Boeing May Halt 737 Max Production(nytimes.com)
nytimes.com
Boeing May Halt 737 Max Production
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/24/business/boeing-earnings-737-max.html
15 comments
There seems to be a lack of objectivity in the article. Is a reduction of 0.6% of the growth rate (which, again, is 0.6% of probably a percentage like 2% of 3%-- a very small percentage indeed) a small price for the safety of air travel? There's zero discussion of the downsides of letting these planes fly. Or, stated in other words, are we willing to accept a third plane's worth of casualties over an already known systemic error, for a miniscule improvement to the growth rate? This strong-arming is not what Boeing needs right now.
> a small price for the safety of air travel?
You're taking it way too far in the other direction. It's not whether we have safety or not, it's a matter of some very close to 100% number vs. a different very close to 100% number. (And at this point it's more likely the same future safety level but different amounts of training.)
You're taking it way too far in the other direction. It's not whether we have safety or not, it's a matter of some very close to 100% number vs. a different very close to 100% number. (And at this point it's more likely the same future safety level but different amounts of training.)
> are we willing to accept a third plane's worth of casualties over an already known systemic error, for a miniscule improvement to the growth rate?
0.6% of 2% of $19 trillion is $2.2 billion. Theoretically, if enough of that could be captured and used to directly reduce airfare on 737 MAX planes (and/or provide a fat guaranteed payout in the event of death) then I bet a lot of people would choose to fly--possibly even in the U.S., but certainly in many parts of the world where people already assume substantial risks when traveling.
It would be difficult to capture it, though, especially because Boeing would be better off shutting down production and waiting as the manufacturer duopoly means Boeing is likely to sell all or most of those planes eventually rather than lose out on a large number of sales entirely.
But if we were able to somehow force Boeing to factor in the real costs to employees of labor disruption (i.e. if Boeing was forced to be 100% unionized now and for the indefinite future) then I imagine Boeing might choose to keep a minimal production line going and sell at discounted prices, in turn permitting some regional airlines to sell cheaper tickets. Actually, more likely Boeing would be better off paying their labor to sit around (and their employees richer for it) by giving labor a greater share of the future expected surplus from duopoly pricing. Or maybe some combination of the above.
I have no idea how to even attempt to pencil that out, though. My point is merely that it could work, depending on the numbers; not that it necessarily would work. In other words, your question can be answered quantitatively, whereas I assume you intended it rhetorically with an implied, categorical, "no".
0.6% of 2% of $19 trillion is $2.2 billion. Theoretically, if enough of that could be captured and used to directly reduce airfare on 737 MAX planes (and/or provide a fat guaranteed payout in the event of death) then I bet a lot of people would choose to fly--possibly even in the U.S., but certainly in many parts of the world where people already assume substantial risks when traveling.
It would be difficult to capture it, though, especially because Boeing would be better off shutting down production and waiting as the manufacturer duopoly means Boeing is likely to sell all or most of those planes eventually rather than lose out on a large number of sales entirely.
But if we were able to somehow force Boeing to factor in the real costs to employees of labor disruption (i.e. if Boeing was forced to be 100% unionized now and for the indefinite future) then I imagine Boeing might choose to keep a minimal production line going and sell at discounted prices, in turn permitting some regional airlines to sell cheaper tickets. Actually, more likely Boeing would be better off paying their labor to sit around (and their employees richer for it) by giving labor a greater share of the future expected surplus from duopoly pricing. Or maybe some combination of the above.
I have no idea how to even attempt to pencil that out, though. My point is merely that it could work, depending on the numbers; not that it necessarily would work. In other words, your question can be answered quantitatively, whereas I assume you intended it rhetorically with an implied, categorical, "no".
If anything, this should be pressure for more regulation, in that arguably it's the transfer of knowledge and responsibility for safety regulation from the FAA to the manufacturers that put us in this "disastrous" situation in the first place.
Boeing has been left to oversee themselves, resulting in serious safety issues with their planes. Both Seattle and Charleston production faculties have caustic cultures that have enabled management to cover up poorly done assembly work, its no wonder the same behaviour occurred when Boeing wrote software: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/business/boeing-dreamline...
It is like a PR campaign but I'd say it's also significant.
While it's not a lot relative to the mass of the GDP, aerospace is one of the key areas that the US has had a strong presence in over the years.
US Health Care spending is approaching 20% of GDP but this is because health care is a bloated corrupt mess. Other parts of the GDP also have debatable reality - overprices infrastructure project also are added to the GDP. But selling advanced airplanes is something real the US does - though with Boeing's many shenanigans, maybe not as much as before.
Of course, it's Boeing gutting itself and stretching every area of safety and regulation that brought us here and the regulators letting this go wouldn't stop a fall at all.
While it's not a lot relative to the mass of the GDP, aerospace is one of the key areas that the US has had a strong presence in over the years.
