Why HTTPS Everywhere isn't on addons.mozilla.org(lists.eff.org)
lists.eff.org
Why HTTPS Everywhere isn't on addons.mozilla.org
https://lists.eff.org/pipermail/https-everywhere/2014-April/002050.html
13 comments
If a result of this "pointless crusade" is for Mozilla to start applying better security to its plugin archive, it's a huge win.
Why commercial enterprises still aren't providing even a fraction of the level of archive integrity assurance completely volunteer free software projects were decades ago is utterly beyond reason.
Why commercial enterprises still aren't providing even a fraction of the level of archive integrity assurance completely volunteer free software projects were decades ago is utterly beyond reason.
As far as I understand you can't make people more secure using AMO without risking compromising those very users later on when some hackers put malware into AMO plugins including this one.
Security is determined by weakest link. Right now it's AMO.
Security is determined by weakest link. Right now it's AMO.
Those 99% of addons are not about adding strong security and good practices to your browser hence do not bear the same expectations.
I would be disappointed if a security add on could easily be circumvented because of a poor choice of distribution.
Keep in mind that such security addons may be used by activists and journalists in hostile environments, you do have a different opinion when overlooking this kind of details could mean imprisonment and torture.
I would be disappointed if a security add on could easily be circumvented because of a poor choice of distribution.
Keep in mind that such security addons may be used by activists and journalists in hostile environments, you do have a different opinion when overlooking this kind of details could mean imprisonment and torture.
Aren't there many ways you could make it safer still?
Should we trial this medicine on humans? No, that's another pointless crusade. Aren't there many other ways you could make it safer still? Your argument applies to any requirement and thus to none.
Weigh that against the many thousands more that might be
experiencing the benefits
It's almost as if their priorities aren't the same as yours.
My priorities are completly irrelevant here, I've been a happy user of https everywhere since idk since I heard of it (years? idk). My criticism is that their own stated priority is being crippled by a self-imposed and arbitrary rule.
It looks to me like they're trying to use not being in AMO as leverage to get Mozilla to implement additional security features. If they said "we'd like these features, but we're ok being in AMO in the mean time" Mozilla would probably mostly ignore them, and these are generally useful features that should help others if developed.
> AMO doesn't do any code signing for extensions, so they're only protected by HTTPS. As we saw with Heartbleed, SSL private keys can be compromised.
I find it quite ironic that HTTPS Everywhere is arguing HTTPS is not safe enough to offer them a reasonable guarantee of integrity.
I find it quite ironic that HTTPS Everywhere is arguing HTTPS is not safe enough to offer them a reasonable guarantee of integrity.
HTTPS is a lower bound of reasonable security, not an upper one. The argument for HTTPS _everywhere_ is that it's the smallest possible thing you can do to make yourself slightly secure.
Would you find it ironic that someone selling combination locks for gym lockers wants a better lock on their storefront?
Would you find it ironic that someone selling combination locks for gym lockers wants a better lock on their storefront?
I find it ironic if banks and post offices are using combination locks as advertised security measures but the people selling those install steel doors on their storefront.
> Would you find it ironic that someone selling combination locks for gym lockers wants a better lock on their storefront?
More like he wants to add additional security measures because the lock isn't secure enough. I wouldn't buy a lock then.
More like he wants to add additional security measures because the lock isn't secure enough. I wouldn't buy a lock then.
It's called layering.
Nothing is 100% secure.
Nothing is 100% secure.
Shouldn't be terribly surprising: http://dayswithoutansslexploit.com
HTTPS might be better than getting a website in cleartext, but you'd have to be a madman to claim that HTTPS is safe, sane, or secure.
HTTPS might be better than getting a website in cleartext, but you'd have to be a madman to claim that HTTPS is safe, sane, or secure.
True, I'm not surprised at all. HTTPS Everywhere-like functionality should be integrated into browsers and not a downloadable extra, tricking people into feeling fully secured.
While not "everywhere"...
