Netcup was founded in my hometown in Germany. They have a very good reputation. However, they were aquired a while ago by Anexia. I am not sure if that changed anything.
There are more than 1 billion cars on earth. Cubesats are smaller than a car and can be distributed in an additional dimension (altitude). I think there is little risk of oversaturation currently.
You can use the kubectl debug command to add ephemeral containers to a running Pod. It's an alpha feature introduced in v1.18.
The ephemeral debug container can contain htop while the application container doesn't. This way minimal application containers aren't complicating debugging when something goes wrong :)
Every bot has a list of peers and their SSH credentials. This way, peers can reinfect machines that were restarted, thus allowing the bot to be volatile on the infected machine.
The article says the researchers can join the peer-to-peer network. The researchers should be able to get a list of all infected machines including SSH credentials. These credentials could be used to remove the backdoor SSH key, kill the bot & netcat processes and maybe change the SSH password on all infected machines at the same time.
If a cryptographic hash function is used, the security of this scheme doesn't rely on keeping the algorithm secret, though. Therefore, it's not security through obscurity. Of course, weaknesses could still exist (e. g. a too small input space because the ID that is hashed has too little entropy).
Yes, the laws don't care about who you bank with. If your "center of life" is in Germany, you are required to pay income taxes. Although "center of life" is not defined in detail in german tax law, there are a number of known indicators that are considered. For example, if you reside in Germany for 183 days per year or more, you are required to pay income tax on all of your income.
That might work nicely for plain TCP traffic, but it's not very useful for TLS encrypted connections by itself.
An attacker wants to decrypt the packets passed on as the man in the middle without alerting the victim. A big red "insecure connection" browser warning due to an untrusted certificate used by the MITM can easily thwart the attack.
To make this work, the attacker needs access to a CA the victim trusts to sign certificates on the fly. If the attack is limited to a single target page, stealing the associated private key from the legitimate website operator is an option, too.
There are some downsides to that approach. The <form> element has semantic meaning which is lost if it's missing. Screen readers for blind people, browser features such as form auto-fill etc. might not work as expected without this semantic information.
Most web applications I have seen opt to use the form element. The default form browser behaviour can be suppressed easily.
Right, the critique is evaluating algorithms based solely on asymptotic time / space characteristics is insufficient. Constants can be significant if they are big enough.