US Health Care spending is approaching 20% of GDP but this is because health care is a bloated corrupt mess. Other parts of the GDP also have debatable reality - overprices infrastructure project also are added to the GDP. But selling advanced airplanes is something real the US does - though with Boeing's many shenanigans, maybe not as much as before.
Of course, it's Boeing gutting itself and stretching every area of safety and regulation that brought us here and the regulators letting this go wouldn't stop a fall at all.
My (conspiratorial) take is that they’re making noises about this so that politicians can step in and pressure the FAA into approving their modifications. Talking about blue-collar job losses and economic impacts has the amazing effect of cutting through politicians’ radar on both sides of the aisle.
That would probably be the worst thing they could do. The FA has already lost a lot of credibility; if there was even a hint that this had happened, other regulators would be extremely cautious of it and any other Boeing plane.
There may be some degree of regulatory capture going on. It was European aviation bodies that halted the 737 Max before the FAA did. (We should all be thankful there's multiple regulatory bodies).
Some degree? That's putting it very lightly. FAA lets Boeing certify their own jets.
Because the FAA doesn't have the resources to do it themselves. It's quite different from, e.g., the FCC.
Then why isn't the cost of certification borne by the company asking to be certified?
If you think they could pressure the FAA, do you also think they could pressure the EASA and CAAC?
They could, but not as easily. On the other hand, the FAA will look very bad if the EASA and CAAC don't agree with them.
This is what I think is going on:
Part of the 737MAX fundamentally is that 737 NG pilots did not need retraining to fly it.
That's a nice goal, but it is not compatible with MCAS. With MCAS in the picture, pilots need to fly out two situations in a simulator: (1) MCAS goes bezerk and they have to manually disable it, and (2) they get into the kind of trouble that MCAS is supposed to stop and then MCAS doesn't stop it.
I think Boeing is hoping they can do a software fix but not add a training requirement and I think that's a major reason why the fix is taking so long. I can't believe that regulators will clear the MAX to fly again without the training requirement. If Boeing is trying to avoid simulator training, they are doing a lot of harm to themselves, their shareholders, their employees, airlines, their suppliers, the U.S. Economy, etc. If they bite the bullet and accept the simulator requirement they can probably get back in the air soon -- they might have to pay for the simulator training that they promised airlines wouldn't have to pay for, but that's probably less than what they are going to pay because of delays.
Another problem with their foot dragging is that delays beget more delays. The more time they waste, the more new problems will be discovered, the more it will cascade. The fast way out is the way through, but from the beginning to this moment, Boeing has not appeared to recognize the gravity of this situation.
This is what I think is going on:
Part of the 737MAX fundamentally is that 737 NG pilots did not need retraining to fly it.
That's a nice goal, but it is not compatible with MCAS. With MCAS in the picture, pilots need to fly out two situations in a simulator: (1) MCAS goes bezerk and they have to manually disable it, and (2) they get into the kind of trouble that MCAS is supposed to stop and then MCAS doesn't stop it.
I think Boeing is hoping they can do a software fix but not add a training requirement and I think that's a major reason why the fix is taking so long. I can't believe that regulators will clear the MAX to fly again without the training requirement. If Boeing is trying to avoid simulator training, they are doing a lot of harm to themselves, their shareholders, their employees, airlines, their suppliers, the U.S. Economy, etc. If they bite the bullet and accept the simulator requirement they can probably get back in the air soon -- they might have to pay for the simulator training that they promised airlines wouldn't have to pay for, but that's probably less than what they are going to pay because of delays.
Another problem with their foot dragging is that delays beget more delays. The more time they waste, the more new problems will be discovered, the more it will cascade. The fast way out is the way through, but from the beginning to this moment, Boeing has not appeared to recognize the gravity of this situation.
Could it be the case that Boeing is behaving obstinately as a negotiation tactic, perhaps to negotiate more favorable terms concerning who pays for the re-training? Maybe they recognize that retraining will be necessary, but fear if they admit it they'll have no leg to stand on when airlines demand Boeing pays for it. Or maybe they realize retraining to some degree is an inevitability but they're trying to minimize the breadth of that retraining?
But here's the thing, is it possible under current regulations to add on that training to existing pilots, without making them do everything else over again?
If they would have to treat this plane as completely unrelated to any existing model, doing an entire training program from scratch, then there is a legitimate need for regulatory compromise.
If they would have to treat this plane as completely unrelated to any existing model, doing an entire training program from scratch, then there is a legitimate need for regulatory compromise.
If somehow the FAA approves it while the EASA does not I can see the current US administration using the "Europe is protectionist" rhetoric. Nobody knows where we will go from there, I can only tell that then it came to car tariffs similar tactics used by the US seem to have "won", as I read yesterday that the EU is ready to eliminate tariffs on US car imports.
EASA is not going to approve the MAX for political expediency, the resulting scandal would end the existence of EASA. There is no tariff in the world that the US can apply that would convince the EU to commit such an act of self-harm.
> as I read yesterday that the EU is ready to eliminate tariffs on US car imports.
where did you read this? The latest I've heard, the EU was ready to go further with the tariff wars[0].