Force SSL only: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security
Have site preloaded in Chrome: https://hstspreload.appspot.com
Force SSL only: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security
Have site preloaded in Chrome: https://hstspreload.appspot.com
Firefox also has a built-in HSTS preload list, which I believe uses the Chrome list as one of its inputs: https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2012/11/01/preloading-hsts...
Old... but interesting, I guess.
From the bug report:
> We don't require update.rdf files to be signed when they're served over HTTPS, since HTTPS provides the same level of verification as an updateKey, and we don't see significant benefit to the additional level of verification.
I'm kind of confused by that comment - Mozilla are saying that signing the software itself is somehow the same as serving it over HTTPS? Think about other software repositories. That's like saying serving Fedora packages over HTTPS is the same as signing the RPM's... it's not, and it's kind of an absurd thing to suggest.
You can independently verify the signature of the RPM itself, offline, outside of the browser. I can't see how that could be considered anything but a significant benefit.
From the bug report:
> We don't require update.rdf files to be signed when they're served over HTTPS, since HTTPS provides the same level of verification as an updateKey, and we don't see significant benefit to the additional level of verification.
I'm kind of confused by that comment - Mozilla are saying that signing the software itself is somehow the same as serving it over HTTPS? Think about other software repositories. That's like saying serving Fedora packages over HTTPS is the same as signing the RPM's... it's not, and it's kind of an absurd thing to suggest.
You can independently verify the signature of the RPM itself, offline, outside of the browser. I can't see how that could be considered anything but a significant benefit.
I think the idea is that you don't need the extra security of signing, because if the file was served over HTTPS then you can be secure in the knowledge that it has not been modified.
The reason you sign packages is to ensure that the file you want and the file you get are actually the same. If you have a secure connection to the trusted host of said file, you don't need to worry about that.
The reason you sign packages is to ensure that the file you want and the file you get are actually the same. If you have a secure connection to the trusted host of said file, you don't need to worry about that.
The difference is that signed code lets you keep the signing key offline, and therefore it can be much more secure.
For a concrete example, consider the case where the server is compromised and an attacker wants to insert malware. HTTPS does nothing at all to help, here. The attacker has control over the server and can make it serve whatever it wants, and since the server still has its normal certificate and key, the attacker's malware-infested code will show up just like legitimate stuff would. If the code was signed using a key that isn't kept on the server (normally a code signing key will be kept on a developer's computer, and often protected by a password so it rarely exists in memory unencrypted) then the attacker can't force the server to serve malware that will be accepted by downloaders.
For a concrete example, consider the case where the server is compromised and an attacker wants to insert malware. HTTPS does nothing at all to help, here. The attacker has control over the server and can make it serve whatever it wants, and since the server still has its normal certificate and key, the attacker's malware-infested code will show up just like legitimate stuff would. If the code was signed using a key that isn't kept on the server (normally a code signing key will be kept on a developer's computer, and often protected by a password so it rarely exists in memory unencrypted) then the attacker can't force the server to serve malware that will be accepted by downloaders.
> If the code was signed using a key that isn't kept on the server (normally a code signing key will be kept on a developer's computer, and often protected by a password so it rarely exists in memory unencrypted)
And to take this even further, you have the option of keeping the key on a machine that is completely disconnected from any network. In addition, this machine could use a Hardware Security Module to further increase the security of the signing key.
And to take this even further, you have the option of keeping the key on a machine that is completely disconnected from any network. In addition, this machine could use a Hardware Security Module to further increase the security of the signing key.
All someone needs to do is hack the AMO servers and change out the XPI -- and no one would no the difference, because the packages aren't signed.
Not to also mention, MITM attacks on the actual SSL connection.
Serving over HTTPS isn't a valid package signing strategy.
Not to also mention, MITM attacks on the actual SSL connection.
Serving over HTTPS isn't a valid package signing strategy.
> Not to also mention, MITM attacks on the actual SSL
> connection.
The AMO cert is pinned in Firefox. If you MITM the connection, Firefox will refuse to connect to it.
The AMO cert is pinned in Firefox. If you MITM the connection, Firefox will refuse to connect to it.
