L1 - if you lose your job and you have no other status (ie have not filed for green card or have your H1B), that's it. You have to leave within 60 days and you cannot work at another company in the US.
H1B - you can switch to a new company and they port your H1B with USCIS. Otherwise, 60 day grace period to leave.
Adjustment of Status to 485 - if it has been pending with USCIS for more than 180 days & you have your EAD, you can port to another company under the AC-21 act.
Yes. The lead underwriter needs to stabilize the price post-IPO. When $unicorn_company IPOs, the underwriter actually sells more shares than the IPO company. If the price starts to drop below the originally listed price, the underwriter steps in to purchase these shares back at the IPO price to stabilize it.
It's generally an optics play - how bad would it look if you as a bank, who wanted to continue to offer IPOs, listed a company and its stock price plummeted below IPO on the first day - obviously you didn't do a great job at valuing the company and building an adequate order book.
Morgan Stanley going to have to do a lot to stabilize the price over the coming days...
On Uber's side, they sold at their $45 mark. However, seems this may have been a down round vs their last private funding round ($74.1BN pre-money vs $76BN last year).
Here's a good take (sorry for all the Levine links, I just think he provides crisp explanations of financial instruments) on what the underwriter does:
The way the greenshoe works is that, in the IPO, the underwriters sold 15 percent more stock than Lyft did. That is, Lyft sold the underwriters 32.5 million shares of stock in the IPO, but the underwriters placed 37.4 million shares with investors. (The underwriters sold the shares for $72, but bought them from Lyft at $70.02; the $1.98 difference is their fee for the underwriting.) The underwriters were short the extra 4.9 million shares. If the stock went up in the days after the IPO, stabilization would be unnecessary, and JPMorgan would cover that short position by buying the extra shares, from Lyft, at the IPO price. (This is called the “overallotment option,” or “greenshoe.”) If the stock went down, though, or threatened to go down, JPMorgan would cover the short position by buying back the extra shares in the market, which would have the effect of stabilizing the price, because JPMorgan would be a big buyer.[0]
While they have 27 million shares short, you may want to look at Levine's take today on that - not all the shares are actually available due to hedging exposure. The 27MM is on top of the 33MM, not out of them.
Levine:
"Here’s a pretty good statistic about Lyft Inc.:
Short interest in the No. 2 ride-hailing company has risen to 27 million shares, according to financial analytics firm S3 Partners, while Lyft’s public float is about 33 million shares in total.
Lyft has 285.9 million shares of stock outstanding (including regular Class A and high-vote Class B stock), but a big chunk of those are held by insiders and early investors who have agreed not to sell them for six months. Lyft only sold 32.5 million shares when it went public at the end of March. But now there are, apparently, some 60 million shares publicly available: 32.5 million from Lyft, and 27 million from short sellers. Short sellers have basically doubled the supply of Lyft stock. If you own a share of Lyft, there’s about even odds that you bought it from (someone who bought it from (etc.)) the company as part of its fundraising efforts, or from a short seller as part of her bet against Lyft.
Or, not necessarily her bet against Lyft. One thing that seems to be happening with Lyft is that some number of its pre-IPO shareholders have somehow managed to hedge their exposure, despite the lockups. The banks that are helping them hedge have shorted the stock. This means that some of the shares that are now publicly available are sort of phantom emanations of shares that aren’t yet publicly available; they are locked-up shares that have nonetheless been sold short. They are not new shares created by short selling, but shares that will be available in the future and that have been moved forward in time by short selling.
People always believe that there is some natural limit on the number of short sales, by the way, but there really isn’t. If there are 32.5 million free-floating shares of Lyft, then some enterprising short seller can borrow all of them and sell them to other people. But now those other people own 32.5 million shares of Lyft, and they can further lend them to another (or the same) short seller, who can sell them to yet other people, who will now own shares and be able to lend them, etc. This tends to peter out—some holders won’t lend the stock—but there is no physical requirement that it will. If enough people really wanted to short Lyft stock, and enough people really wanted to buy it, and also enough people wanted to lend it, then there could be 270 million short shares instead of 27 million. The stock market is not just a mechanism for financing companies and allocating their ownership; it is also a mechanism for betting on them. The financing and ownership things are limited by the actual size of the company, but the bets are not; they are limited only by the demand for betting."[0]
There is signage - there are signs to tell you whether the Express Lanes are open or not that are level with the general signage for direction of travel (ie above the road)