[0] https://www.financial-world.org/news/news/business/2659/eu-p...
where did you read this? The latest I've heard, the EU was ready to go further with the tariff wars[0].
[0] https://www.financial-world.org/news/news/business/2659/eu-p...
At this level of international politics, sure.
Airbus just had an excessive pitch problem in the A321neo, nearly the same as the 737-MAX troubles. https://simpleflying.com/airbus-a321neo-pitch-problem/ Suddenly, the FAA might take aggressive action to ban that aircraft. Maybe the EASA doesn't really object to the 737-MAX as much as they thought they did.
CAAC would like smooth approvals for Chinese aircraft. Huawei is also having issues. Things could suddenly change after a day of golf at Mar-a-Lago. Lots of things could change, some quietly and some publicly.
Airbus just had an excessive pitch problem in the A321neo, nearly the same as the 737-MAX troubles. https://simpleflying.com/airbus-a321neo-pitch-problem/ Suddenly, the FAA might take aggressive action to ban that aircraft. Maybe the EASA doesn't really object to the 737-MAX as much as they thought they did.
CAAC would like smooth approvals for Chinese aircraft. Huawei is also having issues. Things could suddenly change after a day of golf at Mar-a-Lago. Lots of things could change, some quietly and some publicly.
The article you linked does not suggest "nearly as bad as the 737-MAX".
I didn't say that either, and it doesn't matter. The problem is of the same general type. It's more than close enough. The FAA should be extra-careful, so maybe the A321neo will get banned. If the EASA wants to take a hard line on safety, they can hardly object.
After a bit of high-level discussion using that leverage, things may change.
These decisions, in all countries, are being made with consideration for international economic implications. The resulting decisions will be given technical justification as required.
After a bit of high-level discussion using that leverage, things may change.
These decisions, in all countries, are being made with consideration for international economic implications. The resulting decisions will be given technical justification as required.
But it does matter. This A321neo issue is identified during internal simulated tests, never happened or reported on any commercial or test flight.
The issue consists of the anti-stall protection not being aggressive enough under SPECIFIC circumstances:
- Airplane is in Flare mode - Pilot applies sudden and excessive pitch up - Keeps the pitch during pre stall and stall period
Source: https://leehamnews.com/2019/07/19/bjorns-corner-airbus-a321n...
The issue consists of the anti-stall protection not being aggressive enough under SPECIFIC circumstances:
- Airplane is in Flare mode - Pilot applies sudden and excessive pitch up - Keeps the pitch during pre stall and stall period
Source: https://leehamnews.com/2019/07/19/bjorns-corner-airbus-a321n...
If it didn't happen on any test flight, the aircraft wasn't adequately tested. That sounds unsafe.
"anti-stall protection not being aggressive enough under SPECIFIC circumstances" means "not enough MCAS in the A321neo"
(there is no leeway for "SPECIFIC circumstances" unless to grant that to the 737-MAX as well)
The FAA could require more MCAS in the A321neo, and of course more testing.
"anti-stall protection not being aggressive enough under SPECIFIC circumstances" means "not enough MCAS in the A321neo"
(there is no leeway for "SPECIFIC circumstances" unless to grant that to the 737-MAX as well)
The FAA could require more MCAS in the A321neo, and of course more testing.
We do not have details of this anomaly, but I hope you understand that some situations must be simulated, flying into them is difficult, maybe not possible, or downright unsafe.
I don't know how much about planes do you know (I'm starting to feel not much since excessive, maintained pitch during flare didn't tell you anything). But the context explained here is rare and obviously more manageable than "one of three redundant sensors failed and an aircraft went out of the sky without giving the crew even a possibility to save their lives".
EDIT: Found new details. The pilot has to keep the excessive pitch although AWARE that he is stalling the aircraft.
I don't know how much about planes do you know (I'm starting to feel not much since excessive, maintained pitch during flare didn't tell you anything). But the context explained here is rare and obviously more manageable than "one of three redundant sensors failed and an aircraft went out of the sky without giving the crew even a possibility to save their lives".
EDIT: Found new details. The pilot has to keep the excessive pitch although AWARE that he is stalling the aircraft.
Airline security must never be a matter of putting pressure on an organization.
off topic: you sound like a president who thinks that "maximum pressure" is good, but it has not been proven to work.
off topic: you sound like a president who thinks that "maximum pressure" is good, but it has not been proven to work.
There is also an issue with the 777X engines, as reported by the Seattle Times. This could cause a lot of pain for a lot of people in Renton and Everett. https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boein...
From my understanding, the issue with the GE-9x is a durability problem with a component in the compressor that GE itself is manufacturing. It's not good news but it shouldn't be a showstopper.
Here's the best link I could find on the problem: https://thepointsguy.com/news/boeings-777x-delays-engine-iss....