> The reason you sign packages is to ensure that the file you want and the file you get are actually the same. If you have a secure connection to the trusted host of said file, you don't need to worry about that.
HTTPS provides a secure connection, in theory, but what if AMO is itself compromised? They are just a 3rd party host for the EFF's extension, after all.
HTTPS or not, the only way to check that the code you get from AMO is the same code the EFF gave AMO, is to check it against the EFF's signature.
HTTPS provides a secure connection, in theory, but what if AMO is itself compromised? They are just a 3rd party host for the EFF's extension, after all.
HTTPS or not, the only way to check that the code you get from AMO is the same code the EFF gave AMO, is to check it against the EFF's signature.
If AMO is compromised, then a bogus hash or whatever could be published as well.
A MITM attack? What then? Seems you need signing then.
Perhaps I misunderstand you but since it's HTTPS, in theory there are no MITM attacks.
Unless, as the article points out, the attacker has your private SSL key (perhaps leaked via Heartbleed).
Without cert pinning here's also the problem of the attacker convincing some browser-trusted CA to issue an SSL cert for addons.mozilla.org, then MITMing you with that.
(And with 600+ trusted roots, many of which are owned by various governments, against state level attackers an ssl connection's claim of authenticity has to be considered very close to worthless...)
Without cert pinning here's also the problem of the attacker convincing some browser-trusted CA to issue an SSL cert for addons.mozilla.org, then MITMing you with that.
(And with 600+ trusted roots, many of which are owned by various governments, against state level attackers an ssl connection's claim of authenticity has to be considered very close to worthless...)
> Without cert pinning
In the case of Firefox connecting to addons.mozilla.org, there is cert pinning.
In the case of Firefox connecting to addons.mozilla.org, there is cert pinning.
I didn't know that, thanks.
(In retrospect, it's such an obvious thing for them to do - I don't know why I didn't assume it was likely enough to be implemented and check before I posted that...)
(In retrospect, it's such an obvious thing for them to do - I don't know why I didn't assume it was likely enough to be implemented and check before I posted that...)
To be fair, I _think_ the pinning was only added in Firefox 32, back in September. So it's a pretty recent development.
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/11/quantu...
All they need is an authorised certificate.
All they need is an authorised certificate.
Its possible to MITM an HTTPS connection, trick you into thinking it is secure by providing a green lock favicon, and intercepting or sniffing everything you do over that connection. And it will work on nearly every website in existance.
More people should be aware of SSL Strip and how to protect yourself against it.
http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/
More people should be aware of SSL Strip and how to protect yourself against it.
http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/
> Its possible to MITM an HTTPS connection
Not in the case of Firefox connecting to AMO, because it uses a pinned certificate for that.
Not in the case of Firefox connecting to AMO, because it uses a pinned certificate for that.
Are you sure?
I perform HTTPS interception on all out-bound traffic on my network and I don't recall making an exception for AMO, and I have a number of add-ons installed. Though, it wouldn't be the first time I've forgotten about something like that.
I perform HTTPS interception on all out-bound traffic on my network and I don't recall making an exception for AMO, and I have a number of add-ons installed. Though, it wouldn't be the first time I've forgotten about something like that.
Did you install your addons before updating to Firefox 32? That's when the pinning was introduced.
So with the system of mirrors that is in place with distributing some open source software (e.g. debian, ubuntu, etc.) this is less true. A local mirror could selectively serve bad packages (and serve the correct packages to the verification bots).
Debian has a pretty nice mirroring system. Not only are all packages signed, but the Release file (which includes checksums of package lists) is also signed, preventing a mirror from omitting packages. For repositories which receive security updates (say, wheezy-updates), the index is valid for only few days in the future, which helps to prevent mirrors from withholding security updates [1].
If a mirror isn't updated, the user is eventually warned during updates:
> E: Release file for http://mirrors/debian/dists/wheezy-updates/Release is expired (invalid since 1h 20min 30s). Updates for this repository will not be applied.
