Websites Must Use HSTS in Order to Be Secure(eff.org)
eff.org
Websites Must Use HSTS in Order to Be Secure
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/websites-hsts
57 comments
You can't go back! As soon as a browser sees Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000", it will refuse to load your site over HTTP for the next year.
This sounds like a powerful way to DOS a site if you can set up a temporary https server on the domain and send this signal.
This sounds like a powerful way to DOS a site if you can set up a temporary https server on the domain and send this signal.
This DoS risk is documented in section 14.5 of the HSTS standard.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797#section-14.5
It's true that HSTS could be a way for someone who can set up a seemingly valid but nonetheless fake HTTPS listener on a domain to prevent people from later communicating with a genuine HTTP service on that domain.
Three remedies for this, with different degrees of applicability to different sites:
* Put a CAA record for your domain into your DNS (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) to prevent legitimate certificate authorities from issuing the cert to the impostor. (This only provides protection if the attacker doesn't control your DNS zone.)
* Actually switch to HTTPS!
* If this attack happens to you and you don't want to switch to HTTPS, run a legitimate HTTPS listener on your domain that clears the HSTS status and then redirects users back to HTTP.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797#section-14.5
It's true that HSTS could be a way for someone who can set up a seemingly valid but nonetheless fake HTTPS listener on a domain to prevent people from later communicating with a genuine HTTP service on that domain.
Three remedies for this, with different degrees of applicability to different sites:
* Put a CAA record for your domain into your DNS (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844) to prevent legitimate certificate authorities from issuing the cert to the impostor. (This only provides protection if the attacker doesn't control your DNS zone.)
* Actually switch to HTTPS!
* If this attack happens to you and you don't want to switch to HTTPS, run a legitimate HTTPS listener on your domain that clears the HSTS status and then redirects users back to HTTP.
The solution to that is every site should support HTTPS (or at least every site that has even the slightest risk that someone would want to do this to them).
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It would be if SSL was expensive. It isn't.
> 1. You can't go back! As soon as a browser sees Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000", it will refuse to load your site over HTTP for the next year.
Is this true? What if you send a new header with a max-age of 1 second, or send one with a garbage value?
I'm pretty sure I've seen a way for a website to disable HSTS, but I can't confirm right now.
Is this true? What if you send a new header with a max-age of 1 second, or send one with a garbage value?
I'm pretty sure I've seen a way for a website to disable HSTS, but I can't confirm right now.
As per the spec, setting max-age=0 disables HSTS.
Yes, but you'd have to serve that over HTTPS. And even then, how do you know that all the caches that have the older, longer expiration time have revisited and updated their cache? You won't, really, until that many seconds have pass.
Right, my point was just that there is a specified way for the server to tell the client not to use HSTS any more. Of course, the caveats you mention mean that to be certain, you would need to wait.
You can't go back in the sense that random end-users that visit your site will likely have that cached. In chrome, you can always visit about:net-internals and clear the HSTS cache. Probably not useful for random users, but good to know if you've found yourself locked out of something after messing around with settings.
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If a site sends max-age=31536000 and then subsequently sends max-age=3, does the second header overwrite the first? If so, then you can in fact go back as long as you're willing to continue supporting HTTPS until the longest max-age header you ever sent has expired.
Of course, it would help if browsers stopped letting sites put an image at the same place they show the locker (like they used to)... But that would require a few more pixels for canvas, and security is a secondary concern (just like usability).
Firefox stopped showing favicons in the URL bar. For HTTP you see a globe; for HTTPS, a padlock.
That's good, and I didn't notice.
Can't a MITM (as described in the article) strip out any HSTS headers automatically, thus thwarting this quite simply?
As with HTTPS, you need a shared secret before communication begins for anything like this to combat MITM attacks. Unless the browser communicates with a secure server to assess whether the website should be sending HSTS headers... Is that the idea?
As with HTTPS, you need a shared secret before communication begins for anything like this to combat MITM attacks. Unless the browser communicates with a secure server to assess whether the website should be sending HSTS headers... Is that the idea?
On the very first connection from the browser to the website, yes. But the browser saves the HSTS setting (for the time specified by the HSTS header's max-age value) so future connections go straight to HTTPS.
Chrome and Firefox also ship with a baked-in HSTS preload list containing sites that should always use HTTPS, without depending on the HSTS header: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/tra...
Chrome and Firefox also ship with a baked-in HSTS preload list containing sites that should always use HTTPS, without depending on the HSTS header: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/tra...
