I built apps like these on GOV.UK over 10 years ago for the Ministry of Justice. We built our own form wizard library that let us validate long forms in steps and break them out into multiple pages because Ruby on Rails didn't support doing that out of the box. It was a very important principle back then that everyone should be able to make use of these digital services regardless of whatever users were using to access them.
How can pay ostensibly be lagging behind big tech at Rockstar, yet GTA 6 allegedly has a budget of $3B? Granted not all of it will be allocated to development cost, but still.
I'm surprised YC funded this — not because it's a bad idea, because it isn't. But because surely one of the first questions was: what happens when Apple decides to shut it down?
> Before that fact causes you to lose sympathy for the case, note that almost every significant criminal case affirming constitutional rights involves a defendant who did something unsavory, if not reprehensible.
Not always. Often times prosecutors pick cases with bad fact patterns to be test cases when they want to attack a right. A recent example is Biden DoJ choosing to take US v Rahimi to SCOTUS in an attempt to wheel back the NYSRPA v Bruen decision.
Speaking of the forefront the UK has had interbank realtime payments (Faster Payment) since 2008. It also used to have something like Pix, i.e. bank account referenced by user's phone number called Paym from 2014, until it was discontinued due to lack of demand in 2023. Faster Payments is still operational.
But AB 645 is designed to punish and deter rather than compensate, which creates a genuine constitutional vulnerability under California's Article I, Section 16 jury trial guarantee.
The structural problem is that revenue goes to program costs and traffic calming, not to anyone harmed by speeding, which makes the fines punitive in character under any substance-over-label analysis.
The lack of DMV points and criminal record weakens the argument somewhat, but under California's substance-over-label approach those omissions aren't dispositive. They merely show the legislature knew how to stay on the civil side of the line, not necessarily that it succeeded.
If a court finds the penalties punitive in character, the owner-liability structure becomes a compounding problem: California's state due process protections are arguably more robust than federal, and imposing a punitive fine on a registered owner without proof they were driving, while burden-shifting exculpation to them looks increasingly difficult to sustain.
How does the Supreme Court’s elimination of Chevron deference affect USCIS’s ability to narrowly interpret the EB-1A regulatory framework, particularly at Step 1 of the Kazarian analysis? I am specifically interested in two areas: (1) whether, under a strict textual reading of the judging the work of others criterion in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3), participation in code review where the beneficiary evaluates and approves the technical work of others in the same field should qualify without USCIS applying extra regulatory limitations, and (2) whether USCIS can continue using its historically restrictive approach to comparable evidence under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(4) now that courts are no longer required to defer to agency interpretations. I understand that even if these issues favor the petitioner at Step 1 they may not change the outcome of the final merits determination under Step 2, and I am trying to determine how a post Chevron, strictly textual approach might influence Step 1 outcomes for petitioners whose achievements do not align neatly with the ten listed criteria.