High-bypass turbofans are finicky things. It seems likely there will be more teething problems in that area. The GE-9x increases the bypass ratio by 11% from 9 to 10 over the GE-90 based on comparison of specs published in wikipedia. [1,2]
So the interesting question for launch is what else pops up.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric_GE9X
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric_GE90#Specific...
High-bypass turbofans are finicky things. It seems likely there will be more teething problems in that area. The GE-9x increases the bypass ratio by 11% from 9 to 10 over the GE-90 based on comparison of specs published in wikipedia. [1,2]
So the interesting question for launch is what else pops up.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric_GE9X
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Electric_GE90#Specific...
If you are interested in turbine engines, I highly recommend this guy's youtube channel as he will teach you everything you ever wanted to know and more about how turbines work. This video is about the compressor and it's actually a very simple component. Pretty much the only thing that can go wrong is that metal fatigue starts to form where the fan blades meet the hub. I suspect that the size of the compressor is resulting in larger centrifugal forces causing fatigue to occur quicker.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXSi4GXUojo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXSi4GXUojo
I can’t be the only one who’s more surprised that they’ve been making new ones this whole time.
They have a lot of orders to fulfill.
Over 4400 units, 80% of their total backlog, representing 7 years of production value at the present production capacity.
Thanks for adding this -- I can see the total economic impact of this could be huge.
Until April, they were producing 52 planes per month. Then they reduced to 42/mo. Now maybe zero for some while. At $100 million per plane, that's $5.2bil/mo!
And over $400 billion in 7 years. Can their defense business cover that? Can the employee 401k's survive?
Until April, they were producing 52 planes per month. Then they reduced to 42/mo. Now maybe zero for some while. At $100 million per plane, that's $5.2bil/mo!
And over $400 billion in 7 years. Can their defense business cover that? Can the employee 401k's survive?
Blown away they wouldn’t pause production until they knew the design issues were fixed... rather than build new planes that beat case had to be immediately retrofitted. “Let’s just do the wrong thing again, it’ll work this time.” Seems very risky.
Halting production wouldn't necessarily be a prudent financial thing to do. The reported problems were with small physical sensors and software. It would be much easier and cheaper to retrofit finished planes with fixes after the fact, rather then halting all production then rush to fill orders when the plane design is given the all clear
Probably just trying some way to justify the plane, until they can't. The way they slapped the bigger engines onto the old design should not continue. Neither should their complete outsourcing of plane production. Quality counts and they're missing it.
What if it costs too much to fix?
Anything can be made to fly if you spend enough money on it. But Boeing are in the business of making money. So they can't just get the 737 Max to fly at all costs. Even if they went all out the reputational harm is very much deHavilland Comet. They fixed the Comet and it was a lovely plane, but nobody wanted it. With the 737 it needs a full redesign, otherwise it is just an exercise in polishing a turd. Even if the MCAS works perfectly it is still an ugly hack.
To Boeing the decision to be selling single aisle short-hop planes might be something they get completely out of. They can finish orders for 737 oeo (old engine option) and just shut the whole thing down.
After 2008 the US auto sector was pared down a bit, GM getting rid of Pontiac to shutter it for good was needed to solve the bigger GM venture, similarly 737 MAX might be best closed in order to save the company. Much like how quick they were with the Dreamliner, in 5-10 years time Boeing could be back with another Ryanair grade offering.
Ford, GM and FCA decided to give up on making saloons for the domestic market, they let the Germans fill that niche. Similarly, with the 737 it might be better to be realistic about the competition, not just from Airbus but China, Russia and anywhere else. If China has a good plane to rival the 737 in 2-3 years time then it would be hard for Boeing's unionised workers to compete with their robots.
Anything can be made to fly if you spend enough money on it. But Boeing are in the business of making money. So they can't just get the 737 Max to fly at all costs. Even if they went all out the reputational harm is very much deHavilland Comet. They fixed the Comet and it was a lovely plane, but nobody wanted it. With the 737 it needs a full redesign, otherwise it is just an exercise in polishing a turd. Even if the MCAS works perfectly it is still an ugly hack.
To Boeing the decision to be selling single aisle short-hop planes might be something they get completely out of. They can finish orders for 737 oeo (old engine option) and just shut the whole thing down.
After 2008 the US auto sector was pared down a bit, GM getting rid of Pontiac to shutter it for good was needed to solve the bigger GM venture, similarly 737 MAX might be best closed in order to save the company. Much like how quick they were with the Dreamliner, in 5-10 years time Boeing could be back with another Ryanair grade offering.
Ford, GM and FCA decided to give up on making saloons for the domestic market, they let the Germans fill that niche. Similarly, with the 737 it might be better to be realistic about the competition, not just from Airbus but China, Russia and anywhere else. If China has a good plane to rival the 737 in 2-3 years time then it would be hard for Boeing's unionised workers to compete with their robots.
Which Germans? VW and Audi? Sedan numbers have gotten that low?
Maybe if we want safety first we should be engineering lead, and only have sales/customer desires as inputs that are considered when creating a design that fulfills market needs.