It seems silly that Chromium and Firefox now have separate HSTS lists (though Firefox's was seeded using the Chromium list [1]).
At the moment, these lists appear to be b) tied to specific browsers 2) tied to specific releases of those browsers.
Would it be viable to run some kind of global open registry where any website can be registered for mandatory HSTS? That way, every individual website owner doesn't need to submit a bug to Chromium and Mozilla - the browser just needs to securely connect to the registry and download the latest list. Or maybe DNSSEC can help ...
Maybe work on this is already underway, but I was reading some MLs a few weeks ago and I didn't see any forthcoming solutions ...
1. https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2012/11/01/preloading-hsts...
At the moment, these lists appear to be b) tied to specific browsers 2) tied to specific releases of those browsers.
Would it be viable to run some kind of global open registry where any website can be registered for mandatory HSTS? That way, every individual website owner doesn't need to submit a bug to Chromium and Mozilla - the browser just needs to securely connect to the registry and download the latest list. Or maybe DNSSEC can help ...
Maybe work on this is already underway, but I was reading some MLs a few weeks ago and I didn't see any forthcoming solutions ...
1. https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2012/11/01/preloading-hsts...
I believe that Firefox is still generating its HSTS preload list from Chromium's - a few months ago I got a site added to Chromium's HSTS list and a few weeks later it showed up in Firefox. I couldn't even figure out how to submit directly to Firefox.
I agree that a global registry would be better, but it should probably be updated using the browser's normal update channel, to avoid re-inventing the wheel. (And DNSSEC has way too many issues.) It's true that ties the list to specific releases, but since browsers have good, and frequent, auto-updating, I think that's OK.
I agree that a global registry would be better, but it should probably be updated using the browser's normal update channel, to avoid re-inventing the wheel. (And DNSSEC has way too many issues.) It's true that ties the list to specific releases, but since browsers have good, and frequent, auto-updating, I think that's OK.
Every weekend the list from Chrome is used to automatically update Firefox in tree version.
Got it. So not 100% full-proof (not that anything is).
This also means that once you switch to using HSTS, you can't go back.
This also means that once you switch to using HSTS, you can't go back.
You could, it will just take 180 days (or whatever you have it set to).
Ok, so how about the attacker intercepts the https request with a self-signed cert, modifies the stored HSTS header by issuing a new max-age of 0.25 second, and includes a redirect back to http://?
This just kind of seems unwinnable, a million holes.
This just kind of seems unwinnable, a million holes.
> Ok, so how about the attacker intercepts the https request with a self-signed cert, modifies the stored HSTS header by issuing a new max-age of 0.25 second, and includes a redirect back to http://?
HSTS disallows the user from overriding the certificate warning and accepting a self-signed cert.
HSTS disallows the user from overriding the certificate warning and accepting a self-signed cert.
(You just edited your comment, didn't you) Well, that's a good detail then.
Does it in fact reject connections to self-signed certs? Or just disallow you from accepting the broken cert? Because the real goal would just be to get the user onto http:// as quick as possible, and then the untrusted warning is gone.
Does it in fact reject connections to self-signed certs? Or just disallow you from accepting the broken cert? Because the real goal would just be to get the user onto http:// as quick as possible, and then the untrusted warning is gone.
(You keep editing your comments, replacing old questions with new questions, which makes it rather difficult to reply to you. I suggest making new comments instead.)
> Does it in fact reject connections to self-signed certs?
Yes, you don't even need HSTS for this. HSTS just disallows the user from overriding the browser and accepting the self-signed (or otherwise bad) certificate.
> Does it in fact reject connections to self-signed certs?
Yes, you don't even need HSTS for this. HSTS just disallows the user from overriding the browser and accepting the self-signed (or otherwise bad) certificate.
What browser flat-out refuses to connect to a webpage with an invalid SSL cert? Is this a recent development?
Edit: Apparently all of them now, I sure didn't notice that. Not a concern, then
Test site: https://tv.eurosport.com/
Edit: Apparently all of them now, I sure didn't notice that. Not a concern, then
Test site: https://tv.eurosport.com/
> But an attacker can certainly intercept HTTPS as well, and if they redirect you quick enough you'll never see the "wrong cert" errors.
No, any sort of HTTPS interception will be detected by the browser (assuming of course that the certificate authority infrastructure has not been compromised). There's no way to redirect "quick enough" to bypass certificate checking.
