering violation" I really meant "layering" in a systems rather than a protocol sense. For example, it'd be a "layering violation" in this sense if your OS had a system call print_powerpoint_document(2).
I've got it - we'll encode Ethernet frames in JSON and tunnel them over HTTPS to an IP stack in Javascript. With a JS DHCP client, your browser will grab an IP address on the same subnet as the cloud server. And it's business up front, party in the back...
"Layering violation" is not the best term for what I meant, which is just "design mistake." Also the OSI model doesn't have much to do with reality. But if you want layering violations...
Your home PC isn't really on the Internet. It's on a crappy pseudo-network that happens to be connected to the Internet.
This doesn't mean you shouldn't be able to use it as a server - you should. However, to use it as a server, you'll need a proxy/gateway server on the real Internet (ie, in the cloud) and a pseudo-protocol by which the gateway talks to your home PC. The pseudo-protocol could even look a lot like the protocol that real servers speak to each other on the real Internet - but there's no requirement that they be the same. (I'm not sure how well inbound port 80 works if you're on Comcast, anyway.) So, when designing the real-server protocol, it's a layering violation to also be thinking about this pseudopod.
Normal users (ie, users behind NAT) shouldn't be running their own Tent servers, period. People who run their own servers are geeks by definition and can/should host in the cloud. Where "cloud" means "that part of the Internets that actually works."
But your second point is unanswerable. I'd go a little farther and say HTTP is actually a pretty good fit for Tent.
The sweet spot both Tent and Diaspora are/were aiming for is one where most users use somebody else's service, but a few crazy neckbeards choose to self-host.
The neckbeards who actually care (often quite unreasonably) about privacy, etc, provide a very useful service to the ordinary users - they keep the central service(s) honest, ie, keep them from turning into Facebook. Because it's possible to escape, because the neckbeards keep that possibility open, the ordinary users are not captured.
At least, that's the theory. Diaspora didn't execute on it. Tent, well, we'll see.
I already see spam (with t.co links) on the alpha.app.net page. Surely nuking spam and spammers shouldn't be hard for a paid, centralized service like app.net?
Identi.ca also appears to be full of spam. Basically nothing will kill a public space faster or deader. There is a certain set of users who will stick around in a chat room/feed/forum/whatever full of spambots, but it's not a high-quality audience and doesn't tend to grow much.
("America! Fsck yeah!" I mean, some of us USans, proud sponsors of WIPO and other fine agreements, never thought we'd see the day our international representatives would be in the right. Sadly that day appears to be... 2005.)
Leap seconds are an abomination against nature: they make math not work on time. In chronological (atomic) time, math on time is stateless and referentially transparent. Like math. In sidereal time, it... isn't.
The general use of sidereal time is a gigantic global complexification with trivial cosmetic benefits to one specialized profession - astronomy. Unfortunately, it is also the astronomers who have been put in charge of time standardization, so the disaster will probably continue.
The right way to treat time as a programmer, if you're really serious about time, is to treat sidereal time as a display mode, like a timezone, and work internally in proper chronological time (eg, GPS time). Unfortunately the leap second system is a timezone that varies over time. But at least the complexity is isolated in the presentation layer.
Not-patenting a (practically, not legally) patentable algorithm doesn't come easily to academic researchers these days. The authors deserve kudos (unlike the rapacious Michael Luby, fountain code inventor) for trying to make sure people can use their algorithm sometime in the next 20 years.
I don't know that the terminology is common (or correct), but I find it pretty useful. It also corresponds intuitively to the way people in practice use these terms. I say keep it.
TLDR for OP: in both "DP" and "memoization" you construct a name-value table for a given function. In "memoization" you construct it reactively, in "DP" proactively - where "reactively" means "lazily as we need it," and "proactively" means "any way that isn't reactively."
(A dag being just one way of storing this data structure. Generally it is just a cache of function results - which can be stored as a table, derivation graph, or whatever.)
It's not a question of law but simply one of power. The USG is sovereign and not subject to any controlling legal authority. And its power, especially in financial matters, is global.
Therefore it can be analyzed as if it were a criminal actor. Does the USG have motive, propensity and opportunity to murder Bitcoin? Sadly, the answers are yes, yes and yes.
Motive and propensity - obvious. Opportunity - USG can't shut down Bitcoin trading, but it can smash the BTC price by destroying the exchangers. If it misses one, everyone who owns BTC and sees it as an investment will rush for that exit. Once it is closed, the price is zero by definition.
