The PRP test has the same computational cost as an LL test. The reason why GIMPS now prefers to do PRP tests instead of LL tests is because an efficiently verifiable proof-of-work certificate was developed for PRP tests [1].
> But I don't know if it can be proven there do not exist non-prime P/Q values which produce an RSA keypair which can successfully encrypt/decrypt messages. I'm sure this isn't kosher for a real implementation, but I've never found an answer.
If p and q are coprime Carmichael numbers then RSA will still successfully encrypt and decrypt messages, though this will be less secure as p*q will have smaller prime factors and thus be easier to factor.
> this post refers to it as reference 2. That algorithm runs in constant time, which is a pretty big deal.
Not constant time; the analysis in the paper shows that the nth digit can be computed in O(n log n M(log n)) bit operations, where M(j) is the bit complexity of multiplying two j bit numbers.
It's cool seeing this posted here, I authored this paper. The inspirational quote at the beginning was actually from a comment on a HN post a month ago: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19953213
> Who knows what bugs wait lurking in there; who knows which particular combinations of which libraries are a security-bug timebomb. [...] The GTK and GNOME libraries have never been security-audited to the extent that their maintainers would be willing to make the claim, "under no circumstances will this library ever crash."
> gnome-screensaver is brand new, bug-ridden, unreliable, and a security disaster waiting to happen
"Whenever you're told that some existing statistical trend will continue, but you aren't given a hard-to-vary account of what causes that trend, you're being told a wizard did it." -David Deutsch
[1] https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.60