No, any sort of HTTPS interception will be detected by the browser (assuming of course that the certificate authority infrastructure has not been compromised). There's no way to redirect "quick enough" to bypass certificate checking.
Of course it is detected, we are not trying to fool the PC. When I visit my personal website with a flawed certificate (for example, once I was missing the Intermediate CA) it loads the site all the same, but the lock icon shows a security verification failure.
What in HSTS protects you from that? Because it seems to me if you can get there, you can get back to http:// before the user notices the verification failure. Unless the browser simply refuses to load the site due to the verification failure, which I only see for "suspected attack sites"
What in HSTS protects you from that? Because it seems to me if you can get there, you can get back to http:// before the user notices the verification failure. Unless the browser simply refuses to load the site due to the verification failure, which I only see for "suspected attack sites"
Intercept 443 => Issue insecure page with new HSTS timeout => Redirect to 80 before user notices insecure page warningBut it only loads because you added an exception at some point in the past. On any normal site, it would show you a cert error and wouldn't load the page at all.
For that to work they would have to have access to the browser since the headers would be sent over TLS/SSL after the first connection. If they've got access to the client's machine and browser all bets are off. They could install their own CA and MITM even if the site is using HSTS. Certificate pinning would help solve some of that problem but you might not be able to trust that on a compromised machine anyway.
This whole attack is assuming the attacker is there from the very first packet of the particular login session. Not about inserting a MITM in the middle of an established login session.
The initial connection of an intercepted HTTPS connection would throw a security error, because the attacker would be using the wrong cert, but if you redirect the victim quickly...
You can defeat this particular hole by getting more aggressive about untrusted certificates, but it seems browsers are very reluctant to do that.
The initial connection of an intercepted HTTPS connection would throw a security error, because the attacker would be using the wrong cert, but if you redirect the victim quickly...
You can defeat this particular hole by getting more aggressive about untrusted certificates, but it seems browsers are very reluctant to do that.
"Quickly" really isn't applicable in this case, though.
If there's no HSTS record for the domain,
- if it's HTTP, the attacker succeeds.
- if it's HTTPS with an invalid cert, the browser will display a warning and not honor any redirects.
- if it's HTTPS with a valid cert, we assume there is no attack (cert misissuance is an attack outside the scope of HSTS).
If there's an HSTS record for the domain,
- if it's HTTP, the browser will automatically rewrite to HTTPS.
- if it's HTTPS with an invalid cert, the browser produces a hard fail that the user can't override (and ignores redirects).
- if it's HTTPS with a valid cert, as above, the browser accepts the cert and we assume it's not an attack.
If there's no HSTS record for the domain,
- if it's HTTP, the attacker succeeds.
- if it's HTTPS with an invalid cert, the browser will display a warning and not honor any redirects.
- if it's HTTPS with a valid cert, we assume there is no attack (cert misissuance is an attack outside the scope of HSTS).
If there's an HSTS record for the domain,
- if it's HTTP, the browser will automatically rewrite to HTTPS.
- if it's HTTPS with an invalid cert, the browser produces a hard fail that the user can't override (and ignores redirects).
- if it's HTTPS with a valid cert, as above, the browser accepts the cert and we assume it's not an attack.
You can configure your http vhost to do nothing by send redirects to https and never serve content.
One interesting thing I've noticed about HSTS (which is probably a good thing in the long run, but kind of painful for now): it breaks wi-fi capture-portal redirects. Try to load https://news.ycombinator.com/ on a fresh connection to a wi-fi hotspot, and you just get a connection error.
There's no functional difference between craptive portals and a MITM attack, so this definitely seems like a feature...
Some people have been thinking about creating a standard to distinguish between the two so that captive portals won't have to do a MITM attack (that browsers currently correctly defend against). One idea might be to have a different protocol through which the captive portal can indicate its presence and declare itself as a captive portal, entirely or almost entirely outside of the HTTP or HTTPS session.
Getting the UI right is pretty challenging, though. It's not even completely clear what getting it right would mean. Even if the user clearly understands that they're interacting with some network operator rather than, say, Gmail or their organizational webmail server, the user still has no way to know whether the portal they're talking to is actually operated by the operator of the network that they think they're connecting to!
Getting the UI right is pretty challenging, though. It's not even completely clear what getting it right would mean. Even if the user clearly understands that they're interacting with some network operator rather than, say, Gmail or their organizational webmail server, the user still has no way to know whether the portal they're talking to is actually operated by the operator of the network that they think they're connecting to!