That includes all stages of engineering knowing the big picture, even if they don't happen to be acting upon it, so that there are safety checks possible at every stage of design and implementation.
That includes all stages of engineering knowing the big picture, even if they don't happen to be acting upon it, so that there are safety checks possible at every stage of design and implementation.
Safety is never actually first. First, you need an economically viable product. Otherwise, there is no reason for it or any if the processes behind it to exist.
Safety IS first. If it's not safe it won't fly no matter how cheap it is. This is clearly a case where engineers were proposing an inferior solution that allowed a lower price point. They mislead the whole company and let their colleagues down.
“Safe” is a relative term.
For example, it would have been safer for the plane to have 2 more engines. But there are only 2 engines since it’s safe enough and much more economically viable.
It doesn’t matter how safe something is if no one is going to buy it.
It doesn’t matter how safe something is if no one is going to buy it.
Safe is not a relative term in mass transport aerospace.
Safe means "not a death trap."
That level of safety is a hard prerequisite for a viable product. There is no ambiguity about this.
Safe means "not a death trap."
That level of safety is a hard prerequisite for a viable product. There is no ambiguity about this.
“Not a death trap” is a relative term. Safety is a feature and like any other feature it gets prioritized according to need, budget, ROI, and many other factors.
No version of this plane has ever been as bad as "death trap".
>economically viable product
This is always touted around. Fine, you're not wrong. I think the missing implicit assertion that also needs the same level of preaching is "and truly free markets".
Last I checked, the plane industry was not a free market
This is always touted around. Fine, you're not wrong. I think the missing implicit assertion that also needs the same level of preaching is "and truly free markets".
Last I checked, the plane industry was not a free market
Yes, but the airline industry has been doing a great job for the most part on both safety and economics.
The A320 costs about what the 737 costs and it has a flight envelope protection system with much better safety. It's had problems in the past that Airbus has learned from and that Boeing has applied to their newer airliners, but that Boeing got amnesia for when it came to the legacy 737.
(The A320 fly-by-wire also improves fuel efficiency, lowers maintenance costs, rides out turbulence to improve comfort, etc.)
Also the lack of safety has not saved anybody any money. I think now Boeing is saying they've lost $8 billion because of the MAX problems, and if they took that plus what they spent to make the MAX they could have been a clean sheet replacement for the 737.
People are so used to the 737 that they don't realize what a backwards airplane it is. Every other airliner from every manufacturer makes some claim that it is comfortable on their official web page. The 737 doesn't because it is the least comfortable airliner (and thus is the baseline everything is compared to.) The 737 is loud for passengers, pilots, and people on the ground. The A220 and E190 are smaller planes that are much more comfortable because they are designed around the human body as opposed to 1960's aeronautics. Compared to a clean sheet design, the 737 wastes fuel, causes excess global warming, has a higher seat-mile cost, and it makes everybody miserable while doing so.
The 737 is what secular stagnation looks like.
The A320 costs about what the 737 costs and it has a flight envelope protection system with much better safety. It's had problems in the past that Airbus has learned from and that Boeing has applied to their newer airliners, but that Boeing got amnesia for when it came to the legacy 737.
(The A320 fly-by-wire also improves fuel efficiency, lowers maintenance costs, rides out turbulence to improve comfort, etc.)
Also the lack of safety has not saved anybody any money. I think now Boeing is saying they've lost $8 billion because of the MAX problems, and if they took that plus what they spent to make the MAX they could have been a clean sheet replacement for the 737.
People are so used to the 737 that they don't realize what a backwards airplane it is. Every other airliner from every manufacturer makes some claim that it is comfortable on their official web page. The 737 doesn't because it is the least comfortable airliner (and thus is the baseline everything is compared to.) The 737 is loud for passengers, pilots, and people on the ground. The A220 and E190 are smaller planes that are much more comfortable because they are designed around the human body as opposed to 1960's aeronautics. Compared to a clean sheet design, the 737 wastes fuel, causes excess global warming, has a higher seat-mile cost, and it makes everybody miserable while doing so.
The 737 is what secular stagnation looks like.
You're missing some important details.
The A320 and 737 have similar sticker prices, but it's not clear if one is cheaper to buy than the other because the prices paid for planes tend to be around half of the sticker price but the real prices aren't public.
The A320 is around 10k lbs heavier than the 737 and the A320 series burns more fuel per passenger mile (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuel_economy_in_aircraft). The A321 NEO is nearer the efficiency of the Boeing 737-900 than than the 737 MAX 10.
The passenger comfort of the 'human focused' designs often comes at the cost of fuel efficiency.
You're right that the 737 is loud and an old design. I don't dispute that Boeing messed up their one job (making safe planes) but to call the 737 secular stagnation when the newest version is nearly three times as efficient (in terms of fuel burned to move a passenger one miles) as the original 737 misunderstands "stagnation".