In retrospect, BTC will look like a very foolish bubble. In fact it is perfectly sound from an economic perspective, but not from a political perspective - it assumes a basically fair, just and sensible global legal order. Or at least a multipolar one. Closing our eyes and believing these illusions exist is not an effective way to make them exist.
BTC is flourishing. It continues to flourish because DOJ hasn't finished its paperwork yet. If you have some - sell it while you can. A big lump of gold feels nice in the hand.
Can you make a Tent (or more ambitious social p2p) client which is also an FB client? Of course.
FB and Twitter have APIs. Of course, they can revoke your key. But they have web clients, so they can be scraped.
Faced with a genuinely distributed opponent, there's no way the existing behemoths can keep your data in their silos.
For instance, FB can block tent.is at the API level or even at the IP level. But if Tent hosts pop up all around the internets, and if they are general-purpose enough that users can install their own scraping gateways, which can't be attacked centrally using technical or legal means... it's game over. To me this is one of the less recognized advantages of a distributed service.
1. People learned (grudgingly) to use spam filters with their email because they had an existing service which had achieved large-scale network effect in a spam-free environment. A new service which develops a spam problem before it achieves critical mass is much more likely to be abandoned.
There must be some reason we haven't seen successful new decentralized service protocols on the Internet since the early '90s. I don't know of a more obvious one.
2. The problem is that contact names propagate outward from the master state where a push will update them. For instance, they get written down on business cards. They also get cached, imprudently but inevitably, in forms that are still digital but don't update properly.
Imagine a protocol that you could use to update your email address this way, and you'll see the problem. In theory, you could design a special SMTP message that would cause all clients to update their address books. In reality this would scale quite poorly and be quite unreliable, leading people to avoid it, leading it to be even more unreliable, etc. Of course, your chances are much better with a bright, shiny new protocol... but still.
After all, there's a reason social services are centralized on today's Internets. The reason (IMHO) is that the Internets since 1992 or so have been an antisocial network, and anything worth attacking that lacks a centralized defense command is rapidly overrun by digital Huns. For instance, SMTP exists today because it existed before eternal September, and being valuable was (barely) defended; but if it didn't exist as a legacy from the old, social Internet, it would be very difficult to create it in the new antisocial one. If not impossible.
I mean, it's certainly not that some of us rotting old neckbeards weren't using finger and talk on the firewall-free Internet in 1989. So we know how cool it would be if some bright young whippersnapper could solve teh problem...
(2) This is useful but inevitably imperfect, as forcing every interlocutor to equate the old and new names is of course impossible. Eg, HTTP redirects make it possible to change your DNS identity - but hardly trivial, though the redirect itself is trivial.
And of course it's a process that your existing host could easily frustrate, though that would be very ill-mannered. Not saying there are any perfect solutions here.
A couple of things I don't see on a quick scan of the docs:
(1) I don't see how one Tent entity contacts another proactively - it looks like A can't message B unless B has already chosen to follow A. If this is so, is it an anti-spam measure? Given that StatusNet etc. are infested with spam, it seems like a very wise one :-) On the other hand, it is rather limiting as compared to centralized platforms, don't you think?
(2) I don't see how you maintain the promise of a portable identity when your identities are hosted URIs. Eg, if my identity is tent.is/foobar, and I want to move to a different host, how do I do that? I can download my data, sure. It looks like I can even bounce from tent.is to another data server. But unless I want to break all my social connections, don't I remain at the mercy of tent.is? This strikes me as a rather unsolvable problem, but it would be reassuring to clarify that you're not solving it :-)
This part of the Constitution is supposed to guarantee that 5-0 can’t fuck with you (unless they have “probable cause”)
But — the Conservatives found a way around this by allowing a “stop and frisk” aka “Terry stop” if cops have “reasonable suspicion” (this is why they are still allowed to fuck with you) (see Terry v. Ohio)
In an automobile, cops are often held to the “plain view” standard, although the Roberts court has recently increased their ability to fuck with you (see Beacoats v. Georgia)
Nowadays, keeping “your glove compartment locked” is not enough to protect you, as it was in the Jay-Z/Clinton era of liberal jurisprudence in criminal procedure.
While this is a wonderful text and an unimpeachable use of the technology, I can't avoid reflecting that certain initial choices of brand identification may present serious practical concerns in a prospective attempt to pivot and expand.