It mostly negates the need for https mirrors for authenticity, although many still offer it. To my knowledge, most projects with mirror networks operate similar to this.
[1] e.g. https://mirrors.ocf.berkeley.edu/debian/dists/wheezy-updates... has the pseudo-header Valid-Until: Tue, 02 Dec 2014 20:50:35 UTC
If a mirror isn't updated, the user is eventually warned during updates:
> E: Release file for http://mirrors/debian/dists/wheezy-updates/Release is expired (invalid since 1h 20min 30s). Updates for this repository will not be applied.
It mostly negates the need for https mirrors for authenticity, although many still offer it. To my knowledge, most projects with mirror networks operate similar to this.
[1] e.g. https://mirrors.ocf.berkeley.edu/debian/dists/wheezy-updates... has the pseudo-header Valid-Until: Tue, 02 Dec 2014 20:50:35 UTC
Actually, there's no requirement that .deb packages are signed. The system still provides a strong guarantee, because the releases file contains a list of checksums for each package, so it's impossible to tamper with the package, even though it's unsigned. However, if you manually download the package, all bets are off.
RPMs are usually signed directly.
RPMs are usually signed directly.
Someone better tell these guys to stop selling SSL MITM hardware, then.
http://www.wired.com/2010/03/packet-forensics
http://www.wired.com/2010/03/packet-forensics
In this situation, addons.mozilla.org is the hypothetical man in the middle so https doesn't protect you.
HTTPS is a good idea but it really doesn't work for me. I am one of those paranoid people who want full end-to-end SSL without exceptions. HTTPS Everywhere doesn't fill the bill.
This is why the company I work for created PanicMode (https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/panic-mode/lamdafc...).
PanicMode is ridiculously simple extension. Once activated, it will swap HTTP for HTTPS without leaking even a single packet. Not even pre-flight requests are spared.
PanicMode is not good for general purpose browsing mainly because 99% of the site break badly, i.e. they do not support SSL at all. That is very telling and sad reality. The way I use it is with profiles. I have a bunch of chrome profiles that I use for different purpose. One of my profiles is just for social browsing - facebook etc. I have another one for company stuff. Those profile have panic mode installed and activated. Because I care about security in those profiles I don't mind if I click on a facebook link and it doesn't open up because at least I know that I am protected against side-channel attacks.
It is a very simple mechanism but works well when used effectively.
This is why the company I work for created PanicMode (https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/panic-mode/lamdafc...).
PanicMode is ridiculously simple extension. Once activated, it will swap HTTP for HTTPS without leaking even a single packet. Not even pre-flight requests are spared.
PanicMode is not good for general purpose browsing mainly because 99% of the site break badly, i.e. they do not support SSL at all. That is very telling and sad reality. The way I use it is with profiles. I have a bunch of chrome profiles that I use for different purpose. One of my profiles is just for social browsing - facebook etc. I have another one for company stuff. Those profile have panic mode installed and activated. Because I care about security in those profiles I don't mind if I click on a facebook link and it doesn't open up because at least I know that I am protected against side-channel attacks.
It is a very simple mechanism but works well when used effectively.
> PanicMode is ridiculously simple extension. Once activated, it will swap HTTP for HTTPS without leaking even a single packet. Not even pre-flight requests are spared.
Sounds pretty cool and useful to me. As it tends to happen, though, all promises of additional security a Google Chrome extension makes are invalidated by a single notice—
> Panic Mode can read and change all your data on the websites you visit
As a side note, I noticed that lately my sensitivity to these kinds of threats has come down significantly due to multitude of useful extensions and apps requiring ridiculous permissions. Seems like a dangerous trend: not knowing that an app is going to do sneakily collect your data is one thing; knowingly and willingly grant every little extension wildcard access time after time is quite another. I was very happy to ditch Android because of that. Perhaps I’m too paranoid, of course.