The A320 and 737 have similar sticker prices, but it's not clear if one is cheaper to buy than the other because the prices paid for planes tend to be around half of the sticker price but the real prices aren't public.
The A320 is around 10k lbs heavier than the 737 and the A320 series burns more fuel per passenger mile (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuel_economy_in_aircraft). The A321 NEO is nearer the efficiency of the Boeing 737-900 than than the 737 MAX 10.
The passenger comfort of the 'human focused' designs often comes at the cost of fuel efficiency.
You're right that the 737 is loud and an old design. I don't dispute that Boeing messed up their one job (making safe planes) but to call the 737 secular stagnation when the newest version is nearly three times as efficient (in terms of fuel burned to move a passenger one miles) as the original 737 misunderstands "stagnation".
Up to a point the 737 got better, but the same things that made it get better (longer range) made it get worse (worse comfort)
An engineering prof I worked with years ago said that the 737 NG was already long in the tooth
https://www.newsweek.com/boeings-737-airplane-prone-problems...
and has a great quote from Tony: "Boeing are (sic.) stuck with a design that they want to fly forever."
An engineering prof I worked with years ago said that the 737 NG was already long in the tooth
https://www.newsweek.com/boeings-737-airplane-prone-problems...
and has a great quote from Tony: "Boeing are (sic.) stuck with a design that they want to fly forever."
The second gen 737 was long in the tooth. IIRC, the 737 NG has a much better wing than it needs because its landing gear is so short that the plane can't get the right angle of attack on the airfoil during rotation.
It's kind of deliciously ironic that Boeing's attempts to cut corners are going to cost them more than a clean sheet redesign, but I really wonder what's going to replace the 737.
We're at the point where we're doing inappropriate things with single aisle aircraft - it's just not great that we're about to have 9 hour flights on A321XLRs. It seems like there's a natural limit of 140-160 passengers on single aisle aircraft but and hubris has us cramming 220 people in them.
Hopefully someone figures out composites enough to create lifting wide bodies but we'll see.
It's kind of deliciously ironic that Boeing's attempts to cut corners are going to cost them more than a clean sheet redesign, but I really wonder what's going to replace the 737.
We're at the point where we're doing inappropriate things with single aisle aircraft - it's just not great that we're about to have 9 hour flights on A321XLRs. It seems like there's a natural limit of 140-160 passengers on single aisle aircraft but and hubris has us cramming 220 people in them.
Hopefully someone figures out composites enough to create lifting wide bodies but we'll see.
Maybe engineers would be more careful if they were held liable for the faulty designs they produce. This safety system wasn't designed by marketing. It was designed by engineers and deemed sufficient. Several people signed off on it. Boeing is working hard on rectifying every possible flaw and it is doing so under close scrunity. Blame shifting won't help us to get out of this mess and get those planes flying again. Now is the time to work out a solution with the regulators and get those planes delivered to the customers who eagerly await them.
> It was designed by engineers and deemed sufficient. Several people signed off on it.
In a company with failing engineering quality, what typically happens is that, of all the engineers qualified to sign off, management over time tend to choose the ones who are more willing to sign off. The more careful engineers who refuse to sign off, or attempt to negotiate harder for safety before signing off, are not promoted over the less careful engineers. The result is that the engineers in a position to sign off increasingly comprise the less careful ones.
Who is to blame in this case: the management who drive the process that selects the less careful engineers, or the less careful engineers?
In a company with failing engineering quality, what typically happens is that, of all the engineers qualified to sign off, management over time tend to choose the ones who are more willing to sign off. The more careful engineers who refuse to sign off, or attempt to negotiate harder for safety before signing off, are not promoted over the less careful engineers. The result is that the engineers in a position to sign off increasingly comprise the less careful ones.
Who is to blame in this case: the management who drive the process that selects the less careful engineers, or the less careful engineers?
I'm surprised that you think this is a solution - this won't solve anything besides making it easier for management to blame engineers because it doesn't target the people making the ultimate judgement call - the leadership.
The leadership (including the board who are proxies for stockholders) is ultimately liable - they hire, fire, set the strategy, values, and goals for the company. They reap the rewards of profits and take on some risk. That's the difference between a regular employee and an officer. When you have a business that involves public safety like car and airplane manufacturers, a large part of your business should be ensuring that everyone from the lowest level employee to the CEO is at or above industry standards for safety.
The leadership (including the board who are proxies for stockholders) is ultimately liable - they hire, fire, set the strategy, values, and goals for the company. They reap the rewards of profits and take on some risk. That's the difference between a regular employee and an officer. When you have a business that involves public safety like car and airplane manufacturers, a large part of your business should be ensuring that everyone from the lowest level employee to the CEO is at or above industry standards for safety.
Unless there were fraudulent numbers then I don't think holding the engineers responsible makes any sense. Product owners set the stage and place the blinders on the engineers. Good product owners will do so in a productive way, careerist con artists will do otherwise.
I personally find odd the wording:
>... if the grounding of its most popular plane persists ...
as if the grounding was an uncontrollable event, like - say - weather.
