There's no problem using language to talk about language. I think you're referencing performative contradictions rather than self-referential paradoxes.
The cases where the propositions become inaccurate is where the terms used have no concrete definition.
The point is, the proposition "This sentence is false" isn't even sensible, because "This sentence" isn't something that can be true or false. It's just two words put together in a tricky way.
I also love how some people think this article is a defense of anti-structuralism, while others think it's a dismissal.
As to chronology, I'm afraid history isn't on your side. One era does not end sharply as another begins. There's significant chronological overlap between schools of thought and movements in general.
I love how so many of these comments revolve around the term "postmodern." This article's argument is not its title. It's the idea represented by a particular school of thinking.
Call it what you want: there is a school of thought which embraces the idea that the universe is senseless, and they claim the mind creates artificial order. You can see it in artistic work.
Obviously, this article is about that school of thought.
(which, I think you could make a very reasonable case is decidedly "post-modern." Not every representative of the school has to live in the same time frame, just like Beethoven could be called a Romantic artist, but he was a century earlier than Tchaikovsky. Nietzsche preceded the postmodernists, but his ideas fit squarely with theirs.).
Hey there - author here. Somebody emailed me this thread. I'll just make a couple points:
1. Yes, I am biased toward determinism in this case. But that's largely because of the methodology used by proponents of indeterminism (I don't believe their conclusion necessarily follows from their data. In fact, I think it's an entirely unnecessary conclusion). Determinism is my default, unless a more convincing argument prevents itself.
That being said, if indeterminism is true, I'm fine with that - so long as "superposition" doesn't include mutually exclusive states. If the theory can avoid logical contradiction, then it's possible.
2. I'm fine with the MWI. However, I think it's unnecessary and have difficulty getting around Occam's razor in this situation. If the choice is between a) believing a practically-infinite set of real-universes exist (all requiring explanations) or b) remain skeptical for a more compelling theory preserving the simplicity of one universe, I'll take the latter. (Given enough time, the highest levels of abstraction about reality seem to be universally simple, so I'll hold out a bit longer)
3. I also have a difficult time accepting that there's logical proof that hidden variables don't exist. Mathematical proof (satisfying a particular, non-necessary set of mathematical theories) does not sufficiently qualify as logical proof. And, indeed, Bell's theorem has likely already been proven invalid.
The cases where the propositions become inaccurate is where the terms used have no concrete definition.
The point is, the proposition "This sentence is false" isn't even sensible, because "This sentence" isn't something that can be true or false. It's just two words put together in a tricky way.