Sounds pretty cool and useful to me. As it tends to happen, though, all promises of additional security a Google Chrome extension makes are invalidated by a single notice—
> Panic Mode can read and change all your data on the websites you visit
As a side note, I noticed that lately my sensitivity to these kinds of threats has come down significantly due to multitude of useful extensions and apps requiring ridiculous permissions. Seems like a dangerous trend: not knowing that an app is going to do sneakily collect your data is one thing; knowingly and willingly grant every little extension wildcard access time after time is quite another. I was very happy to ditch Android because of that. Perhaps I’m too paranoid, of course.
Looks interesting, but what's the purpose of the button?
Also, any interest in porting it to Firefox?
Also, any interest in porting it to Firefox?
Im all for signing stuff but:
- amo wasnt affected by heartbleed
- signatures arent foolproof either
- HTTPS everywhere.. is supposed to advocate for TLS being safe ?
So the criticism seems quite misguided in this case.
- amo wasnt affected by heartbleed
- signatures arent foolproof either
- HTTPS everywhere.. is supposed to advocate for TLS being safe ?
So the criticism seems quite misguided in this case.
- amo wasnt affected by heartbleed
- signatures arent foolproof either
- HTTPS everywhere.. is supposed to advocate for TLS being
safe ?
you contradicted yourself here - or voluntarily misunderstood the point.
> Once public key pinning lands in Firefox (supposedly scheduled to happen this summer)
Since this was from April, I wonder what has happened since then? Has Firefox added public key pinning or the other option presented?
Since this was from April, I wonder what has happened since then? Has Firefox added public key pinning or the other option presented?
Yes, Firefox has supported public key pinning for a while now.
You can check the latest status at https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinn...
You can check the latest status at https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Public_Key_Pinn...
Thanks.
and yet: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/privacy-badge...
Given the inconsistency of EFF and Mozilla's "policy" on this issue, plausible context to what's written might include something like an inability to upstream HTTPSEverywhere into Firefox by default due to political pushback from large advertising sponsors of Mozilla. EFF certainly resolved these issues for PrivacyBadger, which nevertheless has problems of its own.
Similarly, working with Mozilla to make AMO more secure for everyone by default seems like a pretty straightforward and desirable option for EFF. it's unclear why that hasn't happened here..and perhaps having useful code upstreamed into a larger project doesn't earn people enough credit and recognition. maybe we'll see a BetterAMOEverywhere extension that would enable EFF to integrate HTTPSEverywhere into AMO. ;-)
Yet here we are in 2014 with HTTPSEverywhere not baked into Firefox by default default and a world in which non-techies can't even find what should be browser-integrated functionality in the same place they find most other extensions. Awesome.
The effect for most users is not unlike the the sort of bikeshedding over GPL vs. BSD licenses that has kept so much of the internet in plaintext [0].
[0] as mentioned in phk's 'operation orchestra' talk
Given the inconsistency of EFF and Mozilla's "policy" on this issue, plausible context to what's written might include something like an inability to upstream HTTPSEverywhere into Firefox by default due to political pushback from large advertising sponsors of Mozilla. EFF certainly resolved these issues for PrivacyBadger, which nevertheless has problems of its own.
Similarly, working with Mozilla to make AMO more secure for everyone by default seems like a pretty straightforward and desirable option for EFF. it's unclear why that hasn't happened here..and perhaps having useful code upstreamed into a larger project doesn't earn people enough credit and recognition. maybe we'll see a BetterAMOEverywhere extension that would enable EFF to integrate HTTPSEverywhere into AMO. ;-)
Yet here we are in 2014 with HTTPSEverywhere not baked into Firefox by default default and a world in which non-techies can't even find what should be browser-integrated functionality in the same place they find most other extensions. Awesome.
The effect for most users is not unlike the the sort of bikeshedding over GPL vs. BSD licenses that has kept so much of the internet in plaintext [0].
[0] as mentioned in phk's 'operation orchestra' talk
...working with Mozilla to make AMO more secure for everyone by default seems like a pretty straightforward and desirable option for EFF. it's unclear why that hasn't happened here.