I would have written it as:
"if we (Boeing) cannot soon find a solution that is considered safe enough by the relevant Authorities ..."
>... if the grounding of its most popular plane persists ...
as if the grounding was an uncontrollable event, like - say - weather.
I would have written it as:
"if we (Boeing) cannot soon find a solution that is considered safe enough by the relevant Authorities ..."
At the very least they are going to have to rebrand it - 737 Ultimate Edition perhaps? :)
Apparently they are already selling them to RyanAir under the name 737-8200 to get rid of the MAX naming
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Anyone old enough to second guess that McDonnell Douglas and Boeing merger? And 30 years before that, the McDonnell and Douglas merger? Are these really natural monopolies?
Rebranding to a different name would be a simple solution.
sometimes I wonder, will Boeing end up like de Havilland? too early to say now.
Too big to fail. Not sure if America learned any lessons the last time.
Good!
I really, really hope this isn't necessary. We're currently in one of the longest (if not the longest) periods of continued economic growth in US history, and the knock-on effects from a halt to 737 production could help put an end to that. (not just from the direct hit which was estimated at of 0.6% of GDP, but the confidence hit that would cause)
EDIT: To be clear, I think the best outcome is for the 737 Max to be made safe and to fly again. If it can't be made safe, obviously cancelling production of useless planes is a good idea.
EDIT: To be clear, I think the best outcome is for the 737 Max to be made safe and to fly again. If it can't be made safe, obviously cancelling production of useless planes is a good idea.
Alternatively, I’d like to see companies like Boeing feel the effects of cutting corners recklessly.
I am a sharerholder, but I think management is at fault and should be sacked with no severancee
That'd be a good start.
One thing, however, that bothers me lately is the pursuit shareholder value above all else. The commentary always arrives at that end (shareholder value) in order to justify the means every time a company's direction might not translate so nicely for customers: YouTube ads, Uber rate increases, Boeing cutting corners, etc.
Being a profitable company is one thing, but I can't help but watch and think, I don't feel any sense of compassion for shareholders losing a few bucks because they were impatient or made a bad investment. Of course Boeing's shareholders want <insert new Boeing thing> delivered yesterday, but the "bloody ROI"[1] can't be what drives Boeing development.
[1] https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/03/07/why-tim...
One thing, however, that bothers me lately is the pursuit shareholder value above all else. The commentary always arrives at that end (shareholder value) in order to justify the means every time a company's direction might not translate so nicely for customers: YouTube ads, Uber rate increases, Boeing cutting corners, etc.
Being a profitable company is one thing, but I can't help but watch and think, I don't feel any sense of compassion for shareholders losing a few bucks because they were impatient or made a bad investment. Of course Boeing's shareholders want <insert new Boeing thing> delivered yesterday, but the "bloody ROI"[1] can't be what drives Boeing development.
[1] https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/03/07/why-tim...
This should be easy to change. Make shareholders culpable for management failures. Balance this with an oversight structure that gives shareholders a direct influence on corporate ethics, with the power to investigate and terminate management malpractice and systemic abuse.
Of course the whole point of public share ownership is profit without responsibility. The distancing of benefit from external consequences is considered sacrosanct. So this suggestion is the the worst kind of heresy.
But why should share ownership somehow magically excuse consequences that would be considered criminal in other contexts? If management has to justify its actions to people who share the risk and the blame, it's going to pay a lot more attention to consequences.
Of course the whole point of public share ownership is profit without responsibility. The distancing of benefit from external consequences is considered sacrosanct. So this suggestion is the the worst kind of heresy.
But why should share ownership somehow magically excuse consequences that would be considered criminal in other contexts? If management has to justify its actions to people who share the risk and the blame, it's going to pay a lot more attention to consequences.
Two additional datapoints - shares are used as part of the incentive structure for senior management, and can dwarf salary. Share gains are also taxed less.
It's a simple feedback loop. It gets pretty silly when you look at the share buyback plans many companies operate, huge sums are "invested" in the company's shares for a relatively small - a few million - return to individual management.
It's a simple feedback loop. It gets pretty silly when you look at the share buyback plans many companies operate, huge sums are "invested" in the company's shares for a relatively small - a few million - return to individual management.
Was the current leadership in charge throughout the development of the MAX?
It doesn’t matter; they allowed it to be released.
Pierce the corporate veil and go after the management. When there are consequences for their beancounting at the expense of human lives, maybe they'll think twice about profit over people.
If the plane isn't safe and can't be made safe then it's necessary. Also, the claim that Boeing halting 737 Max production will cause a recession seems like FUD to me.
> Also, the claim that Boeing halting 737 Max production will cause a recession seems like FUD to me.
Aerospace is a sizable part of the US economy. It really isn't FUD at all.
Aerospace is a sizable part of the US economy. It really isn't FUD at all.