Chrome does this already by sending a hidden request to http://www.gstatic.com/generate_204 and displaying the page in a new tab if the request is intercepted.
(More detail at http://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/n...)
(More detail at http://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/n...)
I've wondered this too. Doesn't DHCP support extensible options? Couldn't you just send an option that said, "hey, crappy portal welcome site at {URL}"? It'd be fixed to a particular webpage (so, you can't use another protocol), but that's the state of things today.
It seems like there are only two things captive-portals are "for", though: accepting EULAs, and presenting a login form for the proxy. Both of these could be better if built into browser/OS chrome.
I would like to point out that HSTS is not compatible with private browsing because by saving the information that the particular site must be accessed by HTTPS the browser exposes the fact that the said site was previously accessed. I hope we will eventually come to required secure HTTP by default with the next versions of the protocol.
Is it not effectively like someone hand-typing the address with HTTPS? how does it expose anything?
Briefly: a page can embed a hidden image with a http:// URL (with a different hostname, used just for tracking purposes). If that image gets loaded over HTTPS, it means the site has been visited before. If it loads over HTTP, the site hasn't been visited before; it then redirects to the HTTPS version and sends a HSTS header so on the next visit it goes straight to HTTPS.
That stores one bit of information. Repeat 32 times (with 32 different host names) and you can store a unique 32-bit tracking number that persists even when cookies are cleared.
That stores one bit of information. Repeat 32 times (with 32 different host names) and you can store a unique 32-bit tracking number that persists even when cookies are cleared.
For anyone wondering general best practices for setting up HTTPS on Apache/nginx I found this to be a really great resource
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
One drastic solution if your web site has lots of IE users: Simply don't answer the phone on port 80.
[Edit] Duh. As agentS points out, this won't work.
[Edit] Duh. As agentS points out, this won't work.
The attacker will merely reply on your behalf. Does not improve the situation.
I don't think that's helpful. Perhaps more along the lines of putting a flat redirect on port 80, with no content.
(It sounds like this attack depends on a complete version of the website being available over port 80)
(It sounds like this attack depends on a complete version of the website being available over port 80)
> (It sounds like this attack depends on a complete version of the website being available over port 80)
No, it doesn't. An attacker can always connect to the website over HTTPS and proxy the content to the victim over port 80.
No, it doesn't. An attacker can always connect to the website over HTTPS and proxy the content to the victim over port 80.
Hmm, yes, of course you are correct. I'm not sure why I was thinking that wouldn't be a risk.
The real drastic solution is to disable HTTP for the entire internet and stop implicitly trusting the identity of servers. Until we decide that is worthwhile we're just going to be patching a leaky boat.
My current client is insisting that all https traffic be served over a separate subdomain.
Alternatively, make a plain html website and don't ask users to log in and don't track them with cookies, etc. If you want to collect money from them, make a real product and mail it to them after they sent you a postal money order.
Any attempt to defeat that model will be handled by the US Postal Inspection Service, (see also https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/aboutus/mission.aspx)
Any attempt to defeat that model will be handled by the US Postal Inspection Service, (see also https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/aboutus/mission.aspx)
Note that if you take their money and don't ship their product as described, the US Postal Inspection Service will come after you. It protects both sides from fraud.
HTTPS sounds great and st but HTTPS won't help you if you dumb enough to execute shell commands as a root on your server based on unfiltered user form inputs... Unfortunately, I noticed that lots of 'idea guys' trust the dev they hire first even if they have absolutely no skills whatsoever. lOOOl
1. You can't go back! As soon as a browser sees Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000", it will refuse to load your site over HTTP for the next year.
2. The includeSubDomains option can cause problems in hard-to-predict ways. For example, Mailgun lets you set a CNAME for unsubscribe links. If a browser tries to load the HTTPS version, they'll get mailgun.com's cert, which is invalid for your domain.
3. Secure transport doesn't stop XSS, CSRF, etc. There are other headers such as Content-Security-Policy that can ameliorate some of these attacks. Also, sanitize!
4. HSTS is just one part of ensuring secure transport. It's also important to check your cipher suites. Not all TLS is created equal. SSL Labs is an extremely useful tool for testing your config: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=floobits.com
If you're curious what the final result of all this paranoia looks like, take a look at the httpd config for floobits.com: https://gist.github.com/ggreer/9984770
You'll also notice mod_authn_yubikey. We require multi-factor auth (YubiKey + password) for our admin interface. There's tons of other stuff I could go into, but the real lesson is that security is like raking pine needles: You will never be done.