The bug report [1] was closed as WONTFIX. Essentially, AMO is more worried about malicious updates by extension authors than hijacking of legitimate extensions:
The "hijacking" we worry about is from the addon authors themselves: we review and OK a benign add-on and then it self-updates into malware or adware. This is not a hypothetical worry. The EFF isn't going to do that, obviously, but the number of entities we trust to that extent who cannot simply host on AMO is so small that we can't spare the coding resources to create an exception mechanism.
[1] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=999014
The bug report [1] was closed as WONTFIX. Essentially, AMO is more worried about malicious updates by extension authors than hijacking of legitimate extensions:
The "hijacking" we worry about is from the addon authors themselves: we review and OK a benign add-on and then it self-updates into malware or adware. This is not a hypothetical worry. The EFF isn't going to do that, obviously, but the number of entities we trust to that extent who cannot simply host on AMO is so small that we can't spare the coding resources to create an exception mechanism.
[1] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=999014
to me, WONTFIX is just a signal that personal conversations with Mozilla devs as humans--or at least a more subtle understanding of why Mozilla's not budging--are that much more important as next steps.
and i don't necessarily disagree with the technical merits of EFF's position, either. but what does it say about EFF if they don't feel the same way about PrivacyBadger being available through AMO? seems inconsistent, if we're to take the given rationale at face value.
and more broadly, it seems clear that if EFF's goal is to maximize the number of people using HTTPSEverywhere, the status quo for providing access to their code is not optimal.
i hope Mozilla/EFF will be able to work out a solution that increases the availability of HTTPSEverywhere's functionality.
and i don't necessarily disagree with the technical merits of EFF's position, either. but what does it say about EFF if they don't feel the same way about PrivacyBadger being available through AMO? seems inconsistent, if we're to take the given rationale at face value.
and more broadly, it seems clear that if EFF's goal is to maximize the number of people using HTTPSEverywhere, the status quo for providing access to their code is not optimal.
i hope Mozilla/EFF will be able to work out a solution that increases the availability of HTTPSEverywhere's functionality.
Would addons.mozilla.org really have to store the private keys of the developers as the discussion on bugzilla https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=999014 (closed as 'invalid' 4 month ago) implies? How does the Chrome store do it?
Only if that service intended to do some signing on the developers' behalf, which could make sense for cases like this in which app data would be updated more often than app code.
What a great way to make sure no one uses their add on.
-- an HTTPS everywhere user
-- an HTTPS everywhere user
HTTPS Everywhere is security theater. Encrypting everything creates pressure to cache encrypted content, using "caching services" such as Cloudflare. If it goes through Cloudflare, it's decrypted at Cloudflare. Cloudflare is a man-in-the-middle.
HTTPS Everywhere means MITM Everywhere. It makes interception easier.
HTTPS Everywhere means MITM Everywhere. It makes interception easier.
You should be using the hsts policy list in firefox anyway.
HTTPS everywhere has way too much overhead.
There should be a built-in hsts editor.
HTTPS everywhere has way too much overhead.
There should be a built-in hsts editor.
> Why wasn't HTTPS Everywhere affected by Heartbleed? Because we sign updates with an offline signing key that EFF keeps on a dedicated airgapped machine. So even if SSL is totally broken, the integrity of updates is guaranteed. Yay!
WHY IN THE WORLD AREN'T YOU USING AN HSM!?!?! If you're at the point where you feel the need for a dedicated airgapped machine to hold the signing key, then you are at the point where you need an HSM.
WHY IN THE WORLD AREN'T YOU USING AN HSM!?!?! If you're at the point where you feel the need for a dedicated airgapped machine to hold the signing key, then you are at the point where you need an HSM.
Even better, why HTTPS everywhere is not a default, in all browsers?
Another pointless crusade. Aren't there many ways you could make it safer still? Wouldn't some of those be really dumb because they would prevent many people from accessing the add on?
How many people are you making more secure? Close to no one because 98% of Firefox https everywhere users have some other add on from AMO. Weigh that against the many thousands more that might be experiencing the benefits of your add on if it were hosted where 99% of add ons people use are hosted.