There's more to the aerospace industry than Boeing alone. Aerospace is 1.8% of the GDP, whereas Boeing is 0.6% of the GDP. Damn impressive to be sure, but considering hundreds or thousands of lives lost are the cost to avoid a slump in that area, I'm pretty sure it's the right choice.
> Boeing halting 737 Max production will cause a recession
Oh shit, let's bail them out!
Oh shit, let's bail them out!
This has been recently discussed: https://mattstoller.substack.com/p/the-coming-boeing-bailout
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20353342
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20353342
Nationalize them.
The US's economy is projected to grow 2.1% in 2019 - reducing that by 0.6% would wipe out a major portion of that. And I am inclined to believe that number - 52 planes / month for 12 months at $100m is $62.4 billion directly, and the US economy is ~$20T - 0.6% of that is $120 billion. (so with knock-on effects, I find 0.6% a very reasonable estimate for the cancellation of a year's production. Probably not so reasonable for the 5 months left in 2019, though)
Not spending on A means more is left over to spend on B, C, D, etc. It is not a direct subtraction effect. Just like if you were hungry and the pizza joint was closed, you're still hungry and will end up eating something else.
Political concern would be the micro engineering of small towns focused on single product industries and promises made to them.
Edit: Of GDP refers to a stock. Of GDP Growth refers to a rate of change. These are different.
Political concern would be the micro engineering of small towns focused on single product industries and promises made to them.
Edit: Of GDP refers to a stock. Of GDP Growth refers to a rate of change. These are different.
B, C, and D for small airliners are Airbus, Bombardier and Comac - EU, Canada and China. Yes, there will be some substitution, but it'll still hurt the US economy to lose those sales overseas.
EDIT: Also, "0.6% Of GDP growth" typically means 0.6% as relative to total GDP, not to whatever growth was expected to be. Yes it's stupid, but it's also the standard nomenclature.
And the direct quote from the article is "By one estimate, a production halt would shave about six-tenths of a percent off the gross domestic product growth rate, the financial equivalent of a prolonged government shutdown or a significant natural disaster", which clearly intends for 0.6% to be relative to GDP and not GDP growth.
EDIT: Also, "0.6% Of GDP growth" typically means 0.6% as relative to total GDP, not to whatever growth was expected to be. Yes it's stupid, but it's also the standard nomenclature.
And the direct quote from the article is "By one estimate, a production halt would shave about six-tenths of a percent off the gross domestic product growth rate, the financial equivalent of a prolonged government shutdown or a significant natural disaster", which clearly intends for 0.6% to be relative to GDP and not GDP growth.
>Not spending on A means more is left over to spend on B, C, D,
That's not how economies work. The people who work at Boeing take home money and spend it in the local economy. That effect happens several times for each dollar taken home. Same thing happens for Boeing suppliers, they pay their people and those people spend in to the economy with a multiplier effect. This, spending money earned by workers, is how the engine of the economy is fueled when it is healthy.
Who do you think is going to be paid the dollars that Boeing workers are spending now, if they shut down?
That's not how economies work. The people who work at Boeing take home money and spend it in the local economy. That effect happens several times for each dollar taken home. Same thing happens for Boeing suppliers, they pay their people and those people spend in to the economy with a multiplier effect. This, spending money earned by workers, is how the engine of the economy is fueled when it is healthy.
Who do you think is going to be paid the dollars that Boeing workers are spending now, if they shut down?
Wait, I remember hearing this before. “Too big to fail”, more like “too big to fly!”
I don't care if Boeing gets hurt for their reckless decisions - I just worry this will pressure the FAA putting the Max back into service to protect Boeing (as they seem wont to do)
This feels more like the issue we had in the 80's, where companies would source from the lowest cost regardless. And then they paid for that in the 90's, NEC is a good example of this. The companies that can improve quality without cutting corners should be the winners. Airbus should really push on their advantage.
> Airbus should really push on their advantage.
This is assuming that airbus isn't doing the same things that Boeing was doing....
This is assuming that airbus isn't doing the same things that Boeing was doing....
0.6% of the growth rate, which is very different from 0.6% of GDP...
Boeing's 2018 revenue was ~0.5% of US GDP. Assuming that the 737 Max is a sizable percentage of that revenue, and that there's a decent GDP multiplier (Boeing pays employees who themselves spend money, etc) it could very easily be 0.6% of GDP, not of the growth rate.
Impacts to GDP growth are almost always measured relative to total GDP, not to expected growth.
Impacts to GDP growth are almost always measured relative to total GDP, not to expected growth.
No doubt there would be an economic impact but the writing is just full of hyperbole and doesn't name any sources for it's claims (like 0.6% of GDP growth rate - note the growth rate, not 0.6% of GDP or 0.6% of GDP growth ...). It also fails to differentiate between the impact of existing planes not able to fly and continued production.
This smells like a PR campaign to put pressure on regulators.
Only, in this instance, the FAA probably won't risk further embarrassment by declaring the plane safe while EASA is holding out. Most of the world will wait for them rather than go with the FAA.